GIFT  OF 

REV.  ED.  B.  PAYNE 


BY   SAME   AUTHOR: 

THE  LAW  OF  LOVE,  AND  LOVE  AS  A  LAW; 

OR, 

CHRISTIAN  ETHICS. 

A   NEW    EDITION,    WITH   IMPORTANT   ADDITIONS. 

One  volume,  12mo,  $1.75. 

AN 


OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN; 


OR, 


ie  Bobn  anh  Jttinb  in  one  System. 


WITH  ILLUSTRATIVE  DIAGRAMS,  AND  A  METHOD   FOR 
BLACKBOARD   TEACHING. 


MARK  HOPKINS,  D.D.,  LL.D. 

AUTHOR    OP    "EVIDENCES    OF    CHRISTIANITY,"     "LECTURES    ON     MORAL 
SCIENCE,1'   "THE  LAW  OF  LOVE,"   ETC. 


LIBR  A  R  Y 

UNIYERSITY'OF 

CALIFORNIA.  J 


NEW    YORK: 

SCRIBNER,  ARMSTRONG,  &  COMPANY, 

1873.- 


EDUC. 

PSYCH. 
LIBRAJW 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1873,  by 

SCRIBNER,  ARMSTRONG,  AND  COMPANY. 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


'*y«J 


RIVERSIDE,  CAMBRIDGE: 

STEREOTYPED    AND    PRINTED   BV 

H.   0.   HOIKIUTON   AND   C0MPANV. 


CONTENTS. 

— ♦ — 

LECTURE  I. 
The  Place  of  Man 1 

LECTURE  II. 

The  Body 26 

LECTURE  III. 
Mind.  —  Intellect.  —  The  Reason 50 

LECTURE  IV. 
The  Reason.  —  The  Senses,  External  and  Internal  .     73 

LECTURE  V. 

Recapitulation.  —  Consciousness.  —  Theories,    Be- 
liefs, and  Practical  Results 98 

LECTURE  VI. 

The    Representative    Faculty.  —  Control    of    the 
Will  over  the   Mental  Current        .        .        .        .121 

LECTURE  VII. 
The  Elaborative  Faculty,  and  its  Processes. —  Con- 
cepts  AND   THEIR  PROPERTIES 145 

LECTURE  VIII. 
Reasoning.  —  Analogy  and  Experience.  —  Qemonbtra- 
tion    and    Probable    Reasoning.  —  Inferring    and 
Proving.  —  Systemization 172 


IV  CONTENTS. , 

LECTURE  IX. 
The    Sensibility.  —  A    Good.  —  Beauty.  —  The    Lu- 
dicrous.—  The  Affective  Reason      ....  194 

LECTURE   X. 

Intellect,  Sensibility,  and  Will.  —  The  Practical 
Reason.  —  Personality,  Causation,  Freedom,  Obli- 
gation, Merit  and  Demerit,  Rights,  Responsibil- 
ity, Punishment 221 

LECTURE  XL 

Body;  Soul;  Spirit.  —  Spontaneity;  Freedom.  —  The 
Natural  ;  Supernatural  ;  Miraculous.  —  Conduct  ; 
Obligation;  A  Supreme  End;  Character.  —  The 
Highest  Good  ;  The  Whole  Good  ;  The  Law  of 
Limitation 248 

LECTURE  XII. 

Original   Objects.  —  Action  and    its   Consequences. 

—  Philosophy  of  Action  from  the  Constitution. 
No  Christian  Moral  Philosophy. — Choice.  —  Su- 
preme Ends.  —  Supreme  Principle  or  Action.  — 
Conscience.  —  A  Nature  and  a  Necessity  after 
Choice. —  Moral  Affections-  —  Moral  Emotions. — 
Religious  Emotions.  —  The  Law  of   Construction. 

—  The  Law  of  Conduct.  —  Test  of  Progress.— 
Position  of  Man  as  a  Worshipper      ....  275 

Appendix 302 

Explanation  of  the  Diagram       .  ....  .'306 


LIBRA 
^Wa'fliTro* 


PREFACE. 


As  compared  with  their  delivery  the  following 
lectures  are  published  at  a  special  disadvantage. 
For  their  best  effect  they  need  blackboard  and 
drawing  facilities,  like  those  of  the  Lowell  Insti- 
tute. Through  those  the  work  done  was  retained 
and  kept  before  the  audience ;  each  subject  was 
commented  upon  as  it  found  its  place  in  the  sys- 
tem and  on  the  board,  and  thus  the  system  grew 
before  the  eye  as  well  as  before  the  mind,  till  it  be- 
came for  both  a  completed  whole.  This  gave  a 
freshness  and  interest  that  could  have  been  had  in 
no  other  way. 

The  substance  of  the  lectures  was  preserved  in 
a  phonographic  report.  This,  it  was  found,  would 
be  of  so  much  aid  in  writing  them  out  that  the 
form  of  lectures  and  the  phraseology  appropri- 
ate to  them  have  been  retained,  though  the  refer- 
ences to  the  board  were  so  many  and  of  such  a 
character  that  a  recast  of  many  portions  has  been 
found  necessary.      As  read,  the  lectures    would 


VI  PREFACE. 

scarcely  convey  a  correct  impression  of  the  extent 
to  which  the  board  was  used. 

The  method  of  teaching  an  abstract  subject 
other  than  Mathematics  through  the  eye  has  long 
been  practiced  in  Logic,  but  until  recently  has 
been  chiefly  confined  to  that.  So  far  as  I  know, 
the  first  to  apply  it  generally  and  with  success 
was  my  friend  Mr.  Dickinson  of  the  Westfield 
Normal  School.  This  is  not  object-teaching. 
That  consists  in  showing  the  object  itself,  but  this 
is  the  teaching  of  relations,  which  are  invisible, 
by  means  of  things  that  are  visible.  This  facili- 
tates the  holding  of  abstract  subjects  steadily  be- 
fore the  mind,  and  I  cannot  but  hope  a  good  deal 
from  it  in  the  way  of  popularizing  studies  of  this 
kind. 

Perhaps  it  was  not  wise  to  attempt  the  discus- 
sion of  so  many  and  such  disputed  points  within  a 
compass  so  limited,  but  an  outline  has  its  advan- 
tages for  both  the  teacher  and  the  learner,  and 
that  is  all  that  this  claims  to  be.  Besides,  meta- 
physical points  are  capable  of  being  stated  briefly, 
and  are  often  best  seen  when  thus  stated.  Like 
that  Genius  in  the  Arabian  Nights  who  was  con- 
fined in  a  jar  drawn  out  of  the  sea  by  a  fisher- 
man, they  are  capable  of    being  brought  into  a 


PREFACE.  Vll 

very  narrow  compass,  as  well  as  of  expanding  into 
proportions  vast,  misty,  and  mighty. 

The  method  of  the  work  is  constructive,  and  so, 
except  as  a  positive  and  progressive  system  must 
be,  not  critical  or  controversial.  It  gives  a  Law 
of  Construction  for  the  universe  so  far  as  we 
know  it,  by  which  the  whole,  including  man,  is 
brought  into  one  system.  It  gives  a  Law  of 
Conduct  for  man  that  grows  out  of  the  construc- 
tion ;  and  also  a  Law  of  Limitation  that 
enables  us,  as  is  shown  in  "  The  Law  of  Love,"  to 
carry  the  Law  of  Conduct  into  the  details  of  life. 

In  connection  with  this  method  the  Intuitions 
are  naturally  divided  into  three  kinds,  and  are 
presented  in  an  order  different  from  that  gener- 
ally followed.  Part  of  them  are  also  seen  to  be 
complex,  and  in  coimection  with  their  complexity, 
systems  that  have  been  supposed  to  be  opposed 
are  readily  reconciled. 

In  following  out  the  system,  and  in  turning 
from  books  to  the  investigation  of  the  subjects 
themselves,  I  have  found  myself  differing  more 
frequently  and  more  widely  from  those  who  are 
regarded  as  authorities  than  I  expected.  Such 
difference  will  be  found  not  only  in  regard  to  the 
nature  and  place  of  the  Intuitions,  but  in  regard 


VU1  PREFACE. 

to  Consciousness,  to  Perception,  to  various  doc- 
trines of  Logic,  to  the  central  position  of  Choice, 
and  to  the  nature  and  necessity  that  precede  and 
follow  that  as  they  are  related  to  Choice  and  to 
each  other.  The  work  will,  therefore,  be  found 
to  differ  from  others,  both  in  its  Method  and  its 
System.  If  these  are  correct,  errors  of  detail  will 
be  of  minor  consequence. 

Whatever  may  be  its  fate,  I  shall  be  content  if 
this  work  shall  awaken  in  the  community  a  wider 
interest  in  the  study  of  man,  —  of  man  in  his 
unity  so  marvellously  complex,  as  he  is  related  to 
the  universe  around  him,  to  his  fellow-men,  and 
to  God. 

N.  B.  The  diagrams  which  will  be  found  in 
the  following  Lectures  are  to  be  read  from  the 
bottom  upwards  ;  and  the  reader  will  bear  in  mind 
that,  in  the  use  of  the  diagrams  and  of  the  black- 
board, the  process  is  always  that  of  starting  with 
a  common  foundation  and  building  up. 


'<■ l  «  R  A  R  V 
UNIVERSITY  OF 

CALIFORNIA. 


AIST  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAE 


LECTURE   I. 

THE  PLACE  OF  MAN. 

Is  it  possible  to  present  the  most  abstract  and 
difficult  questions  of  metaphysics  so  that  they 
shall  be  interesting  and  profitable  to  a  popular 
audience  ?  I  think  it  is.  I  think  so  partly  be- 
cause, as  these  questions  naturally  suggest  them- 
selves to  every  man,  so  the  elements  for  their 
solution  are  found  in  every  man ;  and  partly  from 
an  experiment  which  I  made  here  four  years  ago, 
and  from  my  experience  since. 

I  was  aware  at  that  time  that  some  of  my  lec- 
tures, especially  those  on  the  foundation  of  obliga- 
tion, would  require  more  careful  attention  than 
could  reasonably  be  expected  from  a  popular  au- 
dience ;  therefore,  anticipating  that  the  audience 
would  be  small,  I  consulted  Mr.  Lowell  on  the 
expediency  of  permitting,  as  had  been  my  custom 
with  classes  in  college,  questions  from  the  audi- 
ence. It  did  not  seem  to  him  expedient,  and  I 
have  no  doubt  he  was  right.  Then,  being  averse 
1 


2  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

to  saying  anything  that  could  not  be  perfectly  un- 
derstood, and  seeing  a  blackboard  behind  me,  I 
laid  aside  my  manuscript  and  gave  three  or  four 
lectures  on  the  more  abtruse  points  with  the  aid  of 
that.  This  was  thought  to  be  a  success,  and  I 
have  so  far  followed  the  method  since  as  to  desire 
to  test  it  further ;  for  if  these  studies  can  be  popu- 
larized, it  will  be  a  public  benefit. 

It  will,  then,  be  my  first  object  in  the  following 
course  to  present  this  class  of  subjects  so  that 
they  can  be  readily  understood  by  any  one  who 
will   give   attention.     I   believe   in   no    transcen- 

f  dental  metaphysics  which  are  not  capable  of  be- 
ing communicated  in  good  English,  and  of  being 
understood  by  any  man  of  good  common  sense. 
A  second  object  will  be  to  present  man  in  his 
/unity.     Man  is  so  complex,  so  many  studies  origi- 
J  nate  from  him,  that  he  is  seldom  studied  except 
(^in    a   fragmentary   way.     Anatomy,    Physiology, 
Psychology,  Logic,  Morals,  are  studied  separately, 
and  with  little  reference  to  their  relation  to  each 
other. 

I  shall  also  wish  to  present  at  different  points 
views  of  my  own  which  I  think  in  some  measure 
new,  and  not  without  importance.  In  one  sense 
nothing  on  these  subjects  can  be  new.  There  can 
be  no  new  elements,  but  the  elements  may  be 
presented  in  new  relations ;  they  may  be  more 
carefully  discriminated,  and,  perhaps,  better  ar- 
ranged. 


UNORGANIZED  AND  ORGANIZED   BODIES.  3 

We  pass,  then,  to  the  study  of  man.  And  first 
let  us  find  his  place.  This  we  can  do  only  as  we 
separate  man  from  other  beings  and  objects.  In 
making  this  separation  I  observe  that  all  beings 
and  objects  that  fall  under  our  observation  are 
divided  into  two  great  classes  —  they  are  either 
unorganized  or  organized.  Let  us  look  at  some 
of  the  differences  between  these,  most  of  which 
have  been  noticed  by  physiologists. 

Unorganized  and  organized  bodies  differ,  first, 
in  their  origin. 

Organized  bodies  originate  in  a  germ,  a  seed, 
a  spore,  a  cell,  in  something  that  is  itself  organ- 
ized. It  is  now  generally,  though  not  universally, 
conceded  by  naturalists  that  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  spontaneous  generation.  Between  life  and  or- 
ganization there  is  a  relation  of  interdependence, 
as  between  the  different  parts  of  a  circle.  They 
imply  each  other  in  a  way  that  seems  to  necessi- 
tate a  simultaneous  origin,  and  from  a  higher 
power.  Organization  could  not  first  be  without 
life,  and  life  could  have  no  means  of  manifestation 
without  organization.  It  is  said,  indeed,  that  there 
is  living  matter  that  is  not  organized.  It  has  been 
said  that  the  amoeba  is  a  mere  mass  of  unorgan- 
ized jelly,  but  that  is  now  disproved  ;  and  the  as- 
sertion that  anything  has  life,  or  can  be  made  to 
have  it,  that  is  not  either  organized  or  the  product 
of  organization,  be  it  protoplasm  or  what  it  may, 
is  a  mere  assumption. 


4  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

Unorganized  and  organized  bodies  differ,  in  the 
second  place,  in  their  composition. 

Unorganized  bodies  may  be  simple,  having  no 
composition  properly  so  called,  but  simply  aggre- 
gation. They  may  have  two  or  more  elements. 
In  organized  bodies  there  are  always  three  ele- 
ments, one  of  which  is  carbon. 

Unorganized  and  organized  bodies  differ,  in  the 
third  place,  in  their  structure. 

Organized  bodies  have  cellular  and  vascular 
tissues.  They  consist  of  parts  performing  func- 
tions through  which  those  parts  are  mutually  re- 
lated to  each  other  and  to  the  whole.  These  parts 
cannot  be  wholes,  while  any  part  of  a  mass  of  sil- 
ver is  as  much  a  whole  as  the  whole  is.  An  arm 
is  not  and  cannot  be  a  whole  in  any  such  sense  as 
that.  In  an  organized  body  the  parts  are  mutually 
related  as  means  and  ends.  In  an  unorganized 
body  there  is  no  such  relation. 

In  the  fourth  place,  unorganized  and  organized 
bodies  differ  in  their  mode  of  preservation. 

In  unorganized  bodies  the  individual  is  preserved 
as  long  as  the  species.  In  organized  bodies  the  in- 
dividual perishes  and  the  species  only  is  preserved. 
In  the  one  there  is  a  growth  and  decay  from  ac- 
tivities within  ;  in  the  other  there  is  no  growth  and 
no  decay,  and  all  changes  are  by  the  operation  of 
agencies  from  without.  There  is  simply  aggrega- 
tion and  disintegration  by  the  action  of  externa] 
forces.  In  the  one  there  is  health  and  disease,  in 
the  other  there  is  nothing  of  the  kind. 


UNORGANIZED  AND   ORGANIZED   BODIES.  5 

Once  more,  these  bodies  differ  in  their  Motive 
Forces. 

In  unorganized  bodies  certain  general  forces,  as 
gravitation  and  cohesion  and  chemical  affinity,  are 
the  forces  that  produce  motion.  But  in  organized 
bodies  there  is  a  force  commonly  known  as  Life, 
that  coordinates  the  action  of  the  parts  with  ref- 
erence to  the  end  of  the  whole.  This  is  a  crucial 
test  as  between  organized  bodies  and  those  that 
are  not.  In  an  unorganized  body  there  is  no  end 
of  the  whole  within  itself,  so  that  well-being  or  the 
reverse  can  be  affirmed  of  it. 

There  is  also  another  such  test  that  is  worthy  of 
attention  as  opposed  to  the  efforts  now  made  to 
identify  the  processes  of  crystallization  with  those 
of  life.  In  all  upbuilding  by  life  there  is  first,  not 
only  a  selection  of  the  material,  but  a  preparation 
of  it,  and  then  a  placing  of  it  where  it  is  needed. 
Hence  the  movement  of  the  material  is  from 
within  outward,  which  is  never  the  case  under  any 
lower  force,  and  this  movement  is  by  a  force  which 
preserves  the  identity  of  the  being  while  its  ma- 
terials are  changed.  We  have,  then,  as  discrimi- 
nating the  organic  from  the  inorganic  force,  first,  the 
preparation  of  the  material ;  second,  its  movement 
from  within  outward,  or  from  the  point  where  it  is 
prepared  to  that  where  it  is  needed.  This  is  the 
beginning  of  a  reverse  movement,  of  a  new  order 
of  things  in  which  the  process  is  not  by  aggrega- 
tion or  evolution  or  development,  but  by  growth. 


6  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

And   third,  there   is  identity   of  the   being  with 
change  of  the  material. 

I  have  thus  mentioned  the  main  differences  be- 
tween unorganized  and  organized  bodies.  By 
these  they  are  sufficiently  distinguished.  Now 
man  is  organized. 

Leaving,  then,  unorganized  matter  we  pass  on  in 
our  analysis  of  what  we  see  around  us  and  observe 
that  organized  bodies  are  divided  into  two  great 
classes  —  Vegetables  and  Animals.  These  have 
much  in  common  in  those  functions  that  are  called 
organic,  but  they  differ,  — 

First,  in  their  composition. 

For  the  most  part  they  thus  differ,  though  there 
are  individual  exceptions.  For  the  most  part  ani- 
mal organizations  consist  of  a  greater  number  of 
elements.  Nitrogen  is  added.  In  the  vegetable, 
oxygen,  hydrogen,  and  carbon  are  always  present, 
with  little  nitrogen.  In  the  animal,  nitrogen  is 
more  abundant.  Hence  animal  substances  may 
generally  be  distinguished  by  the  peculiar  smell, 
as  of  burnt  feathers,  which  is  produced  by  the 
burning  of  bodies  which  have  nitrogen  in  them. 

Vegetables  and  animals  differ,  in  the  second 
place,  in  their  structure. 

A  vegetable  has  no  muscles.  It  has  no  nerves 
or  nervous  tissue. 

They  differ,  again,  in  their  mode  of  nutrition. 

Vegetables   have  the  power,  and  animals  have 


VEGETABLES  AND  ANIMALS.  7 

not,  of  obtaining  nourishment  from  unorgan- 
ized matter.  There  are  instances  of  vegetables,  as 
the  mushroom  and  certain  parasitic  plants  that  are 
nourished  by  matter  that  has  been  the  product  of 
organization,  but  there  is  no  well  established  in- 
stance of  an  animal  that  is  nourished  by  matter 
that  has  not  been  organized.  This  power  of  the 
vegetable  to  find  its  nourishment  in  unorganized 
matter  is  regarded  by  some  as  its  great  character- 
istic. Certainly  it  is  the  great  function  and  use  of 
the  vegetable  world  to  come  between  animals  and 
unorganized  matter,  and  to  prepare  materials  for 
their  nourishment  and  use. 

The  great  difference,  however,  between  vegeta- 
bles and  animals  is,  that  animals  have,  and  vege- 
tables have  not,  sensation  and  voluntary  motion. 

We  may  not  be  able  to  discriminate  between 
the  sensitive  plant  and  the  animal.  It  is  marvel- 
ous how  Nature  simulates  in  that  which  is  lower 
that  which  is  higher ;  how  she  avoids  abrupt  and 
great  transitions,  and  hence  some  say  that  there 
is  no  difference.  It  may  be  impossible  for  us  to 
draw  the  line,  but  there  is  a  line  ;  there  must  be. 
Either  there  is  sensation  or  there  is  not.  If  there 
be  sensation,  it  is  an  animal ;  if  there  be  not,  it 
is  a  vegetable.  It  may  be  that  God  only  knows 
where  the  line  is,  but  there  is  a  line,  definite  and 
fixed ;  there  is  a  point  where  you  go  over  to  an- 
other thing,  wholly  another  thing,  because,  when 
sensation  begins  it  is  wholly  another  thing.     Cer- 


8  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

tainly  there  is  a  point  where  there  is  no  sensation, 
and  certainly  there  is  a  point  where  there  is  sensa- 
tion, and  if  we  may  not  be  able  to  draw  the  line  it 
yet  exists,  and  it  is  a  new  thing,  altogether  different 
that  comes  in.  And  the  same  thing  is  true  of  vol- 
untary motion.  The  sensitive  plant  has  motion, 
but  anatomists  say  this  is  from  irritability,  and 
not  from  will.  The  motion  is  no  more  voluntary 
than  that  of  the  clouds.  Here  again  there  is  a  line 
whether  we  are  able  to  discern  it  or  not,  a  radical 
difference,  a  new  thing  that  comes  in  —  there  is 
voluntary  motion.  These  two  make  a  difference 
heaven  wide  between  the  vegetable  and  the 
animal. 

Now  man  is  an  animal,  and  we  next  seek  the 
'  difference,  or  differences  between  him  and  other 
animals.  There  are,  indeed,  those  who  think 
that  man  should  not  be  classed  as  an  animal; 
and  if  such  classification  must  imply  that  he  is 
nothing  more,  they  are  right.  Man,  as  man,  is 
not  an  animal.  So  far,  however,  as  he  has  animal 
characteristics  he  may  be  classed  as  an  animal, 
and  if  it  cannot  be  shown  that  he  has  something- 
more,  the  classification  will  be  wholly  correct. 

First,  then,  man  differs  from  animals  in  certain 
physical  characteristics.  He  is  the  only  animal 
that  is  clearly  both  two-handed  and  two-footed. 
Hence  he  is  the  only  animal  that  is  fitted  for  an 
erect  posture.     These    two   characteristics, — the 


ANIMALS  AND  MAN.  9 

release  of  the  upper  extremity  from  all  use  in 
locomotion,  and  his  erect  position,  cause  his  rela- 
tions to  Nature  around  and  above  him  to  be  differ- 
ent from  those  of  the  animals.  By  the  hand  he 
conquers  Nature,  and  by  his  erect  position  he 
studies  the  heavens.  No  animal  can  do  either. 
Man  is  also  the  only  animal  that  has  a  chin.  I 
believe  that  is  so.  I  know  that  Dr.  John  Augus- 
tine Smith,  with  whom  I  studied  medicine,  used 
to  say  that ;  and  he  said  he  always  thought  that 
when  the  chin  was  deficient,  there  was  some  defi- 
ciency in  the  upper  story. 

Again,  man  differs  from  mere  animals  in  cer- 
tain intellectual  characteristics. 

Animals  have  no  thought  in  the  sense  in  which 
that  word  is  now  used.  They  have  no  insight 
properly,  that  is,  no  comprehension  of  the  rela- 
tions of  parts  when  parts  are  put  together  so  as 
to  make  a  complex  whole.  They  may  generalize 
faintly,  but  give  no  evidence  of  abstract  ideas. 
They  may  know  that  a  thing  is  white,  but  do 
not  know  whiteness.  Nor  is  there  any  evidence 
that  animals  have  either  necessary  or  universal 
ideas  in  such  a  sense  as  to  recognize  them  as 
necessary  and  universal.  When  an  animal  is 
driven  into  a  corner,  it  is  not  probable  that  he 
knows  it  as  an  angle  ;  but  if  he  does,  he  does  not 
know,  and  cannot  be  made  to  know,  that  the 
three  angles  of  every  triangle  must  be  equal  to 
two  right  angles.     Whether  an  animal  knows  that 


10  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

lie  is  in  space  may  be  doubted,  but  he  does  not 
know  that  a  body  must  be  in  space,  nor  that  space 
must  be  infinite.  Lacking  thus  those  necessary 
ideas  which  constitute  man  rational,  or  at  least 
without  which  he  could  not  be  rational,  no  ani- 
mal is  capable  of  studying  any  science  as  such, 
or  of  any  rational  discourse.  In  connection  with 
this  it  may  be  stated  that  man  is  the  only  animal 
that  uses  either  articulate  language  or  arbitrary 
signs  as  a  means  of  intercommunication. 

In  consequence  of  these  physical  and  intellect- 
ual differences  —  and  it  is  to  be  said  that  the 
physical  differences  would  avail  nothing  without 
the  intellectual  —  man  has,  and  the  animal  has 
not,  a  capacity  for  progress  in  the  race.  Through 
written  and  spoken  language  man  can  avail  him- 
self of  the  experience  and  improvements  of  the 
past.  This  animals  cannot  do.  Each  genera- 
'  tion  begins  where  the  previous  one  began,  and 
runs  the  same  round.  The  bee  and  the  beaver 
build  to-day  under  the  same  conditions  as  they 
did  four  thousand  years  ago.  If  there  are  trans- 
mitted modifications  of  instinct  it  is  only  of  those 
K  instincts  which  tend  to  the  preservation  of  the 
individual,  and  of  the  race. 

In  connection  with  his  capacity  for  progress, 
and  for  possessing  the  whole  earth,  man  is  the 
only  being  that  uses  fire,  or  metals,  or  artificial 
clothing,  or  that  invents  and  uses  machinery. 
And  what  a  marvelous  difference  does  this  make 


POWER  TO  PRODUCE  REMOTE  EFFECTS.     11 

in  our  day,  this  use  of  machinery !  In  connection 
with  this,  too,  man  is  the  only  being  capable  of 
buying  and  selling,  of  commerce,  and  of  an  inter- 
change of  commodities. 

It  is  further  in  connection  with  the  powers  al- 
ready mentioned  that  man  has  the  wish  and  the 
power  to  produce  remote  effects,  —  effects  that 
are  remote  from  himself  both  in  space  and  in 
time.  Man  alone  has  this  wish  and  power.  The 
animal  produces  whatever  effects  it  may  produce 
through  the  agency  of  its  muscles  in  the  place 
where  it  is  ;  but  man  has  the  wish  and  the  power 
to  produce  effects  upon  the  other  side  of  the  globe. 
It  is  a  great  and  distinguishing  prerogative  of 
man  that  he  is  able,  in  connection  with  those 
agencies  which  he  can  control,  to  cause  his  will 
to  be  felt  over  the  globe  and  through  indefinite 
periods  of  time. 

Whether  man  has  emotions  not  from  the  moral 
nature  different  in  kind  from  those  of  the  brute 
it  is  impossible  to  say  with  certainty.  I  think  he 
has.  As  he  alone  laughs,  so  I  think  he  alone 
has  the  perception  and  feeling  involved  in  that. 
As  he  is  the  only  ridiculous  animal,  so  I  incline 
to  think  he  is  the  only  one  that  has  a  sense  of 
the  ridiculous. 

But  whatever  may  be  said  of  the  emotions  just 
mentioned  I  observe  again  that  man  differs  from 
all  mere  animals  in  possessing  a  moral  and  relig- 
ious nature. 


12  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

I  know  there  are  those  who  say  that  the  dog, 
with  perhaps  other  animals,  has  a  perception  of 
moral  relations ;  and  it  must  be  admitted  that,  as 
in  other  cases  of  gradation,  there  is  an  appearance 
of  something  that  approximates  it,  but  is  not 
it.  The  condition  of  a  moral  nature  is  personal- 
ity. It  is  something  within  in  virtue  of  which 
the  being  becomes,  or  may  become,  subject  to 
moral  law,  of  which  a  brute  knows  nothing.  He 
is  governed  by  impulse  and  not  by  law.  The 
same  is  true  of  worship.  The  brute  has  not  the 
prerequisites  for  it,  and  to  identify  the  feeling  of 
a  dog  towards  his  master  with  that,  shows  an 
ignorance  of  its  elements.  God  is  properly  an 
object  of  worship  only  as  He  has  moral  charac- 
ter, and  the  recognition  of  this  must  imply  a 
^knowledge  of  moral  law,  and  of  obligation  under 
that  law,  of  which  the  brute  is  incapable.  Be- 
sides, true  worship  can  be  rendered  only  to  a 
spiritual  and  invisible  God,  whereas  the  brute 
is  incapable  of  being  affected  except  through  the 
senses.  "Whom,"  says  an  apostle,  "having  not 
seen  ye  love."  No  animal  can  love  a  being  it 
has  never  seen,  or  can  love  at  all  on  the  ground 
of  moral  and  spiritual  excellence. 

But  as  in  passing  from  the  vegetable  to  the  ani- 
mal we  found  a  single  decisive  test,  so  I  think  we 
may  here.  A  number  of  tests  have  been  proposed. 
Some  have  said  that  the  distinctive  difference  be- 
tween man  and  the  animals  is  the  power  of  form- 


POWER   OF   CHOICE.  13 

ing  general  ideas,  and  of  using  general  terms ; 
some  that  it  is  the  power  of  abstraction,  and 
others  that  it  is  the  power  of  looking  in  upon  him- 
self, and  of  so  making  himself  the  object  of  his  con- 
templation as  to  become  at  once  both  subject  and 
object.  But  to  me  it  seems  that  the  discriminat- 
ing difference  is  that  man  has  the  power  to  choose 
his  own  supreme  end  and  the  brute  has  not.  A 
brute  acts  from  impulse  and  is  driven  by  its  consti- 
tution to  its  end.  It  has  no  power  to  compare 
different  motives  and  principles  of  action  and  to 
make  one  supreme.  It  has  no  power  of  choice 
with  an  alternative  in  kind,  and  so  no  true  free- 
dom. It  is  not  a  being  that  is  capable  of  contem- 
plating different  possible  ends  of  its  being  and  of 
choosing  or  rejecting  its  true  end.  Man  is  such  a 
being.  Hence  man  has,  and  the  brute  has  not, 
elements  by  which  he  may  become  a  fool.  A 
brute  cannot  be  a  fool.  Only  a  man  can  be  a 
fool.  There  are  no  elements  in  a  brute  by  which 
he  can  be  made  a  devil ;  neither  are  there  any  by 
which  he  can  be  made  an  angel.  But  man  can 
become  a  fool,  or  a  devil,  or  an  angel. 

Thus,  as  I  think,  do  we  find  man.  He  is  broadly 
discriminated  from  all  other  beings ;  so  broadly, 
that  he  properly  belongs  to  a  different  order. 

Of  man,  as  thus  found,  we  next  inquire  what 
his  place  is  relatively  to  other  beings.  We  say 
that  he  is  higher  than  any  other  being.     But  by 


14  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

what  test  ?  If  the  brute  were  to  make  the  state- 
ment would  he  not  say  that  he  was  higher  ?  Is 
there  any  proper  test  by  which  we  can  ascertain 
what  is  higher  and  what  is  lower  ? 

Naturalists  say  that  specialization  is  a  test. 
We  find  in  what  are  called  the  lower  forms  of 
organization  that  the  functions,  as  of  nutrition  and 
of  circulation,  are  performed  without  particular  or- 
gans, and  that,  as  the  animal  becomes  higher,  the 
organs  are  specialized,  and  each  function  has  its 
own  organs ;  and  it  is  generally  true  that  as  there 
is  more  specialization  the  animal  comes  to  be 
higher.  At  the  same  time  the  specialization  in  the 
musquito,  for  instance,  is  as  perfect  as  it  can  be 
anywhere.  There  is  no  more  perfect  adaptation  or 
specialization  in  Nature  that  I  know  of  than  in  the 
bill  of  the  musquito.  There  is  a  larger  amount  of 
specialization  in  man,  but  the  specialization  itself 
is  as  perfect  in  the  lower  animals  as  in  him. 

But  we  need  a  broader  principle ;  we  need  one 
by  which  we  may  judge  of  that  which  is  higher  or 
lower,  not  merely  with  respect  to  animals  as  they 
are  related  to  each  other,  but  with  respect  to  the 
J  forces  of  Nature,  the  faculties  of  man  and  their 
products,  and  the  whole  structure  of  the  universe. 
Such  a  principle,  if  there  be  one,  must  be  that 
which  gives  its  unity  to  the  universe.  The  princi- 
ple is,  that  those  forces,  and  forms  of  being,  and 
faculties,  and  products,  are  lower,  which  are  a 
condition  for  others  that    are   conditioned    upon 


CAUSE   AND    CONDITION.  15 

them.  I  believe  that  there  is  a  great  law  of  con- 
ditioning and  conditioned,  by  which  we  may  know 
what  is  higher  and  lower  throughout  the  whole 
range  of  being. 

But  here  it  will  be  necessary  to  say  that  I  do 
not  accept  the  doctrine  adopted  by  both  Hamilton 
and  Mill,  and  also  by  some  of  our  American 
writers,  that  there  is  no  difference  between  a 
cause  and  a  condition ;  or  that  the  condition  of  a 
thing  is,  in  any  proper  sense,  a  part  of  the  cause. 
Sir  William  Hamilton  says,  "  By  cause  I  mean 
everything  without  which  the  effect  could  not  be 
realized."  That  is  his  definition  of  a  cause.  But 
a  house  could  not  be  without  materials  of  some 
kind  of  which  to  construct  it ;  and  I  ask  you 
whether,  in  accordance  with  any  proper  meaning 
of  that  term,  the  materials  are  a  part  of  the  cause 
of  a  house,  or  whether  they  are  simply  a  condition 
through  which  it  becomes  possible  that  the  intelli- 
gent agency  of  the  builder  should  be  put  forth  and 
become  a  cause.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the 
foundation  of  a  house.  Without  a  foundation  a 
house  cannot  be,  but  the  foundation  is  no  part  of 
the  cause  of  the  house.  The  earth  could  not  be, 
we  could  not  be,  without  space.  Space  is  the  con- 
dition of  matter.  I  ask  you  whether  you  believe 
it  is  in  any  proper  sense  its  cause.  I  therefore 
make  a  distinction  at  this  point  between  a  cause 
and  a  condition.  It  is  a  distinction  which  I  think 
may  be  maintained,  and  which  ought  to  be  main- 


16  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

tained  in  the  interest  of  both  clearness  of  expres- 
sion and  of  thought.  I  say,  then,  that  some  things 
are  the  condition  of  other  things  ;  that  the  law  of 
conditioning  and  conditioned  runs  through  God's 
universe  ;  and  that  it  is  that  by  which  we  know,  or 
may  know,  scientifically,  that  one  thing  is  higher 
than  another. 

Let  us  then  see  how  this  is  with  reference  to  the 
great  forces  by  which  the  universe  is  controlled. 
I  speak  of  forces,  and  for  the  present  we  must 
speak  thus  whatever  may  be  true  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  correlation  of  forces  by  which  it  is  possible 
they  may  all  be  resolved  into  one.  Indeed,  it 
matters  little  for  our  purpose  whether  what  we 
have  been  accustomed  to  call  the  great  forces  of 
Nature  are  really  separate  forces,  or  different  modes 
of  one  force.  Leaving  this,  then,  let  us  suppose, 
according  to  the  statement  of  the  Bible  and  the 
nebular  theory,  that  "  In  the  beginning  the  earth 
was  without  form  and  void,"  —  mere  diffused, 
nebulous,  chaotic,  surging  matter  in  space  ;  what 
would  be  the  force  which  must  act  in  order  to 
bring  this  matter  into  such  a  condition  that  it 
might  serve  the  purpose  of  a  world?  Evidently  it 
would  be  the  force  of  Gravitation  ;  that  is  to  say,  it 
would  be  that  force  by  which  all  matter  tends  to- 
wards all  matter  by  a  certain  definite  law.  It 
would  be  necessary  that  such  a  force  or  mode  of 
force  should  exist  and  apply  itself  to  eveiy  particle 
of  matter  in  order  to  its  aggregation  in  such  a  way 


TWO  ASPECTS  OF  MATTER.         17 

that  it  could  become  subject  to  the  action  of  any 
other  force  or  mode  of  force.  Being  thus  the  con- 
dition for  the  action  of  any  other  force  we  may  set 
Gravitation  down  as  the  lowest  and  most  universal 
of  all  the  forces  or  forms  of  force. 

In  matter  as  thus  subject  to  this  lowest  and  most 
universal  law  we  find  those  two  aspects  of  it  that 
have  set  thinkers  in  opposition  to  each  other  as 
they  have  regarded  one  or  the  other  of  them  ex- 
clusively. These  are  the  aspect  of  necessity ;  and 
that  of  being  controlled  with  reference  to  an  end. 
The  necessity  is  apparently  absolute  since  there 
can  be  nothing  in  matter  to  resist  the  force,  and 
since  its  movements  under  this  law  can  be  math- 
ematically calculated.  These  movements  would 
therefore  seem  to  have  not  only  the  necessity  that 
belongs  to  physical  law  as  uniform,  but  that  abso- 
lute necessity  which  is  involved  in  mathematical 
relations.  On  the  other  hand,  no  evidence  of  free- 
dom can  be  greater  than  the  control  of  force  di- 
rected to  an  end :  and  that  matter  under  the  con- 
trol of  this  force  is  so  directed  there  can  be  no 
doubt.  And  so  these  two  aspects  or  faces  of  mat- 
ter under  law  have  looked,  one  towards  necessity 
and  atheism,  and  the  other  towards  freedom  and 
God,  and  men  have  failed  to  see  their  reconciliation 
in  the  fact  that  absolute  uniformity — even  that 
which  may  be  expressed  by  mathematical  relations 
—  may  be  the  highest  and  most  perfect  result  of 
an  intelligent  will  working  towards  an  end  which 


18  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

could  be  best  accomplished  only  in  that  way. 
These  two  aspects  I  refer  to  now  because  they  are 
quite  as  prominent  in  this  lowest  law  as  in  any 
other,  and  because  they  present  themselves  in 
every  form  of  physical  law. 

By  gravitation  matter  is  brought  together,  but 
simply  as  loose  particles.  That  it  may  be  service- 
able as  matter  now  is,  there  must  be  a  force  which 
will  unite  the  particles  into  separate  bodies. 
What  is  this  ?  It  is  the  attraction  of  Cohesion. 
This  exists  between  the  particles  of  all  bodies 
whether  solid  or  fluid  that  can  be  defined  or  limited 
as  separate  bodies.  This  would  give  us  a  world 
made  up  of  the  different  kinds  of  matter  indiscrim- 
inately mixed,  or  with  kinds  separated  as  in  crys- 
tallization. 

What  force,  then,  is  there  by  which  such  indis- 
criminate mixture  may  be  avoided,  and  the  varie- 
ties and  combinations  of  matter  as  we  now  have 
them  be  given  us  ?  It  is  Chemical  Affinity,  which 
is  the  next  higher  power  as  conditioned  upon  grav- 
itation and  cohesion.  Under  this,  also,  as  under 
gravitation,  we  have  uniformities  so  perfect  that 
they  may  be  represented  by  mathematical  for- 
mulae. 

We  thus  have  the  three  great  forces  of  or- 
ganic matter  in  their  order  as  lower  and  higher, 
each  one  of  them  being  the  basis  of  some  form  of 
physical  science.  Gravitation  gives  us  Astronomy, 
with  the  laws  of   falling  bodies  ;   Cohesion  gives 


CRYSTALLIZATION.  —  VEGETABLE  LIFE.  19 

vis  crystallography  and  portions  of  mechanics  ;  and 
Chemical  Affinity  gives  us  the  now  great  science 
of  Chemistry.  These  laws  suffice  to  themselves. 
They  would  produce  a  permanent  world  and  system 
of  worlds,  but  these  would  be  of  no  use  except  as 
a  condition  of  a  higher  order.  That  higher  order 
they  anticipate  and  prefigure  by  producing  through 
crystallization  regular  forms.  In  crystallization, 
and  in  crystals,  through  definite  form,  we  find  the 
lowest  point  of  transition  from  inorganic  to  organic 
matter.  Here  again,  too,  we  find  matter  con- 
trolled under  the  semblance  of  mathematical  neces- 
sity with  reference  to  ends,  —  the  ends  of  beauty 
and  of  utility.  Special  mystery  is  supposed  to  be 
attached  to  the  force  that  gives  us  organisms,  but 
I  do  not  see  that  it  is  more  mysterious  than  that 
which  gives  us  crystals.  Indeed  the  whole  mystery 
is  given  in  any  form  of  force  apparently  imper- 
sonal, whether  it  can  be  expressed  by  mathemat- 
ical formulas  or  not,  that  works  so  uniformly  as  to 
give  what  we  call  a  law,  and  to  seem  necessitated, 
and  yet  that  works  in  the  interest  of  ends  beyond 
itself,  and  that  run  up  into  spheres  of  which,  re- 
garded as  impersonal,  it  can  know  nothing. 

So  these  laws  work,  regarded  as  the  condition  of 
the  manifestation  and  force  which  is  next  above 
them.  This  is  vegetable  life.  These  laws  being 
given,  and  working  upon  suitable  materials,  we 
have  the  condition  on  which  the  cause  of  vegetable 
life,  whatever  that  may  be,  can  work.  Without 
them  vegetable  life  could  not  be. 


20 


AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 


Again,  having  vegetable  life  given,  mediating  as 
it  does  between  inorganic  nature  and  animal  life,  by 
converting  inorganic  matter  into  food,  by  absorb- 
ing superfluous  carbon,  and  by  giving  out  oxygen 
to  supply  the  waste  made  by  animals,  we  have  the 
conditions,  and  the  only  conditions,  on  which  ani- 
mal life  could  be  produced  and  permanently  main- 
tained. This  then  gives  us  our  next  higher  force 
—  Animal  Life. 

But  one  higher  force  remains,  that  is,  Rational 
or  Spiritual  Life.  That  an  animal  life  is  a  neces- 
sary condition  of  this  in  all  beings,  is  not  claimed 
or  supposed.  But  in  man  it  is.  Man  exists  in 
his  present  state  only  as  the  laws  and  forces 
already  mentioned  are  given  as  a  part  of  himself, 
and  to  be  subjected  under  the  force  of  a  Rational 
•/  and  Free  Will.     This  gives  us  Man. 

These  forces,  their  products  and  relations,  may 
be  presented  on  the  board  thus, 


Man. 


Animal  Life. 


Vegetable  Life. 


Chemical  Affinity. 


Cohesion. 


Gravitation. 


MAN.  21 

In  this  figure  we  see  the  different  steps  of  the 
creation  as  it  went  up,  taking  with  it  all  that  was 
below,  and  adding  something  at  every  step.  At 
first  we  have  only  Gravitation,  then  Cohesion ;  but 
every  particle  that  coheres  also  gravitates.  Then 
we  have  Chemical  Affinity;  but  every  particle 
united  by  that  also  coheres  and  gravitates,  and 
so  on  upward  till  we  reach  man.  In  him  we 
find  at  work  Gravitation,  Cohesion,  Chemical 
Affinity,  that  Organic  Life  which  belongs  to  the 
vegetable,  a  Life  that  is  merely  animal,  and  also 
that  higher  Rational,  Moral,  and  Spiritual  Life, 
which  is  peculiar  to  himself.  Everything  is  car- 
ried up,  and  then  something  is  added  —  it  is 
not  developed  from  what  is  below,  or  caused  by 
it  —  but  added  to  it  till  we  reach  man  at  the  top. 
Man  is  there  by  the  possession  of  everything  that 
is  below  him,  and  something  more, — that  some- 
thing being  that  which  makes  him  man. 

Having  thus  in  himself  generically  all  that  is 
below  him,  man  has  the  power  of  entering  into 
sympathy  with  it ;  and  then,  in  virtue  of  those 
rational  and  moral  powers,  and  of  that  freedom  of 
choice  with  an  alternative  in  kind  which  he  alone 
possesses,  he  has  not  only  the  capacity  to  compre- 
hend speculatively  what  is  below  him,  which  no 
animal  has  in  any  degree,  but  also  the  higher  ca- 
pacity and  the  natural  right  to  rule  over  it.  Thus 
do  Philosophy  and  the  Scriptures  agree  in  making 
the  outcome  of  those  faculties  by  which  man  is  dis- 
tinguished from  the  brutes  to   be  dominion.     The 


22  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

idea  of  dominion  on  the  part  of  any  brute  as  origi- 
nating in  comprehension,  as  exercised  in  freedom, 
and  as  extending  over  any  distance  in  space,  or 
any  period  of  time,  is  absurd. 

Looking  at  the  relations  of  the  forces  and 
powers  as  presented  on  the  board,  we  see  that 
man  has  a  right  to  the  highest  place  on  two 
grounds.  First,  all  other  things  are  a  condition 
for  him.  He  is  conditioned  upon  them.  They 
precede  him,  not  arbitrarily,  as  a  herald  precedes 
a  king,  but  in  the  way  of  preparation,  as  soil  pre- 
cedes vegetation,  and  as  vegetable,  precedes  ani- 
mal life.  So  far  as  the  creation  was  a  process  of 
upbuilding,  that  which  came  last  was  of  course 
highest.  But  again,  man  is  also  highest  because 
he  subordinates  all  things  to  his  own  ends  and 
uses  them  as  they  do  not  use  him.  Pope  says, 
indeed,  — 

"  While  man  exclaims  '  see  all  things  for  my  use,' 
'  See  man  for  mine,'  replies  a  pampered  goose.'  " 

But  though  in  the  ordering  of  Providence  man 
may  be  of  use  to  the  goose,  it  is  still  true  that  he 
makes  use  of  the  goose,  while  the  goose  does  not 
make  use  of  him  at  all.  So  of  all  other  animals, 
and  of  all  natural  forces.  The  earth  was  given 
to  man  that  he  might  "replenish,"  and  "  subdue  " 
v  it,  and  make  it  subservient  to  his  own  ends. 

The  superiority  of  man  as  thus  seen  is  not 
anomalous.  It  is  wholly  analogous  to  the  supe- 
riority of  each  higher  force  to  those  below  it. 
Each  of  them  makes  use  of  those  below  as  they 


HIGHER  FORCES  NOT  DEVELOPED.       23 

do  not  of  it;  and,  indeed,  each  manifests  itself 
only  on  the  condition  of  overcoming  that  which 
is  below  it.  Cohesion  in  the  wall  above  us  and 
in  the  objects  around  us,  manifests  itself  only  as 
it  overcomes  gravitation,  holding  the  parts  in  their 
place  in  opposition  to  it.  If  there  were  as  little 
cohesion  among  the  particles  of  the  wall  as  there 
is  in  water,  it  would  come  down  at  once.  Chem- 
ical Affinity  manifests  itself  only  as  overcoming 
cohesion,  and  Vegetable  Life  only  as  overcoming  all 
the  three  lower  forces,  separating  from  their  affini- 
ties and  cohesions  the  particles  it  needs,  bringing 
them  into  new  relations,  and  lifting  them,  in  oppo- 
sition to  gravitation,  a  hundred  and  fifty,  yes,  in 
the  great  trees  of  California,  three  hundred  and 
fifty  feet  into  the  air.  And  this  holds  all  the  way 
up.  Man  acts,  as  man,  chiefly  as  he  resists  and 
overcomes  lower  forces. 

The  above  relation  of  these  forces  to  each  other 
in  its  bearing  on  the  doctrine  of  development 
was,  I  believe,  first  seen  and  stated  by  President 
Chadbourne  in  his  lectures  here  on  Natural  The- 
ology. That  bearing  is  this.-  It  is  not  readily 
seen  how  a  force  manifesting  itself  in  conjunction 
with  other  forces,  and  yet  only  as  it  makes  them 
subservient,  can  be  developed  from  those  forces. 
It  would  seem  to  be  making  the  effect  mightier 
than  the  cause,  and  so  to  be  violating  that  funda- 
mental law  of  causation  by  which  for  every  effect 
there  is  demanded  an  adequate  cause. 


24  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

From  the  figure  I  have  drawn  you  will  see  how 
it  is  that  the  universe  gets  its  unity.  It  is  because 
each  lower  force  is  a  condition  for  that  which  is 
above  it,  and  is  then  taken  up  and  acts  in  con- 
junction with  the  higher.  On  any  other  system 
the  forces  would  be  either  alien  or  discordant. 

You  will  also  see  how  it  comes  to  pass  that  the 
structure  of  the  universe,  or  rather  of  that  part  of 
it  with  which  we  are  more  immediately  connected, 
must  be  regarded  as  pyramidal.  The  sphere  of 
the  lowest  force  is  the  broadest.  There  are  more 
bodies  affected  by  Gravitation  than  by  Cohesion, 
more  by  Cohesion  than  by  Chemical  Affinity,  more 
by  Chemical  Affinity  than  by  Vegetable  Life,  more 
by  Vegetable  than  by  Animal  Life,  and  more  by 
Animal  Life  than  are  under  the  dominion  of  Rea- 
son, or  are  possessed  of  it. 

But  while  this  is  true,  it  will  be  observed  that 
we  have  here  two  wholes  that  are  inversely  as 
each  other.  If,  as  we  go  up  step  by  step  we 
diminish  the  number  of  individuals  so  as  to  form 
a  pyramid  in  respect  to  numbers,  we  add  at  each 
step  to  the  number  of  forces,  so  that  in  respect  to 
them  man  is  a  greater  whole  than  any  below  him. 
These  two  wholes  are  analogous  to  those  of  exten- 
sion and  comprehension,  which  belong  to  the  con- 
cept, and  will  be  spoken  of  hereafter. 

I  said  that  I  should  be  glad  to  present  to  you 
man  as  a  unity.  You  now  see  what  the  idea  of 
unity  is.     It  is  in  contrast  with  that  of  a  unit, 


MAN   AS   A   UNITY.  25 

and  can  result  only  from  some  relation  of  parts 
that  go  to  form  one  whole.  I  propose  then  to 
present  man  as  having  a  unity  in  himself  similar 
to  that  which  I  have  now  presented  to  you  as 
belonging  to  the  universe,  and  in  the  next  Lecture 
shall  present  that  unity  as  it  is  manifested  phys- 
ically in  the  different  systems  of  which  his  body 
is  composed. 


THE  BODY. 

We  have  now  separated  man  from  all  other 
beings  and  things,  and  have  found  his  place.  This 
last  we  have  done  by  comparing  the  great  forces  of 
the  universe  and  finding  what  I  called  the  law  of 
the  conditioning  and  the  conditioned.  According 
to  this,  Gravitation,  the  most  universal  of  the  forces, 
is  the  condition  for  the  others,  and  so  the  lowest. 
Next  above  is  Cohesion.  Of  this,  Gravitation  is 
the  condition,  but  not  the  cause.  These  two,  again, 
are  generally,  not  always,  the  condition  of  Chem- 
ical Affinity  ;  these  three,  of  Vegetable  Life ;  these 
four,  of  Animal  Life  ;  and  these  five,  of  that  higher 
Rational  and  Spiritual  Life  which  is  peculiar  to 
man.  In  each  case,  as  we  go  up,  we  take  with  us 
all  that  is  below,  and  add  something  ;  and  in  each 
case  we  introduce,  not  merely  complexity,  which 
some  have  made  the  test  of  higher  and  lower,  but 
we  introduce  a  force  which  subordinates  to  itself 
all  that  is  below  it ;  which  indeed  manifests  itself 
only  by  thus  subordinating  and  overmastering  that 
which  is  below  it.  Hence  the  impossibility  that 
the  higher  force  should  have  been  developed  from 
the  lower.     So  far  as  these  forces  are  concerned,  if 


CLASSIFICATION  OF   SCIENCES.  27 

the  universe  had  been  constituted  for  the  purpose 
of  excluding  the  idea  of  development,  it  could  not 
have  been  more  effectually  done. 

In  virtue  of  the  law  thus  given  we  have  a  pyr- 
amidal structure  of  the  universe  which  gives  us 
a  basis  for  the  symmetrical  classification  of  the 
sciences.  The  first  three  forces  give  the  Physical 
Sciences.  As  matter  acts  in  masses,  or  in  molecules; 
through  vast  distances,  or  distances  imperceptible, 
we  have  Astronomy  and  Chemistry.  The  fourth 
force  gives  us  Botany  in  its  various  branches ;  the 
fifth  gives  us  Zoology ;  and  the  sixth  Civil  Law, 
Political  Economy,  Ethics,  Metaphysics,  all  those 
sciences  which  originate  from  man  as  their  subject. 
This  conception  has  always  entered  unconsciously 
into  the  classification  of  the  sciences  as  a  whole, 
so  far  as  they  have  been  classified,  and  often  also 
into  the  arrangement  in  particular  sciences.  It  is 
a  law  of  the  forces.  It  is  not  a  law  of  logic.  It 
is  not  a  mere  classification.  It  is  a  law  of  the 
forces,  and  so  underlies  the  classification  and  the 
logical  relations.  It  is  not  a  law  of  interdepend- 
ence. It  is  a  law  of  dependence  of  the  upper 
upon  the  lower  forces,  but  there  is  no  dependence 
of  gravitation  upon  any  other  force,  and,  where  the 
method  is  by  the  addition  of  superior  forces,  there 
is  no  dependence  throughout  of  that  which  is 
below  on  that  which  is  above.  Vegetable  life  is 
dependent  upon  the  forces  below  it,  but  they  are 
in  no  way  dependent  upon  it. 


28  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

To  this  law  of  conditioning  and  conditioned  I 
ask  particular  attention,  because  it  will  give  us  our 
method  in  the  investigations  that  are  to  follow.  I 
do  not  speak  of  it  as  anything  new.  It  was 
stated  by  me  some  ten  years  since  in  this  place, 
and  will  be  found  in  the  Lectures  on  Moral  Science 
then  delivered  and  since  published.  But  as  I  am 
to  make  so  free  a  use  of  this  law,  as  it  is,  indeed, 
so  the  condition  of  these  Lectures,  that  I  could  not 
have  delivered  them  without  it,  their  whole  method 
depending  upon  it,  it  may  not  be  unsuitable  for 
me  to  say  that  so  far  as  I  know,  it  had  not  been 
previously  stated.  I  feel,  therefore,  that  I  have 
a  right  to  it.  It  came  to  me,  not  in  the  interest 
of  physical  science  though  it  covers  the  physical 
sciences,  but  in  the  interest  of  Ethics,  and  as  lying 
at  the  basis  of  the  law  of  limitation,  to  be  spoken 
of  hereafter.  It  is,  I  think,  the  law  that  pervades 
the  structure  of  the  universe  up  to  the  point  where 
a  true  causation  comes  in,  and  gives  it  its  unity ; 
and  it  is  under  the  guidance  of  this  law  that  we 
now  take  up  the  study  of  man. 

We  have  separated  man  from  everything  else  ; 
we  have  shown  his  place  ;  and  now,  in  accordance 
with  the  law  just  stated,  we  make  a  further  sepa- 
ration thus,  — 

MIND. 
BODY. 

In  our  present  state  the  body  is  the  condition  of 
the  mind  as  we  know  it.     We  therefore  place  it 


THE   BODY.  29 

below,  and  begin  with  the  body.  We  wish  to 
study  man  as  a  unity.  This  we  can  best  do  by  a 
separation  of  the  parts  of  his  complex  nature,  by 
taking  that  part  first  which  is  lowest,  and  so  a  con- 
dition for  all  the  rest,  and  so  on  upward  till  we 
reach  that  which  is  highest,  and  so  the  condition 
of  nothing  above  it.  If  we  can  do  this  we  shall 
have  an  "  Outline  Study  of  Man  "  throughout. 

First,  then,  we  take  the  body.  This  is  the 
subject  of  two  sciences  of  which  one  is  the  condi- 
tion of  the  other.    We  therefore  place  them  thus,  — 

PHYSIOLOGY. 

ANATOMY. 

Anatomy  is  simply  descriptive.  It  tells  us  what 
there  is  in  the  body.  Physiology  teaches  us  the 
function,  or  functions  of  each  part,  and  how  those 
functions  are  performed.  The  three  questions 
which  I  endeavor  to  teach  my  classes  on  this  sub- 
ject to  answer  are,  First.  What  is  there  in  this  part 
of  the  body  ?  Second.  What  function  does  it  per- 
form ?  Third.  How,  or  on  what  conditions,  does  it 
perform  it  ?  Whoever  knows  all  that  is  implied 
in  these  questions  knows  all  he  needs  to  know  in 
regard  to  the  body  in  health,  since  a  knowledge  of 
the  laws  of  health  is  involved  in  that  of  the  func- 
tions and  the  mode  of  their  performance.  The 
physician  needs  to  know  another  class  of  sciences. 
That  you  should  all  know  the  position  and  struct- 
ure  of    those  organs  and  tissues  of  the  body  by 


30  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

which  the  functions  of  life  are  performed,  is  desira- 
ble, but  not  necessary  for  our  present  purpose. 

The  body  is  not  a  single  system.  It  is  consti- 
tuted of  different  systems  that  are  separate  from 
each  other,  and  are  capable,  at  least  some  of  them, 
of  being  shown  separately.  They  have  intimate 
relations  to  each  other,  and  are  bound  up  together, 
but  are  still  separate,  and  each  of  these  systems 
has  a  separate  function.  If  then  we  would  study 
this  subject  in  accordance  with  the  principle  laid 
down,  we  shall  need  to  inquire  in  the  first  place, 
just  as  we  inquired  in  regard  to  the  lowest  and 
most  universal  force  in  nature,  what  that  funda- 
mental function  is  without  which  none  of  the  rest 
could  be  performed. 

I  am  perfectly  aware,  and  it  cannot  fail  to 
occur  to  you  as  I  proceed,  of  the  circle  that  is 
implied  in  these  inquiries.  In  any  given  organiza- 
tion, life  seems  to  move  in  a  circle,  each  system 
and  function  implying  every  other.  The  heart, 
where  there  is  a  heart,  implies  the  stomach,  and 
the  stomach,  the  heart.  The  heart  needs  the 
stomach  to  supply  it  with  nutriment,  and  the 
stomach  needs  the  heart  to  supply  it  with  blood. 
This  is  because,  when  we  reach  organization,  we 
find,  not  merely  as  heretofore,  dependence  of  the 
higher  upon  the  lower,  but  a  system  of  interdepend- 
ence. In  all  organizations,  there  is  not  only  a 
dependence  of  the  higher  upon  the  lower,  but -also 
a  reaction  of  the  higher  upon  the  lower,  binding 


THE  DIGESTIVE  SYSTEM.  31 

them  together  in  a  union  so  close  that  "  if  one 
member  suffer  all  the  members  suffer  with  it." 
In  this  view  of  it  the  different  systems  may  be 
said  to  be  reciprocally  conditioned  upon  each  other. 
Still  there  is  an  order  of  nature  and  of  thought  by 
which  these  systems  may  be  presented  as  condi- 
tioning and  conditioned,  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  already  laid  down. 

To  proceed  then  :  if  anything  is  to  be  built,  it  is 
obvious  that  we  must  have  something  to  build  it 
of.  We  must  have  material ;  and  in  the  case  of 
all  organizations,  so  far  as  I  know,  some  prepara- 
tion of  that  material  is  needed.  The  process  by 
which  this  preparation  is  made  in  the  human 
system,  for  we  are  now  speaking  only  of  that,  is 
called  digestion.  This  process,  with  its  accessories, 
is  performed  by  the  organs  of  mastication,  and  by 
the  stomach  and  intestinal  canal,  together  with  the 
organs  of  secretion  connected  with  them.  It  con- 
sists of  various  steps,  and  is  so  scientific  that  science 
cannot  perform  it;  or,  if  you  please,  so  artificial 
that  art  cannot  reach  it.  So  it  is  in  man,  and  in- 
deed everywhere  ;  but  in  the  lower  forms  of  organ- 
ization the  process  is  simple,  and  the  organ  may 
seem  a  mere  surface.  But  whatever  the  organ 
may  be  we  must  have  the  material ;  that  material 
must  be  prepared  ;  the  process  by  which  it  is  pre- 
pared is  digestion  ;  and,  as  that  process  is,  at  least 
in  thought,  the  condition  of  any  other,  we  may 
set  down  as  lowest 

THE    DIGESTIVE    SYSTEM. 


32  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

But  when  the  material  for  building  up  the  body 
has  been  prepared,  what  next  is  required  ?  evidently 
it  must  be  transported  to  the  point  where  it  is 
needed.  The  system  which  does  this  is  composed 
of  the  heart,  the  arteries,  and  the  capillaries.  The 
veins,  as  returning  the  blood  to  the  heart,  are  acces- 
sory to  these,  and  are  a  part  of  the  same  system. 
As  the  blood  goes  out  from  the  heart  and  returns 
to  it,  it  is  said  to  circulate,  and  this  movement 
gives  its  name  to  the  system.  Its  object,  however, 
is  distribution,  and  since  this  is  immediately  con- 
ditioned upon  the  digestive  system,  and  is  itself 
the  condition  of  any  other  system,  we  have  as 
next  in  order 

THE   CIRCULATORY   SYSTEM. 

For  some  reason  not  fully  understood  by  us  it  is 
requisite  for  the  fitness  of  fluids  which  are  to  be 
used  in  building  up  animal  bodies,  I  believe  uni- 
versally, certainly  it  is  so  in  man,  that  they  should 
first  be  acted  upon  by.  the  oxygen  of  the  atmos- 
phere. That  this  may  be  done  we  have  what  is 
called  the  smaller  circulation,  in  which  the  blood  is 
carried  from  the  right  side  of  the  heart  through  the 
lungs,  and  returned  to  its  left  side.  In  thus  pass- 
ing it  loses  carbon  and  its  dark  color,  taking  on  a 
bright  scarlet,  and  thus  becomes  fitted  for  its  work. 
We  thus  have 

THE   RESPIRATORY   SYSTEM. 


RESPIRATORY  AND  SECRETORY  SYSTEMS.     33 

What  next  ?  The  material  is  now  prepared  for 
use,  but  its  constituent  parts  are  mixed  in  one  fluid, 
and  we  need  special  fluids  to  be  used  for  particular 
purposes  in  different  parts  of  the  body.  We  need 
tears  to  moisten  the  eyes,  and  ear-wax  to  guard 
the  ears  from  insects,  and  saliva  to  moisten  the 
mouth  and  to  enable  us  to  swallow  food  that  is 
dry.  For  digesting  the  food  and  its  chylification, 
we  need  the  gastric  juice,  the  pancreatic  juice,  and 
the  bile  ;  we  need  synovia  for  the  joints,  and  we 
need  to  have  the  ashes  of  the  system,  when  the  car- 
bon has  been  consumed,  separated  and  carried  off. 
These  and  similar  selections  and  processes  are  per- 
formed for  the  most  part  by  what  are  called  glands, 
sometimes  by  what  seem  to  be  only  surfaces,  and 
the  system  by  which  they  are  performed  is  that 
which  comes  next  in  order.     It  is  called 

THE    SECRETORY   SYSTEM. 

But  in  the  processes  of  life  there  is  constant 
waste.  The  material  becomes  unfit  for  use.  What 
are  you  to  do  with  it?  You  strike  your  finger- 
nail and  there  comes  under  it  extravasated  blood. 
What  is  to  become  of  it  ?  Plainly  we  need  a  set 
of  vessels,  everywhere  at  work,  that  may  be  called 
scavengers,  as  having,  for  their  chief  office,  to 
gather  up  waste  material  and  carry  it  into  those 
channels  by  which  it  may  be  eliminated  from  the 
body.  This  system  is  next  in  order,  and  is 
called 

THE  ABSORBENT    SYSTEM. 
3 


34  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY    OF   MAN. 

*  The  systems  already  considered,  or  at  least  the 
functions  performed  by  them,  seem  necessary  to 
life  in  any  form.  We  now  pass  to  those  that  are 
built  up  by  these,  and  which  belong  to  special 
forms  of  life,  generally  those  that  are  higher.  If 
the  body  of  man  was  to  be  erect  and  movable,  a 
permanent  frame-work  with  joints  was  necessary. 
Such  a  frame-work  we  find  in  the  bones.  Of  these 
the  main  objects  are  support  and  leverage,  but  they 
also,  as  in  the  brain  and  thorax,  furnish  protection. 
For  these  all  the  other  systems  are  a  condition,  and 
so  we  have  in  the  next  place 

THE    OSSEOUS    SYSTEM. 

Having  then  something  to  be  moved,  and  having 
joints  and  leverage,  we  need  that  which  shall  move 
it.  This  we  have  in  the  muscles.  These  are  ad- 
justed to  the  bones  so  as  to  produce  by  their  mu- 
tual contractions  and  relaxations  just  the  motions, 
and  all  the  motions  of  which  the  joints  admit. 
For  these, in  a  being  like  man,  the  bones  are  a  con- 
dition.    We  thus  have  next 

THE    MUSCULAR    SYSTEM. 

But  the  muscles  have  neither  intelligence  nor 
power,  unless,  indeed,  it  be  what  is  called  the  vis 
insita,  by  which  they  are  simply  held  in  position, 
and  hold  the  bones  strongly  together.  If  they  are 
to  contract,  it  must  be  by  a  stimulus  from  without 


THE   NERVOUS   SYSTEM.  3/> 

themselves ;  and  if  they  are  to  contract  in  obedience 
to  intelligence  and  will,  there  must  be  some  system 
in  which  that  intelligence  and  will  shall  more  im- 
mediately reside.  This  system  must,  moreover,  be 
related  to  the  muscles  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the 
external  world  on  the  other,  so  as  to  be  at  onGe 
receptive  of  sensations  and  a  fountain  of  power. 
Such  a  system  we  have  in  the  brain,  the  spinal 
marrow,  and  the  nerves.  Of  these  the  larger  por- 
tions are  central,  are  wholly  inclosed  in  bone,  and 
show  by  their  position  and  the  care  with  which  they 
are  guarded,  that  the  other  systems  were  made 
with  reference  to  them,  while  the  nerves  are  chan- 
nels of  sensation  and  of  motive  power.  We  thus 
have  next,  and  highest  as  completing  the  individ- 
ual, 

THE  NERVOUS   SYSTEM. 

But  though  we  have  thus  reached  the  top  so 
far  as  the  individual  is  concerned,  we  have  not 
yet  enumerated  all  the  systems.  There  are  two 
more,  incidental,  but  yet  essential. 

The  systems  already  given  have  been  given  as 
separate.  They  may  be  conceived  of  as  separate, 
and  several  of  them  may,  to  a  great  extent,  be 
actually  separated  from  the  rest.  If  we  but  had 
the  skill,  the  circulatory,  the  digestive,  and  the 
nervous  systems  might  be  drawn  out  from  the 
rest  and  shown  separately  as  the  skeleton  actu- 
ally is.     How  is  it  then  that  they  are  so  bound 


36  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

together  as  to  become  a  unity  ?  This  is  done  by 
a  mass  of  cellular  tissue  which  envelops  and  per- 
vades the  other  tissues  of  the  body.  Take,  for 
instance,  the  muscles  as  composed  of  those  little 
fleshy  fibres  that  have  the  power  of  contraction, 
and  each  one  of  those  fibres  is  enveloped  by  a 
portion  of  cellular  tissue  that  passes  on  to  a  point 
where  they  all  unite  and  are  hardened  into  a  ten- 
don. This  tissue  thus  pervading  all  parts  of  the 
body  is  called  cellular,  because  it  is  connected 
throughout  by  cells,  and  it  is  in  that  that  the 
fat  is  deposited.  It  is  in  that  also  that  the  water 
collects  in  dropsy.  A  man  with  this  disease  may 
seem  large,  but  if  you  tap  him  in  the  top  of  his 
foot,  several  gallons  of  water  will  run  off,  and  he 
will  collapse  at  once,  showing  that  this  cellular 
tissue  is  connected  throughout  the  body.  It  is 
exceedingly  fine.  If  it  could  be  separated,  it 
would  weigh  but  a  few  ounces,  and  you  could 
double  it  up  and  hold  it  in  your  hand.  It  has 
withal  no  sensibility,  and  yet  it  is  absolutely 
indispensable  to  the  unity  of  the  body  that  there 
should  be  this  fine,  all-pervading,  unobtrusive  sys- 
tem.    It  is  called 

THE  CELLULAR   SYSTEM. 

But  since  it  performs  no  distinct  function  by 
itself,  but  is  only  incidental  and  subsidiary,  it 
cannot  be  ranked  with  the   others.     It  seems  to 


CELLULAR   AND   TEGUMENTARY   SYSTEMS.  37 

me  it  should  be  written  across  the  ends  of  the 
others  to  show  that  it  pervades  the  whole,  and 
binds  the  whole  together. 

The  Cellular  System,  however,  is  not  the  only- 
one  that  is  thus  incidental.  It  binds  the  others 
together  indeed  and  gives  them  unity,  but  they 
also  need  to  be  covered.  They  would  not  look 
well  otherwise.  We  have  therefore  a  covering 
provided,  which  also  indeed  performs  other  func- 
tions. It  consists  of  three  layers,  the  scarf-skin, 
the  rete  mucosum,  which  holds  the  coloring 
matter,  and  the  true  skin.  These  three  parts, 
including  the  hair  and  the  nails,  which  are  sup- 
posed to  pertain  to  the  scarf-skin,  compose 

THE  TEGUMENTAHY  SYSTEM. 

This  also  requires  the  same  arrangement  in  the 
mode  of  its  presentation  as  the  Cellular  System. 
I  have  now  given  in  their  order  the  functions 
that  seem  necessary  to  be  performed,  and  also  the 
systems  that  perform  them,  but  there  are  two 
great  functions  performed  in  the  body  for  which 
we  know  of  no  systems.  One  of  these  is  what 
is  called  ASSIMILATIOn. 

This  is  the  most  wonderful  process  that  takes  place 
in  the  physical  system,  that  is,  if  there  is  any  dif- 
ference between  them.  You  will  see  what  is  meant 
by  this.  Suppose  you  have  the  food  prepared,  sup- 
pose it  changed  by  the  lungs,  and  circulated,  and 


38  AN  OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

special  fluids  secreted,  what  have  you  to  do  fur- 
ther? Why,  you  have  to  construct  the  system. 
Here  you  have  a  great  variety  of  substances  and 
tissues  ;  you  have  the  skin,  the  hair,  the  nails,  the 
muscles,  the  bones,  the  enamel  of  the  teeth,  the 
peculiar  matter  of  which  the  eye  is  formed,  and  all 
this  is  to  be  taken  from  one  common  fluid,  that  is, 
the  blood.  Now  when  the  food  is  brought  in  a  fluid 
state  to  the  point  where  it  is  needed,  what  is  it 
that  causes  it  to  become  skin,  or  nail,  or  bone,  or 
muscle?  What  is  it?  Nobody  knows  what  the 
system  or  organ  is  that  does  it.  As  far  as  we 
can  understand  it,  it  is  performed  at  the  point 
where  the  arteries  terminate  and  the  veins  begin. 
And  that  is  most  marvelous,  because,  so  far  as  I 
know,  there  is  no  microscope,  wonderful  as  are 
the  improvements  in  that  instrument,  that  can 
discover  the  exact  point  where  the  arteries  run 
into  the  veins.  Yet  there  is  no  doubt  about  it. 
It  is,  as  it  is  called,  a  system  of  circulation.  The 
blood  goes  in  a  circle,  and  moreover  there  is  no 
doubt  about  the  fact  of  a  very  free  intercommuni- 
cation between  the  arteries  and  the  veins.  Some 
of  you  may  remember,  I  do,  when  they  used  to 
bleed  people,  and  may  have  noticed  how  the  flow 
of  the  blood  would  be  instantly  quickened  by 
loosening  the  cord  about  the  arm  when  it  had 
been  made  so  tight  as  to  check  the  flow  of  blood 
in  the  artery.  This  was  such  as  could  be  ac- 
counted for  in  no  way  except   by  supposing   the 


ASSIMILATION.  —  CALORIFICATION.  39 

arteries  and  veins  to  inosculate,  as  the  doctors 
say,  at  some  point,  and  so,  to  form  one  continuous 
circle.  It  is  at  that  point,  so  far  as  we  can  judge, 
that  this  process  of  assimilation  takes  place.  But 
what  is  it  at  that  point  that  knows  the  material 
that  is  required  for  bone,  for  muscle,  for  skin,  for 
the  enamel  of  the  teeth,  and  selects  it,  and  carries 
it  to  its  proper  place,  and  so  fixes  it  there  as  to 
complete  the  texture  ?  What  it  is  nobody  knows, 
but  it  is  this  selection  of  material  from  a  common 
fluid,  and  this  compacting  and  arranging  of  it  into 
organized  tissue  that  is  called  assimilation,  and  it 
is  a  wonderful  process  —  a  process  without  which 
all  the  others  had  been  useless.  So  far  as  we  can 
discover,  there  is,  as  has  been  said,  no  separate 
system  by  which  this  process  is  performed,  but  it 
seems  to  be  performed  by  the  capillaries  that  con- 
nect the  arteries  and  the  veins. 

Then  there  is  another  great  function  which  seems 
to  have  no  separate  system.    This  is  what  is  called 

CALORIFICATION 

or  the  heating  of  the  body.  On  that  subject  there 
have  been  all  kinds  of  theories  since  my  remem- 
brance. There  was  a  time  when  the  heat  of  the 
body  was  accounted  for  by  supposing  that  the  lungs 
were  a  furnace,  and  that  there  was  combustion  in 
them  just  as  there  is  in  a  fire-place.  No  doubt 
there  is  in  the  lungs  a  union  of  oxygen  and  carbon, 
and  carbonic  acid  is  formed.     But  then  it   is  not 


40  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

any  hotter  in  the  lungs  than  it  is  elsewhere.  But 
if  the  fire  is  there  it  ought  to  be  hotter.  Then  it 
was  said  that  arterial  blood  contained  latent  heat 
which  was  diffused  as  it  went  on.  That  was  in 
the  days  when  it  was  supposed  there  was  such 
a  thing  as  heat,  but  since  that  is  exploded,  and 
all  heat  is  motion,  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  latent  motion.  It  would 
appear  therefore  that  the  function  of  calorification 
is  performed  in  some  way  in  connection  with  that 
of  assimilation,  perhaps  in  accordance  with  the 
law  that  heat  is  evolved  when  a  fluid  becomes 
solid.  It  may  be  also  that  in  that  destruction 
of  organization  which  is  constantly  going  on  in 
the  body,  there  is  a  union  of  oxygen  with  the 
material,  from  which  heat  is  evolved.  At  any 
rate  we  know  of  no  separate  system  by  which 
this  function  is  performed. 

We. have  then,  so  far  as  I  know,  the  systems 

and  functions  that  are  requisite  for  the  well-being 

of  the  body,  and  they  may  be  presented  together 

thus  : 

Nervous. 
Muscular. 

jh*      Osseous. 

o  g      Absorbent.  «  h 

g   5      Secretory.  j  3 

o  g      Respiratory.  2  § 

_-<  «      Circulatory,  w  % 
Digestive. 

That  is  the  order  in  which,  on  the  whole,   I 


THE   BODY.  41 

should  put  them.  In  regard  to  some  of  them  there 
may  be  room  for  question.  If  there  are  physi- 
cians here,  they,  very  likely,  would  think  so.  For 
instance,  there  might  be  criticism  at  this  point.  I 
have  put  the  circulatory  immediately  above  the 
digestive  system,  but  when  the  material  is  digested 
and  separated  in  the  stomach  and  intestines,  before 
it  goes  into  what  may  properly  be  called  the  cir- 
culatory system,  it  is  taken  up  by  a  set  of  absorb- 
ents called  lacteals,  and  is  carried  by  them  into 
the  circulatory  system.  Some  physiologists  would 
therefore  say  that  the  absorbent  system  should  be 
placed  next  above  the  digestive,  but  I  regard  the 
lacteals  as  a  part  of  the  digestive  system,  and  think 
that  that  system  properly  continues  till  its  product 
is  delivered  over  to  another. 

If  now  you  look  at  that  as  a  whole,  you  will 
observe  that  it  may  be  divided  into  two  parts  by 
a  line  between  the  absorbent  and  osseous  systems, 
and  that  the  five  which  are  below  are  used  for 
the  purpose  of  building  and  repairing  the  three 
which  are  above.  Whatever  you  may  say  about 
the  arrangement  of  the  whole,  nothing  can  be 
plainer  than  that  the  five  lower  systems  are 
necessary  as  a  condition  for  those  which  are  above 
them.  These  are  the  builders  and  repairers,  and 
their  functions  are  common  to  vegetables  and  to 
animals.  Vegetables  have  what  is  equivalent  to 
digestion ;  they  have  a  circulation,  and  they  have 
respiration.     A   tree  breathes  through   its  leaves, 


42  AN  OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

and  it  circulates  its  fluids  once  a  year.  It  has 
also  secretions  and  absorbents.  All  these  are  com- 
mon to  the  animal  and  the  vegetable,  but  the 
three  above  are  the  systems  that  are  to  be  built 
up. 

But  between  the  two  classes  of  systems  now 
pointed  out  there  is  also  another  difference.  Of 
the  three  lower  systems  the  organs  are  in  the 
great  cavities  of  the  thorax  and  abdomen,  which 
are  mainly  given  up  to  them,  and  they  all  per- 
form their  functions  without  our  knowing  anything 
about  them.  They  are  involuntary.  There  are, 
indeed,  some  muscles,  as  those  of  respiration  and 
of  the  eyelids,  that  are  partly  voluntary  and 
partly  involuntary,  but  these  are  wholly  involun- 
tary, or  at  least,  they  are  so  with  most  persons. 
Occasionally  there  is  an  exception  in  some  respects. 
I  knew  a  man  who  could  stop  by  his  will  the 
beating  of  his  heart,  so  that  it  would  beat  eight 
times  less  in  a  minute  ;  and  there  is  on  record  the 
case  of  a  man  who  had  power  over  his  heart  in 
this  respect,  and  who  went  so  far  as  to  make  bets 
about  the  time  he  could  stop  it,  till  at  length  he 
stopped  it,  and  it  never  beat  again.  In  general, 
these  five  are  involuntary ;  their  organs  are  con- 
cealed from  view,  and  are  placed  where  they  are 
needed  without  regard  to  symmetry. 

And  here  again  there  is  a  difference.  The 
three  higher  systems  are  symmetrically  divided  by 
a  vertical  line  into  two  equal  and  similar  halves,  — 


TEMPERAMENTS.  43 

these,  and  all  the  special  organs  connected  with 
them.  Thus  you  have  on  each  side  an  eye,  an  ear, 
a  nostril,  an  arm,  and  so  on,  and  these  are  gen- 
erally so  far  equal  and  similar  that  most  persons 
observe  no  difference.  There  are,  however,  few  if 
any,  the  two  sides  of  whose  faces  are  precisely 
alike.  Their  eyes  are  not  alike,  the  form  of  the 
muscles  on  the  two  sides  of  the  face  is  not  alike. 
I  know  a  lady  who  says  that  she  is  careful  to  turn 
the  company  side  of  her  face  to  those  she  is  speak- 
ing with.  In  some  this  difference  is  more  con- 
spicuous than  in  others,  but  in  general  it  is  not 
noticed  except  by  artists. 

Thus  is  a  voluntary  and  symmetrical  system 
built  up  by  one  that  is  involuntary,  and  presented 
to  an  intelligent  spirit  for  its  use  and  control. 

The  systems  of  which  I  have  spoken  are  com- 
bined in  different  proportions,  and  that  gives  rise 
to  the  doctrine  of  Temperaments.  In  their  enu- 
meration of  these,  physiologists  are  not  uniform. 
They  speak  of  the  sanguine,  the  bilious,  the 
melancholic,  the  phlegmatic,  and  the  nervous. 
This  doctrine  of  the  temperaments  is  of  ancient 
date,  and  was  once  in  high  repute  ;  but  since  at- 
tention has  been  more  directed  to  the  connection 
of  the  mental  operations  with  the  nervous  system, 
it  has  been  less  esteemed.  Still  there  are  those 
who  judge  of  other  men  by  the  predominance  of 
these  different  systems,  and  no  doubt  there  is  some 
foundation  for  this.     No  doubt  the  predominance 


44  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

of  the  nervous,  or  the  muscular,  or  the  lymphatic 
system  will  be  connected  with  certain  traits  of 
character,  or  rather  with  certain  characteristics ; 
but  at  present  the  temperaments  are  so  poorly 
defined,  and  so  inextricably  mixed,  that  no  doctrine 
respecting  them  can  be  called  a  science,  or  scarcely 
scientific.  Perhaps  more  may  be  learned  by  the 
relation  of  the  three  great  cavities,  that  of  the 
brain,  of  the  thorax,  and  of  the  abdomen,  to  each 
other.  With  the  cavity  of  the  brain  and  of  the 
thorax  both  large,  you  may  count  on  a  powerful 
man.  With  the  cavity  of  the  brain  small,  and 
the  expanse  of  the  abdomen  large,  you  would 
expect  less  general  power.  No  bullet-headed  man 
carrying  a  large  abdomen  has  been  known  to  ac- 
complish much. 

In  connection  with  these  systems,  I  again  call 
your  attention  to  the  doctrine  of  development 
which  was  spoken  of  in  the  last  Lecture.  Is  the 
body  developed  ?  Are  these  systems  developed  ? 
Starting  as  the  body  does  from  a  cell,  the  doctrine 
of  development  may  seem  plausible.  This  doc- 
trine, so  far  as  it  can  account  for  anything,  sup- 
poses two  things:  first,  a  force  that  works  from 
within  ;  and  second,  a  whole  already  existing,  that 
is  enveloped.  If  either  of  these  be  wanting,  there 
can  be  no  development  that  we  need  trouble  our- 
selves about,  and  indeed  the  word  loses  its  mean- 
ing.    A  house  is  not  developed.     Its  increase  in 


DEVELOPMENT.  45 

size  or  elevation  is  by  an  agency  from  without. 
The  figure  on  a  carpet,  as  it  gradually  appears,  is 
not  developed ;  it  grows,  and  that  through  an 
agency  not  in  the  loom,  or  in  the  materials. 
When,  therefore,  we  inquire  whether  the  body  is 
developed,  we  inquire  whether  its  different  sys- 
tems are  in  any  sense  enfolded  in  the  cell  from 
which  it  starts,  and  are  made  manifest  by  a  force 
inherent  in  itself.  This  point  we  need  to  settle. 
Precisely  what  we  mean  by  development  we  need 
to  know,  lest  we  fall,  as  is  so  often  done,  into  a 
learned  ignorance  by  substituting  a  word  not  well 
analyzed,  but  become  familiar,  for  a  knowledge  of 
the  thing. 

With  this  statement,  if  we  look  at  the  relation 
of  the  systems  mentioned  to  each  other,  or  even 
of  the  different  parts  of  individual  systems  to  the 
other  parts,  we  may  see  what  this  doctrine,  as  thus 
applied,  amounts  to.  Take,  for  instance,  the  os- 
seous system.  Each  bone  of  the  skeleton  grows 
from  a  distinct  centre  of  ossification,  is  formed  as 
a  distinct  instrument,  in  most  instances  tipped  with 
cartilage,  and  except  through  this  cartilage  never 
comes  into  contact  with  any  other  bone.  The 
bones  of  the  upper  extremity  are  a  separate  organ- 
ization that  do  not  touch,  except  at  a  single  point, 
those  of  the  lower.  The  bones  of  the  skull  com- 
mence at  different  points  and  grow  towards  each 
other,  uniting  by  sutures.  The  bone  of  the 
tongue  is  wholly  unconnected  with  any  other  bone 


46  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

and  so  could  not  have  been  developed  from  the 
system.  The  teeth  grow  in  the  jaws,  but  are 
separate  instruments,  and  are  not  developed  from 
them.  Indeed,  each  bone  seems  to  have  been 
formed  separately,  as  a  mechanic  forms  nails  and 
pegs  and  the  different  parts  of  a  chair,  and  then 
brings  them  together.  There  is  nothing  to  in- 
dicate that  they  start  from  a  common  centre. 
Take,  again,  the  heart  and  the  arteries.  Let  the 
arteries  run  on  till  they  become  capillaries,  and 
then  enlarge  themselves  again  and  come  round 
into  the  heart  in  the*  vena  cava.  Does  anybody 
believe  that  this  double  set  of  vessels  could  have 
been  developed  from  the  heart  and  thus  joined  at 
the  extremities  ?  And  if  that  be  so  when  but  a 
single  system  is  concerned,  much  more  is  it  so  in 
relation  to  the  several  systems.  To  me  it  does  not 
seem  possible  that  each  and  all  of  these  can  so 
exist  in  a  single  cell  that  their  production  can  be 
at  all  accounted  for  by  development.  The  process 
stands  by  itself  —  both  that  of  origination  and  of 
growth,  and  is  utterly  inscrutable.  Growth  is  not 
evolution.     It  may  accompany  it,  but  is  not  it. 

And  now  that  I  am  on  this  subject  there  is 
another  point  connected  with  a  system  that  I  have 
not  yet  mentioned,  and  which  bears  upon  both 
origin  and  development.     I  have  not  mentioned 

THE   KEPRODUCTIVE  SYSTEM, 

which  is  the  last  in  order,  and  has  relation  to  the 


CREATION.  47 

race.  This  involves  that  sexual  relation  which  is 
so  universal  and  controlling  in  the  structure  of 
organized  bodies.  This  relation  implies  more  than 
one  individual  as  its  condition,  and  the  difficulty- 
is  to  account,  not  merely  for  one  individual  by  de- 
velopment, but  for  the  first  two  that  held  to  each 
other  this  relation.  In  all  the  accounts  I  have  seen, 
this  difficulty  has  been  either  ignored  or  slurred 
over.  According  to  the  Bible,  as  you  will  remem- 
ber, the  fact  of  this  relation  in  our  first  parents  is 
connected  with  the  idea  of  creation.  It  is  said, 
"  male  and  female  created  He  them  ;  "  and  I  ask 
you  whether  the  idea  of  this  relation,  especially  as 
so  pervasive  and  involving  such  variety  of  adap- 
tation, does  not  necessitate  an  origin  by  creation. 
In  dioecious  plants,  unless  there  were  originally 
two,  how  was  the  species  perpetuated  ?  Not  as 
now  certainly.  So  of  animals  and  of  man.  Give 
us  a  first  pair  and  we  have  no  difficulty ;  without 
that,  it  seems  to  me  we  must  suppose  processes  for 
which  facts  furnish  no  support,  and  the  present 
order  of  Nature  no  analogy.  Such  processes  we 
must  suppose,  and,  unless  we  resort  to  that  cuttle- 
fish ink  of  philosophers,  indefinite  words,  we  must 
ultimately  get  back  to  the  fact  of  a  creation.  Go 
back  as  we  may,  development  presupposes  a  whole 
either  in  idea  or  in  fact,  and  the  origin  of  such  a 
whole  demands  intelligence  and  creative  power. 

Connecting,  then,  this  fact  of  the  sexual  relation 
in  organized  matter  with  that  relation  of  the  forces 


48  AN  OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

in  unorganized  matter  mentioned  in  the  last 
Lecture,  by  which  the  higher  force  reveals  itself 
only  as  it  overmasters  the  lower  —  which  fact 
indeed  runs  up  through  the  various  grades  of  or- 
ganization —  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  phys- 
ical universe  could  have  been  so  constructed  as  to 
exclude  more  effectually  the  idea  of  development. 
The  two  relations  demand  a  power  working  from 
without,  and  from  above. 

Looking  now  at  these  systems  as  a  whole,  I  may 
observe  in  a  practical  way  that  we  see  what  health 
is,  and  to  what  our  attention  is  to  be  directed  in 
preserving  it.  Health  consists  in  the  perform- 
ance by  each  system  of  the  body  of  its  function, 
or  functions,  in  a  perfect  manner.  Let  each  system 
thus  perform  its  function  perfectly  and  there  will 
be  perfect  health  ;  otherwise  not.  Hence,  in  pre- 
serving and  promoting  health,  attention  should  be 
directed  to  the  performance  of  function,  rather 
than  to  technical  and  formal  rules. 

In  looking  also  at  the  different  combinations  of 
these  systems,  and  at  the  differences  between  men 
thence  resulting,  we  may  see  that  it  is  one  thing 
to  study  man,  and  another  to  study  men.  In  one 
case  we  study  those  things  in  man  which  are  com- 
mon to  all  men,  and  only  in  those  respects  in 
which  they  are  thus  common  ;  that  is,  we  study 
uniformities.  This  gives  us  science.  In  the  other 
case  the  things  that  are  common  are  presupposed, 


UNITY  OF  NATURE  AND  OF  THE  BODY.     49 

and  we  study  men  only  as  they  differ.  Uniformi- 
ties —  differences  —  as  men  perceive  and  arrange 
the  first  they  become  scientific  ;  as  they  perceive 
the  second  they  become  practical ;  as  they  are  able 
to  combine  both .  they  become  both  scientific  and 
practical.  Often  these  are  not  combined,  hence 
a  man  may  be  scientific  and  able  to  talk  well,  and 
yet  utterly  fail  in  practical  affairs ;  or,  again,  he 
may  know  nothing  but  differences  and  details  and 
be  a  successful  business  man.  You  will  see  at 
once  that  in  a  course  of  Lectures  like  this  it  is  only 
the  knowledge  of  man  that  can  be  taught. 

We  have  thus  seen,  as  I  promised  to  show  you, 
that  the  body  is  built  up  on  the  same  principle  as 
external  nature.  It  has  its  unity  in  the  same  way, 
one  system  being  conditioned  upon  another ;  but 
the  unity  is  more  close,  because  here  the  higher 
systems  react  upon  the  lower,  and  thus  give  a 
reciprocal  sympathy  of  all  the  parts. 

And  now  I  will  close  this  Lecture  by  asking  you 
what  it  is  that  constitutes  this  body  which  we  have 
thus  considered.  Is  it  simply  the  shifting  matter 
of  which  it  may  happen  to  be  composed  at  any 
given  moment  ?  or  is  it  not  rather  that  permanent, 
invisible,  automatic,  selecting  and  arranging  power 
which  begins  with  us,  and  goes  with  us  to  the 
end? 

4 


LECTURE   III. 

MIND.  —  INTELLECT.  —  THE   REASON. 

External  nature  is  built  up  on  the  principle  of 
the  conditioning  and  the  conditioned.  Thus  built 
it  becomes  a  condition  for  the  body  of  man.  That 
again,  as  we  have  seen,  is  built  up  on  the  same 
principle.  Is  this  true  also  of  the  mind?  To 
that  we  are  next  to  pass,  but  before  doing  this  we 
must  notice  here,  as  we  do  at  every  point  of  transi- 
tion in  nature,  the  care  that  is  taken  to  prevent  the 
transition  from  seeming  abrupt.  The  transition  is 
absolute  and  perfect.  An  element  wholly  new  is  in- 
troduced. Sensation,  which  we  have  now  reached, 
is  not  gravitation,  nor  any  modification  of  it.  But 
when  the  new  element  is  introduced  it  is  so  fore- 
shadowed and  simulated  by  that  which  is  below 
it  that  it  is  often  difficult  to  fix  the  point  of  tran- 
sition, and  some  are  even  led  to  doubt  whether 
there  is  such  a  point.  And  nowhere  is  this  more 
noticeable  than  in  the  shading  off  there  is  between 
what  is  called  the  reflex  action  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem and  those  conscious  and  voluntary  actions  which 
are  the  product  of  mind.  This  kind  of  action  has 
been  much  spoken  of  of  late,  and  without  know- 
ing something  of  this  we  cannot  understand  our- 
selves. 


REFLEX  ACTION.  51 

This  automatic  and  reflex  action  is  of  different 
degrees.  There  is,  first,  that  which  originates  in 
the  system  of  nerves  that  is  called  ganglionic,  and 
that  is  wholly  involuntary.  With  no  knowledge 
or  consciousness  on  our  part  the  ganglion,  or  ner- 
vous centre  connected  with  the  heart,  takes  cogni- 
zance of  its  state  when  full,  and  by  a  reflex  action 
originates  the  movement  of  contraction.  In  the 
same  way  the  enlargement  and  contraction  of  the 
pupil  of  the  eye  is  regulated,  and  also  the  processes 
of  digestion  and  secretion  and  assimilation,  with 
the  muscular  movements  they  involve.  In  all 
these  there  is  an  adjustment  of  movements  and  a 
conspiring  of  means  to  ends  that  are  admirable, 
and  such  a  simulation  of  intelligence  and  volition 
that  not  a  few  have  referred  these  movements,  and 
so  the  up-building  of  the  body,  to  the  unconscious 
operations  of  the  soul. 

But  however  this  may  be,  we  have,  in  the  second 
place,  that  reflex  action  which  is  connected  with 
the  voluntary  muscles.  It  was  in  connection  with 
this  that  the  constitution  of  the  nervous  system 
as  double,  and  also  the  different  functions  of  its 
cineritious  and  fibrous  portions  were  discovered. 
This  may  be  illustrated  thus :  — 


y^, 


o 


LIBRAR  V 

UNIVEUSIT1 

ORNIA 


52  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

If  we  suppose  the  straight  line  A  to  represent  the 
spinal  column  and  the  lines  B  and  C  to  be  nerves 
passing  out  from  it,  as  there  are  nerves  on  either 
side  passing  out  between  each  of  the  vertebrae,  then 
it  is  found  that  the  nerve  is  composed  of  two  parts, 
one  originating  on  the  back  side  of  the  spinal  col- 
umn, or  rather  from  its  centre,  and  passing  out  sep- 
arately by  distinct  roots,  the  other  originating  on 
the  front  side.  The  one  originating  from  the  centre 
springs  from  the  cineritious  matter,  and  has  upon  it, 
before  it  reaches  the  other  portion,  an  enlargement 
or  ganglion.  These  portions  unite  in  the  common 
nerve  and  become  undistinguishable.  Still  they 
perform  different  functions.  The  part  with  the 
ganglion  upon  it  is  found  to  be  the  nerve  of  sensa- 
tion, and  the  other  the  nerve  of  motion.  This  is 
ascertained  by  experiments  upon  animals  in  which 
the  roots  of  each  are  severed.  If  one  be  severed  all 
power  of  motion  will  be  lost  while  the  power  of  sen- 
sation will  remain,  if  the  other  be  severed  all  power 
of  sensation  will  be  lost  while  the  power  of  motion 
will  remain.  It  sometimes  happens  in  paralysis 
that  there  is  the  power  of  motion  without  that  of 
feeling,  and  the  reverse.  We  have  thus  what 
resembles  a  railway  with  a  double  track.  One 
portion  of  the  nerve,  called  the  afferent,  brings  in 
the  impression  from  without ;  and  the  other,  called 
the  efferent,  responds  by  originating  motion  from 
within.  Motion  thus  produced  in  the  voluntary 
muscles  without  consciousness  or  volition,  is  called 


SEPARATE   EXISTENCE  OF   MIND.  53 

reflex  action.  The  centre  of  it  is  the  spinal  column 
and  the  medulla  oblongata,  and  its  object  is  to 
guard  the  body  in  sudden  emergencies,  and  to 
relieve  volition  from  unnecessary  burdens.  Some 
motions  originally  of  this  kind,  as  winking  and 
breathing,  may  be  controlled  in  a  measure  by  the 
will ;  while  others,  originated  by  the  will,  but  often 
repeated,  are  supposed  by  some  to  pass  out  of  con- 
sciousness, and  to  become  wholly  reflex.  These 
are  such  as  walking  and  playing  on  a  musical  in- 
strument. Certainly  there  is  a  wonderful  blend- 
ing of  action  from  forces  merely  vital,  and  from 
the  action  of  mind  by  intelligent  volition ;  and 
it  is  often  difficult  to  say  where  one  ends  and  the 
other  begins. 

We  now  pass  to  the  Mind.  And  first,  has  mind 
a  separate  existence  ?  Is  it  something  distinct 
from  matter  ?  So  far  as  I  can  see,  we  have  as  much 
evidence  for  the  existence  of  a  permanent  thinking 
thing  that  is  separate  from  matter  as  we  have  of  a 
permanent  hard  thing  that  is  matter.  Of  the 
essence  of  either  matter  or  mind  we  neither  have, 
nor  can  have  any  direct  cognizance.  That  the 
phenomena  of  each  have  an  underlying  essence,  or 
substance,  we  know  by  the  laws  of  thought.  We 
know  that  there  can  be  no  phenomena  without  a 
cause,  and  since  the  cause  cannot  be  nothing,  the 
cause  of  both  phsyical  and  mental  phenomena  must 
be  some  being,  some  thing.     But  how  do  we  know 


54  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY    OF  MAN. 

that  the  cause  of  mental  phenomena  is  not  mat- 
ter ?  Because  mental  phenomena  are  different  from 
those  of  matter,  and  so  different  that  they  are  not 
compatible  with  its  laws.  How  do  we  know  that 
a  stone  is  not  a  fluid  ?  Because  the  phenomena  it 
exhibits  are  incompatible  with  the  laws  of  fluidity. 
In  the  same  way  the  phenomena,  of  mind  are  in- 
compatible with  the  laws  of  matter.  The  first 
law  of  matter  is  that  of  inertia.1  This  is,  that 
matter  will  continue  in  a  state  of  rest  or  of  motion, 
whichever  it  may  be  in,  without  change  of  state, 
unless  that  change  be  produced  by  something  out- 
side of  itself.  It  is  true  that  all  bodies  are  in 
motion,  but  that  does  not  conflict  with  the  law,  for 
they  will  continue  in  motion  precisely  as  they  are 
unless  they  are  affected  by  some  external  force. 
According  to  this,  matter  cannot  become  a  cause 
except  as  it  is  an  effect.  What  is  called  a  second 
cause  it  may  be,  for  the  precise  difference  between 
a  first  and  a  second  cause  is  that  a  second  cause  is 
first  an  effect,  and  so  an  effect  as  to  be  necessarily 
determined.  It  would  be  contradictory  to  this 
fundamental  law  to  suppose  it  to- be  an  originating, 
or  proper  cause.  It  can  have  no  voluntary  action. 
But  mind  knows  itself  as  acting  voluntarily,  and 
as  a  proper  cause.  It  is  an  essential  difference 
between  mind  and  matter  that  one  is  self-active 
and  the  other  is  not.  Mind  acts  from  within  by 
an  energy  of  its  own,  and  not  simply  as  it  is  acted 
upon  from  without.     Matter,  under  the  same  cir- 

1  See    Psychology,   Human   and    Comparative,    by  Dr.  Wilson. 


THE   MIND   NOT   MATERIAL.  55 

cumstances,  must  always  act  with  the  same  degree 
of  force.  This  follows  from  the  law.  With  mind 
we  know  that  this  is  not  so.  I  can  use  this  stick 
with  one  degree  of  force  or  with  another,  with  no 
reference  to  any  fixed  law  or  external  force.  It  is 
in  this  power  of  mind  to  originate  motion,  and  not 
only  to  direct  force,  but  to  increase  or  diminish 
the  amount  put  forth,  that  we  find  a  sufficient 
reason  for  putting  mind  in  a  different  order  from 
matter.  Call  matter  force  if  you  will,  though 
what  force  can  be  without  some  being  that  has 
force  I  do  not  understand ;  but  call  it  so,  and  it  is 
a  force  that  can  originate  nothing,  can  direct  noth- 
ing, can  modify  nothing  except  as  it  is  modified, 
that  has  neither  spontaneity  nor  volition,  and  can 
in  no  sense  be  a  proper  cause.  Origination,  cau- 
sation, modification,  and  direction  belong  to  mind. 
Mind,  in  short,  is  the  cause  of  its  own  actions, 
and  acts  from  reasons.  Matter  is  not  the  cause 
of  its  own  actions,  or  rather  movements,  and  acts 
from  causes  in  distinction  from  reasons.  Or  if 
we  take  any  other  law  of  matter  or  of  motion,  as, 
that  action  and  reaction  will  be  equal  and  in  con- 
trary directions,  we  shall  find  that  it  is  wholly  in- 
applicable to  the  phenomena  of  mind.  As  applied 
to  them  its  terms  are  without  meaning. 

Since  then  the  phenomena  of  mind  are  not  only 
wholly  different  from  those  of  matter,  but  are  in- 
compatible with  its  laws,  we  conclude  that  they 
have  a  different   basis.     We   conclude   also   that 


56  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

that  basis,  whatever  it  be,  is  a  permanent  thing. 
It  is  something  underlying  phenomena,  and  if  I  do 
not  know  it  to  be  permanent,  then  I  do  not  know 
that  any  thing  hard  is  permanent.  How  do  I  know 
that  this  desk  is  the  same  hard  thing  that  was 
here  last  Friday  night  if  I  do  not  know  myself  to 
be  permanent?  I  cannot  know  it.  Therefore  I 
have  the  same  evidence  of  something  in  myself 
that  is  permanent,  that  has  thought  and  affections, 
and  that  we  call  mind,  as  I  have  of  something  out 
of  myself  that  is  permanent  and  hard,  and  that  we 
call  matter.  Certainly  my  evidence  for  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind  is  as  good  as  that  for  the  phe- 
nomena of  matter,  since  I  know  the  phenomena  of 
matter  only  through  those  of  mind.  That  those 
phenomena  have  some  permanent  basis  is  as  certain 
as  the  laws  of  thought,  and  that  the  basis  of  one  is 
different  from  that  of  the  other  we  infer  not  only 
from  the  difference  of  the  phenomena,  differing  as 
they  do  in  their  nature,  lying  in  a  different  region, 
and  made  known  in  a  different  way,  but  also  from 
the  incompatibility  of  the  laws  of  matter  with  the 
phenomena  of  mind.  Either  physicists  must  give 
up  their  own  definitions  and  laws,  or  must  concede 
to  the  phenomena  of  mind  a  different  basis  from 
those  of  matter. 

Of  mind  as  thus  existing  we  say  that  it  mani- 
fests itself  in  three  forms,  and  that  these  follow 
the  law  of  conditioning  and  conditioned  already 
spoken  of,  thus,  — 


SENSATION  AND  THE  SENSIBILITY.  57 

WILL. 

SENSIBILITY. 

INTELLECT. 

As  philosophers  universally  regard  it  now,  these 
are  the  general  divisions  of  the  manifestation  of 
mind.  I  remember,  and  others  here  may,  when 
the  division  was  into  the  Intellect,  or  Understand- 
ing, as  it  was  then  called,  and  the  Will.  The  Sen- 
sibility, as  that  which  moves  the  Will,  was  classed 
with  it,  but  now  the  division  is  as  I  have  stated, 
and  in  the  order  in  which  I  have  placed  the  powers. 

For  a  rational  being  this  is  clearly  the  natural 
order.  As  rational,  such  a  being  can  have  feeling 
only  as  he  has  knowledge,  and  he  can  put  forth 
choices  and  volitions  only  as  he  has  both  knowl- 
edge and  feeling.  This  is  the  universal  law,  and 
this  is  the  order. 

Here,  however,  it  must  be  noticed  that  the  Sen- 
sibility as  used  in  this  connection  does  not  include 
Sensation.  This  is  from  the  state  of  the  body  and 
mind  as  mutually  related.  After  the  body  is  re- 
vealed to  the  mind,  sensation  is  known  by  the 
mind  as  from  the  body.  It  is  known  as  it  is  in 
itself,  and  as  indicative  of  something  beyond  itself. 
It  is  the  connecting  link  between  mind  and  matter. 
The  mind  is,  indeed,  affected  by  it,  but  its  initia- 
tive is  in  matter,  and  because  it  is  so  we  leave  it 
behind  us  as  capable  of  existing  in  connection  with 
animal  life  only.     At  any  rate,  whatever  may  be 


58  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

said  of  it  as  belonging  to  the  Sensibility  in  a 
broad  sense,  it  is  widely  different  from  those  affec- 
tions and  emotions  which  belong  to  man  as  intel- 
ligent, and  which  are  possible  only  on  condition  of 
the  action  of  the  intellect. 

Here  then,  we  begin  again,  as  we  did  before, 
with  that  which  is  lowest, 

THE   INTELLECT. 

It  may,  perhaps,  seem  strange  to  some  that  the 
Intellect  should  be  placed  lowest,  but  it  belongs 
there ;  and  the  order  in  which  I  have  presented  the 
different  parts  of  our  nature  presents,  as  I  suppose, 
the  order  of  progress  of  the  race  when  it  has  been 
reduced  to  a  savage  or  semi-barbarous  state  and 
would  rise  again.  At  first  men  worship  strength 
of  body,  physical  energy.  The  man  who  had  the 
greatest  power  of  muscles  was  the  hero.  Even 
yet  there  are  many  with  whom  physical  prowess  is 
the  great  thing,  and  who  hold  those  who  manifest 
it  in  higher  esteem  than  any  others.  The  next 
step  is  the  worship  of  intellect.  Disputants  and 
intellectual  prize  fighters  become  heroes.  Great 
debaters,  pleaders,  orators,  writers,  become  the 
great  men  irrespective  of  character.  This  is  our 
present  state.  No  nation  has  yet  got  beyond  this. 
In  our  literary  institutions  it  is  chiefly  the  intel- 
lect that  is  educated,  and  in  some  of  them  more 
and  more,  with  little  or  no  systematic  regard  for 
the  training  of  the  higher  powers.     No  doubt  the 


THREE   QUESTIONS.  0         59 

time  will  come  when  this  state  of  things  will  be 
looked  back  upon  as  we  now  look  back  on  the 
ascendency  of  physical  force.  Until  the  Intellect 
is  placed  by  the  community  where  it  belongs,  and 
made  subordinate  to  the  Sensibility  and  the  Will, 
we  shall  find  that  mere  sharpness,  shrewdness,  in- 
tellectual power,  and  success  through  these,  will 
be  placed  above  those  higher  qualities  in  which 
character  consists,  and  success  through  them.  The 
Intellect  is  simply  instrumental,  and  belongs  where 
I  have  placed  it. 

The  proper  business  of  the  Intellect  is  to  know. 
This  operation  of  knowing  may  take  place  without 
willing.  Whether  it  ever  does  without  feeling  is 
not  so  certain.  We  can,  I  think,  imagine  the  In- 
tellect as  contemplating  certain  subjects,  say  the 
existence  of  space,  or  a  mathematical  proposition, 
in  a  perfectly  dry  light,  with  no  feeling  whatever  ; 
but  if  not,  we  can  treat  of  it  separately,  as  of 
length  without  breadth,  and  as  we  often  do  and 
must  of  things  which  we  can  conceive  of  sepa- 
rately, but  which  do  not  in  fact  exist  apart. 

You  will  remember  I  said  in  the  last  Lecture 
in  regard  to  the  body  that  there  were  three  ques- 
tions to  be  asked,  —  First,  What  is  there  in  any 
particular  part  of  it  ?  Second,  What  function  does 
it  perform?  and  third,  How  does  it  perform  it? 
And  so  there  are  three  questions  to  be  asked  with 
respect  to  the  Intellect. 

First,  What  is  there  in  the  mind  regarded  as  In- 
tellect? 


60  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

Second,  How  came  it  to  be  there  ?    And 

Third,  What  operations  can  we  perform  with  it, 
now  that  it  is  there  ? 

These  are  the  three  questions  which  we  need  to 
answer ;  and  if  we  can  answer  these  three  ques* 
tions  we  shall  know  all  that  we  need  to  know  about 
the  Intellect. 

The  two  questions  in  relation  to  what  there  is 
in  the  mind,  and  how  it  got  there,  cannot  be 
treated  separately.  They  blend  together.  But 
we  need  to  know  the  answers  to  both,  and  in 
treating  of  them  as  thus  blended,  we  treat  of  the  fa- 
mous question  of  the  origin  of  Knowledge.  That 
has  been  one  of  the  most  famous  questions  among 
philosophers  in  past  times,  and  it  is  that  that  we 
propose  to  consider  now. 

In  doing  this  we  suppose  the  Intellect  to  be 
unfurnished,  but  then  we  suppose  it  to  be  Intel- 
lect. As  such  we  suppose  it  to  have  the  capacity, 
the  power,  to  know,  for  this  is  the  function  of 
Intellect.  If  there  be  not  in  it  an  original  power 
to  know,  then  it  is  not  Intellect.  Of  the  origin 
of  this,  or  any  other  original  power,  we  know 
nothing.  We  simply  know  it  to  be  because  it 
manifests  itself,  and,  plainly  a  power  of  knowing 
can  manifest  itself  only  by  knowing.  So  we  be- 
gin by  knowing ;  knowing  something.  What  then 
is  it  to  know  ?  I  agree  with  President  Porter  as 
he  puts  it  in  his  book  on  The  Intellect,  that  to 
know  is  to  be  certain  of  something.     If  you  have 


THE    FACULTIES   GIVE  CERTAINTY.  61 

not  certainty  there  is  no  knowledge.  It  is  mere 
belief  or  opinion.  To  know  is  to  be  certain.  But 
certain  of  what  ?  Of  the  existence  of  that,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  concerning  which  we  have  knowl- 
edge. It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  we  can  have 
knowledge  of  that  which  does  not  exist.  To  know 
also  involves  a  knowledge  by  himself  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  being  that  knows.  Certainly  if  a  per- 
son is  not  certain  of  his  own  existence  he  cannot 
be  certain  of  anything  else.  There  is  involved, 
therefore,  in  knowing,  the  certainty  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  thing  known,  and  also  the  certainty  of 
the  existence  of  the  being  knowing. 

And  here  I  observe  that  it  is  a  great  thing  for 
a  man  to  find  himself,  and  to  reach  certainty.  It 
is  a  great  thing  to  have  the  certain  knowledge  of 
anything.  This  we  have  on  the  authority  of  our 
faculties.  The  authority  of  the  human  faculties 
is  for  us,  and  must  be,  the  ultimate  authority.  If 
I  cannot  trust  my  faculties  I  cannot  trust  any- 
thing. Perhaps  some  one  would  say  that  I  might 
trust  revelation,  might  trust  the  direct  voice  of 
God.  But  how  am  I  to  know  that  it  is  a  revela- 
tion? How  that  it  is  the  voice  of  God?  How 
do  I,  or  can  I  know  anything  except  through  my 
faculties  ?  And  if  these  faculties  do  not  give  me 
in  some  form,  and  to  some  extent,  immediate  and 
direct  knowledge,  that  is  certainty,  then  there  is 
no  hope  of  it  anywhere.  The  thing  is  impos- 
sible.    Therefore  it  is  that  I  say  we  begin  with 


62  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

knowledge.  We  begin  with  certainty.  If  we  do 
not  we  never  find  it.  We  begin  with  the  cer- 
tainty of  the  thing  known,  whatever  it  may  be, 
and  also  with  the  certainty  of  the  existence  of  the 
being  that  knows.  If  the  thing  known  be  not 
certain,  we  do  not  know  it.  If  the  knower  do  not 
exist,  he  cannot  know  it.  This  certainty  of  the 
thing  known  and  of  the  existence  of  the  knower 
I  suppose  to  be  given  in  one  concrete  act.  I  do 
not  understand  that  one  of  these  is  before  the 
other,  but  they  come  together  and  are  mutually 
dependent.  The  knower  and  the  thing  known  are 
each  revealed  by  an  authority  that  involves  cer- 
tainty. If  not,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  it  is  impossible 
that  certainty  should  ever  be  reached.  We  must 
here  find  our  beginning.  The  occasion  of  the  first 
mental  operation  is  supposed  to  be  in  the  action 
of  some  one  of  the  senses,  but  the  operation  itself 
is  accompanied  by  that  certainty  which  is  involved 
in  knowledge. 

If ,  then,  we  suppose  man  possessed  of  intellect 
alone,  he  may  be  represented  by  a  single  straight 
line  thus,  — 


Being. 


Object. 


Let  us  now  suppose  an  object  presented  before 
him  as  a  tree.  Let  this  object  so  affect  him 
through  his  senses  that  he  becomes  aware  of  its 


THE  IDEA  OF  BEING.  63 

existence  as  something  different  from  himself,  and 
he  will  know  the  thing,  and  will  know  himself  as 
knowing  it.  In  thus  knowing  that  which  is  not 
himself  he  will  be  revealed  to  himself,  and  in  this 
double  revelation  there  will  be  involved  by  neces-  /g*/g  if 
sity  an  idea  that  will  connect  itself  with  every  sub- 
sequent mental  operation.     That  is  the  idea  of 

BEING. 

As  not  given  by  sensation,  but  originated  by  the 
mind  itself,  we  may  place  this  on  the  other  side 
of  the  line,  and  we  shall  have  two  ideas,  or  men- 
tal products,  wholly  different  in  their  origin  and 
characteristics.  The  one  is  the  direct  product  of 
sensation.  It  is  contingent  and  variable.  The  ob- 
ject might  as  well  have  been  anything  else.  It 
appears  and  gives  place  to  others.  But  the  idea 
of  being,  no  sense  can  give.  It  comes  by  the  en- 
ergy of  the  mind  itself,  and  is  present  in  connec- 
tion with  all  its  subsequent  operations.  It  passes 
on  and  becomes  an  element  in  them  by  necessity. 

We  have  thus  two  sources  of  knowledge :  one 
the  external  world,  giving  objects  that  are  contin- 
gent and  variable ;  the  other  the  mind  itself,  evolv- 
ing ideas  when  the  occasion  arises  by  the  necessity 
of  its  own  constitution. 

We  inquire  then,  for  we  are  now  furnishing  the 
mind,  what  other  ideas  it  gets,  not  as  the  product 
of  the  senses,  but  from  the  mind  itself  and  by  ne- 
cessity ;  and  I  ask  you  whether  it  is  possible  that 


64  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

the  Intellect  should  have  the  notion  of  a  tree  and 
not  know  that  it  is  in  space.  We  put  down, 
then, 

SPACE. 

By  the  constitution  of  our  minds  the  idea  of  a 
tree,  or  of  any  other  material  thing  not  in  space,  is 
impossible  to  thought.  This  idea  of  Space  there- 
fore will  be  present,  and  accompany  all  perception 
of  material  objects,  as  that  of  being  must  be  pres- 
ent and  accompany  every  operation  of  the  mind. 

What  next  ?  You  look  at  the  tree,  you  repeat 
your  observation.  I  ask  you  whether  it  would  be 
possible  thus  to  make  two  successive  observations 
without  having  the  idea  of 

TIME. 

Thenceforward  no  thought,  no  event,  no  change 
can  any  more  occur  that  shall  not  be  known  as  in 
time  than  a  material  object  can  be  perceived  and 
not  be  known  as  in  space.  The  idea  will  accom- 
pany you  in  all  your  thinking. 

Succession  gives  occasion  for  the  exercise  of 
memory,  and  I  ask  you  again  whether  it  is  possible 
for  any  one  to  say  I  remember,  and  not  have  the 
idea  that  he,  as  remembering,  is  the  same  person 
that  in  time  past  knew  the  thing  that  is  remem- 
bered. Of  necessity  he  must  know  that.  He  does 
not  know  it  by  consciousness  alone,  for  conscious- 
ness does  not  take  cognizance  of  the  past.  He 
knows  it  immediately  and  necessarily  on  the  joint 


NUMBER. — RESEMBLANCE.  65 

operation   of  consciousness  and  memory.     Hence 
we  put  down  as  the  next  idea  that  of 

PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 

We  proceed  :  I  ask  whether  it  would  be  possible 
to  observe  different  objects  or  successive  events 
without  having  the  idea  of 

NUMBER. 

If  not  revealed  to  the  mind  distinctly  as  number 
in  the  first  instance,  it  is  yet  so.  involved  in  all 
repetition,  and  especially  in  the  presentation  of 
different  objects,  that  it  enters  in  by  necessity,  and 
becomes  a  part  of  the  furniture  of  every  rational 
being. 

Once  more :  in  noticing  different  objects  of  the 
same  kind,  would  it  be  possible  to  avoid  having 
the  idea  of  resemblance,  and  its  correlative,  differ- 
ence ?  Therefore,  from  the  first,  the  idea  of  resem- 
blance enters  in  and  travels  along  with  the  mind 
as  the  basis  of  all  its  classifications,  and  so  of  all 
science.     Our  next  idea  therefore  is  that  of 

RESEMBLANCE. 

Besides  the  ideas  just  mentioned  it  is  claimed 
that  those  of  Substance,  of  Motion,  and  of  the 
Infinite  belong  here.  In  respect  to  substance  my 
only  question  would  be  whether  the  idea  of  it  does 
not  so  come  under  that  of  being  that  we  need  not 
give  it  a  separate  place.     As  to  motion  the  ques- 

5 


DO  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

tion  is  whether  it  be  not  directly  apprehended  by 
the  senses.  If  not,  it  belongs  here.  But  what 
shall  I  say  of  "  The  Infinite' '  ?  This  seems  to  me 
to   be   a   mere   generalization,  like  "  The  True," 

c  3  rather  than  an  original  and  necessary  idea.  That 
we  have  the  idea  of  infinity  in  connection  with  that 
of  space  there  can  be  no  doubt.  When  the  mind 
has  completed  its  intuitions  in  regard  to  space,  it  is 
as  certain  that  space  is  infinite  as  that  it  is  at  all. 
Let  the  occasion  arise  and  the  idea  comes  by  intu- 

6  3  ition  and  necessity.  It  can  come  in  no  other  way. 
Frame  to  yourselves  any  conception  you  please  of 
distance,  and  it  does  not  approximate  infinity. 
Suppose  a  flash  of  lightning  to  go  on  for  a  thou- 
sand years,  it  would  be  no  nearer  a  limit  than  when 
it  began.  Of  space  it  may  be  said,  as  has  been  said 
of  God,  that  its  centre  is  everywhere,  and  its  cir- 
cumference nowhere.  And  the  same  of  duration. 
Go  back  as  you  will,  and  you  are  no  nearer  a 
beginning.  Hence  it  has  been  well  replied,  when 
it  has  been  asked  why  the  world  was  not  created 
sooner,  that  it  was  created  as  soon  as  it  could  be. 
This  is  true,  for  at  whatever  point  it  might  have 
been  created  the  same  question  might  have  been 
asked.  But  the  infinite  which  we  reach  in  con- 
nection with  extension  is  different  from  that  which 
we  reach  in  connection  with  duration.  The  in- 
finity of  space  is  one  thing,  that  of  duration  is 
another.  The  infinity  of  being,  or  of  attributes, 
would  be  still  another  thing,  and  wholly  different. 


NECESSARY    IDEAS.  67 

The  term  infinite  cannot  be  applied  to  either  the 
intellectual  or  moral  attributes  of  God  in  the  same 
sense  as  to  space  and  time.  In  strictness  it  can  be 
applied  to  nothing  that  admits  of  degrees  or  limit- 
ation in  any  respect.  But  "  The  Infinite  "  must 
cover  all  cases  in  which  the  term  infinite  can  be 
applied.  Hence  it  must  be  found  by  comparison, 
and  we  shall  always  be  entitled  to  ask,  The  Infin- 
ite what  ?  This  form  of  expression  has  its  place 
and  use,  but  like  "  The  Unconditioned,"  and 
"  The  Absolute,"  it  is  so  remote  from  ordinary 
lines  of  thought  and  so  vague  and  hazy  that  it  has 
special  fitness  for  use  when  men  would  "  darken 
counsel  by  words  without  knowledge." 

Precisely  what  the  ideas  are,  and  all  of  them, 
that  are  thus  orginated  by  the  mind  itself,  though 
occasioned  by  the  senses,  it  is  not  important  to 
settle  ;  but  it  is  important  to  establish  the  fact  of 
such  a  class  of  ideas,  and  to  understand  their  na- 
ture and  functions.  How  little  the  senses,  or  any- 
thing that  can  properly  be  called  experience,  has 
to  do  with  the  origin  of  those  mentioned  appears 
from  the  fact  that  but  a  single  object  is  needed 
for  them  all.     The  taper  is  lighted  and  it  burns. 

I  will  now  place  before  you,  on  the  left  of  the  line, 
and  in  the  order  given,  the  ideas  we  have  considered. 

Resemblance. 


Number. 

Personal.  Identity. 

Time. 

Space. 

Being. 


Products  of  the  Outek 
and  Inner  Sense. 


68  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

It  will  be  observed  that  I  have  spoken  hitherto 
only  of  ideas  that  are  necessary.  But  besides  ideas 
there  are  also  Propositions  which  are  so  immediately 
connected  with  the  ideas  as  to  be  necessarily  true. 
This  body  is  in  space.  That  proposition  is  true, 
and  seen  to  be  true  by  a  necessity  equal  to  that  by 
winch  we  have  the  idea  of  space.  The  swaying  of 
that  branch  is  in  time.  That  is  a  truth  which  no 
man  can  deny.  To  deny  it  would  be  an  absurdity. 
I  will  tell  you  what  an  absurdity  is.  It  is  some- 
thing that  is  opposed  either  to  a  mathematical 
demonstration,  or  to  one  of  these  first  truths  or 
original  intuitions.  Anything  opposed  to  either 
of  these  is  an  absurdity,  and  that  which  it  is  im- 
possible for  the  human  mind  to  believe. 

In  the  ideas  and  truths  now  presented  we  have 
one  part  of  our  mental  furniture,  and  we  see  what 
its  origin  is.  It  originates  in  the  mind  itself,  and 
is  that  part  of  its  furniture  which  is  common  to  all 
men.  These  ideas  and  truths  are  as  the  bones 
of  the  mental  skeleton.  They  are  not  only  what 
all  men  have,  but  must  have  if  they  are  men,  and 
they  abide  permanently  in  the  mind.  Other  ideas 
come  and  go  as  guests.     These  keep  the  house. 

But  if  there  are  such  ideas  and  truths  you  will 
want  to  know  how  they  are  to  be  tested.  The  test 
of  the  ideas  is  that  they  are  necessary,  and  also 
universal  in  human  consciousness.  They  are  uni- 
versal because  they  are  necessary.  The  test  of 
the  truths  is  that  they  are  necessarily  and  univer- 


TESTS  OF  NECESSARY  IDEAS.         69- 

sally  believed.  Another  test  sometimes  given  is 
that  they  cannot  be  proved  because  no  truths 
plainer  than  themselves  can  be  found  with  which 
to  prove  them.  Another  test  of  these  truths  is, 
that  if  a  man  denies  one  of  them  he  must  act  as 
if  he  believed  it ;  and  that  other  men,  let  him  deny 
it  as  vehemently  as  he  will,  have  a  right  to  treat 
him  as  if  he  believed  it.  There  is  nothing  that 
somebody  has  not  claimed  to  disbelieve,  but  this 
will  be  a  test.  Let  any  one,  for  instance,  claim 
to  believe  that  he  does  not  exist.  I  should  like 
to  know  whether  he  is  not  compelled  to  speak 
in  order  to  make  the  denial,  and  whether  that 
would  not  be  acting  as  if  he  believed  that  he  did 
exist.  Or,  take  the  belief  in  personal  identity. 
Suppose  a  man  to  deny  that,  and  to  make  a  plea  on 
that  ground  before  a  judge.  Suppose  him  to  say  : 
"  My  body  changes  once  in  seven  years.  Accord- 
ing to  the  physiologists  not  a  particle  of  matter  that 
was  in  it  seven  years  ago  is  in  it  now.  I  believe 
that,  and  as  I  am  a  materialist,  I  believe  that  my 
mind  changes  in  the  same  way.  I  do  not  believe 
that  there  is,  or  can  be  any  such  thing  as  personal 
identity.  It  is  true  some  one  bearing  my  name 
committed  the  murder  eight  years  ago,  but  to 
punish  me  would  be  a  case  of  mistaken  identity, 
and  unjust."  Would  the  judge  admit  the  plea? 
Would  he  admit  it  himself  in  the  case  of  another 
man  if  that  man  owed  him  a  debt?  You  know 
that   no   sane   man    could    believe   that.     If    we 


70  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

could  possibly  suppose  any  one  to  believe  it,  we 
should  say  that  he  had  lost  his  reason,  and  was  no 
longer  to  be  treated  as  a  rational  being. 

I  have  dwelt  on  the  above  because  I  wish  to 
show  that  there  are  certain  elements  and  truths 
that  belong  to  human  nature,  and  that  mankind 
believe  in  with  absolute  certainty.  In  these  days, 
when  it  would  sometimes  seem  as  if  the  founda- 
tions of  belief  were  to  be  utterly  unsettled,  I  wish 
to  have  it  understood  that  there  are  some  things 
that  all  men  believe,  and  must  believe. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  see  the  distinction 
between  a  priori  ideas  and  those  of  experience ; 
and  also  between  priority  in  the  order  of  time, 
and  in  the  order  of  nature. 

The  term  a  priori  has  been  applied  to  those 
ideas  which  originate  from  the  mind  itself  on  the 
occasion  of  experience ;  while  ideas  of  experience 
are  those,  as  of  external  objects,  which  are  de- 
rived directly  from  the  senses.  The  term  is  not 
a  happy  one,  but  we  may  see  how  it  arose.  The 
mind  must  itself  exist  prior  to  experience,  and 
as  the  capacity  and  necessity  for  forming  these 
ideas  exist  with  equal  priority  as  a  part  of  its 
constitution,  the  ideas  themselves  are  called  d 
priori. 

The.  distinction  between  the  priority  of  nature 
and  of  time  has  been  much  insisted  on  by  some 
philosophers,  and  is  worthy  of  attention.  Sensa- 
tion   is  supposed  to  be  first.     I  see  a  body,  and 


METAPHYSICS.  71 

have  knowledge  of  it  as  such.  That  is  first  in 
the  order  of  time.  But  in  connection  with  knowl- 
edge of  body  I  have  by  necessity  a  knowledge 
of  space,  and  now  I  see  that  space  must  have 
existed  in  the  order  of  nature  before  the  body. 
It  must  have  existed  as  a  condition,  not  as  a 
cause.  So  a  man  perceives  an  attribute.  That  is 
first  in  the  order  of  time ;  he  then  knows  at  once 
that  in  the  order  of  nature  the  substance  must 
have  been  first.  It  is  in  this  way  that  a  part  of 
a  priori  ideas  are  distinguished  from  those  of  ex- 
perience. 

I  will  simply  say  in  closing  that  I  entered  upon 
this  course  of  Lectures  as  an  experiment,  in  the 
hope  of  making  what  is  commonly  called  meta- 
physics somewhat  plain.  In  considering  the  ideas 
and  truths  which  have  been  our  subject  to-night, 
we  have  reached  that  field,  and  I  ask  you  if  they 
are  not  plain.  In  one  aspect  of  them  they  are 
the  plainest  things  possible.  Everybody  knows 
them,  and  not  only  so  but  always  has  known 
them,  and  could  not  help  knowing  them.  The 
ideas  all  men  have,  and  the  propositions  are  such 
as  nobody  thinks  of  denying  except  a  philosopher, 
or  possibly  a  fool.  In  another  aspect,  however, 
they  are  not  plain.  But  this  comes  from  their 
central  position,  and  from  that  certainty  about 
them,  and  familiarity  with  them,  which  are  such 
in  the  mass  of  men  as  to  prevent  curiosity  about 


72  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

them,  or  even  thought.  If  their  relations  are 
obscure,  and  their  analysis  difficult,  it  is  for  the 
same  reason  that  it  becomes  more  difficult  to 
demonstrate  a  mathematical  proposition  as  it 
comes  nearer  to  being  a  self-evident  truth. 


LECTURE   IV. 

THE   REASON.  —  THE    SENSES,    EXTERNAL    AND 
INTERNAL. 

Being,  Time,  Personal  Identity,  Space,  Num- 
ber, Resemblance.  The  ideas  expressed  by  these 
words  I  suppose  belong  to  all  men.  They  are 
the  common  furniture  of  the  mind,  so  that  we 
see  now  what  one  part  of  its  furniture  is.  We 
also  see  how  they  come.  They  are  the  product 
of  the  Intellect  itself,  and  of  that  alone,  revealing 
itself  uniformly  according  to  its  own  law.  They 
are  occasioned  by  sensation,  but  are  in  no  proper 
sense  its  product,  since  they  are  the  same  what- 
ever the  sensation  may  be,  and,  with  the  excep- 
tion perhaps  of  Space,  might  all  be  given  from 
odors  merely  that  would  give  no  idea  of  an  ex- 
ternal world  at  all.  So  little,  indeed,  is  the  mind 
in  this  department  dependent  upon  an  external 
world,  that  it  might,  from  the  sense  of  smell  alone, 
make  comparisons  endlessly,  and  evolve  the  whole 
science  of  numbers. 

And  not  only  do  all  men  have  these  ideas,  but 
they  all  believe  equally  those  propositions  which 
affirm  their  necessary  relations.  And  not  only 
do  they  believe  them,  but  if  any  one  denies  them 


74  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

in  words  we  have  a  right  to  assume  that  he  is 
disingenuous,  and  to  treat  him  as  if  he  believed 
them.  Amidst  the  uncertainties  of  life  it  is  pleas- 
ant to  find  something  that  is  certain,  amidst  the 
Babel  of  opinions,  a  ground  of  common  belief. 

Having  then  this  class  of  ideas,  what  name 
shall  we  give  them  ?  Some  have  called  them  in- 
tuitions ;  some,  primitive  ideas ;  some,  fundamen- 
tal laws ;  some,  rational  instincts ;  some,  innate 
ideas.  Each  of  these  names  points  to  some  char- 
acteristic or  function  of  the  ideas,  and  their  num- 
ber is  indicative  of  the  many-sidedness  and  im- 
portance of  ideas  that  can  be  so  variously  named. 
The  term  innate,  at  one  time  much  used,  points 
to  the  origin  of  these  ideas  in  the  mind  itself,  but  is 
not  correct.  They  are  not  born  in  us,  but,  as  we 
are  born  with  eyes  so  that  when  the  occasion  is 
given  we  see,  so  we  are  born  with  a  capacity  of 
forming  these  ideas,  so  that  when  the  occasion  is 
given  we  form  them  of  necessity. 

But  if  the  ideas  have  been  variously  named, 
so  has  that  power  of  the  mind  by  which  they  are 
given.  Some  have  called  it  a  faculty.  It  is  not 
properly  that.  The  mind  is  said  to  have  different 
faculties,  not  that  it  is  constituted  of  different 
parts  as  the  body  is,  but  that  it  has  the  power  of 
acting  in  different  ways  that  can  be  distinguished 
and  named,  and  its  power  of  acting  in  each  of 
these  ways  is  called  a  faculty  if  it  be  under  the 
control  of  the  will.     A  faculty  is  a  power  that  is 


THE  REASON.  75 

under  the  control  of  the  will.  If  not  under  such 
control  it  is  not  properly  a  faculty.  We  have, 
for  instance,  the  faculty  of  speaking,  but  not  that 
of  circulating  the  blood.  We  do  not  say  that, 
because  the  will  has  no  power  over  it.  In  the 
same  way  I  would  say  that  the  mind  has  not  the 
faculty  of  forming  these  ideas,  because  it  forms 
them  by  necessity. 

With  these  remarks  about  a  faculty,  and  what 
it  is,  which  will  serve  us  further  on,  I  observe 
that  some  have  called  the  power  which  gives  us 
these  ideas  Reason,  or,  The  Reason.  Hamilton 
and  others  object  to  this  as  ambiguous,  and  so  it 
is.  Reason  is  often  used  to  signify  that  power 
by  which  we  carry  on  the  process  of  reasoning, 
which  is  entirely  different  from  the  power  by 
which  we  gain  the  ideas  that  render  reasoning 
possible,  and  in  the  gaining  of  which  there  is  no 
process.  This  ambiguity  is  especially  misleading 
from  the  similarity  of  the  words,  reason  and  rea- 
soning; for  what  is  the  power  by  which  a  man 
should  carry  on  a  process  of  reasoning  if  it  be  not 
reason  ?  There  is  no  reasoning  in  obtaining  these 
ideas,  and  the  power  that  gives  them  is  not  more 
used  in  processes  of  reasoning  than  in  other  pro- 
cesses. Still,  as  reason  was  the  word  used  in  Ger- 
many, and  was  introduced  by  Coleridge  into  Eng- 
land in  the  days  when  transcendentalism  was 
something  mysterious  and  was  rife,  it  has  been 
more  used  in  England  and  in  this  country  than 


76  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

any  other.  But  then,  while  its  connection  with 
the  word  reasoning,  and  its  general  use  for  all  the 
powers  of  man  in  distinction  from  those  of  the 
brute,  furnish  a  reason  why  it  should  not  be  used, 
its  connection  with  the  word  rational,  furnishes  a 
reason  why  it  should.  As  I  have  said,  if  a  man 
deny  any  one  of  the  truths  involved  in  these  ideas, 
or  fail  in  any  way  to  act  under  their  regulative 
influence,  we  say  that  he  has  lost  his  reason,  and 
surely  that  must  be  reason  which  a  man  has  lost 
when  he  ceases  to  be  rational. 

Another  term  that  has  been  used  is  Common 
Sense.  That  was  used  by  Reid  and  the  Scotch 
philosophers,  when  they  felt  the  need  of  going 
back  to  first  principles  in  order  to  meet  the  skepti- 
cism of  Hume.  They  called  that  which  gives  us  this 
class  of  ideas  Common  Sense,  because  the  ideas  be- 
long to  all  men.  And  that  was  a  good  reason  ;  but 
here  again  the  term  was  ambiguous,  and,  as  in  the 
other  case,  preoccupied.  Common  Sense  was  then 
universally  taken  to  mean,  as  it  does  now,  that  per- 
ception, apparently  without  a  process,  by  which 
the  average  man  comes  to  apprehend  the  common 
relations,  and  to  conform  himself  to  the  common 
proprieties  of  life.  The  judgments  formed  in 
this  way  seem  to  be  instantaneous  and  intuitive, 
as  those  of  distance,  or,  as  those  formed  through 
what  is  called  tact  in  any  particular  business  when 
once  the  tact  is  gained,  but  they  are  not  intuitive. 
They  are  the  result  of  a  process.     Understood  in 


NAME  OF  THE  POWER.  77 

this  way,  common  sense  is  something  that  may  be 
acquired,  and  in  which  men  may  be  improved,  but 
simulating  intuition  as  it  does,  the  ambiguity  was 
unfortunate.  The  difference  was  not  generally 
perceived  even  by  philosophers ;  and  Priestley,  and 
the  English  generally,  ridiculed  the  Scotch  for 
turning  philosophy  over  to  common  sense. 

Intuition  has  also  been  used  to  indicate  the 
source  of  these  ideas.  This  is  the  term  preferred 
by  President  Porter.  It  indicates  the  immediate- 
ness  and  necessity  of  the  knowledge  we  gain  by  it. 
The  difficulty  with  it  is  that  we  have  other  intu- 
itions, as  those  connected  with  the  operations  of 
the  senses  and  with  mathematical  reasoning. 

Hamilton  called  it  the  Regulative  Faculty. 
This  points  to  the  office  of  its  products  as  accom- 
panying and  regulating  all  the  other  operations  of 
the  mind.  The  difficulty  with  this  is,  that  it  is  not 
a  Faculty  at  all,  as  not  being  under  the  control  of 
the  will. 

By  some  German  writers  Faith  has  been  used 
in  this  connection,  and  also  by  Sir  William  Ham- 
ilton and  Dr.  McCosh.  By  them  all  it  is  spoken 
of  as  a  special  faculty  or  power.  Hamilton  says : 
"  Faith —  Belief  is  the  organ  by  which  we  appre- 
hend what  is  beyond  our  knowledge ; "  *  and  he 
refers  our  belief  in  the  Infinite  to  that.  Dr. 
McCosh  does  the  same,  but  makes  it  more  gen- 
real.     He  says  :  "  It  is  that  operation  of  the  soul 

1  Lect.  xxxviii. 


78  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

in  which  we  are  convinced  of  the  existence  of 
what  is  not  before  us."  Also,  that  "It  is  a  na- 
tive energy  of  the  mind  quite  as  much  as  Knowl- 
edge is."  1  It  is  much  to  be  desired  that  this 
term  should  be  freed  from  its  ambiguities,  but  this 
can  never  be  while  it  is  used  to  signify  any  oper- 
ation of  the  pure  intellect,  or,  if  you  please,  with 
no  reference  to  any  estimate  of  persons.  As  re- 
lated to  Faith,  the  operations  of  the  Intellect  are 
of  two  kinds.  They  either  give  us  certainty  or 
they  do  not.  If  they  give  us  certainty,  that  is 
Knowledge,  and  not  Faith.  If  they  do  not  give 
us  certainty,  then  we  have  mere  belief,  or  opinion, 
and  the  reasonableness  of  the  belief  or  the  value 
of  the  opinion  will  depend  on  the  evidence  on 
which  they  rest.  Is,  then,  our  assent  to  a  propo- 
sition when  there  is  more  evidence  for  it  than 
against  it  Faith  ?  Certainly  not.  If  any  one  is 
certain  from  the  operations  of  his  own  mind,  or  in 
any  other  way,  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  what 
we  may  please  to  call  the  Infinite,  then  he  knows 
it  as  he  knows  other  things.  And  if  so  let  him 
say  so,  and  not  run  the  whole  subject  into  mysti- 
cism by  attributing  it  to  a  mysterious  principle 
called  Faith,  and  then  opposing  Faith  to  Knowl- 
edge. Faith  as  an  energy  or  principle  can  neither 
be  opposed  to  Knowledge  nor  compared  with  it, 
for  Knowledge  is  a  result.  There  is  properly  no 
faith  till  we  bring  in  the  element  of  confidence  in 

1  Intuitions  of  the  Mind,  p.  419. 


THE  REASON.  79 

a  person.  If  we  believe  a  thing  because  a  person 
says  so,  there  is  faith.  Into  the  confidence  we  re- 
pose in  a  person  there  enters  an  element  of  choice 
and  of  will,  which  can  have  no  place  in  any  oper- 
ation of  the  intellect  alone  in  any  of  its  forms,  and 
without  ^hat  element  there  can  be  nothing  that 
ought  to  be  called  faith,  or  that  can  be,  without 
introducing  confusion. 

What  name  then  shall  we  adopt  ?  On  the 
whole  I  prefer  the  term  Reason,  as  giving  us  the 
term  rational  —  not  reasonable,  which  is  quite  an- 
other thing — and  would  say  that  the  ideas  and 
truths  of  which  we  have  been  speaking  are  imme- 
diately given,  or  intuitively  apprehended  by  the 
Reason. 

We  next  inquire  after  the  function,  or  office,  of 
these  ideas  and  truths.  As  elemental  and  condi- 
tional for  all  mental  action,  and  for  the  action  of 
brutes  as  well  as  of  men,  their  office  is  low,  just  as 
that  of  gravitation  is  low.  Certainty  the  brutes 
know  these,  so  far  at  least  that  they  are  assumed 
in  their  actions.  The  only  question  is,  whether 
they  consciously  recognize  them  as  elements,  and 
as  involved  in  all  that  they  are  and  do.  And  be- 
cause they  are  thus  elemental  no  proposition  or 
knowledge  respecting  them  can  ever  be  directly 
practical.  In  the  practical  question,  What  is  the 
cause  of  this  particular  sound  ?  it  is  assumed  that 
the  sound  had  a  cause,  that  that  which  caused  it 
had  being,  that  that  being  was  in  space,  and  that 


80  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

the  causing  of  it  was  in  time.  Neither  can  we 
make  direct  use  of  these  ideas  and  truths  as  prov- 
ing anything ;  but  without  them  the  propositions 
necessary  for  proof  could  not  be  framed.  They 
have  been  well  compared  by  Stewart  to  the  lime 
that  cements  the  sand  in  mortar,  or  to  the  vincula 
in  a  chain,  where  >thfc  links  that  produce  the  exten- 
sion do  not  interlock.  Being  given  by  an  invol- 
untary process  they  can  be  neither  proved  nor  dis- 
proved, but  are  assumed  in  every  proposition  that 
can  be  thus  dealt  with.  Not  being  the  product 
of  experience,  except  as  we  must  have  experience 
in  order  to  know  anything,  they  make  experience 
possible  and  valuable  ;  they  give  it  coherence. 

With  so  great  a  difference  in  the  origin  and  office 
of  that  furniture  of  the  mind  which  is  on  the  left 
side  of  the  perpendicular  line  I  have  drawn,  we 
should  expect  to  find  a  similar  difference  in  its 
processes  —  in  the  mode  and  result  of  its  working. 
We  should  expect  to  find  such  a  difference  that 
they  ought  not  to  be  called  by  the  same  name. 
And  that  we  do  find.  It  seems  to  me  unfortunate 
that  such  terms  as  generalization,  and  induction, 
should  be  applied  to  processes  that  have  their  be- 
ginning, and  middle,  and  end,  in  intuition  and  cer- 
tainty. Generalization  and  induction  may  take 
place  on  the  right  side  of  the  line,  but  that  which 
characterizes  them  there  is  wholly  wanting  on  the 
left  side.  All  proper  generalization  proceeds  on 
the  ground  of  similarity  and  comparison,  but  thera 


INTUITION  NOT  INDUCTION.  81 

is  no  such  ground  for  the  movement  on  the  left 
hand  side.  In  all  proper  induction  as  we  have  it 
on  the  right  side  of  the  line,  the  conclusion  be- 
comes more  certain  by  the  bringing  in  of  repeated 
instances;  and  if,  in  this  way,  certainty  can  be 
reached  in  any  case,  yet  necessity  never  can.  But 
on  the  left  side  the  certainty  is  as  great  at  the 
outset  as  it  can  ever  be,  and  whatever  is  affirmed 
as  true  is  seen  to  be  so  by  necessity.  But  radical 
as  this  difference  is,  able  men  continue  to  apply 
the  same  terms  to  processes  on  both  sides  of  the 
line,  and  thus  confound  things  that  differ. 

But  if  there  is  no  generalization  or  induction  on 
the  left  side,  what  are  the  processes  that  take 
place  ?  It  is  conceded  that  we  first  gain  truth  in 
the  concrete.  Our  first  affirmation  is,  not  that 
space  is,  separate  from  body,  but  that  the  body  is 
in  space.  What  then  is  the  process  by  which  we 
come  to  the  knowledge  that  every  body  is  in  space, 
and  must  be  ?  Not  by  comparison,  or  general- 
ization, or  induction,  but  by  what  I  should  call  ex- 
tension —  an  extension  to  all  subsequent  cases  of 
the  same  intuitive  and  necessary  judgment  that 
we  had  to  begin  with.  That  every  event  has  a 
cause  is  no  proper  generalization  gained  by  com- 
parison. It  is  a  proposition  assented  to  by  the 
same  necessity  as  the  particular  truth,  as  soon  as 
the  meaning  of  the  words  is  understood.  But  in- 
duction, unless  it  be  by  complete  enumeration, 
which  is  frivolous,  does  not  give  necessity.     The 

6 


82  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

same  is  true  of  the  affirmation  that  every  event 
must  have  a  cause,  and  of  the  infinity  of  space. 
When  the  occasion  arrives  for  the  mind  to  affirm 
these,  it  does  it  by  an  intuitive  judgment  similar 
in  nature  and  authority  to  those  which  had  gone 
before.  The  time  may  be  delayed,  the  occasion 
may  not  come,  but  if  it  does  come  the  judgment  is 
intuitive  and  necessary. 

But  the  word,  being  —  is  not  that  general,  that 
is,  formed  by  generalization  ?  Not  as  here  used. 
When  I  affirm  for  the  first  time  of  a  body,  that  it 
M,  or  exists,  or  has  being,  I  have  received  a  speci- 
fic, necessary,  permanent  element  in  my  mind  that 
I  am  compelled  to  carry  with  me  in  all  my  think- 
ing. I  am  brought,  either  actually  or  potentially, 
face  to  face  with  a  mystery  that  never  can  be 
solved  —  the  mystery  of  being.  That  something 
is  I  know,  but  can  never  know  how  anything 
came  to  be.  Is  it  said  that  there  is  nothing  in 
nature  that  corresponds  to  the  term  being?  It 
may  be  replied  that  everything  corresponds  to  it 
in  such  a  sense  that  we  are  compelled  to  affirm  it 
of  every  new  object.  But  is  not  this  term,  being, 
the  very  one  made  use  of  to  express  the  highest 
generalization,  the  summum  genus  ?  Yes,  but  that 
is  only  because,  at  that  point,  all  that  has  been 
gained  by  experience  is  dropped,  and  nothing  is 
left  but  that  with  which  we  began. 

You  will  see  then  that  I  would  separate  broadly 
in  their  origin,  and  characteristics,  and  processes, 
the  products  that  we  find  on  the  left  hand  side  of 


SENSATION.  83 

the  line  from  those  on  the  right.  Until  that 
shall  be  done,  I  do  not  think  that  metaphysical 
subjects  can  be  treated  of  with  clearness.  In 
nearly  all  metaphysical  treatises  these  products 
are  considered  last,  but  I  always  thought,  if  I 
were  to  write  a  book  on  mental  philosophy,  which 
I  never  expected  to  do,  I  would  place  them  first. 
They  are  first  in  the  order  of  nature,  they  are  the 
lowest  and  most  elemental,  they  are  involved  in 
all  the  processes  that  come  after,  and  are  needed 
to  explain  them. 

Having  thus  considered  the  products  and  pro- 
cesses on  the  left  hand  side  of  the  line  —  our 
rational  intuitions,  so  far  as  the  intellect  alone  is 
concerned,  we  pass  to  those  on  the  right.  Here  we 
find  Sensation,  and  Perception,  through  which  we 
gain  a  knowledge  of  an  external  world.  By  sensa- 
tion we  mean  the  result  in  consciousness  of  any  af- 
fection of  the  sensorium.  It  is  a  state  of  mind 
produced  through  the  sensorium  by  something  act- 
ing upon  it  that  is  independent  of  the  mind.  By 
perception  we  mean  that  knowledge  which  we 
gain  of  external  objects  through  sensation.  Sen- 
sation is  what  it  is  felt  to  be.  It  is  our  own  state 
in  consequence  of  action  from  without.  Perception 
is  a  knowledge  of  the  being  and  state  of  some- 
thing without  ourselves  in  consequence  of  action 
from  within.  What  then,  is  it  that  each  sense 
gives  ?  and  how  is  it  that  through  the  senses  we 
get  a  knowledge  of  an  external  world  ? 


84  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

On  these  points  I  do  not  agree  fully  with  the 
more  prominent  writers.  They  are  points  on 
which  you  are  all  qualified  to  judge.  My  object 
will  be  to  bring  the  subject  fairly  before  you,  stat- 
ing my  own  opinion.  In  doing  this,  perhaps  I  can- 
not do  better  than  to  take  each  of  the  senses  sep- 
arately, and  inquire  what  that  would  give  acting 
wholly  by  itself.  In  doing  this,  however,  I  must 
premise  the  difficulty  there  is  in  making  this  ab- 
straction perfectly.  From  the  first  the  senses  have 
acted  together,  and  it  is  most  difficult  for  us  to 
imagine  the  isolation  and  poverty  of  one  wholly 
alone.  A  full  appreciation  of  this  would,  I  can- 
not help  thinking,  have  modified  the  opinions  on 
this  subject  of  some  able  thinkers. 

Let  us  take,  then,  the  sense  of  smell,  for  that  is 
the  simplest,  and  what  does  that  give  ?  Suppose 
a  man  organized  with  no  sense  but  this.  His 
mind  is  entirely  vacant,  as  not  yet  awakened  by 
any  sensation.  There  comes  to  him  an  odor. 
What  would  he  know  in  consequence  of  that? 
Would  he  know  that  there  was  an  external  world  ? 
or  a  sensorium  ?  or  any  being  besides  himself  ? 
Yes,  says  President  Porter.  According  to  him, 
"  Every  sense  gives  the  knowledge  of  an  extended 
non-ego"  1  Others  agree  with  him.  I  can  only 
say  that  it  does  not  seem  so  to  me.  I  think  the 
man  would  suppose  the  sensation  to  be  a  feeling 
which  arose  in  him  spontaneously,  as  thought  does. 

l  Human  Intellect,  p.  183. 


SENSATION  THROUGH  TASTE  AND  HEARING.   85 

He  would  have  no  feeling,  no  eyes,  no  touch,  no 
motion.  His  own  existence  as  modified  by  the 
sensation  he  might  know,  but  what  one  property 
of  matter,  or  of  space  as  external  to  himself,  could 
he  know  ?  This  is  a  simple  case.  It  seems  to  me 
plain,  but  if  it  be  not  so  to  others  there  is  no  way 
of  making  it  plainer. 

The  sense  of  taste  is  allied  to  that  of  smell  by 
the  proximity  of  the  organs,  and  the  similarity  of 
the  sensations  they  give.  They  differ  in  that  taste 
is  always  associated  with  touch ;  smell  never. 
But  this  is  incidental.  It  is  because  the  nerves  of 
taste  and  of  touch  are  inextricably  blended.  But 
there  is  a  nerve  of  taste  just  as  there  is  one  of 
smell.  That  nerve  gives  taste  and  nothing  else. 
Touch  it,  and  there  is  no  response.  If,  therefore, 
this  nerve  could  act  by  itself,  taste  would  be 
nothing  more  than  a  smell  in  the  mouth.  It 
would  be  a  sensation,  which  is  what  it  is  felt  to 
be,  and  nothing  more,  and  could  not  be  interpreted 
as  a  sign  of  anything  external  and  beyond  itself. 

But  hearing  —  how  is  it  with  that  ?  Here 
again,  there  is  no  touch,  and  the  sensation,  by  no 
agency  of  ours,  and  simply  as  a  sensation,  comes 
and  goes.  With  no  other  agency,  standing  wholly 
alone,  I  do  not  see  how  the  mind  could  reach  any- 
thing through  this  but  the  sensation. 

Up  to  this  point  I  should  not  be  surprised  if 
many,  perhaps  the  most  of  you,  have  agreed  with 
me,  but  we  now  come  to  sight,  and  most  people 


86  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

believe  that  by  means  of  that  we  come  at  once  to 
the  knowledge  of  an  external  world.  Do  we  ? 
Sight  is  like  smell  and  hearing  in  not  being  asso- 
ciated with  touch.  It  gives  its  own  product,  and 
that  alone.  It  differs  from  those  senses  in  our 
having  direct  control  over  the  organ.  We  can 
move  the  eye  by  itself,  and  so  control  and  modify 
the  sensation  it  gives.  Here,  I  think,  lies  the 
main  difference  on  the  point  in  question  between 
this  sense  and  the  others.  If  an  eye  were  set  in 
stone,  and  held  fixed  what  would  it  see  ?  Color, 
certainly.  Some  say  form.  But  form  of  what  ? 
Nobody  supposes  that  the  eye  originally  gives  form 
in  more  than,  one  dimension  —  that  we  see  a  globe 
or  a  cube  as  such.  It  could  be  then  but  a  colored 
surface.  But  under  those  circumstances  what 
could  be  known  of  surface  or  extension  ?  Could 
the  form  be  anything  more  than  the  form  of  color, 
and  would  that  be  known  as  form  at  all  ?  I  think 
not.  To  me  it  seems  that  there  would  be,  as  in 
the  other  cases,  sensation  and  nothing  more,  some- 
thing purely  subjective.  The  sense  would  not 
perceive  or  recognize  itself.  No  sense  does  that. 
It  presents  its  object  and  nothing  else.  In  the 
case  of  the  eye  I  think  that  would  be  color,  and 
that  only. 

We  next  come  to  touch.  Of  course  when  we 
touch  a  thing  we  have  it.  Yes,  when  we  touch  it. 
But  suppose  it  touches  us.  Suppose,  as  before,  the 
whole  organization  to  be  encased  in  stone  except 


SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION.        87 

the  point  of  a  finger  and  then  that  something 
should  touch  that  point.  It  must  touch  merely, 
not  press  it,  for  touch  is  to  be  carefully  distin- 
guished from  pressure.  Suppose  this,  and  what 
would  you  have  ?  A  knowledge  of  anything  but 
a  mere  subjective  sensation  ?  I  think  not.  You 
would  have  all  there  is  of  the  sense  regarded  as 
passive,  and  it  would  be  as  little  likely  to  give  us 
externality,  or  anything  that  can  come  under  the 
definition  of  matter  as  the  sense  of  smell. 

I  think  a  mind  thus  situated  would  be  in  hope- 
less perplexity.  If,  however,  the  senses  thus  act- 
ing would  give  the  knowledge  of  space  and  of 
some  being  besides  ourselves,  they  would  not  give 
us  a  knowledge  of  matter  and  of  the  material 
world. 

If,  then,  we  do  not  get  a  knowledge  of  the  exter- 
nal world  by  any  one  of  the  five  senses,  acting 
singly,  or  by  them  all  acting  together,  how  do  we 
get  it  ? 

My  view  on  this  whole  subject  can  be  briefly 
stated.  I  have  spoken  of  sensation  as  originating 
in  a  movement  from  without  inward,  and  of  per- 
ception as  originating  in  a  movement  from  within 
outward.  This  gives  us  our  principle,  or  rather 
principles,  for  there  are  three  propositions  that  we 
need  to  state. 

The  first  is,  that  whatever  originates  from  with- 
out by  no  agency  of  ours,  and  is  communicated  to 
us  by  a  movement  from  without  inward,  is  known 


88  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

as  subjective,  that  is,  as  a  mere  sensation,  and 
would  give  us  no  knowledge  of  an  external  or 
material  world. 

The  second  proposition  is,  that  whatever  resists, 
or  in  any  way  modifies,  a  muscular  movement  vol- 
untarily put  forth,  that  is,  a  movement  from  within 
outward,  is  known  as  objective,  and  would  reveal 
to  us  an  external  world,  the  resistance  of  course 
being  known  through  the  general  sensibility  as 
distinguished  from  the  sense  of  touch.  In  the  one 
case  we  have  simply  action  from  without,  in  the 
other  reaction.  And  this  makes  a  great  difference, 
for  we  thus  get  the  two  forms  of  our  life,  as  passive 
and  active.  In  the  first  we  know  ourselves  as  in  a 
state  that  has  come  by  no  power  of  our  will.  In 
the  second  we  know  ourselves  as  agents,  and  thus, 
and  thus  only  come  to  a  knowledge  of  our  proper 
selves.  This  knowledge  of  ourselves  as  agents, 
and  of  that  upon  which  we  are  to  act,  I  suppose  we 
gain  at  the  same  time  by  one  concrete  act.  At  this 
point  we  come  to  the  knowledge  of  opposing  forces 
and  to  the  beginning  of  the  struggle  of  life. 

The  third  proposition  is,  that  after  thus  gaining 
immediately  and  necessarily  a  knowledge  of  mat- 
ter, that  which  is  subjective,  all  mere  sensations,  be- 
come signs  the  significance  of  which  we  learn  by 
comparison  and  experience  as  we  learn  a  language. 

These  propositions  I  give  you  as  my  opinion, 
but  without  the  time,  or  indeed  the  wish,  to  illus- 
trate and  defend  them.     They  are  simply  an  opin- 


"  THE  ACQUIRED  PERCEPTIONS."       89 

ion,  as  I  do  not  remember  what  happened  so  long 
ago.  Many  do  not  receive  them,  and  will  not. 
Perhaps  the  more  prevalent  opinion  is  that  in  all 
sensation  we  know  the  sensorium  as  an  extended 
something  distinct  from  ourselves  with  which  we 
yet  act  in  conjunction,  and  that  subsequently  we 
gain  by  experience  a  knowledge  of  the  other  parts 
of  the  body,  and  then  of  a  world  wholly  beyond 
ourselves !  The  questions  at  issue  here  I  do  not 
regard  as  of  great  importance  provided  we  are 
allowed  to  gain,  in  some  way,  an  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  an  external  and  material  world. 

The  third  of  the  propositions  just  now  stated 
was  that  all  mere  sensations  are  signs,  the  signifi- 
cance of  which  we  learn  as  we  do  a  language. 
This  many  will  not  accept  in  full,  but  they  do  and 
must  accept  it  in  part,  as  it  is  illustrated  in  what 
are  called 

THE  ACQUIRED  PERCEPTIONS. 
This  brings  us  to  an  interesting  subject  and  I  will 
say  a  word  upon  it. 

Nothing  is  more  admirable  than  the  economy  of 
the  senses,  and  by  this  I  mean  the  small  capital 
with  which  they  begin  compared  with  their  ulti- 
mate wealth.  One  reason  of  this  is  that  each  bor- 
rows from  all  the  rest,  and  often  in  such  a  way 
that  it  is  hard  to  distinguish  between  the  borrowed 
and  the  original  capital.  I  have  already  spoken  of 
sight  in  this  aspect.  This  is  the  richest  of  the 
senses,  and  like  most  rich  men  in  this  country, 
began  poor.     It  had  originally  nothing  but  color, 


90  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

or  at  best  form  in  one  dimension,  but  it  immedi- 
ately begins  to  borrow,  and  especially  from  touch. 
Much  the  larger  part  of  what  sight  gives  us  was 
originally  from  touch.  As  has  been  said,  it  is  only 
by  touch  that  we  know  a  globe  to  be  a  globe,  a 
cube  a  cube,  or  any  solid  body  to  be  what  it  is.  In 
the  same  way  also,  and  so  only,  do  we  originally 
know  hardness,  softness,  roughness,  smoothness, 
fluidity,  viscidity,  heat,  cold,  and  yet  all  these  are 
given  by  sight,  and  in  such  a  way  that  most  people 
do  not  know  that  they  have  not  always  been  given 
by  it.  Sight  does,  indeed,  become  a  more  extended 
touch,  so  that  by  it  we  can  know,  as  by  intuition, 
and  seemingly  by  direct  perception,  the  tangible 
properties  of  distant  objects.  We  can  see  that  the 
polished  marble  is  smooth,  and  the  file  hard  and 
rough,  that  water  is  fluid,  and  tar  sticky,  that 
molten  iron  is  hot,  and  snow  cold. 

So  too  sight  borrows  of  the  other  senses,  but 
not  so  extensively.  We  see  that  the  rose  is  fra- 
grant, and  the  bell  sonorous,  and  that  sugar  is 
sweet.  With  some  persons  the  sight  of  a  nauseous 
object  acts  as  an  emetic.  They  see  that  it  is  nau- 
seous. And  not  only  does  sight  thus  borrow  from 
the  other  senses,  it  appropriates,  and  ultimately 
presents  as  its  own,  the  products  of  the  judgment. 
This  is  true  of  distance.  It  seems  settled  that 
some  animals  have  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  dis- 
tance.  Chickens  strike  their  food  at  first  with  the 
same  precision  as  afterwards.     It  seems   equally 


BORROWING   BY   THE    SENSES.  91 

settled  that  man  has  not  the  knowledge  of  dis- 
tance in  this  way.  He  gains  it  by  a  process,  or 
rather  by  certain  processes,  in  which  size,  and  dis- 
tinctness, and  intervening  objects,  and  probably 
the  movement  of  the  eyes  as  affecting  the  angle 
of  vision,  become  elements ;  but  these  processes 
become  so  familiar  that  we  disregard  them,  and 
notice  only  the  result.  That  seems  to  be  given 
at  once,  and  as  the  immediate  product  of  sight. 
Most  persons  would  say,  perhaps  all  who  have  not 
reflected  upon  it,  that  the  knowledge  of  distance 
is  as  immediate  as  that  of  color  which  we  seem  to 
see  in  the  distance.  And  as  we  gain  by  sight  a 
knowledge  of  distance  that  seems  immediate,  so 
do  we  of  the  thoughts  and  emotions  of  others. 
What  we  see  is  the  flush  on  the  cheek,  a  slight 
change  of  color  merely.  What  we  think  of  is  its 
cause  as  it  reveals,  it  may  be  an  emotion,  it  may 
be  a  purpose.  But  all  this  is  by  acquired  percep- 
tion. It  is  the  knowledge  of  one  thing  by  means 
of  another,  and  not  direct  knowledge.  We  have 
learned  it  precisely  as  we  have  learned  the  mean- 
ing of  words  and  of  letters.  The  signs  by  which 
we  reach  it  are  a  language,  and  the  earliest  lan- 
guage learned.  It  is  this  very  early  acquisition  of 
the  language  that  sinks  its  signs  and  processes  so 
far  out  of  sight ;  indeed,  attention  to  them  would 
defeat  the  end  for  which  the  language  was  given. 

As  was  said,  sight  is  the  largest  borrower,  and 
we  have  seen  what  vast  wealth  it  gains  in  this  way, 


92  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

but  the  other  senses  are  not  slow  in  taking  up  the 
same  method.  By  hearing  we  come  to  know 
direction,  and  distance,  and  form.  The  voice  of  a 
friend,  his  footstep,  his  knock,  brings  him  before 
us.  The  click  of  the  telegraph  reveals  the  oper- 
ator three  thousand  miles  distant.  By  the  ear  the 
physician  can  see  what  is  passing  within  the  body. 
But  I  need  not  specify  further.  Cases  in  which 
visible  and  tangible  qualities  are  presented  through 
smell  and  taste  will  readily  occur  to  you.  I  will 
only  add  that  when  sight  is  taken  away  the  power 
of  the  other  senses  to  gain  acquired  perception  is 
greatly  quickened.  It  is  marvellous  what  reach 
and  delicacy  they  will  then  gain.  It  was  said  that 
Julia  Brace,  in  the  seminary  at  Hartford,  deaf, 
and  dumb,  and  blind,  could  distribute  the  clothes 
by  the  sense  of  smell  after  they  had  been  washed. 
From  this  extent  and  reach  of  the  acquired  per- 
ceptions we  shall  readily  see  how  it  is  that  the 
senses  are  deceived,  or  are  said  to  be.  It  is  from 
a  misinterpretation  of  signs.  Such  deception  may 
occur  in  connection  with  any  set  of  signs,  if  it  be 
possible  that  the  sign  should  be  present  without 
the  thing  signified.  So  it  is  sometimes  in  a  paint- 
ing, in  an  echo,  in  a  stick  seeming  bent  in  the 
water,  in  our  own  seeming  motion  when  an  oppo- 
site car  moves  ;  in  the  seeming  motion  of  the 
heavens  when  it  is  we  that  move.  So  also  it  is 
when  the  nerves  are  so  affected  by  disease  that  we 
seem  to  see   sights   and   to  hear  sounds.     In  all 


A  PERCEPT  NOT  A  THING.  93 

these  cases  the  sign  is  present  without  the  reality, 
but  in  direct  perception  this  cannot  take  place. 

After  the  account  just  given  of  perception,  you 
will  readily  see  what  a  percept  must  be  as  distin- 
guished from  a  thing.  This  is  a  word  that  has 
recently  come  into  use,  but  it  is  needed.  A  per- 
cept is  what  is  given  by  any  one  sense.  The  color 
of  an  object  as  distinguished  from  the  object  is  a 
percept.  So  of  its  hardness,  or  form,  or  odor. 
In  a  thing,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  a  number 
of  percepts  combined  at  the  same  time,  in  the 
same  place,  and  under  the  idea  of  substance.  To 
form  a  thing  we  must  have  at  least  three  ideas 
from  the  left  hand  side  of  the  upright  line  that  I 
drew.  This  stick  has  color,  form,  hardness.  Each 
of  these  is  a  percept,  but  to  make  a  thing  they 
must  be  combined  at  one  time  and  place  under  the 
idea  of  substance.  To  these,  other  percepts  might 
be  added.  It  might  have  odor  and  taste,  and  be 
sonorous,  and  all  would  be  combined  and  form 
a  part  of  one  notion  of  the  thing.  Because  our 
notion  of  the  thing  is  gained  through  perception 
some  have  called  the  thing  a  percept,  but  this  can 
only  cause  confusion.  A  thing  is  formed,  or  rather 
our  notion  of  it,  by  combining  in  one  notion  the 
product  of  different  senses  with  rational  ideas. 
Hence,  because  the  materials  are  thus  gathered 
separately  and  brought  together,  and  also  because 
of  the  use  made  of  it,  perhaps  I  might  as  well  say 
here  that  I  call  it  a  concept,  —  an  individual  con- 


94  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY    OF  MAN. 

cept,  to  distinguish  it  from  a  general  one  to  be 
spoken  of  hereafter.1 

We  have  now  dwelt  perhaps  sufficiently,  on 
Sense-perception,  through  which  we  get  so  large 
a  part  of  the  furniture  of  the  mind.  We  have 
seen  what  the  furniture  is  which  we  thus  get,  and 
how  we  get  it.  But  besides  this  there  is  another 
wide  department  in  which  we  gain  immediate,  or 
presentative  knowledge.  We  have  the  power  of 
knowing  immediately  not  only  the  objects  around 
us,  but  also  the  processes  and  products  of  our  own 
minds.  This  power  of  turning  back  and  making 
the  processes  and  products  of  the  mind  the  object 
of  his  thought,  of  classifying  and  reasoning  about 
them  as  about  external  objects,  is  supposed  to  be 
peculiar  to  man.  At  any  rate,  it  is  essential  to 
him.  It  is  the  condition  of  self-knowledge,  and  of 
rational  self-government.  How  else  can  he  know 
what  powers  are  higher,  what  lower,  what  are  im- 
pulsive, and  what  governing  ?  Rational  self-gov- 
ernment implies  the  ability  to  survey  all  our  pow- 
ers together  with  their  objects,  and  not  merely 
to  know  what  their  action  is,  but  to  determine 
what  it  shall  be.  Full  self-knowledge  requires 
that  we  know  not  only  our  motives,  which  per- 
tains to  character,  but  also  our  powers  as  they  are 
in  themselves,  as  they  are  related  to  each  other, 
and  as  adapted  to  attain  the  end  of  our  being. 
This  brings  us  into  a  realm,  not  only  wide,  but  of 

1  See  Schuyler's  Logic,  p.  17. 


THE  INNER  SENSE.  95 

the  deepest  interest,  because  through  this  we  not 
merely  know  ourselves,  but  also  our  fellow-men. 
So  far  as  God  has  made  men  alike  we  have  a  right 
to  judge  others  by  ourselves.  That  this  knowledge 
is  immediate  all  agree.  It  must  be,  for  nothing 
can  come  between  the  mind  and  its  own  processes 
and  products. 

But  what  shall  we  call  that  faculty,  or  form  of 
the  mind's  activity,  by  which  we  have  this  knowl- 
edge ?  Hamilton  calls  it  Self-consciousness,  and  so 
does  President  Porter.  To  this  I  object,  first,  be- 
cause I  do  not  see  what  consciousness  of  any  kind 
has  to  do  with  one  kind  of  knowledge  more  than 
another;  and,  second,  because  a  consciousness  of 
the  operations  of  the  mind  is  not  a  consciousness  of 
self.  The  operations  of  the  mind  are  no  more  itself 
than  external  objects  are,  and  when  the  products 
of  mind  become  objective,  or  objects  to  the  mind, 
they  are  like  other  objects.  Hamilton  says  that 
this  power  has  been  called  Reflex  Perception.  This 
is  well  as  putting  it  in  contrast  with  Sense  Percep- 
tion, but  it  is  not  properly  perception  at  all.  It  has 
also  been  called  the  Inner  Sense.  To  this  there 
would  be  no  objection  if  we  might  call  Sense  Per- 
ception the  outer  sense.  As  it  is,  it  is,  perhaps, 
the  best  name  we  can  give.  The  name  is  not 
important  provided  we  understand  the  thing  and 
it  be  not  ambiguous,  and  so,  misleading.  It  is  be- 
cause I  think  it  ambiguous  and  misleading,  that 
I  object  to  Self -consciousness. 


96  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

But  call  this  power  what  we  may,  we  have  re- 
vealed through  it  an  inner  world  more  wonderful 
even  than  that  which  is  without,  —  a  world  of  in- 
telligence, of  comprehension,  of  feeling,  of  will,  of 
personality,  and  of  moral,  instead  of  physical  law. 
It  is  a  world  whose  phenomena  we  can  study  and 
arrange  as  we  do  those  of  the  external  world  ;  but 
as  in  the  external  world,  the  phenomena  them- 
selves must  be  immediately  given.  We  must  in 
some  way  intuitively  and  necessarily  know  them 
to  be.  This  we  do  know,  and  we  thus  have  our 
third  and  last  department  and  kind  of  mental  fur- 
niture. 

We  have  now  answered,  conjointly  as  we  were 
compelled  to  do,  two  of  the  questions  originally 
proposed.  First,  what  is  in  the  mind?  and,  sec- 
ond, how  came  it  there  ?  The  result  may  be  pre- 
sented to  the  eye  thus,  if  we  suppose  the  upright 
line  to  represent  a  man  possessed  of  intellect  only, 
and  objects  of  sense  to  be  presented  before  him. 


cog 
oq 

WW 
5  Ah 


Resemblance. 

Number. 

Per.  Identity. 

Time. 

Space. 

Being. 


^  (  Willing. 
THE  INNER  SENSE,  m  U  <  Feeling. 

§  jz;  (  Thought. 

K       (  Objkcts 
SENSE  PERCEPTION.  H  |  )  Percepts. 


THE  REASON,  THE  PRESENTATIVE  FACULTY. 

OR, 

INTUITION, 

OR,  THE 

REG.  FACULTY. 
Here  we  have  two  departments  of  mental  fur- 


THREE  DEPARTMENTS.  97 

niture  of  different  origin.  The  first  is  given  by- 
Reason,  or  Intuition,  or  the  Regulative  Faculty,  as 
you  may  please  to  call  it.  The  second  is  given  by 
the  Presentative  Faculty.  The  products  of  the 
Reason  are  few.  The  great  mass  of  our  mental 
furniture  is  given  by  the  Presentative  Faculty. 
This  is  divided  into  two  departments :  the  world 
of  sense,  and  the  world  of  mind,  with  an  infinity 
of  objects  in  each.  The  products  on  the  right- 
hand  side  of  the  upright  line  differ  endlessly  in 
different  minds,  and  we  combine  them  in  every- 
way as  we  please.  Those  on  the  left  hand  are  the 
same  in  all  men.  We  cannot  manipulate  and 
combine  them  as  the  others.  That  is  the  region 
of  necessity.  They  are  given  by  necessity,  we 
must  have  them  to  be  men.  All  modifications 
and  changes  in  or  among  themselves,  whatever 
they  may  be,  are  by  necessity ;  and  they  enter  by 
necessity  as  elements  into  all  our  thinking. 

We  have  thus  three  departments  of  mental  fur- 
niture with  different  characteristics  and  laws. 
We  have  a  priori  ideas  and  truths ;  we  have  the 
external  world;  and  the  processes  of  our  own 
minds.  Each  is  necessary  to  the  others,  and  all 
combine  in  giving  us  a  rational  being  standing 
face  to  face  with  an  unlimited  universe  which  he 
is  to  investigate. 

LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  OE 

CALIFORNIA 


• 


LECTURE  V. 

EEC  APITUL  ATION.  —  CONSCIOUSNESS.  —  THEORIES, 
BELIEFS,   AND  PRACTICAL  EESULTS. 

In  investigating  mind  we  have  now  answered 
two  questions  :  first,  What  is  in  the  mind  ?  and 
second,  How  did  it  get  there  ?  We  say  that  there 
are  in  the  mind  necessary  ideas,  and  that  in  con- 
nection with  them  we  reach  necessary  truths. 
These  ideas  come,  not  by  sensation  or  perception, 
but  on  the  occasion  of  them.  They  are  given  by 
the  native  power  of  the  mind  as  an  original  source 
of  ideas.  They  are  not  innate,  but  the  mind  is 
so  pre-formed  that  it  necessarily  originates  these 
ideas.  The  truths  are  self-evident  and  necessary. 
Neither  the  ideas  nor  the  truths  are  reached  by 
what  is  properly  a  faculty,  as  it  is  not  subject  to 
the  control  of  the  will.  We  call  that  which  gives 
them  Reason,  Intuition,  the  Regulative  Faculty. 

Then  we  have  that  furniture  of  the  mind  which 
is  gained  through  sensation  and  perception.  This 
we  have  in  two  ways :  directly  through  perception, 
indirectly  through  sensation.  That  which  comes 
through  perception  I  hold  that  we  get  immediately, 
intuitively,  necessarily,  through  that  power  of 
motion  by  which  we  know  ourselves  as  causes,  and 


DIRECT   PERCEPTION   BY   CONTACT.  99 

through  that  resistance  of  bodies  by  which  we 
know  them,  not  as  causes  in  the  same  sense  in 
which  we  are,  but  as  substances.  Motion  originat- 
ing in  us  presupposes  a  cause  in  us.  It  also  im- 
plies space,  and  as  necessarily  as  body  does.  It 
implies  both  time  and  space  ;  and  resistance  to  mo- 
tion made  by  our  own  effort  gives  us  a  permanent 
substance  out  of  ourselves  and  other  than  ourselves, 
which  is  matter.  According  to  this,  direct  percep- 
tion takes  place  only  when  there  is  contact,  with 
pressure.  All  besides  that  is  called  perception  is 
indirect.  This  knowledge  some  impute  to  what  is 
now  called  the  muscular  sense.  It  comes,  indeed, 
on  the  occasion  of  resistance  to  muscular  effort,  and 
is  commonly  confounded  with  what  is  given  by  the 
sense  of  touch ;  but  sensation  is  not  perception. 
Sensation  is  on  the  occasion  of  a  movement  from 
without  inward  ;  direct  perception  is  on  the  occa- 
sion of  a  movement  from  within  outward,  and  is 
an  immediate  recognition  of  substance  as  external 
to  ourselves.  Mere  sensation,  being  wholly  within 
us,  with  no  sense  of  effort  from  within,  and  with 
no  resistance  or  pressure  from  without,  which  is 
all  that  any  one  of  the  five  senses  really  gives, 
would  give  us  cause,  whether  within  or  from  with- 
out perhaps  we  could  not  tell,  but  it  would  not  give 
us  substance  external  to  ourselves. 

You  thus  see  that  I  hold  to  an  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  an  external  world  rationally  and  necessa- 
rily obtained ;  and  also  how  I  do  this  without  at- 


100  AN  OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

tributing  it  to  any  one  of  what  are  called  the  five 
senses.  The  notices  given  by  them  I  regard  as  a 
set  of  signs  to  be  interpreted,  as  a  language  to  be 
learned,  and  not  as  giving  us  immediate  and  neces- 
sary knowledge  except  of  some  cause  —  not  neces- 
sarily of  anything  without  us.  Not  simply  by  sen- 
sation, but  by  an  operation  proceeding  from  within 
outward,  involving  the  action  of  the  mind  as  ra- 
tional, bringing  in  the  ideas  of  cause,  of  substance, 
and  of  space  do  I  suppose  that  the  mind  takes  cog- 
nizance by  its  native  power  of  something  that  is 
not  itself.  I  suppose  the  mind  is  thus  introduced 
to  material  substance  as  that  which  it  is  to  control, 
and  to  space  as  the  field  in  which  it  is  to  control  it. 
It  is,  as  I  think,  because  the  proof  of  an  external 
world  has  been  made  to  rest  on  a  set  of  signs  that 
need  to  be  interpreted,  rather  than  on  immediate 
knowledge  that  it  has  been  possible,  as  so  many 
philosophers  have  done,  to  deny  the  existence  of 
an  external  world.  The  distinction  has  not  been 
properly  made  between  the  immediate  perception 
of  substance  and  its  mediate  perception  through 
something  intermediate. 

The  furniture  of  the  mind  given  by  perception 
as  now  explained  is  contingent  and  variable. 
That  which  is  in  the  mind  of  one  man  may  differ 
entirely  from  that  which  is  in  the  mind  of  an- 
other, so  that  those  things  which  have  been  fa- 
miliar from  infancy  to  one  may  be  unknown  to 
another,  or  may  be  regarded  as  a  curiosity.     I  re- 


THE   MIND   FURNISHED.  101 

member  to  have  heard  Mr.  Everett  say,  when  he 
was  President  of  Harvard  College,  that  a  boy  from 
one  of  the  Rice  Islands  of  the  South  was  com- 
mended to  his  special  care,  and  that  when  he  asked 
him  the  morning  after  he  came  what  he  would 
like  to  see,  he  said  he  thought  he  should  like  to  see 
some  rocks,  and  so  he  sent  him  over  to  Nahant. 

Then  we  have,  in  the  third  place,  besides  the 
knowledge  of  an  external  world,  an  immediate 
knowledge  of  the  operations  of  our  own  minds,  of 
our  thoughts,  our  feelings,  and  our  volitions.  And 
this  again  is  a  vast  world,  contingent  and  variable, 
and  not  the  same  for  any  two  men. 

These  two,  the  outer  and  the  inner  sense,  com- 
monly called  sense-perception  and  self -consciousness, 
make  up  what  is  called  the  Presentative  Faculty,  or 
the  Faculty  of  immediate  knowledge.  Some  faculty 
by  which  we  know  immediately  and  necessarily  we 
must  have  if  we  are  to  know  at  all.  When  we 
know  thus  we  are  said  to  have  presentative  knowl- 
edge, and  the  Presentative  Faculty  is  divided  into 
those  two  branches  or  departments  by  which  we 
get  a  knowledge  of  the  external  and  the  internal 
worlds.  By  these,  or  by  this,  together  with  The 
Reason,  the  mind  is  furnished,  and  we  thus  answer 
the  two  questions,  What  is  in  the  mind  ?  and,  How 
did  it  get  there  ?  We  thus  give  our  solution  of  the 
vexed  problem  of  the  origin  of  knowledge. 

Materials  being  thus  given,  the  next  inquiry 
would  naturally  be,  what  operations  the  mind  can 


102  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

perform  with  those  materials.  But  there  is  one 
operation  having  relation  not  so  much  to  the  ma- 
terial as  to  the  mind  itself,  and  so  involved  in  all 
the  others  that  it  stands  by  itself  and  will  need  to 
be  understood  before  we  shall  be  ready  to  go  on  to 
the  consideration  of  what  are  properly  the  opera- 
tions of  the  mind  upon  the  materials  given.  That 
operation  is  what  is  commonly  called 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

This  is  not  a  condition  for  the  other  operations 
of  the  mind,  and  so  needing  to  be  considered  be- 
fore them.  They  are  a  condition  for  it,  since,  in 
the  order  of  nature,  the  mind  must  know  before  it 
can  be  conscious  of  knowing.  Nothing  within  the 
mind  is,  or  can  be,  a  condition  of  the  operations 
of  the  mind  but  the  mind  itself.  The  condition  of 
knowing  is  a  mind  endowed  with  the  faculty  of 
knowing ;  and  the  condition  of  consciousness  is  an 
operation  of  the  mind  of  which  it  can  be  con- 
scious. 

What  then  is  consciousness  ?  As  universal,  and 
as  thus  intimate  to  the  mind,  we  might  suppose 
it  would  be  among  the  plainest  of  all  things,  but 
instead  of  this  there  is  nothing  in  which  writers 
are  less  agreed.  What  then  do  we  mean  by  it  ? 
Can  we  find  a  definition  that  will  enable  us  to  be 
consistent  with  ourselves  in  the  use  of  the  term  ? 
I  know  of  no  writer  on  this  subject  who  has  been 
thus  self-consistent. 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  103 

Whatever  Consciousness  may  be,  there  are  three 
characteristics  attributed  to  it  by  common  con- 
sent, and  these  it  must  have.  The  first  is,  as  its 
etymology,  cow-scio,  implies,  that  it  can  never  be 
alone.  It  must  always  accompany  some  other 
operation  of  the  mind,  and  does  in  fact  equally  ac- 
company all  mental  operations.  The  second  char- 
acteristic is  that  it  must  be  infallible.  It  must  be 
something  that  never  does,  or  can,  deceive  us.  In 
this  all  are  agreed,  for,  if  our  consciousness  can 
deceive  us,  there  is  nothing  between  us  and  univer- 
sal skepticism.  The  third  characteristic  is  that 
consciousness  is  not  a  separate  faculty.  A  separate 
faculty  has  its  own  domain,  and  is  subject  to  the 
will.  It  is  not  a  faculty,  but  is  involuntary ;  is  alike 
in  all  the  race  ;  and  is  a  necessary  act  concomitant 
with  all  mental  acts  of  which  we  know  anything. 
It  has  an  equal  and  common  relation  to  all  the 
faculties. 

We  inquire  then,  first,  is  Consciousness,  as  is 
said  by  Sir  William  Hamilton,  "  the  knowing  that 
we  know  ?  "  He  says  that  consciousness  differs 
from  knowledge  in  this  :  in  knowledge  we  know, 
and  in  consciousness  we  know  that  we  know.  But 
if  the  act  of  knowledge  does  not  suffice  to  itself,  it 
can  avail  nothing  to  have  another  act  of  knowl- 
edge back  of  that.  No  one  can  know  without 
knowing  that  he  knows,  and  nothing  is  gained  by 
thus  dividing  and  giving  names  to  the  two  as- 
pects of  one  indivisible  act.     But  Hamilton  went 


104  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

further,  and  the  main  peculiarity  of  his  view  is  that 
in  being  conscious  that  we  know,  we  are  also  con- 
scious of  the  thing  known,  or  of  that  which  the 
knowledge  respects.  Thus,  our  knowledge  of  a 
table,  according  to  him,  includes  a  consciousness  of 
the  table.  He  said  it  was  absurd  to  assume  to 
be  conscious  of  knowing  the  table  without  being 
conscious  of  the  thing  known,  thus  giving  us,  as 
you  see,  the  evidence  of  consciousness  for  the  ex- 
istence of  an  external  world.  This  was  thought 
important  as  being  decisive  against  the  Idealists 
and  all  those  who  deny  the  existence  of  anything 
external  to  the  mind.  But  this  is  to  confound 
consciousness  with  perception.  If  we  do  not  have 
by  direct  perception  a  knowledge  of  the  external 
world  that  suffices  to  itself  we  can  never  have  it 
at  all.  If  we  do,  then  consciousness  is  not  needed 
for  that  purpose. 

We  inquire  then,  again,  is  not  Consciousness  a 
knowledge  by  the  mind  of  its  own  operations? 
That  is  the  common  definition.  "  The  most  gen- 
eral characteristic,"  says  Hamilton,  "  of  conscious- 
ness, is  that  it  is  the  recognition  by  the  thinking 
subject  of  its  own  acts  or  affections." 1  So 
President  Porter  says,  "  Consciousness  is  briefly 
defined  as  the  power  by  which  the  soul  knows  its 
own  acts  and  states."  But  in  saying  this  they 
seem  to  confound  their  definition  of  consciousness 
with  that  which  they  give  of  self -consciousness,  or 
what  I  have  called  the  inner  sense,  regarded  as  a 

1  Lect.  xi.  p.  139. 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  105 

branch  of  the  Presentative  Faculty.  Hamilton 
says  that  "  self-consciousness  is  the  power  by  which 
we  apprehend  the  phenomena  of  the  internal 
world."1  How,  I  ask,  does  this  differ  from  his 
definition  of  consciousness  just  given  ?  And  Pres- 
ident Porter  says  (Sec.  64)  :  "  The  presentative 
faculty  is  subdivided  into  sense  perception  and 
consciousness,  or,  as  they  are  sometimes  called,  the 
outer  and  the  inner  sense."  This  seems  to  me  to 
be  a  confounding  of  the  two  by  these  eminent 
men,  and  I  quote  them  only  to  show  the  need  of 
care  at  this  point.  Consciousness  has  no  more  to 
do  with  that  "  knowledge  of  the  internal  world  " 
given,  according  to  Hamilton,  by  self-conscious- 
ness, and  according  to  President  Porter,  by  con- 
sciousness regarded  as  a  part  of  the  Presentative 
Faculty,  than  it  has  with  our  knowledge  of  the 
external  world,  since  it  accompanies  both  equally. 
Consciousness  as  much  accompanies  my  knowledge 
of  an  external  world  as  it  does  my  knowledge  of 
what  is  passing  within  myself.  Here  is  a  separ- 
ate department  of  knowledge.  It  is  of  that  which 
takes  place  within  myself.  Here  is  another  de- 
partment. It  is  of  that  which  is  without  myself ; 
and  the  knowledge  of  each  is  equally  accompanied 
by  consciousness.  Can,  then,  the  knowledge  of 
either,  or  of  one  more  than  the  other,  be  con- 
sciousness ?  I  think  not.  Certainly  not  without  a 
confusion  of  terms.     That  consciousness  is  gener- 

1  Lect.  xxix.  p.  401. 


106  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY    OF  MAN. 

ally  regarded  as  giving  a  knowledge  of  the  in- 
ternal world  I  do  not  deny.  This  has  come  to 
pass  because  it  is  convenient,  and  because  such 
knowledge  is  always  present  as  a  condition  of  con- 
sciousness. Nor  will  it  be  easy,  or  perhaps  possible, 
to  change  the  usage ;  but  if  we  are  to  think  or 
write  clearly  we  cannot  give  to  consciousness  its 
own  department  of  knowledge  and  al^p  make  it 
pervade  all  the  other  departments. 

Is  not  consciousness  then  an  inward  witness 
L  or  light  ?  So  some  have  said.  So  Cousin  said  ; 
and  he  said  it  because  it  was  so  pervasive  in  its 
character.  This,  however,  is  figurative  language, 
and  is  so  far  from  precision  as  to  need  no  farther 
notice  here. 

Once  more,  is  not  consciousness  one  of  those 
original  and  primitive  ideas  of  which  we  have 
spoken  ?  Should  it  not  be  placed  as  such  on  the 
left  hand  side  of  our  line  ?  This  has  been  said ; 
but  since  consciousness  accompanies  our  knowledge 
of  those  ideas  in  the  same  way  as  it  accompanies 
our  other  knowledge,  if  consciousness  were  one  of 
them  we  should  need  another  consciousness  back 
of  that,  and  so  on  forever. 

What  then  is  consciousness  ?  Is  there  any  one 
power  of  the  mind  or  mode  of  its  activity  that  pos- 
sesses the  three  characteristics  already  mentioned 
as  belonging  to  consciousness.  We  think  there  is ; 
and  would  define  consciousness  to  be  the  knowl- 
edge by  the  mind  of  itself  as  the  permanent  and 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  107 

indivisible  subject  of  its  own  operations.  This  im- 
plies a  knowledge  of  the  operations,  but  leaves 
that  knowledge  to  be  given  by  its  own  specific 
faculty  while  consciousness  holds  the  whole  in 
unity  by  a  constant  reference  of  the  different  acts 
and  states  of  the  mind  to  the  indivisible  self  or 
ego.  According  to  this  the  formula  of  conscious- 
ness will  be,  not  "  I  know  that  I  know,"  but  I 
know  that  it  is  i"  that  know,  and  I  know  that  it 
is  the  same  I  that  knows,  that  also  feels  and  wills. 
This  knowledge  of  the  self  as  the  subject  and  cen- 
tre of  mental  operations  will  have  no  reference  to 
the  validity  or  trustworthiness  of  those  operations. 
We  have  our  faculties.  We  know  by  perception  ; 
we  know  by  memory.  We  know  immediately,  we 
know  mediately  ;  but  if  our  faculty  of  knowledge, 
whatever  it  be,  does  not  suffice  to  itself,  it  cannot 
be  supplemented  by  consciousness.  That  has  an- 
other field ;  it  belongs  to  another  sphere.  Its  office 
is  to  bind  all  the  operations  of  the  mind  into  unity. 
It  does  for  the  mind  just  what  the  cellular  system 
does  for  the  body.  You  will  remember  what  I 
said  about  that.  As  I  stated,  the  cellular  mem- 
brane is  found  in  connection  with  every  part  of 
the  body.  It  enfolds,  for  instance,  each  fibre  of  the 
muscles.  It  is  never  by  itself.  It  always  accom- 
panies something  else,  is  for  the  sake  of  something 
else  ;  and  it  gives  unity  to  the  body.  And  con- 
sciousness does  the  same  thing  for  the  mind.  It 
is,  as   it  were,  its  cellular  membrane,  combining 


108  AN  OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

everything  connected  with  it  into  unity ;  never 
found  by  itself,  but  always  present  in  connection 
with  every  other  mental  operation.  Hence,  as  I 
said,  it  is  not  a  faculty.  It  is  not  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  will.  It  is  not  anything  that  comes 
to  us  in  any  sense  or  degree  through  the  operation 
of  will.  We  have  it  from  the  beginning ;  we 
have  it  by  necessity  ;  and  one  man  has  it  as  much 
as  another.  Hence  there  cannot  be  different  kinds 
of  consciousness.  If  you  choose  to  say  self-con- 
sciousness, and  give  that  a  special  field  of  knowl- 
edge, very  well.  You  can  then  give  attention  to  it 
or  not,  as  you  please,  but  consciousness,  as  just  de- 
fined, is  automatic  and  admits  of  no  diversity. 

What  I  have  now  called  consciousness  has  always 
been  known  as  one  of  the  elements  of  what  has 
been  so  called,  but  it  needs  to  be  separated ;  and, 
so  far  as  I  can  judge,  until  that  shall  be  done,  and 
the  term  shall  come  to  designate  this,  and  this 
alone,  it  will  be  impossible  to  speak  or  write  on 
this  subject  without  confusion.  Very  possibly  the 
discrimination  I  have  made  is  not  the  right  one. 
I  could  not  accept  what  had  been  done,  and  have 
made  it  rather  than  sit  down  in  despair.  We 
must  go  on  until  we  understand  what  this  cardi- 
nal, universal  operation  of  the  mind  is.  In  order 
to  this  we  must  separate  it  from  everything  else, 
and  agree  upon  the  elements  to  which  we  will  give 
the  name.  So  only  can  we  make  progress,  and 
come  out  into  a  clear  understanding  of  the  ques- 
tions which  we  discuss  on  these  abstract  subjects. 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  109 

If  what  has  now  been  said  of  consciousness  be 
correct,  it  is  plain  that  in  adding  it  to  our  scheme, 
as  we  now  do,  we  must  write  it  as  we  did  the 
cellular  membrane,  giving  it  the  same  relation  to 
the  mental  faculties  and  their  operations  that  the 
cellular  membrane  has  to  the  bodily  systems  and 
their  functions. 


I  have  now  stated  continuously  what  I  believe  in 
regard  to  three  of  the  great  questions  which  have 
divided  the  philosophic  world,  and  which  still  di- 
vide it.  The  first  relates  to  the  origin  of  knowl- 
edge ;  the  second  to  the  mode  of  our  communica- 
tion with  the  external  world ;  and  the  third  to 
consciousness.  The  discussions  on  the  subject  of 
consciousness  are  recent,  and  what  I  have  said  con- 
cerning that  involves  what  has  been  said  by  others  ; 
but  those  on  the  other  two  subjects  are  ancient, 
and  concerning  them,  especially  the  first,  philoso- 
phers have  been  divided  from  the  beginning.  And 
that  these  discussions  are  not  wholly  speculative  we 
shall  see  if  we  notice  how  the  views  I  have  pre- 
sented on  the  first  two  points  will  either  set  aside, 
or  solve  the  theories  and  questions,  that  have  been 
proposed  at  different  times. 

In  the  first  place  the  view  I  have  taken  of  the 
origin  of  knowledge  sets  aside  the  question  of 
which  Cousin  makes  so  much,  about  what  he  calls 
"  the  passage   from  knowledge   to   being."     He 


110  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

seems  to  regard  that  as  the  great  question  of  phi- 
losophy. According  to  him  we  know  without 
knowing  being,  and  it  is  a  great  thing  to  make  a 
safe  passageway  over  from  knowledge  to  being. 
But  if  we  accept  what  has  been  said  we  set  aside 
that  question  altogether  because  we  do  not  know 
at  all  except  as  we  know  being.  In  knowing  at 
all  we  know  ourselves  to  be.  In  perception  we 
know  matter  to  be,  and  we  know  the  subject  as  we 
know  the  attribute,  one  as  much  as  the  other.  We 
know  them  in  one  concrete  act,  and  so  there  is  no 
such  bridge  needed  as  has  been  furnished  us. 

In  the  second  place,  our  solution  of  the  problem 
of  the  origin  of  knowledge  is  that  we  have  knowl- 
edge of  three  kinds  as  is  seen  in  the  diagram,  and 
that  the  mind  is  itself  a  source  of  ideas  and  of 
truths.  On  this  point  there  have  been  two  schools 
from  the  time  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  Plato  believ- 
ing that  ideas  existed  before  the  several  classes  of 
objects,  and  that  those  objects  became  what  they 
were  by  partaking  of  those  ideas  ;  and  Aristotle,  on 
the  other  hand,  believing  that  all  the  furniture  of 
mind  came  through  the  senses.  These,  at  least, 
are  the  views  commonly  imputed  to  these  two  phi- 
losophers. Locke  has  been  supposed  by  the  conti- 
nental philosophers  to  hold  that  all  our  knowledge 
originates  in  sensation,  and  that  the  furniture  of 
the  mind  consists  only  of  sensations  and  modified 
sensations.  To  this  English  writers  generally 
have  not  agreed ;  and  certainly  Locke  uses  language 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  Ill 

by  which  either  view  may  be  sustained.  Possibly 
the  question  had  not  fully  cleared  itself  up  in  his 
own  mind.  Liebnitz,  on  the  other  hand,  was  dis- 
tinctly on  the  other  side.  Accordingly,  when  the 
formula  was  stated,  supposed  to  be  that  of  Locke, 
that  "  there  is  nothing  in  the  understanding  that 
was  not  previously  in  the  sense,"  Liebnitz  said, 
"  except  the  understanding  itself."  There  was  the 
mind  itself  as  a  source  of  ideas  in  distinction  from 
those  it  got  from  sensation.  So  in  our  time,  the 
two  schools  continue  ;  and  we  have  had  Hamilton 
on  the  one  side  and  Mill  on  the  other  with  their 
respective  followers.  It  is  remarkable  that  there 
should  have  been,  and  should  continue  to  be,  such 
a  diversity  of  view  on  a  point  like  this. 

The  interest  in  this  question  is  not  merely  specu- 
lative. If  it  had  been  it  would  probably  have 
died  out  long  ago.  It  is  mainly  derived  from  the 
tendencies  of  the  two  schools.  Connected  with  the 
origin  of  knowledge  in  sensation  there  has  been  a 
tendency  to  materialism,  to  sensualism,  to  a  low 
standard  of  morality,  and  to  the  denial  of  a  here- 
after. Connected  with  what  has  been  called  the 
spiritual  philosophy,  or,  sometimes,  transcendent- 
alism, there  has  been  a  tendency  to  idealism,  to 
mysticism,  to  excursions  into  cloud-land,  to  forms 
of  expression,  oracular  and  obscure,  and  to  an  un- 
due exaltation  of  reason.  Men  have  assumed  as 
the  product  of  reason  what  was  not ;  they  have 
made  out  of  ideas  received  in  this  way,  or  sup- 


/ 


112  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY    OF  MAN. 

posed  to  be  thus  received,  a  kind  of  inspiration, 
and  have  become  conceited  and  dogmatic.  As 
everything  known  in  this  way  is  known  infallibly, 
they  cease  to  be  concerned  about  being  consistent 
with  themselves.  They  say,  "  We  know  this  ;  we 
see  it  to  be  so."  Yes,  but  did  you  not  see  another 
thing  the  other  day  inconsistent  with  that.  "  We 
do  not  know  whether  we  did  or  not.  If  we  did, 
no  matter;  this  is  true."  This  is  presumption. 
These  are  the  two  tendencies  ;  but  as  we  solve  the 
question,  you  see  how,  by  the  tests  applied,  the 
mind  is  kept  in  a  state  of  sobriety,  and  held  down 
to  the  truth. 

Now  comes  the  second  question.  How  does  the 
mind  communicate  with  the  external  world,  and 
what  does  it  know  about  it  ?  And  here  it  will  be 
seen  that  I  stand  with  Hamilton  as  a  "  natural 
realist,"  believing  in  the  immediate  knowledge  — 
not  as  Hamilton  says,  consciousness  —  but  in  the 
immediate  knowledge  of  both  a  me  and  a  not-yne 
of  an  ego  and  a  non-ego.  Hamilton  believed  in 
an  immediate  and  simultaneous  apprehension  of 
two  things  —  of  himself  and  of  the  world.  I 
agree  to  that,  but  I  do  not  agree  at  all  to  his  view 
about  the  senses,  or  about  the  relativity  of  knowl- 
edge. What  is  this  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of 
knowledge  ?  It  is  that  what  we  know  we  know 
as  it  is  related  to  our  senses,  and  our  faculties,  and 
not  as  it  is  in  itself.  That  this  is  true  of  much  of 
our  knowledge  no  one  will  doubt.     It  is  because 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  113 

of  this  that  "  there  is  no  disputing  about  tastes." 
But,  affirmed  of  knowledge  universally,  as  he  af- 
firms it,  it  would  land  us  in  our  not  being  sure 
that  we  know  anything  at  all.  Do  I  then  know 
that  the  whole  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  all  its  parts, 
or  that  a  body  must  be  in  space,  as  something  that 
is  relative  to  my  mode  of  apprehension  ?  or  do  I 
know  it  as  something  which  is  so  in  itself,  and 
which  must  be  known  to  be  so  by  all  rational  be- 
ings ?  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  the  latter ; 
nor  in  saying,  further,  that,  whatever  may  be  pos- 
sible for  others,  it  would  not  be  possible  for  me  to 
hold  to  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge, 
without  passing  over  into  skepticism. 

And  not  only  does  our  mode  of  statement  set 
aside  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge, 
but  also  that  of  materialism  on  the  one  hand,  and 
of  idealism  on  the  other.  Some  have  believed 
that  there  is  nothing  but  matter.  These  are  the 
materialists.  Others,  as  Berkeley,  have  believed 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  matter.  These  are 
the  idealists.  Seeking  for  a  knowledge  of  matter 
through  some  one  of  the  senses  by  a  movement 
originating  from  without,  and  not  finding  it,  and 
not  having  reached  the  distinction  between  the 
two  movements  from  without  and  from  within,  and 
their  results,  they  regard  the  whole  process  of 
knowledge,  through  the  senses,  as  illusory.  The 
notices  of  the  senses  they  regard,  not  as  a  set  of 
signs  to  be  interpreted  with  reference  to  something 


y 


114  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

back  of  them,  but  as  wholly  an  illusion.  These 
two  views,  especially  that  of  idealism,  have  been 
extensively  held. 

But  besides  materialism  and  idealism,  there  are 
other  forms  of  belief  that  are  at  once  set  aside  by 
this  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism,  or  the  immedi- 
ate and  simultaneous  apprehension  of  both  sub- 
ject and  object.  Of  these  one  is  what  is  called 
the  theory  of  Identity.  This  affirms  that  mind 
and  matter,  subject  and  object,  are  the  same  thing. 
Those  holding  this  hold  to  a  power  of  causation  in 
matter  similar  to  that  of  mind,  whereas  matter, 
whatever  may  be  said  of  its  dynamics,  is  not,  in 
any  proper  sense,  causative  at  all.  It  has  no  power 
of  originating  anything.  It  moves  only  as  it  is 
moved  upon.  This  distinction,  and  this  only,  ex- 
plains, as  I  suppose,  the  doctrine  of  second  causes. 
A  second  cause  is  neither  spontaneous,  nor  volun- 
tary, but  moves  only  as  it  is  moved  upon,  whereas 
a  first  cause  is  self-moved.  This,  as  I  have  said 
before,  is  a  fundamental  distinction  between  mind 
and  matter,  and  while  those  who  would  break  it 
down  by  a  theory  of  identity  may  not  be  panthe- 
ists, yet  their  doctrine  tends,  and  would  logically 
lead  to  pantheism. 

Then  there  is  the  doctrine  of  Nihilism,  and  I 
mention  it  that  you  may  see  to  what  extremes  wise 
men  —  shall  I  say  ?  —  no,  I  will  not  say  that,  but 
men  who  call  themselves  philosophers  —  may  run 
when  they  abandon  their  primary  convictions  and 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  115 

reason  logically  from  assumed  premises.  Rejecting 
Reason  and  its  intuitions,  and  seeking  in  vain  for 
substance  through  sensation,  the  Nihilists  believe 
that  there  is  neither  mind  nor  matter.  But  this 
is  absurd,  since  a  man  who  denies  his  own  exist- 
ence has  no  right  to  affirm  or  deny  anything. 

But  the  theory  regarding  perception,  that  has 
created  more  discussion  than  any  other,  has  re- 
spected, not  so  much  its  result,  as  its  mode.  The 
larger  number  of  philosophers  have  believed  in  an 
external  and  substantial  world  as  given  by  percep- 
tion, but  have  supposed  that  the  thing  perceived 
was  not  the  object  itself,  but  something  interme- 
diate. Than  this  theory  nothing  can  be  more 
natural  if  we  suppose  perception  to  take  place 
through  any  one  or  all  of  the  five  senses.  We  do 
see  by  means  of  an  image,  and  hear  by  means  of 
vibrations,  and  smell  by  means  of  odoriferous  par- 
ticles. The  theory  had  its  name,  "  Ideal  theory," 
from  the  sense  of  sight,  and  drew  its  chief  support 
from  that.  Reid  was  first  led  to  examine,  and 
then  to  attack  it,  as  furnishing  the  chief  ground  to 
Berkeley  of  his  denial  of  matter ;  and  then  to 
Hume  of  the  denial  of  both  matter  and  mind. 
Hamilton  followed,  and  his  refutation  of  this 
theory,  in  both  its  forms,  is  among  the  great  ser- 
vices he  rendered  to  philosophy. 

On  this  subject  there  is  a  remarkable  form  of 
belief  in  our  day  —  that  of  Mill  and  his  followers. 
It  is  remarkable  as  combining  Sensationalism  with 


116  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

Idealism.  Mill  is  a  sensationalist.  According  to 
him  there  is  nothing  in  the  mind  that  is  not  the 
direct  product  of  sensation  and  experience,  and 
yet  he  denies  the  existence  of  anything  but 
phenomena,  and  even  of  anything  but  subjec- 
tive phenomena.  As  illustrating  what  this  form 
of  belief  is  in  itself,  and  in  its  results,  perhaps  I 
may  be  permitted  to  quote  from  a  work  of  Mr. 
Taine x  just  published,  and  which  I  had  not  seen 
till  I  came  to  the  city.  Concerning  matter  or 
body  he  says :  "  Certain  possibilities,  and  certain 
necessities  of  sensations  — >  to  these  are  reducible 
the  powers,  consequently  the  properties,  conse- 
quently the  very  substance  of  bodies  "  (p.  280). 
Here  he  speaks  of  bodies,  but  what  is  body? 
"  A  power  then  is  nothing  intrinsic  and  personal 
to  the  object  to  which  we  attribute  it.  Conse- 
quently a  collection  of  powers  is  nothing,  conse- 
quently a  body,  that  is  to  say  a  collection  of 
powers,  is  nothing  "  (p.  279).  But  how  do  we 
come  to  know  this  body  which  is  thus  nothing  ? 
"  No  doubt,"  he  says,  "  we  know  nothing  of  ani- 
mate or  inanimate  beings  except  from  the  sensa- 
tions they  give  us"  (p.  296).  And  again:  "  A  sen- 
sation, and  notably  a  tactual  or  visual  sensation, 
engenders  by  its  presence  alone  an  internal  phantom 
which  appears  an  external  object "  (p.  264).  But 
how  about  the  internal  world  ?  "  Our  successive 
events,"  he  says,  "  are  then  successive  components 

1  On  Intelligence.    By  Henri  Taine. 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  117 

of  ourselves.  The  ego  is,  in  turn,  each  of  these 
events.  At  one  moment,  as  was  clearly  seen  by 
Condillac,  it  is  nothing  more  than  the  sensation  of 
taste  ;  at  the  second  moment  nothing  more  than 
suffering ;  at  the  third,  nothing  more  than  the 
recollection  of  the  concert"  (p.  205).  Again  he 
says  :  "  The  Ego  is  nothing  more  than  the  continu- 
ous web "  —  though  how  he  gets  a  web  I  do  not 
see  —  but  "  the  continuous  web  of  its  successive 
events.  If  we  consider  it  at  a  given  moment,  it 
is  nothing  more  than  a  portion  severed  from  its 
web,  some  salient  sensation  among  others  less  sali-' 
ent,  some  preponderant  image  among  others  about 
to  fade  away"  (p.  207).  Again  he  says:  "We 
have  already  seen  that  what  constitutes  a  distinct 
being  is  a  distinct  series  of  facts  and  events  "  (p. 
294).  Now  attend  to  what  man  is  in  full :  "  This 
man  is  1st,  the  permanent  possibility  of  tactual, 
visible,  and  other  sensations  which  I  experience  in 
his  neighborhood ;  and  further,  he  is  a  distinct 
series  of  sensations,  images,  and  volitions  conjoined 
to  the  tendencies  by  which  this  series  is  accom- 
plished "  (p.  366).  Now  if  you  do  not  know  what 
man  is  it  is  not  my  fault. 

Finally,  to  show  the  tendency  of  this  doctrine 
and  the  reach  of  this  class  of  questions,  he  says : 
"  We  are  disposed  to  conceive  of  it "  (the  Ego) 
"  as  a  distinct  thing,  stable,  and  independent  of  its 
modes  of  being,  and  even  capable  of  subsisting 
after  the  series  from  which  it  is  derived  has  dis- 


118  *    AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

appeared."  It  is  not  fair  to  charge  a  man  with 
holding  what  we  may  think  the  legitimate  conse- 
quences of  his  doctrine  if  he  disavows  those  con- 
sequences. I  know  nothing  of  Mr.  Taine,  or  of 
others  holding  similar  doctrines  as  regards  their 
belief  in  immortality  and  accountability,  but  it  is 
fair  to  state  what  we  think  does  legitimately  flow 
from  such  doctrines,  and  what  would  be  the  result 
of  their  general  reception.  And  I  have  no  doubt 
that  if  men  suppose  they  are  nothing,  and  that 
their  minds  are  nothing  but  the  successive  states 
of  sensation  that  they  are  in,  they  will  suppose 
that  when  the  organization  ceases  the  mind  ceases. 
They  will  find  involved  in  the  doctrine  a  virtual 
denial  of  any  proper  personality  or  accountability 
either  here  or  hereafter ;  and,  so  far  as  mere  spec- 
ulative belief  can  prevail  against  the  native  in- 
stincts and  tendencies  of  the  mind,  the  doctrine 
will  involve  the  destruction  of  the  moral  sense  of 
the  community. 


We  have  now  finished  one  part  of  our  work. 
We  have  furnished  the  Intellect.  We  have  seen 
what  is  in  it,  and  how  it  got  there.  We  have 
also  shown  how  our  mental  operations  are  bound 
into  unity  by  consciousness,  and  have  explained  the 
nature  of  that.  We  have  attempted  a  separation 
of  that  knowledge  by  the  mind  of  its  own  opera- 
tions, which  is  a  separate  field  of  knowledge  and 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  119 

known  by  a  separate  faculty  from  that  knowledge, 
by  the  mind  of  itself  which  is  not  by  a  faculty, 
but  is  native  and  necessary  and  common  to  all. 
In  common  discourse  both  these  are  included  as 
given  by  consciousness,  and  without  inconvenience, 
but  for  the  purposes  of  philosophy  a  separation  is 
needed,  both  in  the  thing,  and  in  the  name.  That 
which  gives  the  first  has  been  called  by  Hamilton, 
and  others,  self-consciousness,  but  to  avoid  con- 
fusion we  have  called  it  the  inner  sense.  That 
which  gives  the  other  I  have  ventured  to  call  con- 
sciousness because  that,  and  that  only  justifies  the 
name  by  accompanying  all  other  mental  opera- 
tions. It  is  a  knowing  of  the  mind  by  itself  as 
the  subject  of  its  own  operations  at  the  same  time 
that  it  knows  those  operations.  How  far  it  may 
be  possible  to  change,  or  wise  to  attempt  to 
change  the  usage  in  respect  to  language  I  do  not 
know ;  but  the  time  has  come  when  it  is  essential 
to  clear  thinking  that  the  things  should  be  distin- 
guished. 

I  refer,  in  closing,  to  the  very  brief  and  imper- 
fect account  I  have  given  of  the  theories  respecting 
the  origin  of  knowledge,  and  the  modes  of  percep- 
tion. Those  theories  seemed  to  me  to  enter  too 
largely  into  the  history  of  human  thought  to  be 
omitted  entirely,  and  yet  the  limits  of  the  course 
would  not  permit  me  to  treat  of  them  adequately. 
I  can  only  hope  that  enough  was  said  to  show 
how  the  most  abstruse  speculations  connect  them- 


120  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

selves  with  questions  that  are  vital  to  society,  and 
also  to  show  how  beautiful,  and  simple,  and  safe, 
nature  and  truth  are,  when  compared  with  the 
speculations  of  man.  True,  the  process  of  dis- 
covery has  not  always  been  from  apprehended 
complexity  to  simplicity,  but  it  was  so  in  Astron- 
omy ;  so  it  has  been  hitherto  in  mental  science, 
and  so,  I  believe,  it  will  continue  to  be. 


LECTURE  VI. 

THE  REPRESENTATIVE  FACULTY. — CONTROL  OF 
THE  WILL  OVER  THE  MENTAL  CURRENT. 

Haying  now  answered  the  two  questions,  What 
is  in  the  mind  regarded  as  intellect  ?  and,  How  did 
it  get  there  ?  we  are  prepared  to  pass  to  the  third 
question  as  originally  stated.  What  operations 
can  we  perform  with  the  materials  thus  in  the 
mind  ?  That  the  materials  should  be  in  the  mind 
is  clearly  a  condition  for  the  performance  of  any 
operation  with  those  materials. 

But  we  must  first  inquire  in  what  sense  any 
thing  is  in  the  mind.  It  is  not  there  as  money 
is  in  your  pocket,  that  is,  if  you  have  any  there. 
That  is  something  that  you  put  there,  and  it 
abides,  and  you  take  out  the  same  piece  you 
put  in.  But  is  there  anything  in  the  raind? 
You  learned  the  multiplication  table  once.  Is  it 
in  your  mind  when  you  are  not  thinking  about  it  ? 
You  know  nothing  about  it.  You  can  recreate 
it ;  you  can  say  it  when  called  upon,  but  it  is  a 
new  thing. 

But  call  it  what  you  will,  there  is  a  power  in 
the  mind  by  which  it  reproduces  states  in  which 
it  has  once  been ;  or,  more  accurately,  by  which 
it  returns  to  similar  states  while   it  knows  itself 


122  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY    OF  MAN. 

to  be  the  same  mind.  Having  then  been  once  in 
a  particular  state  of  knowing,  or  feeling,  or  will- 
ing, the  mind  has  the  power  of  re-presenting,  or 
re-producing  those  states.     Hence  we  have 

THE  REPRESENTATIVE  FACULTY. 

Hamilton  interposes  a  Conservative  faculty  by 
which  that  which  is  in  the  mind  is  preserved  there, 
but  we  know  nothing  of  the  operation  of  such  a 
faculty.  He  also  speaks  of  a  Reproductive,  as 
distinguished  from  a  Representative  faculty.  But 
that  is  not  needed.  What  we  know,  and  all  that 
we  know,  is,  that  when  the  mind  has  once  been  in 
a  state  of  knowing,  or  feeling,  or  willing,  it  may, 
on  certain  conditions,  be  caused  to  return  to  a 
similar  state.  The  state  and  its  product,  if  we 
distinguish  the  two,  may  be  so  similar  that  they 
shall  seem  identical,  and  the  language  used  con- 
cerning them  shows  that  they  are  supposed  to  be 
identical.  What  we  need  then  is  a  faculty  which 
shall  bring  back  those  states  of  mind  which  we 
have  previously  had,  that  knowledge  which  we 
have  once  acquired,  and  to  do  that  is  the  office 
of  the  Representative  Faculty. 

Through  this  Representative  Faculty,  in  con- 
nection with  other  agencies,  when  once  the  mind 
is  set  in  motion,  there  is  a  constant  succession  of 
thoughts,  of  feelings,  of  volitions,  passing  on  in  a 
flow  as  constant  as  the  flow  of  a  river,  and  as  in- 
dependent of  our  wills.     We  can  no  more  cease  to 


DURABILITY  OF  OUR  NATURE.       123 

think  than  we  can  stop  the  planets  from  revolving. 
We  may  think  about  one  thing  and  not  about 
another,  but  think  we  must.  In  this  respect  the 
mind  is  like  the  body.  You  will  remember  that 
I  pointed  out  the  involuntary  powers  of  the  body. 
There  are  also  involuntary  powers  of  the  mind 
analogous  to  them.  The  involuntary  powers  of 
the  body  furnish  the  material  for  the  upbuilding 
of  its  voluntary  systems  and  powers;  they  fur- 
nish the  material.  And  so  the  involuntary  pow- 
ers of  the  mind  furnish  the  material  on  which  its 
voluntary  powers  act.  They  give  the  material, 
and  form  the  condition  of  all  those  operations 
by  which  we  recognize  ourselves,  and  by  which 
we  have  character. 

And  here  we  find  that  double  aspect,  or  more 
properly,  duality  of  our  nature,  by  which  a  man 
is  called  upon  to  govern  himself.  This,  if  suffi- 
ciently understood,  has  not  been  sufficiently  in- 
sisted upon  and  illustrated.  It  is  a  wonderful 
fact  in  our  constitution,  making  a  distinctive  dif- 
ference between  man  and  the  brutes.  Possibly  I 
can  illustrate  it. 


Let  us  suppose  the  space  on  the  left-hand  side 
of  the  two  upright  lines  to  represent  a  vast  un- 
known, and  the  space   on  the  right-hand  side  to 


124  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

represent  the  region  of  personality.  Let  the  hori- 
zontal line  A,  represent  those  involuntary  move- 
ments, the  current  I  have  spoken  of,  bringing  with 
it  thought,  feeling,  impulse,  desire.  All  these  move 
on.  They  come  by  no  will  of  yours.  A  man  pro- 
vokes you,  perhaps  strikes  you,  how  many  im- 
pulses, feelings,  thoughts,  passions,  this  calls  up  ! 
They  come  of  themselves.  You  do  not  will  them. 
You,  represented  by  the  shorter  upright  line  B., 
stand  above  the  stream  at  the  point  of  its  entrance 
and  you  watch  them  as  they  come  in.  The  in- 
stant they  come  you  see  them,  and  one  you  ap- 
prove and  another  you  disapprove.  Of  the  one 
you  say,  I  accept  it ;  and  you  cherish  it.  To  the 
other  you  say  Down  !  down  !  You  will  have  noth- 
ing to  do  with  it,  and  so  you  control  yourself. 
Now  do  you  not  see  that  the  stream  which  thus 
comes  in  and  is  moving  on  without  any  volition 
of  yours  is  yourself  ;  and  that  that  which  stands 
above  and  watches  it  is  you  ?  That  is  the  differ- 
ence between  you  and  yourself  ;  at  least  when  we 
refer  to  the  voluntary  and  involuntary  movements 
of  the  mind.  This  involuntary  current  it  is  that 
is  the  source  of  dreams,  of  reveries,  of  fantasies, 
of  insanity.  When  a  man  becomes  insane,  cer- 
tain ideas,  springing  up  involuntarily,  become  con- 
tinuous and  persistent,  and  overmaster  him.  He 
has  no  control  over  himself.  The  ideas  become 
realities  to  him  and  govern  him  instead  of  his  gov- 
erning them.     Often  the  struggle  is  long  between 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  SELF-CONTROL.  125 

a  man  and  these  illusions ;  and  doubtless  many- 
have  been  saved  from  insanity  by  a  resolute  will ; 
but  the  moment  he  gives  way  he  passes  into  one 
of  the  saddest  and  most  humiliating  conditions 
that  belongs  to  our  humanity.  This  is  a  mysteri- 
ous part  of  our  nature.  There  are  phenomena 
connected  with  it  that  are  not  now,  and  probably 
never  will  be  fully  understood.  This  it  is  that 
brings  in  temptation.  To  this,  in  the  form  that  is 
strongest  at  the  moment,  some  men  give  them- 
selves up,  while  others  struggle  during  their  whole 
lives  against  its  suggestions  and  promptings.  A 
most  blessed  thing  it  would  be,  would  it  not  ?  if 
this  part  of  our  nature,  which  is  indeed  nature 
and  nothing  else,  were  never  to  present  to  us  any- 
thing which  we  should  need  to  reject ;  if  we  could 
always  say  to  everything  thus  presented,  Yes,  yes. 
But  it  is  not  thus  with  any  one  of  us.  It  was  not 
always  thus  with  the  Apostle  Paul  even.  He 
could  say  in  view  of  that  which  thus  presented 
itself,  as  well  as  of  the  infirmity  of  purpose  in 
that  to  which  it  was  presented,  M  Oh,  wretched 
man  that  I  am." 

Now  the  inquiries  that  will  occupy  us  to-night 
are  mainly  four. 

First.  What  is  it  that  determines  the  materials 
and  order  of  this  current  when  that  is  presented 
which  has  been  before  in  the  mind  ? 

Second.  What  forms  do  the  materials  thus 
brought  into  the  mind  assume,  either  of  themselves 
or  under  the  direction  of  the  will  ? 


126  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

Third.  What  is  there  besides  the  laws  of  asso- 
ciation and  our  own  wills,  that  influences  the  whole 
mental  current  ? 

Fourth.  What  power  has  the  will  over  the  whole 
mental  current  —  these  materials,  and  this  order  ? 

First,  then,  of  Representation.  Do  the  mate- 
rials that  have  once  been  in  the  mind  come  into  it 
again  fortuitously,  or  by  some  law  ?  They  often 
seem  to  come  fortuitously.  Nothing  can  be  more 
capricious,  or  whimsical,  or  disconnected,  than  the 
odd  fancies  of  our  waking  hours,  to  say  nothing  of 
our  dreams.  It  is  supposed,  however,  that  under 
this  seeming  caprice  there  is  always  some  law  at 
work;  and  this  leads  us  to  consider  the  law,  or 
rather  laws  of  what  has  been  called  the 

ASSOCIATION  OF  IDEAS. 

And  by  ideas  as  here  used  is  meant,  not  merely 
intellectual  states,  but  also  states  of  feeling  and  of 
will.  In  connection,  then,  with  what  ideas  or 
principles  are  former  mental  states  reproduced  ? 

First,  if  two  things  are  presented  at  the  same 
time,  and  then,  afterwards,  one  of  those  things  pre- 
sents itself,  we  shall  be  led  to  think  of  the  other 
also. 

Therefore  we  have 

TIME, 

as  one  of  what  have  been  called  the  associating 
principles.    It  matters  not  that  the  two  ideas  have 


CASUAL  ASSOCIATION.  127 

no  other  relation  than  that  of  time,  they  will  in- 
troduce each  other.  If  I  see  a  flock  of  wild  geese 
go  over  and  there  comes  a  storm  immediately- 
after,  or  if  winter  sets  in,  the  next  time  I  see  the 
geese  I  shall  think  of  the  storm,  or  of  the  setting 
in  of  winter.  It  is  in  this  way  that  what  are 
called  casual  associations  arise  and  become  estab- 
lished in  the  minds  of  the  community.  It  is  in 
this  way  that  signs,  in  distinction  from  causes,  come 
to  have  the  power  over  the  minds  of  men  that 
they  have,  and  that  various  superstitions  and 
quackeries  arise.  Two  things  are  seen  at  the  same 
time  or  in  immediate  succession,  and  afterwards 
come  to  be  associated  whether  they  have  any  con- 
nection in  nature  or  not.  Friday,  you  know,  is 
considered  an  unlucky  day.  I  do  not  know  how 
it  originated,  but  the  association  became  estab- 
lished, and  now  there  are  many  cultivated  persons 
who  will  not,  if  they  can  avoid  it,  start  on  a  jour- 
ney on  Friday.  As  communities  become  enlight- 
ened such  associations  give  place  to  the  inductions 
of  science,  but  the  number  still  remaining  among 
us,  based  on  this  relation  of  time,  is  very  great. 

But  the  relation  of  time  is  not  the  only  one  on 
which  casual  associations  are  based.  There  is  also 
that  of  place,  and  these  two  are  generally  com- 
bined. It  is  impossible  for  us  to  visit  the  place 
where  an  event  of  interest  has  occurred  to  us  with- 
out thinking  of  that  event,  and  it  is  because  we 
thus  associate  events  with  places,  that  places  have 


128  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

a  historic  interest.  But  for  this,  Plymouth  Hock, 
Rome,  Jerusalem,  would  be  but  as  other  places. 
But  while  both  these  principles  are  natural  and 
necessary,  they  furnish  a  soil  into  which  supersti- 
tion and  folly  so  readily  strike  their  roots  that  if 
we  were  to  take  from  the  history  of  the  world 
their  results  as  based  on  these  two  relations  it 
would  be  quite  another  thing.  We  put  down 
then  as  a  second  associating  principle, 

PLACE. 

Again  if  we  see  a  man  to-day,  and  to-morrow 
see  another  who  resembles  him,  we  shall  think  of 
the  man  whom  he  resembles.     Hence  we  put  down 

RESEMBLANCE 

as  a  third  principle  of  association.     This  is  wider 
and  more  extensive  than  any  other. 
A  fourth  principle  is  that  of 

CONTRAST. 

Heat  reminds  us  of  cold,  poverty  of  riches,  labor 
of  rest,  time  of  eternity,  hope  of  despair.  This  is 
the  opposite  of  resemblance. 

A  fifth  associating  principle  is  that  of 

CAUSE  AND   EFFECT. 

These  are  correlative  terms,  and  so  imply  each 
other.  The  cause  reminds  us  of  the  effect,  the 
effect  of  the  cause. 


PRINCIPLES   OF  ASSOCIATION.  129 

In  the  same  way 

MEANS  AND  END 

are  correlative  terms.  I  place  them  here  because 
they  are  generally  placed  among  the  associating 
principles,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  they  are  not 
so  subordinated  to  Cause  and  Effect  that  they 
ought  to  be  identified  with  them. 

These  six  principles  of  association,  have  been 
divided,  and  I  think  properly,  into  three  classes : 
Time  and  Place,  under  which  the  mind  works 
immediately  and  without  reflection;  Cause  and 
Effect,  under  which  everything  is  done  by  reflec- 
tion ;  and  Resemblance  and  Contrast  which  are 
intermediate. 

These  are  the  chief  principles  of  association,  and 
they  seem  to  me  to  be  original  and  irreducible ; 
or  at  least  that  no  reduction  of  them  to  any  law 
more  general  can  be  made  that  will  be  of  practical 
value.  They  will  remain  the  separate  working 
principles  of  the  mind,  and  must  be  studied  as 
such.  Attempts  at  reduction  have  been  made,  and 
the  result  as  given  by  Hamilton  is  what  he  calls 
the  law  of  Redintegration  ;  this  is,  that  "  thoughts 
tend  to  suggest  each  other  that  have  previously 
been  parts  of  one  whole."  That  is  the  law  which 
was  given,  as  is  said  by  Hamilton,  by  St.  Augus- 
tine, and  which  he  adopts.  That  it  is  a  law  I 
agree,  but  I  do  not  think  it  the  law,  because  I  do 
not  see  that  the  law  of  resemblance  can  be  brought 


130  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

under  it.  That  it  cannot  is  shown  by  President 
Porter,  who  proposes  as  the  law,  "  That  the  mind 
tends  to  act  again  more  readily  in  a  manner  or 
form  which  is  similar  to  any  in  which  it  had  acted 
before,  in  any  defined  exertion  of  its  energy."  But 
taking  this  statement  as  it  stands,  I  see  in  it  no 
more  reason  why,  if  I  pass  the  place  where  I  met 
a  friend  yesterday  I  should  think  of  him  then  and 
there  than  at  any  other  time  or  place.  If  the  ten- 
dency be  there  independent  of  circumstances,  it 
would  be  as  likely  to  show  itself  at  one  time  as 
at  another  ;  but  if  it  depends  upon  circumstances, 
we  are  thrown  back  at  once  upon  the  original  law, 
having  simply  that  and  whatever  tendency  may 
be  implied  in  our  having  a  representative  faculty 
at  all.  The  faculty  itself  implies  the  tendency 
under  certain  conditions.  That  being  given,  what 
we  need  is  to  know  the  conditions.  It  is  not,  how- 
ever, important  whether  we  reduce  these  laws  to 
one  or  not.  The  great,  primitive,  working  ideas, 
are,  as  I  have  said,  those  which  I  have  put  down, 
and  you  will  observe  that  most  of  them  are  taken 
from  those  ideas  which  were  put  down  in  the  dia- 
gram as  belonging  to  all  men. 

I  have  now  mentioned  the  primary  laws  of  as- 
sociation. There  are  also  secondary  laws  which 
have  much  to  do  with  the  order  of  succession. 
These  were  especially  mentioned  by  Brown,  and 
you  will  find  them  dwelt  upon  at  length  in  his 
lectures.  They  are  chiefly  these :  1st.  Events 
that  are  recent,  and  objects  recently  seen  are  more 


SECONDARY    LAWS   OF   ASSOCIATION.  131 

apt  to  recur  to  the  mind.  2d.  The  greater  the 
vivacity  or  emotion  with  which  anything  is  received 
into  the  mind,  the  more  likely  it  is  to  reappear. 
3d.  The  longer  it  is  dwelt  upon,  other  things  be- 
ing equal.  4th.  The  more  frequently  it  is  brought 
before  the  mind.  Hence  the  benefit  of  reviews. 
5th.  The  state  of  our  bodily  powers  will  have  an 
influence.  6th.  Which  will  include  some  of  the 
others,  whatever  will  lead  to  more  fixed  and  pro- 
tracted attention.  These  secondary  laws  will  vary 
with  every  individual ;  and  hence  we  see  from 
these,  as  well  as  from  the  varying  combinations  of 
the  primary  laws,  how  it  happens  that  such  a  di- 
versity of  thoughts  and  courses  of  thought  shall 
be  struck  out  in  conversation  and  in  writing  by 
different  men. 

But  if  thoughts  come  into  the  mind  through 
some  associating  principle  can  that  always  be 
traced  ?  Can  you  always  tell  how  you  come  to 
think  of  a  thing  ?  Something  comes  into  your 
mind.  You  say,  "  How  did  I  come  to  think  of 
that  ?  "  And  you  cannot  tell.  Concerning  this 
philosophers  have  had  two  theories.  One  is  that 
something  comes  into  the  mind  and  introduces 
something  else,  but  disappears  so  instantaneously 
that  all  trace  of  it  is  lost.  The  other  is  that  there 
is  going  on  in  the  mind  an  operation  which  is 
below  consciousness,  but  which  still  affects  the  in- 
voluntary current.  This  is  Hamilton's  view.  I 
can  only  say  that  if  it  be  correct  it  is  an  aban- 


132  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

donment  of  the  principle  that  the  current  is  reg- 
ulated by  the  laws  of  association,  or  by  any  laws 
that  we  can  understand  or  control.  I  hold  to  the 
first  supposition. 

Of  the  representative  faculty  thus  marshaling 
its  hosts  under  the  laws  of  association,  the  prod- 
ucts appear  in  three  forms ;  and  to  these  as  was 
proposed,  we  now  pass. 

The  first  and  lowest  of  these  is  what  is  called 
Fantasy.  Of  this  I  have  already  spoken.  There  is 
in  it  simply  a  succession  of  images  that  have  been 
before  in  the  mind,  with  no  intervention  of  will, 
or  recognition  of  time  or  place.  It  takes  place, 
as  I  have  said,  in  reverie,  in  dreams,  and  in  in- 
sanity. You  have  seen  Niagara.  It  rises  before 
you  as  a  picture.  You  view  it  simply  as  such, 
and  it  passes  and  gives  place  to  another.  This  is 
one  form. 

A  second  form  is  Memory.  In  this  there  is  re- 
production with  recognition,  and  with  the  element 
of  past  time.  These  two  distinguish  memory  from 
fantasy  on  the  one  hand,  and  imagination  on  the 
other.  Memory  is  spontaneous,  or  voluntary.  Spon- 
taneous memory  is  the  immediate  suggestion,  with- 
out the  intervention  of  will,  of  our  past  knowledge 
when  the  occasion  demands  it.  It  may  come  by 
one  principle  of  association  or  by  another,  but  it 
comes  unsought.  Sometimes  it  seems  as  if  the 
mind  has  the  power  to  grasp  what  it  needs  by 
the  mere  suggestion  of  want.      But  however  this 


VOLUNTARY   MEMORY.  133 

may  be,  in  proportion  as  that  which  has  before 
been  in  the  mind  is  presented  thus  spontaneously, 
we  are  said  to  have  a  ready  memory.  The  spon- 
taneous and  ready  memory  go  together. 

Then  there  is  voluntary  memory,  or  as  it  is  also 
called,  Recollection.  We  say,  "  I  do  not  recollect, 
that  is  re-collect,  or  gather  again.  And  that  is 
done  through  the  will.  This  power  of  re-collec- 
tion differs  according  to  the  associating  principles 
by  which  the  mind  has  been  accustomed  to  collect 
and  arrange  its  knowledge.  Are  time  and  place 
the  associating  principles  ?  They  will  'determine 
the  order  in  which  the  past  shall  come  up ;  and, 
if  there  be  a  want  of  cultivation  and  judgment, 
the  story  that  is  told  will  have  in  it  all  the  cir- 
cumstances of  time  and  place  whether  they  are 
related  to  its  point  or  not.  It  is  by  loosely  con- 
necting in  this  way,  and  uttering  whatever  the 
lighter  associating  principles  may  happen  to  bring 
up,  that  story-tellers  become  tedious,  and  talkers 
become  endless.  It  is  in  this  way  also  that  men 
with  this  form  of  memory  strongly  developed  have 
created  the  impression  tliat  great  memory  and 
sound  judgment  do  not  go  together ;  they  do  go 
together,  but  men  of  sound  judgment  never  dis- 
play their  memory  in  a  way  to  show  that  they  lack 
judgment.  What  is  to  be  observed  here,  however, 
is,  that  if  events,  or  knowledge  of  any  kind,  asso- 
ciated by  time  and  place,  do  not  come  at  once  and 
of  themselves,   they  can  seldom  be  re-collected. 


134  AN  OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

The  will  has  little  power  over  them  ;  whereas,  if 
the  knowledge  has  been  associated  and  arranged 
under  the  principles  of  Resemblance,  and  Cause 
and  Effect,  and  Means  and  End,  it  can  be  re-col- 
lected more  certainly.  Time  may  be  needed,  but 
if  it  has  once  been  thoroughly  known  and  well 
arranged,  it  will  come.  Hence  persons  arranging 
their  knowledge  thus  are  said  to  have  a  retentive, 
but  not  a  ready  memory. 

These  are  the  kinds  of  memory  so  far  as  they 
depend  upon  the  principles  of  association.  Facts 
seem  also  to  show  that  there  are  varieties  of  it,  as 
a  memory  for  names,  that  depend  on  special  or- 
ganization.    But  of  that  I  cannot  speak. 

Now  a  word  on  the  cultivation  of  the  memory. 
This,  with  given  power,  will  depend  on  three 
things.  1st.  Attention  —  habits  of  fixed  atten- 
tion. Nothing  can  be  remembered  that  is  not  at- 
tended to,  and  generally  the  memory  will  be  in 
proportion,  not  to  the  attention  we  try  to  give  to  a 
subject  in  which  we  feel  no  interest,  for  that  is 
often  what  is  called  study,  but  to  the  attention 
actually  given  from  a  genuine  interest  in  the  sub- 
ject. Of  this  I  have  spoken  before.  2d.  A 
second  condition  for  cultivating  the  memory  is 
Order.  This  imposes  upon  every  student  who 
would  remember  well,  the  necessity  not  only  of 
external  order  and  arrangement,  but  of  studying 
his  subject  till  he  sees  its  relations  as  whole  and 
parts,  and  brings  it  into  a  system.     It  is  generally 


CULTIVATION  OF  THE   MEMORY.  135 

from  not  carrying  studies  out  till  this  is  done,  and 
this  is  something  which  each  must  do  for  himself, 
that  they  are  not  remembered.  3d.  A  third  con- 
dition is  repetition.  Of  the  effect  of  this  in  ena- 
bling us  so  to  hold  fast  what  we  have  acquired  that 
we  can  command  it  at  our  will  there  can  be  no  doubt. 
But  here  a  question  arises.  Will  the  memory 
ever  lose  anything  ?  It  is  not  whether  some  things 
may  pass  beyond  the  power  of  recall  by  the  will, 
but  whether  anything  can  so  pass  away  that  no 
circumstance  or  event  can  recall  it.  It  would 
be  a  marvelous  thing  if  the  throng  and  series  of 
which  I  have  spoken  were  to  be  retained  —  so  mar- 
velous that  formerly  I  did  not  credit  it  at  all ;  but 
there  are  well  attested  phenomena  which  render  it 
highly  probable.  I  have  a  written  account  by  a 
young  man  who  was  suddenly  brought  into  danger 
of  immediate  death,  and  whose  whole  life  passed 
before  him  in  the  course  of  not  more  than  two  or 
three  seconds  in  such  a  way  as  to  convince  him, 
who  had  been  skeptical  before,  that  there  were  in 
him  the  preparation  for,  and  elemeuts  of,  a  day  of 
judgment,  and  to  lead  him  to  become  a  religious 
man.  Similar  phenomena  are  related  by  those 
who  have  passed  a  certain  stage  in  drowning  and 
been  recovered.  Perhaps  a  distinction  may  be 
drawn  here.  A  portion  of  what  has  been  in  the 
mind  pertains  to  character,  and  a  portion  does  not. 
All  that  does  I  believe  will  be  retained,  and  perhaps 
what  does  not.     I  saw  in  yesterday's  paper  that  a 


136  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

machine  had  been  invented  by  which,  when  one 
writes,  there  is  made  an  invisible  copy  of  every  dot 
and  mark  so  that  it  can  be  read  by  the  microscope. 
We  know  too  that  there  may  be  writing  with  invis- 
ible ink  which  only  the  fire  will  bring  out,  and  I 
think  there  can  hardly  be  a  doubt,  wonderful  and 
fearful  as  it  is,  that  all  that  pertains  to  character,  at 
least,  is  so  written  that  it  can  be  made  to  reappear. 
The  materials  that  have  ouce  been  in  the  mind 
reappear  simply  as  pictures  in  Fantasy  ;  in  Mem- 
ory we  recognize  them  and  place  them  in  the  past ; 
but  we  are  also  capable  of  forming  them  into  new 
combinations,  and  our  power  of  doing  this  is  called 

THE  IMAGINATION". 

This  is  spoken  of  as  Reproductive  and  Creative. 
But  by  Reproduction  here  nothing  more  can  be 
meant  than  Fantasy,  that  is,  the  exact  re-presen- 
tation of  the  pictures,  or  images,  that  have  been 
before  in  the  mind.  As  to  creation,  it  seems  to  be 
agreed  that  the  Imagination  can,  in  strictness,  cre- 
ate nothing.  Its  office  is  to  rearrange  and  recom- 
bine  materials  given ;  but  its  work  will  be  wholly 
different  as  it  deals  with  the  parts,  or  only  the  ele- 
ments of  the  materials  given.  It  is  one  thing  for 
the  poet  to  take  parts  of  the  different  landscapes 
he  has  seen  and  combine  them  into  a  new  one, 
more  beautiful,  it  may  be,  than  any  of  them  ;  it  is 
quite  another  for  him  to  go  back  to  the  simple  ele- 
ments of  form  and  color,  and  without  reference  to 


THE  IMAGINATION.  137 

the  wholes  or  parts  of  landscapes  seen,  to  create 
one.  To  do  this  is  the  higher  power.  The  first  is 
patch-work.  This  alone  can  be  called  creation. 
The  same  distinction  holds  with  the  dramatist  and 
novelist.  Their  characters  may  be,  and  generally 
are,  exaggerated  or  in  some  way  modified  speci- 
mens of  persons  they  have  seen ;  or  they  may  be 
combinations  by  the  mind  from  the  original  ele- 
ments of  our  nature,  perhaps  true  to  that  nature, 
perhaps  not.  So  too  in  invention.  The  mind  may 
avail  itself  of  approximate  combinations,  and  to 
this  there  is  no  objection ;  or,  as  in  the  case  of 
Whitney's  cotton  gin,  the  end  being  given,  it  may 
frame  an  original  and  wholly  new  combination  for 
its  attainment.  In  these  two  ways  imagination 
works,  all  material  being  plastic  under  its  eye,  if 
not  under  the  power  of  which  it  can  avail  itself ; 
and  it  is  easy  to  see  that  its  importance  to  human 
progress  can  hardly  be  over-estimated. 

And  not  only  with  general  progress  is  the  im- 
agination intimately  connected,  but  also  with  in- 
dividual happiness.  I  have  known  persons  with 
imaginations  strong  and  active,  that  seemed  to 
minister  chiefly  to  a  suspicious  tendency.  Out  of 
some  look  or  casual  expression  of  a  friend,  hav- 
ing no  reference  to  them,  they  would  frame  theo- 
ries that  would  make  them  wretched,  and  throw 
them  off  into  lines  of  conduct  indicating  aliena- 
tion, and  for  which  nobody  could  account.  Noth- 
ing can  be  more  unhappy.     Anything  but  a  suspi- 


138  AN  OUTLINE   STUDY   OF   MAN. 

cious  temper  combined  with  an  active  imagination, 
for  the  comfort  of  the  person  himself,  or  of  those 
connected  with  him.  On  the  other  hand,  the  imag- 
ination may  minister  not  only  to  the  embellishment 
of  life,  but  to  its  cheerfulness  and  hope. 

But  perhaps  the  greatest  power  of  imagination 
over  life  comes  from  the  creation  by  it  of  what  are 
called  ideals,  not  of  art,  but  of  character  and  con- 
duct. Ideals  are  representations  of  that  which  is 
perfect,  or  which  we  esteem  so.  They  are  a  set- 
ting before  ourselves  of  lines  of  conduct  such  as  be- 
long to  the  higher  and  better  parts  of  our  nature. 
This  all  can  do,  and  he  who  does  not  do  it,  and 
hold  himself  to  them,  is  but  drift-wood  driven 
hither  and  thither  by  the  circumstances  in  which 
he  may  be  placed.  The  man  who  does  it  is  a 
vessel  that  is  bearing  on  to  its  port.  He  has  an 
ideal,  an  end,  a  purpose.  He  is  aiming  at  excel- 
lence. For  a  single  person  thus  to  form  the  ideal 
of  a  perfect  life  and  to  shape  his  course  steadily 
with  reference  to  it  is  a  great  thing.  It  is  a 
greater  thing,  both  for  themselves  and  for  society  ; 
it  is  what  is  now  needed  in  opposition  to  the  loose 
theories  that  are  coming  in,  for  two  young  persons 
who  are  united  in  marriage  to  form  a  perfect  ideal 
of  a  double  life,  and  so  to  hold  themselves  steady 
against  the  temptations  of  selfishness  and  of  passion 
as  to  reach  its  complete  realization. 

We  have  now  seen  what  the  laws  of  association 
are,  when  what  has  once  been  in  the  mind  is  pre- 


SENSE  PERCEPTION.  139 

sented  again ;  and  also  what  forms  the  materials 
assume,  either  of  themselves,  or  under  the  direction 
of  the  will. 

We  next  inquire,  as  was  proposed,  what  there  is 
besides  the  laws  of  association  and  our  own  wills, 
that  influences  the  mental  current. 

And  here  it  is  to  be  said,  that  in  addition  to  the 
laws  of  association,  there  is  the  constant  operation 
of  the  presentative  faculty  in  the  form  of  sense 
perception  presenting  something  new.  This  was 
intended  to  have,  and  must  have  with  all,  a  great 
influence  on  the  mental  current.  The  succession 
of  day  and  night,  the  order  of  the  seasons,  heat 
and  cold,  cloud  and  sunshine,  new  faces,  new  fash- 
ions, new  scenes,  affect  all,  but  some  much  more 
than  others.  With  some,  the  material  and  order 
of  the  current  is  determined  chiefly  from  without. 
Unless  excited  by  that  which  addresses  the  senses 
they  are  vacant  and  listless,  while  with  others,  the 
current  is  mainly  determined  from  within.  And 
then,  if  we  add  to  the  sights  and  sounds  from  na- 
ture, its  tastes,  and  odors,  and  sensitive  pleasures, 
and  pains,  what  comes  from  conversation  and  from 
books,  we  shall  see  how  greatly  the  mental  current 
is  modified  from  without.  It  is  to  be  added,  too, 
that  as  those  around  us  can  make  suggestions  for 
good  or  evil  through  the  senses  which  we  know  to 
be  from  them,  so  I  see  nothing  impossible  or  un- 
philosophical  in  supposing  that  there  may  be  access 
to  the  mind  by  invisible  beings  who  may  originate 


140  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

promptings  and  suggestions  which  we  may  not  be 
able  to  distinguish  from  the  products  of  our  own 
mind.  Who  can  tell  ?  Many  promptings  and  sug- 
gestions come  to  us,  both  waking  and  sleeping,  in 
a  way  to  indicate  such  an  agency ;  but  the  fact  of 
such  agency  philosophy  can  neither  affirm  nor  deny. 

It  only  remains  to  inquire  what  power  the  will 
has  over  the  whole  mental  current,  its  material, 
and  its  order. 

And  first,  the  will  has  no  direct  power.  It  seems 
self-evident  that  we  cannot  bring  a  thought,  and 
much  more  a  feeling,  into  the  mind,  by  willing  to 
bring  it  there,  because  it  is  impossible  to  exert 
the  will  upon  what  is  not  in  the  mind  already. 
Thought  and  feeling  are  the  condition  of  will. 
But  if  we  have  no  direct  power,  what  indirect 
power  have  we  ?  First,  we  can  arrest  any  partic- 
ular thing  that  appears  in  the  current,  and  hold  it, 
and  dwell  upon  it,  and  thus  change  the  whole  cur- 
rent. And  not  only  can  we  so  arrest  a  particular 
thought  as  to  change  the  current,  but  we  can  hold 
it  with  a  firm  grasp  until  we  have  examined  it  in 
all  its  parts  if  it  be  complex,  and  in  all  its  relations 
to  other  thoughts  and  things.  In  the  power  to  do 
this,  men  differ  greatly ;  and  he  who  can  do  it  is 
capable  of  producing  great  mental  results.  It  was 
in  this  power  alone  that  Sir  Isaac  Newton  said  his 
genius  consisted ;  and  in  studies  like  his  we  may 
be  sure  that  without  this  no  genius  could  have  ac- 
complished anything.    It  is  in  this  indeed,  that  all 


WILL  AND  THE  MENTAL  CURRENT.      141 

mental  labor  consists.  If  we  would  understand 
anything,  all  we  can  do  is  to  hold  the  subject  be- 
fore the  mind  till  we  see  it  as  it  is.  If  we  would 
originate  or  invent  anything,  all  we  can  do  is  to  hold 
steadily  in  the  mind  what  we  do  know  on  the  sub- 
ject, in  the  hope  that  laws  of  association,  not  directly 
subject  to  the  will,  may  present  some  new  phase,  or 
relation,  or  combination  that  will  either  be  what 
we  seek,  or  give  us  a  clew  to  it.  And  to  do  this  is 
mental  labor ;  it  is  hard  work ;  it  is  among  the 
things  men  are  most  reluctant  to  do.  Whoever  can 
do  this  when  he  pleases,  and  especially  if  he  has 
come  to  do  it  with  pleasure,  is  said  to  have  a  well 
disciplined  mind ;  and,  as  mental  labor  consists  in 
this,  so  does  mental  dicipline  consist  in  the  capacity 
to  do  this  at  will. 

But  again  the  will  has  a  wide  control  over  those 
avenues  by  which  the  mental  current  is  affected 
from  without.  What  books  we  shall  read  is 
wholly  within  our  own  power  ;  what  companions 
we  shall  have,  and  what  conversation  we  shall 
hear,  is  measurably  so ;  instead  of  seeking,  as 
many  do,  for  scenes  and  objects  and  pictures 
which  tend  to  defile  the  imagination  and  inflame 
the  passions,  we  can  avoid  them.  In  a  great  de- 
gree the  senses  may  be  guarded,  and,  instead  of 
becoming  inlets  and  purveyors  of  vice,  they  may 
become  ministers  to  purity,  and  to  our  sense  of 
beauty  in  nature  and  in  art.  The  senses  and 
the  imagination  unguarded  are  the  highway  of 
temptation. 


142  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

But  our  deepest  and  widest  control  over  the 
mental  current  comes  from  the  power  we  have  of 
controlling  the  habits  of  association.  We  may 
dwell  habitually  on  the  dark  side  of  things,  and 
there  are  those  who  do  that ;  we  may  dwell  habit- 
ually on  the  bright  side  of  things,  and  there  are 
those  who  do  that.  Day  by  day  there  come  up  from 
the  mysterious  fountain  opened  within  us  thoughts, 
feelings,  suggestions,  impulses.  We  can  repress 
one  and  cherish  another.  If  not  by  a  strong  hand, 
then  little  by  little,  a  little  to-day  and  a  little  to- 
morrow, we  can  cherish  certain  lines  of  thought 
and  of  feeling  till  the  whole  current  shall  be 
changed.  What  is  really  done  in  such  cases  is 
the  adoption  by  the  will  of  some  object  of  pursuit, 
some  ruling  passion,  some  supreme  end,  which 
shall  become  as  the  centre  to  a  whirlpool  in  the 
current,  and  draw  all  things  to  itself.  When  the 
storm  comes  the  philosopher  thinks  of  his  rain- 
gauge  or  his  barometer,  the  merchant  of  his  ships, 
and  the  farmer  of  his  crops.  It  is  a  special  point 
with  dramatic  writers  and  novelists  to  make  their 
characters  speak  and  act  in  accordance  with  such 
habits  of  association  as  their  occupation  or  train- 
ing would  naturally  originate,  and  it  is  a  special 
source  of  pleasure  to  the  reader  when  they  do 
that.  It  is  in  this  way  that  men  become  men  of 
one  idea.  Let  the  ruling  passion  become  strong, 
and,  according  to  the  idea  they  adopt,  they  will 
become  successful  and  applauded,  as  falling  in 
with  the  general  sentiment ;  or  notorious,  as  out- 


REFLEX   POWER.  143 

raging  the  moral  sense  of  the  community  ;  or  ri- 
diculous, as  riding  a  hobby ;  or  heroic,  as  breast- 
ing the  current,  and  sacrificing  everything  for 
principle. 

There  is  one  thing  more.  It  is  what  I  may  call 
the  reflex  power.  This  is  not  understood,  but  is 
still  a  fact.  Suppose,  for  instance,  you  wish  to 
remember  a  name.  You  know  it  in  a  sense  per- 
fectly well,  but  it  does  not  come  to  you.  You 
make  efforts  of  all  sorts,  and  for  a  long  time,  and 
give  it  up ;  but  some  half  hour  afterwards,  when 
you  are  thinking  of  something  else,  the  name 
comes  of  itself  in  a  moment.  But  for  your  effort, 
your  concentrated  attention,  it  would  not  have 
come ;  but  by  what  hidden  spring,  or  circle  of 
influences,  it  is  there,  I  do  not  understand :  The 
physicists  call  it  unconscious  cerebration.  It  is 
in  this  way  that  many  inventions  are  made,  and 
that  original  thoughts  come.  Men  labor  and 
seem  to  labor  in  vain,  but  they  are  all  the  while 
becoming  more  and  more  acquainted  with  the  sub- 
tler and  more  remote  relations  of  the  subjects, 
and  at  length  the  thing  reveals  itself  as  in  a  mo- 
ment—  perhaps  a  bright  moment  that  rewards 
the  labors  of  years. 

On  the  whole,  then,  while  there  is  doubtless  a 
difference  both  in  force  and  material  in  the  invol- 
untary current  in  different  minds,  and  while 
external  surroundings  and  influences  will  assert 
themselves  in  a  measure,  it  yet  appears  that  every 
man,  not  insane,  has  sufficient  means  of  self-con-,  / 


144 


AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 


trol.  Let  parents  control  children  at  the  right 
point;  ; let  individuals  begin  at  the  right  point 
with  themselves,  and  avail  themselves  of  the  help 
which  God  offers,  and  they  can  control  themselves 
with  reference  to  all  the  ends  for  which  He  made 
them. 

In  the  last  Lecture  we  added  nothing  to  our  dia- 
gram, and  found  nothing  to  add  except  conscious- 
ness. In  this  we  have  found  more,  and  with  the 
additions  now  made  the  diagram  will  stand  thus  : 


Imagination. 


Memory,  —  Spontaneous,  Voluntary, 
Fantasy.  5 


Ideals. 

Poetry, 

Art, 

—  The  Past. 

Air  Castles. 

Dreams, 


Secondary  Principles:  — 

Means. 
Primary  Principles  Cause, 

of  <     Resemblance, 

Association.  Place, 

*    Time, 
The  Representative  Faculty  —  Products." 


Resemblance. 

Identity, 

Time, 

Space, 

Being, 


The  Inner 

Sense. 

The  Outer 
Sense. 


Willing. 

Feeling, 

hought, 


Objects. 

Percepts, 


H      (/J 

W 
'      S3 


The  Reason  or  Regula- 
tive Faculty. 


The  Presentative  Fac- 
ulty. 


INTELLECT. 
Will. 
Mind  =  ^   Sensibility, 
Intellect, 


L I  B  R 


A  H  y 


<L7?RWTr°* 


LECTURE  VII. 

THE  ELABORATIVE  FACULTY  AND  ITS  PROCESSES. 
—  CONCEPTS  AND   THEER.   PROPERTIES. 

We  have  seen  that  the  mind,  once  awakened 
and  furnished,  moves  on  with  an  involuntary- 
power.  This  movement  the  will  cannot  arrest  in 
our  waking  hours,  and  we  have  no  reason  to  sup- 
pose that  it  is  ever  arrested  in  sleep.  With  such 
a  power  only,  a  being  in  the  form  of  man  would 
be  a  thing —  a  necessitated,  sensitive,  spontaneously 
active  thing.  In  this  we  have  that  in  us  which 
is  properly  nature,  and  we- have  seen  the  relation 
to  this  of  that  voluntary  personal  power  that 
stands  above  it,  that  comprehends  and  controls  it, 
and  which  is  what  we  mean  when  we  say  "  I." 
Through  the  agency  of  these  two  powers  acting 
in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  association  we  have 
the  Representative  Faculty,  giving  us  mere  pic- 
tures, as  in  Fantasy,  or  recognized  products,  as 
in  Memory,  or  modified  products,  as  in  Imagi- 
nation. These,  with  the  inflow  of  new  material 
through  the  senses,  all  constantly  modified  by  the 
rational  intuitions,  and  brought  into  unity  by 
consciousness,  make  up  the  mental  current.  Over 
this,  as  we  have  seen,  we  have  means  of  efficient 
10 


146  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

control,  by  attending  to  some  particular  thing ;  by- 
guarding  the  avenues  of  temptation,  by  a  control 
of  the  habits  of  association,  and  by  reflex  power. 

But  besides  the  power  of  thus  representing 
what  it  has  received,  the  mind  has  the  power  of 
performing  with  the  materials  thus  received  other 
operations  of  an  entirely  different  character.  It 
can  Compare,  Abstract,  Generalize,  Judge,  Reason, 
and  Systematize,  and  in  doing  these  it  is  said  to 
bring  into  exercise  what  is  called  the 

ELABORATIVE  FACULTY. 

It  is  by  this  faculty  that  those  operations  which 
are  now  called  thought  are  performed.  Formerly 
all  the  operations  of  the  intellect  were  called 
thought,  but  more  recently  the  term  thought  has 
been  limited  to  the  processes  just  mentioned. 

The  faculty  is  called  Elaborative,  and  it  will  be 
observed  that  its  processes  hold  the  same  relation  to 
the  materials  brought  into  the  mind  that  the  pro- 
cesses of  building  and  repairing  hold  to  the  mate- 
rials which  are  brought  into  the  body.  The  build- 
ing and  repairing  systems  take  hold  of  that  which 
is  brought  into  the  system  and  elaborate  it ;  they 
transform  it,  and  make  of  it  another  thing.  The 
elaborative  system  does  the  same  thing  in  the 
mind.  It  takes  the  material  given  by  the  presen- 
tative  faculty  and  performs  the  operations  I  have 
mentioned,  and  those  are  the  operations  we  are 
now  to  consider.  These  operations  have,  as  I 
showed  that   the   various  functions   of   the   body 


THE  ELABORATIVE  FACULTY.        147 

have,  a  regular  gradation.  In  order  to  abstract,  it 
is  necessary  to  compare  ;  in  order  to  generalize,  it 
is  necessary  to  compare  and  abstract ;  in  order  to 
judge,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  that  word,  it  is 
necessary  to  compare,  abstract,  and  generalize ; 
in  order  to  reason,  it  is  necessary  to  compare,  ab- 
stract, generalize,  and  judge ;  and  in  order  to  sys- 
tematize, it  is  necessary  to  compare,  abstract,  gen- 
eralize, judge,  and  reason.  There  is  here,  pre- 
cisely as  in  the  body,  a  regular  gradation  and 
order  of  functions  as  conditioning  and  conditioned. 
The  processes  here  spoken  of  as  belonging  to 
the  Elaborative  Faculty  are  the  same  as  those  as- 
signed to  the  Understanding  by  those  who  divide 
the  Intellect  into  the  Understanding  and  the  Rea- 
son. As  elaborating  materials  already  given,  and 
as  subject  to  the  will,  these  processes  are  in  entire 
contrast  to  those  assigned  to  the  Reason.  These 
we  now  proceed  to  consider  separately.  And  first 
of 

COMPAKISON. 

This  some  would  not  place  first,  but  I  do  it  be- 
cause there  is  an  elementary  comparison  and  con- 
trast of  ourselves  with  other  things  in  our  first  acts 
of  thought,  and  that  is  involved  in  all  our  thinking. 
This  is  little  noticed,  but  with  what  is  commonly 
called  comparison  we  are  all  familiar.  Here  are 
two  men  presented  by  the  senses.  One  is  tall,  well 
proportioned,  with  a  light  complexion  and  sandy 
hair ;  the  other  is  short,  with  rickety  shoulders,  a 
dark   complexion  and  dark  hair.      In  these  and 


148  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

other  respects  they  differ,  but  there  are  others  in 
which  they  agree.  They  have  common  senses ; 
each  has  two  hands  and  two  feet ;  each  has  a  chin  ; 
they  both  use  language  to  express  thought,  and 
both  have  a  moral  nature.  In  comparing  them  or 
any  two  objects,  we  observe  both  the  points  of 
resemblance  and  those  of  difference,  and,  as  we 
notice  one  or  the  other,  we  form  habits  of  mind 
practically  different. 

There  are  men,  who,  in  looking  at  different 
objects,  habitually  and  chiefly  observe  the  points 
of  resemblance.  These  tend  to  classify  and  ar- 
range all  things,  and  bring  them  into  unity. 
They  are  constructive  and  run  into  science,  for 
there  is  no  science  except  as  there  is  resemblance, 
and  as  there  are  classification  and  arrangement 
based  on  that.  Other  men  observe  differences, 
and  so  become  practical  rather  than  scientific  men. 
In  dealing  with  different  substances  or  different 
men  we  need  to  know,  not  so  much  what  they 
have  in  common,  as  their  specific  characteristics 
and  differences.  Take  the  physician.  There  are 
physicians  who  are  scientific  ;  they  know  the  gen- 
eral facts  and  laws  of  their  profession,  and  can 
give  a  good  lecture  on  any  point  pertaining  to  it. 
But  take  them  to  the  bedside,  and  they  fail  from 
not  discriminating  differences.  This  is  typhus 
fever,  and  that  is  typhus  fever.  The  resemblances 
they  see,  but  the  difference  between  typhus  fever 
and  typhus  fever  they  do  not  see,  and  so,  in  treat- 
ing each  case  alike,  they  kill  their  patients  scien- 


ABSTRACTION.  —  GENERALIZATION.  149 

tifically,  or  at  least  fail  to  cure  them.  These  are 
the  men  of  routine.  There  are  others,  who,  while 
using  the  common  name,  observe  every  difference 
of  age,  of  temperament,  of  habit,  and  who  are 
thus  able  to  adapt  their  treatment  to  each  par- 
ticular case.  And  so  it  is  throughout.  Scientific 
classification  depends  on  the  observation  of  resem- 
blances, and  practical  skill  on  the  observation  of 
differences.  So  much  for  comparison  —  the  obser- 
vation of  resemblances  and  differences.  We  next 
pass  to 

ABSTRACTION. 
By  this  we  mean  simply  the  consideration  of  one 
of  the  qualities  of  an  object  without  reference  to 
the  rest ;  as,  for  instance,  the  redness  of  this  desk. 
You  can  consider  that  with  no  reference  to  the 
other  qualities  of  the  desk,  and  when  you  do  that 
you  abstract.  This  supposes  a  difference  between 
substances  and  attributes.  In  abstraction  we  con- 
sider attributes  by  themselves.  To  do  this  is  nec- 
essary in  order  to  the  next  process  mentioned, 
which  is 

GENERALIZATION. 

We  can  abstract  without  generalizing,  but  we 
cannot  generalize  without  abstracting.  Between 
the  two  men  already  referred  to,  there  are  such 
points  of  resemblance  that  many  assertions  may  be 
made  that  will  be  true  of  both  of  them ;  and  that 
we  may  make  such  assertions  conveniently,  we  need 
a  common  name.     Generalization  is  the   giving  of 


150  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

a  common  name  to  individuals  and  objects  that  re- 
semble each  other,  on  the  ground  of  that  resem- 
blance. This  implies  that  we  abstract  the  points 
of  resemblance,  and  consider  them,  without  refer- 
ence to  the  points  of  difference.  To  do  this  is 
natural,  and  is  necessary  to  make  language  a  con- 
venient instrument  for  communicating  thought. 
If  we  may  call  that  a  contrivance  which  is  instinc- 
tive, we  may  say  that  there  is  no  labor-saving  con- 
trivance like  it.  The  single  assertion,  "  Man  is 
mortal,"  is  equivalent  to  as  many  separate  asser- 
tions as  there  are  men  on  the  earth.  And  so  of 
other  things.  On  the  ground  of  their  resemblance 
we  are  able  to  affirm  of  them  all  by  a  single  asser- 
tion what  is  true  of  each.  And  this  gives  us  in- 
directly a  good  rule  for  generalization.  It  is  that 
we  may  apply  a  common  name  only  on  the  ground 
of  such  resemblance  that  what  we  affirm  of  all 
shall  be  true  of  each.  That  this  rule  should  al- 
ways be  observed  is  not  possible,  but  the  delusions 
and  prejudices  into  which  men  fall  from  not  ob- 
serving it  are  endless.  When  it  cannot  be  observed, 
and  a  common  name  is  given  on  such  a  ground,  for 
instance  as  nationality,  we  are  to  be  careful  to  affirm 
of  individuals  only  what  is  necessarily  implied  in 
the  name,  and  not  what  we  may  have  accidentally 
associated  with  it. 

We  now  see  how  we  get  the  general  term,  and 
what  the  use  of  it  is.  We  next  inquire  what  that 
is  in  the  mind  that  corresponds  to  such  a  term. 


MEANING  OF  THE  TERM,   "MAN."  151 

When  I  speak  of  an  individual  man,  I  know 
what  is  in  my  mind.  I  know  there  is  an  actually 
existing  being  who  corresponds  to  the  name  he  may 
happen  to  have  ;  but  when  I  take  the  term  "  man," 
what  is  it  in  my  mind  that  corresponds  to  that  ? 
Is  there  anything  out  of  my  mind,  and  existing  in 
nature,  that  corresponds  to  it  ?  No.  What  does 
the  term,  "  man,"  mean  then  ?  The  question  here 
involved  has  long  divided  philosophers,  and  there 
have  been  three  theories  a"bout  it.  The  first  is 
that  of 

REALISM. 

According  to  this,  when  a  general  term  is  made 
use  of,  at  least  in  some  cases,  there  is  something 
out  of  the  mind  that  corresponds  to  it,  a  real  thing. 
The  term  man,  for  instance,  means  not  only  what 
all  men  have  in  common,  but  something  which  ex- 
ists apart  from  any  individual  man,  and  by  partak- 
ing of  which  each  individual  becomes  a  man. 

The  second  theory  is  that  of 

NOMINALISM. 

According  to  this,  there  is  not  only  nothing  in 
nature  that  corresponds  to  the  word  "man,"  but 
there  is  nothing  in  the  mind  except  the  word,  the 
name. 

The  third  theory  is  that  of 

CONCEPTUALISM. 

There  are  those  who  say  that  in  apprehending 


152  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

those  points  of  resemblance  on  which  the  word  is 
based,  there  is  a  mental  product  distinct  from  the 
word,  which  may  be  called  a  conception,  or  con- 
cept. This  I  suppose  to  be  correct.  But  whether 
it  be  so  or  not,  a  concept  is  that  which  corresponds 
to  a  general  term,  and  you  see  how  it  is  reached. 

Of  concepts,  as  thus  formed,  the  properties  and 
uses  are  so  many  and  so  important,  that  they  need 
to  be  well  understood.  And  first,  they  have  what 
are  called  comprehension  and  extension.  What 
these  are  will  be  best  explained  by  a  series. 

Being. 

Organized  Being. 

Animal. 

Vertebrate. 

Mammal. 

Man. 

Cato. 

In  this  series,  there  are  two  wholes  which  are 
inversely  as  each  other.  Taking  the  individual, 
Cato,  you  will  see  that  he  has  in  him  a  greater 
number  of  qualities  than  man  has.  He  has  all 
the  qualities  needed  to  make  him  a  man,  and  in 
addition,  those  specific  qualities  which  make  him 
Cato.  Man,  again,  has  more  qualities  than  Mam- 
mal. He  has  all  that  belongs  to  Mammal,  with 
those  needed  to  make  him  man.  And  so  on,  all 
the  way  up,  till  we  reach  Being,  which  is  said  to 
be  the  most  general  of  all,  but  has  no  attribute  ex- 
cept itself.  Here  then  we  have,  in  an  individual 
man,  a  greater  number  of  qualities,  and  so  greater 


COMPREHENSION   AND  EXTENSION. 


153 


comprehension,  than  in  any  member  of  the  series 
above  him  ;  and  the  qualities  go  on  diminishing 
till  we  reach  the  top.  In  the  individual,  at  the 
bottom,  the  number  is  the  greatest  possible  ;  in 
Being,  at  the  top,  the  number  is  the  smallest  pos- 
sible. We  thus  see  what  a  whole  of  comprehen- 
sion is,  and  how  one  is  greater  than  another. 

Beginning  now  at  the  top,  we  shall  see  that  Be- 
ing can  be  affirmed  of  more  objects  than  organ- 
ized being ;  that-  organized  being  includes  under 
it  more  objects  than  Animal ;  Animal  more  than 
Vertebrate,  and  so  on  till  we  come  to  Cato,  where 
we  have  the  least  number  possible.  This  gives 
us  extension,  and  it  will  be  seen  at  once  that  the 
whole  of  extension  can  become  less,  only  as  the 
whole  of  comprehension  becomes  greater, 

In  our  first  Lecture  we  had  a  pyramid  in  which 
the  steps  of  the  creation  were  represented,  the 
numbers  diminishing  as  qualities  were  added  till 
we  reached  man.     We  may  also  have  here  a  pyr- 


154 


AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 


amid  representing  the  progress  of  thought  as  it 
passes  from  the  more  to  the  less  general.  Thus, 
this  pyramid  shows  us  a  whole  of  extension,  and 
how  it  diminishes  till  it  reaches  a  point  in  Cato. 
A  similar  pyramid  with  its  members  inverted  will 
give  us  a  whole  of  comprehension  diminishing  till 
it  reaches  a  point  in  Being.     Thus 


N 

/  Being\ 

Or.  Being. 

Animal. 

Vertebrate. 

Mammal. 

Man. 

Cato. 

These-two  pyramids  will  enable  you  to  under- 
stand easily  the  two  wholes  that  are  contained  in 
the  concept,  and  how  it  is  that  they  must  be  in- 
versely as  each  other.  A  clear  understanding  of 
this  is  the  key  to  most  of  the  processes  of  thought 
and  of  Logic. 

But  before  showing  how  this  is,  let  me  ask  your 
attention  to  the  peculiarities  of  the  lowest,  and  of 
the  highest  members  of  the  series  above  given. 
And  first  of  Cato.  This  is  the  name  of  an  indi- 
vidual, and,  according  to  the  definition  that  has 
been  given,  cannot  be  a  concept,  since  a  concept 


BEING.  155 

is  formed  by  a  comparison  of  different  individuals. 
What  right,  then,  has  it  to  be  among  concepts  ? 
It  would  have  no  right  there  if  it  were  not  itself 
a  concept.  This  it  is,  but  differently  formed  from 
those  already  considered.  Etymologically  a  con- 
cept is  a  gathering  together.  As  heretofore  con- 
sidered, it  is  a  gathering  together  of  individuals 
under  a  common  name  on  the  ground  of  a  common 
attribute  or  attributes.  Here  it  is  a  gathering  to- 
gether of  attributes  in  an  individual  or  object,  and 
so  it  is,  as  I  explained  in  the  fourth  lecture,  an 
individual  concept,  in  distinction  from  a  general 
concept  that  is  formed  by  generalization.  It  is 
the  concept  of  qualities,  as  that  is  of  objects;  of 
comprehension,  as  that  is  of  extension.  In  the 
books  generally  it  is  called  a  percept,  but  a  per- 
cept is  the  product  of  a  single  sense.  This  gives 
harmony  to  the  whole  procedure.  It  places  at  the 
foot  of  the  column,  and  as  the  condition  of  gen- 
eralization, an  individual  person  or  object  whose 
distinguishing  and  common  qualities  must  have 
been  found  by  observation,  so  that  observation 
must  be  the  basis  of  any  generalization  that  can 
avail  anything, 

So  much  for  the  lowest  term  of  the  series.  Now 
for  the  highest,  that  is,  Being.  This  is  commonly, 
and  I  believe  universally  regarded  by  logicians  as 
the  result  of  generalization,  and  as  giving  us  the 
summum  genus,  or  most  comprehensive  class.  But 
is  this  so  ?     It  is  conceded  that  the  idea  of  Being 


156  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

is  given  us  by  intuition  at  the  very  beginning  of 
our  mental  operations.  Is  the  idea  of  it  here  dif- 
ferent from  that  we  had  when  we  began?  Do 
we  get  something  new,  or  do  we  complete  the 
circle,  excluding  everything  except  Being,  with 
which  we  began?  I  think  the  latter.  We  had 
with  us  the  idea  of  being  when  we  began  with 
Cato,  and  it  simply  remains  as  applicable  to  all 
things  when  everything  else  is  excluded.  It  is  not, 
like  the  others,  an  attribute  known  by  observa- 
tion to  belong  to  an  individual  or  to  a  class.  We 
know  by  observation  the  attributes  that  belong  to 
Cato,  and  man,  and  mammals ;  but  it  is  not  so 
with  Being.  That  is  a  necessary  idea  accompany- 
ing the  whole  process,  and  is  at  length  left  alone 
as  the  one  thing  that  must  be  thought  in  connec- 
tion with  every  particular  being  and  thing.  In 
this  view  of  it,  Being  is  not  a  concept  at  all,  either 
individual  or  general. 

Knowing  thus  how  our  column  is  composed,  we 
shall  readily  understand  those  two  great  opera- 
tions in  thinking,  definition  and  division.  Who- 
ever can  define  and  divide  accurately  will  have 
power  as  a  thinker.  A  logical  definition  always 
consists  of  the  genus,  that  is,  of  the  class  above, 
and  the  specific  difference.  Thus,  Cato  is  a  man, 
with  the  specific  differences  that  make  him  Cato. 
A  man  is  a  mammal,  with  the  specific  differences 
that  make  him  man.  A  mammal  is  an  animal, 
with  the  specific  differences  that  make  it  a  mam- 


DISTINCTNESS   OF  THINKING.  157 

mal,  and  so  on  till  we  come  to  Being  which  can- 
not be  defined,  because,  as  is  commonly  said,  there 
is  no  higher  genus  above  it.  And  technically, 
this  is  the  reason,  but  the  real  reason  I  suppose 
to  be  that  Being  is  a  simple  idea,  and  simple  ideas 
being  known  immediately,  can  only  be  recognized, 
but  not  defined. 

In  division  we  begin  at  the  top  and  reverse  the 
process  by  which  we  went  up  in  definition.  Be- 
ing cannot  be  divided,  but  as  indicating  a  group  it 
may  be  regarded  as  a  concept,  and  the  things  that 
have  being  may  be.  Of  these,  therefore,  we  make 
a  division  into  Substance  as  either  spiritual  or  ma- 
terial ;  then  of  Material  Substance  into  organized 
and  unorganized;  then  of  organized  matter  into 
animals  and  plants ;  then  of  animals  into  their  great 
classes,  and  so  on,  constantly  diminishing  numbers 
and  adding  qualities,  till  we  reach  Cato  who  has 
the  greatest  possible  number  of  qualities,  but  who 
cannot  be  divided  and  remain  Cato,  or  a  man.  Re- 
maining a  man,  the  individual  is  incapable  of  a 
logical  division. 

And  now,  in  connection  with  the  two  processes 
just  given,  we  may  see  what  it  is  to  think  clearly, 
and  what  to  think  distinctly,  and  the  difference  be- 
tween these. 

We  think  clearly  when  we  discriminate  a  given 
concept,  as  man,  from  all  others.  This  it  is  often 
not  easy  to  do.  To  this  day  men  are  not  agreed 
as  to  the  differences  between  man  and  animals  ; 


158  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

but  whoever  shall  be  able  to  include  in  the  term 
man  all  that  is  so  distinctive  of  him  as  to  constitute 
him  a  man,  and  nothing  else,  will  think  clearly 
respecting  man.  This  clearness  is  said  to  be  ob- 
tained by  definition,  but  it  seems  rather  to  be  true 
that  we  get  at  the  definition  through  that  clearness 
which  we  gain  by  investigation. 

By  distinctness,  on  the  other  hand,  we  mean  a 
knowledge  of  all  the  divisions,  and  parts,  and 
qualities,  contained  within  a  given  concept.  We 
may  separate  man  clearly  from  other  beings,  and 
yet  not  have  a  distinct  knowledge  of  him  as  he  is 
divided  into  different  races,  or  as  he  is  made  up 
of  those  different  systems  which  we  are  now  study- 
ing. And  distinct  thinking  will  respect  not  merely 
the  general,  but  also  the  individual  concept.  We 
think  distinctly  of  an  individual  only  when  we 
have  an  exact  knowledge  of  those  traits  by  which 
he  is  distinguished  from  all  others. 

This  distinctness  of  thinking  we  reach  by  divis- 
ion, or  rather,  again,  by  distinct  thinking  we  are 
able  to  make  divisions  that  are  exhaustive.  This 
is  even  more  difficult  than  clear  thinking.  It  is  a 
great  thing  to  be  able  to  think  clearly  and  distinctly 
on  any  subject,  and  no  man  can  do  it  on  many.  It 
is  a  great  thing,  and  what  few  men  attain  to,  to  be 
able  to  handle  adequately  general  terms.  Take, 
for  instance,  such  a  word  as  civilization,  and  who 
can  fix  precisely  its  elements  and  limits  ?  Take 
such  a  word  as  virtue.     To  the  child  and  untrained 


ANALYSIS  AND  SYNTHESIS.         159 

man  it  presents  a  mere  blur,  and  who  is  there  that 
thinks  with  entire  clearness  and  distinctness  when 
it  is  used  ?  And  so  it  comes  to  pass  that  there  is  a 
great  deal  of  speech  in  which  such  terms  are  used, 
which  conveys  but  a  very  indistinct  impression  to 
those  who  hear  it.  And  so  too  we  may  see  how  it  is, 
as  Campbell  says  in  his  "  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric," 
that  men  may  speak  and  write  nonsense  without 
knowing  it.  The  words  are  familiar,  they  are  cor- 
rectly arranged,  they  have  connected  with  them, 
it  may  be,  pleasing  and  stimulating  associations, 
but  when  you  come  to  analyze  them  they  mean 
nothing  at  all.  I  remember  inquiring  of  an  author 
who  sent  me  his  work  for  criticism,  what  a  particu- 
lar passage  meant.  He  replied  that  he  thought  it 
meant  something  when  he  wrote  it,  but  was  satis- 
fied it  did  not.  Of  this  there  is  not  a  little,  espe- 
cially in  writing  supposed  to  be  "  deep." 

The  two  wholes  in  the  column  presented,  related 
as  they  are  inversely  to  each  other,  have  given  rise 
to  no  little  difficulty  among  philosophers  in  regard 
to  the  processes  of  analysis  and  synthesis.  Some 
philosophers  have  called  it  an  analysis  to  begin  at 
the  bottom  and  throw  off  properties,  and  a  synthe- 
sis to  begin  at  the  same  place  and  add  objects  ; 
while  others  have  called  it  an  analysis  to  begin  at 
the  top  and  throw  off  objects,  and  a  synthesis  to 
add  properties,  and  so,  dealing  with  the  same 
elements,  they  have  been  at  cross  purposes  and  have 
seemed  to  contradict  each  other.     Both  were  right, 


160  AN  OUTLINE   STUDY   OF   MAN. 

but  they  began  with  different  wholes,  and  did  not 
think  clearly. 

We  have  now  found  all  the  substantive  materials 
which  the  mind  forms  and  with  which  it  works  ex- 
cept one.  We  speak  of  the  individual,  of  man, 
and  of  humanity.  Humanity  is  what  is  called  an 
abstract  term.  In  forming  it  we  abstract  what 
belongs  to  man  universally,  and  then,  having  con- 
densed it  into  a  word,  we  deal  with  it  as  if  it  were 
a  separate  thing.  It  is  not  a  separate  thing.  It 
has  no  real  existence,  but  it  is  convenient  for  us  to 
regard  it  thus,  and  to  make  use,  in  this  way,  of  ab- 
stract terms. 

We  have,  then,  as  the  substantive  product  of 
our  mental  action  up  to  this  point,  and  as  the  mate- 
rials for  our  future  work :  First.  The  primitive 
necessary  ideas  of  Reason.  Second.  Percepts. 
Third.  Individual  or  comprehensive  concepts. 
Fourth.  General  concepts.  Fifth.  Abstract  terms. 
These  are  the  materials  with  which  we  are  con- 
stantly dealing,  and  these  are  all.  Of  these,  each 
is  differently  formed.  Each  has  its  own  laws  and 
is  subject  to  its  own  processes  ;  and  it  will  be  an 
era  in  mental  science  when  these  shall  be  clearly 
discriminated,  and  there  shall  be  no  attempt  to 
employ  the  processes  which  belong  only  to  one  in 
dealing  with  the  others. 

No  one  can  know  the  past  without  seeing  that 
much  labor  has  been  spent  in  manipulating  the 
general  concept  which  could  have  no  possible  bene- 


DISCRIMINATION  BETWEEN  IDEAS.  1G1 

fit  till  more  had  been  given  to  the  investigation  of 
individual  objects,  and  so  to  the  enriching  of  indi- 
vidual concepts.  The  general  is  dependent  upon 
the  individual  concept  for  its  whole  value,  and 
men  might  as  well  be  employed  in  blowing  soap- 
bubbles  as  in  ringing  changes  upon  general  terms, 
quite  as  empty,  except  as  they  are  freighted  with 
meaning  from  individual  concepts.  It  has  been 
a  serious  mistake  to  suppose  that  labor  in  one  of 
these  departments  could  be  a  substitute  for  it  in 
the  other. 

I  cannot  help  thinking  also  that  there  has  been, 
and  is,  a  want  of  discrimination  between  the  neces- 
sary ideas  of  Reason  given  us  at  first  on  the  left 
side  of  the  line  on  our  diagram,  and  those  found  by 
generalization.  These  are  wholly  different  in  their 
origin  and  characteristics,  and  should  be  named 
and  treated  differently.  In  the  one  we  have  a  com- 
plex product  given  by  observation,  the  comparison 
of  different  objects  by  abstraction  and  generali- 
zation. There  is  about  these  ideas  no  necessity 
either  of  the  ideas  themselves,  or  in  the  processes 
by  which  they  are  formed.  In  the  other  the  product 
is  simple,  it  comes  without  any  process  of  abstrac- 
tion or  generalization.  It  is  not  the  product  of 
any  process  of  thinking,  but  its  condition ;  and  not 
only  are  the  ideas  themselves  necessary,  but  all  pro- 
cesses and  movements  of  the  mind,  so  far  as  these 
are  elements  in  them,  are  necessary  also.  Looking 
then  at  the  process  by  which,  as  we  have  seen,  con- 
11 


162  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

cepts  are  formed,  I  ask  you  by  what  process  that 
shall  conduce  to  clearness  of  thought  and  of  expres- 
sion we  can  make  concepts  of  these  ideas  and  thus 
bring  them  under  the  same  class  with  those  formed 
by  generalization.  And  yet  this  is  constantly  done, 
and  by  our  most  eminent  writers.  And  not  only 
so,  but  the  processes,  as  of  induction,  that  have 
properly  for  their  material  only  the  products  of 
observation  and  generalization,  are  nominally  trans- 
ferred to  these  ideas  as  if  they  were  the  same.  I 
venture  to  question  whether  these  ideas  can  ever 
become  what  may  properly  be  called  concepts,  or 
can  be  the  material  for  any  process  that  can  prop- 
erly be  called  induction.  In  these  studies  nothing 
can  be  more  confusing  than  the  transference  of 
the  same  name  to  things  and  processes  that  are 
radically,  or  essentially  different. 

But  however  this  may  be,  we  have  now  those 
mental  products  which  are  to  be  employed  as 
elements  and  materials  in  the  remaining  elabora- 
tive  processes,  as  those  processes  are  generally  un- 
derstood. Involving,  as  they  must,  the  ideas  of 
Reason,  Judgment  and  Reasoning  are  supposed  to 
have  for  their  material,  and  to  deal  directly  with 
the  percept,  the  individual  concept,  the  general 
concept,  and  with  abstract  terms.  We  proceed  then 
to  the  next  of  the  elaborative  processes  mentioned. 


judgment:  reasoning.  163 


,       THE  JUDGMENT. 

In  one  view  of  it,  Judgment  is  elementary.  I 
do  not  well  see  how  we  can  think  without  judging 
And  that  is  the  doctrine  of  the  philosophers  gen 
erally.  They  say  that  a  judgment  is  involved  in 
all  our  thinking.  But  as  it  is  used  in  logic,  and 
used  generally,  the  term  does  not  go  back  in  that 
way.  As  thus  used,  it  is  subsequent  to  a  compari- 
son either  of  objects  or  concepts,  and  consists  in  an 
affirmation  that  they  agree  or  disagree.  Iron  is  a 
metal ;  we  know  what  iron  is,  and  we  know  what 
metal  is,  and  we  affirm  that  they  agree ;  or  that 
one  of  these  comes  under  the  other.  That  is  a 
judgment.  A  judgment  is  necessarily  expressed 
in  a  proposition ;  and  this  will  be  either  affirma- 
tive or  negative.  The  proposition  again  must  con- 
tain either  expressly  or  impliedly  two  terms,  indi- 
cating the  notions  compared,  and  a  copula,  which 
will  always  be  some  form  of  the  verb  to  be.  This 
is  true  of  judgment  in  general.  Of  its  different 
forms,  as  Categorical,  Hypothetical,  and  Disjunc- 
tive, it  is  not  necessary  to  speak. 

For  judgment,  as  we  have  now  considered  it,  the 
previous  Elaborative  processes  were  a  condition; 
and  Judgment,  together  with  those  processes,  is  a 
condition  for  the  next  of  those  processes,  that  is, — 

REASONING. 

By  Reasoning  we  gain  mediate  knowledge.     In 


164  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

intuition  we  have  immediate  knowledge,  but  in 
reasoning  we  get  a  knowledge  of  one  thing  by- 
means  of  other  things.  The  process  of  the  mind 
in  this  is  said  to  be  discursive  instead  of  intuitive. 
Its  object  is  to  show  that  a  proposition  that  is  not 
self-evident  is  either  true  or  false.  Ability  to  do 
this  indicates  mental  power,  but  the  need  of  doing 
it  is  from  a  limitation  of  power.  A  mind  with 
power  enough  to  see  all  things  directly  and  intui- 
tively would  not  reason.  And  not  only  do  we 
reason  when  we  prove,  or  disprove  propositions, 
but  also  when  we  assign  causes,  or  give  reasons,  or 
explain  anything.  Here  is  a  rainbow.  You  wish 
to  know  how  it  came,  and  you  discover  the  laws  of 
light,  and  its  operations  in  connection  with  the 
rain  drops,  so  that  you  are  able  to  give  the  reason 
or  cause  of  its  being  there  ;  and  that  is  Reasoning. 
It  is  a  passage  from  a  thing  to  its  cause  by  means 
of  other  things,  in  the  same  way  as  we  pass  from 
one  truth  to  another  by  means  of  one  or  more  in- 
termediate propositions. 

Of  Reasoning  there  are  several  forms,  and,  in  my 
judgment,  more  than  one  process.  Whately  in- 
sists strenuously  that  there  is  but  one.  He  says : 
"  In  every  instance  in  which  we  reason  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  word  ....  a  certain  process  takes 
place  in  the  mind  which  is  one  and  the  same  in  all 
cases,  provided  it  be  rightly  conducted.''  But  of 
that  we  can   judge   better  after   considering   the 


INDUCTION.  165 

different  forms   which  reasoning   assumes.     And 
first  of 

INDUCTION. 

In  this  we  establish  general  facts,  or  laws,  or 
truths,  from  particular  instances.  We  begin  with 
the  individual,  we  compare  individual  with  indi- 
vidual, and  go  on  till  we  feel  authorized  to  affirm 
a  general  truth. 

This  assumes  two  forms.  There  is  first  what  is 
called,  by  the  logicians,  Formal  Induction,  in  which 
the  conclusion  is  drawn,  or  is  said  to  be,  from  an 
enumeration  of  each  case.  This  is  all  the  Induction 
that  Sir  William  Hamilton  allows  of  in  logic,  be- 
cause he  allows  of  nothing  as  belonging  to  logic, 
unless  the  conclusion  is  necessitated  by  the  laws 
of  thought.  But  it  may  be  questioned  whether  in- 
duction by  simple  enumeration  is  reasoning  at  all. 
Suppose  I  enumerate  the  sixteen  wards  of  Boston, 
and  affirm  of  each  that  it  has  a  steam-fire,  engine, 
and  then  say,  therefore  every  ward  of  Boston  has 
a  steam-fire  engine,  would  that  be  reasoning  or 
would  it  be  an  assertion  of  the  same  thing  in  a 
different  form  ?  I  think  the  latter.  But  however 
that  may  be,  this  is  not  what  people  generally  un- 
derstand by  Induction.  They  understand  by  it 
the  bringing  in  of  numerous  individual  instances 
by  observation,  and  then  concluding  from  them 
over  to  a  general  truth.  The  observation  is  pre- 
paratory to  the  induction,  but  no  part  of  it.     That 


166  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

consists  in  so  reasoning  from  observed  instances  to 
those  not  observed  as  to  constitute  a  class,  or  to  find 
a  general  law. 

In  any  particular  instance  of  induction,  the  in- 
quiry is  whether  we  are  authorized  to  extend,  in 
that  instance,  uniformity  of  causation,  of  construc- 
tion, of  succession,  of  appearance  even  as  in  color, 
from  the  instances  which  we  have  observed  to  oth- 
ers not  observed  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  of  them 
one  class,  as  to  affirm  of  them  the  same  general 
truths,  and  to  make  of  those  general  truths  prem- 
ises for  deductive  reasoning.  All  the  ground  we 
can  have  for  this  is  Analogy,  or  a  likeness  in  some 
respects  between  the  phenomena.  That  likeness 
in  some  respects  leads  us  to  infer  likeness  in  others 
is  a  fact,  and  a  fundamental  fact  in  the  reasonings 
of  life.  It  is  the  basis  of  probable  reasoning.  "  It 
is  not  my  design,"  says  Bishop  Butler,  "to  in- 
quire farther  into  the  nature,  the  foundation,  and 
measure  of  probability  ;  or  whence  it  proceeds  that 
likeness  should  beget  that  presumption,  opinion, 
and  full  conviction,  which  the  human  mind  is 
formed  to  receive  from  it,  and  which  it  does  neces- 
sarily produce  in  every  one."  So  when  Franklin 
had  observed  certain  similarities  between  terrestrial 
electricity  and  lightning,  he  suspected  they  might 
be  the  same ;  but  in  inquiring  whether  he  had  a 
right  to  put  them  in  the  same  class,  the  question 
was  not  about  the  uniformity  of  nature  in  general, 
and   in  other  departments,  but  whether   the  ob- 


INDUCTION.  167 

served  similarities  were  sufficient  to  justify  him  in 
inferring  that  they  were  altogether  similar,  or  at 
least  so  far  as  to  be  attributable  to  the  same  cause. 

But  while  likeness  alone  raises  this  expectation, 
other  things  may  come  in.  Seeing  an  animal  with 
horns,  that  was  also  cloven-footed,  some  slight  ex- 
pectation might  be  raised  that  the  next  kind  of 
animal  with  horns  would  also  be  cloven-footed ;  but 
as  no  reason  of  congruity  or  utility  can  be  assigned 
for  this,  it  would  require  many  instances  to  justify 
us  in  saying,  as  we  now  do,  that  all  horned  animals 
are  cloven-footed.  But,  observing  one  kind  of  ani- 
mal, as  the  sheep,  destitute  of  upper  cutting  teeth 
and  also  chewing  the  cud ;  we  should  much  more 
readily  affirm  the  chewing  of  the  cud  of  all  other  ani- 
mals destitute  of  upper  cutting  teeth  because  there 
is  an  evident  congruity  and  utility  in  it.  While, 
therefore,  likeness  in  certain  respects  is  indispen- 
sable as  the  ground  of  any  Induction  ;  yet  other 
things  come  in  to  determine  the  degree  of  likeness 
or  the  number  of  instances  required,  and  of  these 
no  exact  statement  can  be  made. 

It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  an  act  of  Induc- 
tion may  respect  causes,  as  of  the  movements  of  the 
heavenly  bodies  ;  or  structures,  as  of  horned  ani- 
mals that  are  also  cloven-footed  ;  or  successions,  as 
of  the  seasons;  or  mere  color,  as  when  we  infer 
that  all  crows  are  black.  In  each  case  we  inquire, 
not,  as  is  commonly  said,  whether  we  may  infer 
from  a  part  to  the  whole,  which  would  be  a  begging 


168  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

of  the  question,  but  whether  we  may  regard  as  a 
whole,  that  is,  put  into  one  class,  beings  and  phe- 
nomena which  had  been  regarded  as  separate. 
With  phenomena  thus  different,  and  with  resem- 
blances of  every  shade,  we  might  expect  that  the 
human  mind  would  find  here,  instead  of  a  logical 
treadmill,  constant  calls  for  all  its  natural  and  ac- 
quired sagacity. 

Such  being  the  process  of  Induction,  it  remains 
to  inquire  for  its  underlying  axiom.  There  is 
none  except  the  uniformity  of  causation.  By  this 
we  mean  that  the  same  causes  operating  under  the 
same  circumstances,  will  produce  the  same  effects. 
Instead  of  this,  modern  science  assumes  as  the 
axiom  of  Induction  that  "  Nature  is  uniform." 
And  here  we  see  the  source  of  much  of  the  false 
logic  of  science.  It  assumes,  wholly  without 
proof,  and  against  it,  that  nature  and  its  laws  are 
uniform  and  independent.  This  is  the  one  postu- 
late of  mere  scientists  on  which  their  whole  struc- 
ture rests.  But  so  far  is  the  general  proposition  that 
nature  is  uniform  from  being  at  the  basis  of  our 
Induction  that  it  is  itself  the  result  of  Induction. 

There  is  doubtless  in  man,  as  in  animals,  an  in- 
stinctive adjustment  of  his  nature  to  his  surround- 
ings as  uniform.  But  this  is  not  Induction,  nor 
its  basis.  As  intelligent  and  scientific,  man  has 
reached  particular  uniformities,  as  of  the  seasons, 
of  tides,  of  comets,  only  after  such  induction  as 
each  case  seemed  to  demand.     This  he  has  done, 


AXIOM   OF   INDUCTION.  169 

not  on  the  ground  of  uniformity  of  nature,  for  the 
question  in  each  particular  case  was  whether  nature 
would  be  uniform  in  that  case,  but  solely  on  the 
ground  of  the  uniformity  of  causation.  That  nature 
is  uniform  in  her  different  departments  and  through- 
out her  domain  is  by  no  means  an  instinctive  belief. 
It  was  long  before  the  laws  that  prevail  on  the  earth 
were  supposed  to  extend  to  the  heavens  ;  and  it 
was  a  surprise  to  find  that  the  sun  and  fixed  stars 
are  composed  of  the  same  materials  as  our  earth. 
If  it  were  an  axiom  that  "  nature  is  uniform," 
then  nature  could  not  be  broken  up  without  fal- 
sifying a  fundamental  law  of  belief.  But  if  we 
assume  that  the  only  axiom  applicable  in  Induc- 
tion is  uniformity  of  causation,  the  other  uniform- 
ities following  from  that,  two  things  will  follow. 

One  is  that  we  cannot  put  Induction  into  a  syl- 
logism. The  fact  that  causes  will  continue  in  the 
future  to  operate  as  they  do  now,  or  that  they  will 
continue  to  operate  at  all,  is  not  contained  in  the 
fact  that  they  are  operating  now,  in  the  same  way 
that  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  is  contained  in 
the  premises.  It  is  not  contained  in  it  at  all. 
One  assertion  is  not  a  general  truth  under  which 
the  other  comes,  and  no  ingenuity  can  make  it  so. 
The  conclusion,  therefore,  or  inference,  can  be  only 
probable.  No  axiomatic  major  premiss  can  give 
to  it  one  particle  of  its  own  evidence,  and  nothing 
can  be  gained  by  any  attempt  to  make  it  do  that. 

The   second  thing  that  will  follow  is  that  the 


170  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

order  of  nature  may  be  changed  or  broken  up 
without  interfering  with  any  law  of  thought  or 
of  human  belief .  That  this  may  be,  the  whole 
history  of  belief  shows.  We  do  indeed  naturally 
expect  that  causes  now  operating  will  continue  to 
operate  ;  that  structures  similar  to  those  now  grow- 
ing up  will  continue  to  grow,  that  events  occur- 
ring regularly  now  will  continue  to  occur  ;  but  if 
this  were  not  to  be  so  it  would  contradict  no  law 
of  thought ;  it  would  be  opposed  to  no  funda- 
mental axiom.  We  have  but  to  suppose  that 
back  of  all  bases  of  Induction,  back  of  uniformities 
and  laws  of  nature,  there  is  a  Personal  Cause,  and 
all  difficulty  about  miracles,  or  about  any  such  fu- 
ture catastrophe  as  the  Bible  reveals,  is  removed  at 
once. 

Induction  presupposes  a  ground  of  uniformity 
which  presents  itself  to  us  as  impersonal.  This 
ground  may  indeed  be  maintained,  and  so,  over- 
ruled and  suspended,  by  a  personal  being ;  but  as 
a  ground  of  induction  the  personal  element  is  not 
recognized.  Hence  the  moment  we  begin  to  rea- 
son about  final  causes,  or  ends,  and  nature  re- 
garded as  the  work  of  a  personal  being,  we  pass 
from  the  region  of  nature  to  that  of  personality, 
and  the  question  whether  we  have  a  right  thus  to 
pass  cannot  be  decided  by  Induction.  We  reason 
respecting  the  conduct  of  personal  beings,  on  the 
ground  that  they  will  be  consistent  with  them- 
selves ;  and  we  reason  respecting  the  processes  and 


INDUCTION  —  GROUND  IMPERSONAL.  171 

laws  of  nature,  on  the  ground  that  they  will  be 
consistent  with  themselves  ;  but  it  is  only  the  last 
.that  we  call  Induction.  The  first  has  no  distinct- 
ive name,  probably  because  it  cannot  become  a 
science.  The  underlying  principles  are  not  the 
same,  and  we  should  be  careful  not  to  confound 
them  as  has  too  often  been  done. 


LIBRARY 

JNIVERSITY  OF 

.VLIFORNIA. 


LECTURE  VIII. 

SEASONING.  —  ANALOGY  AND  EXPERIENCE.  — 
DEMONSTRATION  AND  PROBABLE  REASONING. 
—  INFERRING  AND  PROVING.  —  SYSTEMIZA- 
TION. 

The  Elaborative  Faculty  takes  the  crude  mate- 
rials furnished  by  the  Presentative  faculty  and 
modifies  them.  The  operations  it  performs  in 
doing  this,  are  Comparison,  Abstraction,  General- 
ization, Judgment,  Reasoning,  and  Systemization. 
These  processes  were  shown  to  follow  the  law  of 
the  conditioning  and  the  conditioned,  and  to  be 
analogous  to  those  by  which  food  is  elaborated  for 
the  body.  These  we  have  considered  as  far  up  as 
to  Reasoning,  and  spoke  particularly  of  Induction. 

For  Induction  we  found  the  sole  field  to  be  the 
phenomena  furnished  by  observation  ;  we  found 
that  a  conclusion  respecting  these,  whether  in 
their  succession  or  construction,  could  gain  noth- 
ing from  any  syllogistic  arrangement  of  terms, 
and  that  the  only  law  of  belief  on  which  any  con- 
clusion can  rest  back  is  that  of  the  uniformity  of 
causation.  If  it  can  be  shown  in  regard  to  any- 
thing that  the  same  causes  will  continue  to  oper- 


ANALOGY  AND  EXPERIENCE.        173 

ate  under  the  same  circumstances  we  may  be  sure 
of  uniformity.  If  not,  nothing  reached  by  Induc- 
tion that  we  may  call  a  law  has  any  claim  to  be 
regarded  either  as  absolutely  uniform  or  as  per- 
manent. No  law  of  belief  would  be  violated  if  it 
were  to  be  interrupted  or  broken  up  at  any  time. 
The  mouse  remains  in  his  underground  nest  for 
three  months,  and  "  all  things  continue  as  they 
were,"  but  the  fourth  month  the  plowman  comes, 
and  he  must  seek  a  new  nest.  The  question  of 
an  interruption  is  one  of  evidence  like  any  other, 
and  can  be  decided  only  by  a  knowledge  of  all  the 
causes  that  may  come  in. 

After  Induction,  Deduction  is  usually  spoken  of. 
Indeed,  Deduction  is  often  considered  first,  and 
there  are  reasons  for  that ;  but  as  Induction  is  sup- 
posed by  some  to  be  always,  and  is  many  times, 
the  condition  of  Deduction,  it  comes  first  here. 
Then  comes,  not  Deduction,  but,  as  based  on  the 
same  ground  as  Induction,  reasoning  from 

ANALOGY  AND  EXPEBLENCE. 

This,  as  well  as  Induction,  is  what  the  logicians 
call  modified  logic.     It  can  never  give  certainty. 

In  Analogy  we  reason  from  individual  to  indi- 
vidual on  the  ground  of  observed  similarity  in 
certain  points.  From  similarity  in  points  which 
we  are  able  to  observe,  we  infer  similarity  in 
others  which  we  either  cannot,  or  do  not,  observe. 
In  Induction  Ave  reason  from  several  individuals  and 


174  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OP  MAN. 

form  a  class,  or  infer  a  law  ;  in  Analogy  we  reason 
from  one  or  more  individuals  to  an  individual,  and 
infer  resemblance  in  unobserved  qualities  or  par- 
ticulars. You  have  seen  a  man  with  red  hair,  and 
he  was  passionate.  You  see  another  man  with 
red  hair,  and  infer  that  he  is  passionate.  A  miner 
finds  a  mine  in  connection  with  certain  forma- 
tions or  appearances  of  the  earth  above  it.  Find- 
ing those  appearances  again,  he  reasons  from  An- 
alogy and  expects  to  find  another  mine.  The  case 
commonly  put  is  that  of  reasoning  from  the  earth 
to  the  moon.  We  observe  several  similarities 
between  the  two,  and  then  if  we  think  they  will 
authorize  it,  we  conclude  that  the  moon  is  inhab- 
ited. Or,  we  observe  the  differences,  and  infer 
that  the  moon  is  not  inhabited.  Here  we  have 
the  same  underlying  ground  as  in  Induction.  It 
is  likeness,  giving,  as  Bishop  Butler  says,  proba- 
bility—  that  and  nothing  more.  Hence,  though 
it  is  a  constant  ground  of  inference  in  life,  and  a 
constant  means  of  advancing  knowledge,  some  will 
not  admit  it  as  belonging  to  logic. 

But  I  spoke  of  Experience  as  well  as  Analogy. 
Experience  is  supposed  to  be  a  certain,  and  Anal- 
ogy an  uncertain,  ground  of  inference.  How  do 
they  differ?  We  have  strict  experience  only  of 
what  has  been,  and  now  is.  These  we  may  know 
certainly  by  experience,  and  these  only.  We  say 
we  know  by  experience  that  fire  will  burn.  Not 
strictly.     We   know  by  experience   that  fire  has 


EXPERIENCE   AND  ANALOGY.  175 

burned ;  we  infer  from  experience  that  it  will 
burn ;  but  in  strict  experience  the  certainty  of 
the  past  so  passes  over  into  the  future  that  we  say 
we  know  both.  We  reason  from  Experience,  as 
from  Analogy,  in  regard  to  objects  that  coexist 
in  space,  and  events  that  succeed  each  other  in 
time ;  and  we  reason  from  strict  experience  only 
on  the  supposition  that  the  objects  and  causative 
agencies  continue  to  be  either  the  same  or  pre- 
cise^ similar  in  that  point,  or  in  those  points  on 
which  the  argument  turns.  We  then  feel  the 
same  certainty  of  our  conclusion  that  we  do  in 
the  continuance  of  the  laws  of  nature ;  but  if  there 
be  any  departure  from  identity  or  exact  similarity 
in  the  circumstances,  the  certainty  will  be  propor- 
tionately diminished.  Our  reasoning  will  be  from 
Analogy,  and  not  from  Experience. 

We  have  thus  the  exact  difference  between  Ex- 
perience and  Analogy  so  far  as  Analogy  is  a  ground 
of  argument.  All  analogy  implies  resemblance,  but 
resemblance  may  be  either  between  things  or  their 
relations.  It  is  only  a  resemblance  between  things 
that  can  be  a  basis  of  argument ;  a  resemblance 
between  relations  is  the  basis  of  figures  of  speech. 
There  is  no  resemblance  between  the  foot  of  a  man 
and  the  foot  of  a  mountain  or  between  the  head 
of  a  man  and  the  head  of  a  nail,  or  of  a  river,  or 
of  a  government,  therefore  we  cannot  reason  from 
one  to  the  other,  but  there  is  a  resemblance  of 
relations,  and  so  there  is  a  foundation  for  a  figure 


176  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY    OF  MAN. 

of  speech.  There  is  no  resemblance  between  light 
and  truth,  but  truth  is  to  the  intellect  what  light 
is  to  the  eye,  and  from  this  resemblance  of  rela- 
tions they  are  said  to  be  analogous  to  each  other. 
It  is  true  that  resemblance  in  relations  generally 
implies  some  resemblance  in  things,  but  we  are  to 
be  careful  not  to  confound  these  two  grounds  of 
Analogy,  and  so  mistake  for  Reasoning,  mere  fig- 
ures of  speech. 

But  if  the  account  now  given  of  the  difference 
between  Analogy  and  Experience  be  correct  we 
shall  see  that  the  cases  are  relatively  few  in  which 
we  reason  from  strict  experience,  and  that,  in  most 
cases  in  which  we  are  said  to  do  that,  we  reason 
from  analogy.  This  is  well  illustrated  by  Dugald 
Stewart.  Men  are  said  to  be  governed  by  experi- 
ence in  politics  or  statesmanship,  but  no  two  cases 
exactly  alike  ever  occur,  and,  for  the  most  part, 
in  this  department  what  is  called  experience  is  not 
only  analogy,  but  a  remote  or  loose  analogy.  The 
same  is  true,  and  perhaps  more  signally,  in  medi- 
cine. Without  undervaluing  what  is  called  expe- 
rience in  that,  for  by  it  great  sagacity  is  acquired, 
it  may  be  said  that  cases  seldom  occur  in  which  it 
is  possible  to  be  guided  by  a  strict  experience. 
The  same  name  is  prescribed  for,  but  from  differ- 
ence of  age,  constitution,  habits,  no  two  cases  are 
wholly  alike,  and  diseases  properly  bearing  the 
same  name  may  require,  with  different  persons, 
at  different  periods,  in  different  localities,  differ- 


EXPERIENCE  AND  ANALOGY.        177 

ent  and  even  opposite  treatment ;  while  a  rou- 
tine practitioner,  claiming  that  he  is  governed  by- 
experience,  will  take  the  easy,  perhaps  reputable, 
but  perhaps  also  fatal  course  of  treating  them  all 
alike.  This  uniformity  of  names  and  diversity 
of  things  explains  the  number  of  infallible  reme- 
dies that  are  advertised,  all  claiming  the  sanction 
of  experience.  No  doubt  all  have  proved  bene- 
ficial in  certain  cases,  and  would  in  others  if  they 
were  exactly  like  them.  There  is  the  difficulty. 
There  is  uniformity  of  causation,  but  such  a  vari- 
ety of  cases  that  it  is  impossible  to  apply  the  prin- 
ciple. Let  any  one  have  the  rheumatism  and 
he  will  be  surprised  at  the  number  of  those  who 
will  propose  remedies  that  they  know  by  experi- 
ence will  cure  it.  What  they  really  know  is  that 
they  took  the  remedy  and  got  well,  possibly  in 
spite  of  it. 

In  theory  an  exact  line  can  be  drawn  between 
Analogy  and  Experience,  in  practice  it  seldom  can. 
The  usage  of  language  would  make  it  to  be  Ex- 
perience when  we  reason  from  one  individual  of  a 
species  to  another  of  the  same  species,  and  Anal- 
ogy when  we  reason  from  one  species  to  another. 
But  we  can  reason  more  safely  from  species  to 
species  on  some  points  than  from  individual  to  in- 
dividual on  others.  However  alike  two  men  may 
seem,  we  cannot  be  sure  that  the  same  remedy 
that  will  cure  one  will  cure  the  other.  .As  dif- 
ferent as  an  alligator  is  from  a  man  we  might 
12 


178  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

be  sure  it  would  kill  him  to  cut  off  his  head.  The 
essential  thing  whether  in  Analogy  or  Experience, 
is  to  make  sure  of  the  similarity  or  identity  of 
that  on  which  the  reasoning  turns.  There  may 
be  great  diversity  in  other  respects,  but  if  that  be 
the  same  we  may  conclude  safely. 

These  processes  of  Induction,  Analogy,  and  Ex- 
perience I  have  dwelt  on  because  they  belong  to 
the  regulation  of  our  daily  life.  We  are  all, 
young  and  old,  unlearned  and  learned,  constantly 
carrying  them  on,  and  it  is  well  for  us  to  under- 
stand the  ground  on  which  they  proceed. 

We  now  pass  to 

DEDUCTION. 

This  is  commonly  said  to  be  opposed  to  Induc- 
tion, that  beginning  with  particulars  and  reaching 
general  truths  ;  this  beginning  with  general  truths 
and  deducing  particulars  from  them.  So  far  as 
it  does  this,  Deduction  is  a  process  that  assumes, 
or  may  assume,  the  form  of  the  syllogism,  thus  — 

All  explosive  substances  are  dangerous. 

Nitroglycerine  is  an  explosive  substance. 

Therefore  nitroglycerine  is  dangerous. 

This  is  a  form  of  reasoning  the  importance  of 
which  has,  at  times,  been  strangely  exaggerated. 
At  times,  also,  it  has  been  undervalued.  Even 
yet,  while  a  man  so  eminent  as  Archbishop  Whate- 
ly  says  that  all  forms  of  Reasoning  may  be 
brought  under  it,  John  Stuart  Mill  says  it  is  not  a 


THE  SYLLOGISM.  179 

form  of  reasoning  at  all.  What  then  are  we  to 
do  ?  Perhaps  we  cannot  do  better  than  first  to 
explain  what  the  process  is,  and  then  inquire  re- 
specting its  nature  and  value. 

Referring  to  the  example  given,  it  will  be  seen 
that  we  first  affirm  something  of  a  class  of  sub- 
stances ;  that  we  then  affirm  of  a  particular  sub- 
stance that  it  comes  under  that  class,  and  then 
conclude  that  what  belongs  to  the  whole  class  be- 
longs also  to  the  particular  substance  affirmed  to 
come  under  it.  Putting  this  in  its  most  general 
form  we  have  the  dictum  of  Aristotle,  which  is 
that  "  Whatever  may  be  affirmed  or  denied  of  a 
class,  may  be  affirmed  or  denied  of  whatever 
comes  under  that  class."  Here  the  conclusion  is 
made  to  depend  on  the  class  relation.  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton  makes  it  depend  on  the  relation 
of  whole  and  part.  His  general  maxim  is  that 
"  What  is  part  of  a  part  is  part  of  the  whole." 
This  is  more  comprehensive  than  the  other,  but 
the  principle  is  the  same.  In  both  the  proof  is 
wholly  from  the  fact  that  one  thing  is  included  in 
another  as  a  smaller  circle  is  included  in  a  larger. 

But  to  trace  the  process  more  particularly.  We 
wish  to  prove  to  an  unbeliever  that  nitroglycerine 
is  dangerous.  We  have  here  two  terms  that  indi- 
cate, the  one  a  substance,  the  other  an  attribute, 
and  we  wish  to  know  whether  we  may  affirm  of 
that  attribute  that  it  belongs  to  that  substance. 
We  cannot  bring  them  together  directly.      We 


180  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

therefore  find  a  third  or  middle  term  that  indi- 
cates a  class  of  substances  of  which  we  both  agree 
that  the  attribute,  dangerous,  can  be  affirmed.  If 
now  we  can  show  that  nitroglycerine  comes  under 
that  class  our  point  is  gained.  This  we  do,  as  in 
the  example,  by  a  set  of  comparisons.  We  first 
compare,  in  the  major  proposition,  the  major  term, 
dangerous,  with  the  middle  term,  explosive  sub- 
stances, and  find  that  they  agree.  We  then  com- 
pare also  the  minor  term,  nitroglycerine,  with  the 
same  middle  term,  and  find  that  they  agree ;  and 
we  then  infer  that  the  major  term,  dangerous, 
agrees  with  the  minor  term,  nitroglycerine,  on 
the  principle  that  things  which  agree  with  the 
same  thing  agree  with  each  other.  Here  you  will 
see  that  I  bring  in  another  principle  wider  than 
that  of  class  relations,  or  of  whole  and  part,  that  of 
agreement,  and  this  Whately  and  the  logicians 
generally  bring  in  without  distinguishing  it  from 
those  principles,  or  from  those  of  identity  and 
equality.  Everywhere  Whately  asserts  that  all 
Reasoning  can  be  brought  under  the  dictum,  and 
yet  he  lays  down  as  the  axioms  of  pure  categorical 
syllogisms,  first,  "  If  two  terms  agree  with  one  and 
the  same  third  they  agree  with  each  other ;  "  sec- 
ond, "  If  one  term  agrees,  and  another  disagrees 
with  one  and  the  same  third,  these  two  disagree 
with  each  other,  evidently  supposing  that  these 
axioms  are  identical  with  the  dictum.  But  they 
are  not.     They  are  broader,  and  apply  to  cases  to 


DEDUCTIVE  REASONING.  181 

which  neither  the  dictum  nor  the  axiom  of  Hamil- 
ton will  apply.  The  principle  itself  is  different, 
and  that  such  a  man  as  Whately  did  not  see  this, 
setting  aside  as  it  does  his  theory  of  the  syllogism 
as  inclusive  of  all  reasoning,  shows  the  relative  dif- 
ficulty and  importance  of  a  careful  discrimination 
of  the  elements  with  which  we  deal  as  compared 
with  a  ready  command  of  logical  forms.  The  dic- 
tum under  which  he  would  bring  all  Reasoning 
does  not  even  apply  to  all  Deductive  Reasoning. 
If  I  say  that  A  equals  B,  B  equals  C,  therefore 
C  equals  A,  there  is  conclusive  reasoning  under 
the  relation  of  equality  which  may  perhaps  come 
under  that  of  agreement,  but  there  is  no  class  re- 
lation, and  no  whole  and  part.  It  will  be  found, 
and  indeed  enters  into  its  very  form,  that  the  dic- 
tum, and  so  the  syllogism,  is  not  applicable  ex- 
cept when  a  general  concept  forms  a  part  of  the 
major  premiss.  The  regular  syllogism  begins 
with  that ;  it  makes  a  general  affirmation  from 
which  some  particular  truth  is  deduced,  and  to 
make  such  deduction  is  its  province.  Syllogistic 
logic  teaches  the  proper  use  of  general  terms 
when  they  are  employed  in  reasoning ;  that,  and 
nothing  else. 

But  is  what  we  term  syllogistic  reasoning,  rea- 
soning at  all  ?  Yes,  in  the  sense  that  all  our  rea- 
sonings where  general  terms  are  involved,  when 
we  state  the  process  in  full,  assume  that  form. 
Let  the   question  be,  Is  this  man   a  murderer? 


182  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

Certain  facts  being  given,  you  determine  by  a  pro- 
cess of  reasoning  that  he  killed  the  man.  But  did 
he  do  it  with  malice  ?  You  determine  that  also  by 
a  process  of  reasoning.     You  then  say  that  — 

Murder  is  killing  with  malice  prepense  ; 

This  man  killed  with  malice  prepense  ; 

Therefore  this  man  is  a  murderer. 

The  proof  of  the  murder,  and  the  force  of  the 
reasoning  does  not  turn  on  any  manipulation  of 
terms,  or  class  relations,  but  on  the  facts  which  give 
us  the  right  to  use  our  terms,  and  which  enable 
us  to  bring  the  individual  into  those  class  relations. 
It  is  not  proved  by  the  syllogism  that  the  man 
committed  the  murder,  but  the  syllogism  is  the 
form  which  the  proof  takes  in  our  minds  when  we 
state  it  fully  and  in  order.  As  is  stated  by  Pres- 
ident Porter,  the  relation  on  which  the  proof 
turns  is  that  of  reason  and  consequent. 

In  its  form  the  syllogism  is  demonstrative.  No 
one  can  assent  to  the  premises  without  assenting 
to  the  conclusion,  but  the  evidence  for  the  conclu- 
sion is  only  equal  to  that  for  each  of  the  premi- 
ses, and  that  can  never  be  demonstrative.  Hence, 
unless  we  admit  the  syllogism  into  mathematics, 
where  I  do  not  think  it  belongs,  it  can  never  give 
us  demonstration.  Hence,  too,  it  is  evident  that 
the  main  labor,  when  we  would  establish  a  fact 
by  a  process  of  which  reasoning  must  form  a  part, 
will  be  to  establish  the  premises  and  bring  them 
together.     That  being  done,  the  inference,  which 


DEMONSTRATION   AND  PROBABLE   REASONING.     183 

is  strictly  the  act  of  reasoning,  is  readily  drawn. 
Hence,  again,  the  inadequacy  and  necessary  fail- 
ure of  logical  forms  taken  by  themselves,  as  they 
were  among  the  schoolmen,  in  the  investigation 
of  truth.  Doubtless  it  is  easier  to  combine  and 
transpose  terms  variously  and  ingeniously  than  to 
analyze  compounds,  and  unravel  complexities,  and 
investigate  facts  and  laws  ;  and  the  process  may 
tend  to  a  certain  readiness  and  sharpness  of  intel- 
lect, but  it  can  avail  nothing  by  itself,  and  rela- 
tively little  in  any  way  to  the  advancement  of 
truth.  If  we  include  in  syllogistic  logic  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  concept  with  its  relations  of  extension 
and  comprehension,  or,  as  they  are  sometimes 
called,  of  quantity  and  quality,  and  also  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  relations  in  which  the  terms  repre- 
senting concepts  must  stand  to  each  other  that 
inferences  may  be  safely  drawn,  we  have  a  wide 
and  worthy  field  of  study,  but  less  so  than  that 
furnished  by  Experience,  Analogy,  and  Induction. 
Perhaps  it  is  not  more  important  than  the  field  in 
which  our  reasonings  respect  only  individual  and  ab- 
stract notions  and  terms,  and  in  which  the  principle 
of  reasoning  is  either  that  of  identity  or  equality. 
The  results  of  Reasoning  are  either  demonstra- 
tive or  probable,  and  this  distinction  is  supposed 
to  turn  on  the  certainty  or  uncertainty  of  the  con- 
clusion. It  does  not.  It  turns  on  the  nature  of 
the  conclusion.  Demonstration  has  nothing  to  do 
with  facts,  or  with  anything  that  actually  exists. 


184  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

It  begins  with  a  supposition.  In  a  mathemat- 
ical demonstration  you  do  not  demonstrate  any 
thing  respecting  the  figure  that  you  draw.  Sup- 
pose I  draw  what  I  call  a  right  angled  triangle,  I 
cannot  demonstrate  that  the  angle  I  call  a  right 
angle  is  so.  Whatever  knowledge  I  may  get  of  it 
I  must  get  from  the  eye  or  from  measurement. 
What  I  do  then  is  to  make  a  supposition  or  hy- 
pothesis. I  say,  let  it  be  a  right-angled  triangle, 
and  then  it  will  follow  that  the  sum  of  the  two 
other  angles  will  be  equal  to  a  right  angle.  Or, 
again,  if  we  suppose  A  equal  to  B,  and  B  equal 
to  C,  it  will  follow  that  C  is  equal  to  A.  We 
cannot  know  that  A  is  equal  to  B,  or  B  to  C,  or 
if  we  do  know  it,  it  cannot  be  by  demonstration. 
Beginning  therefore,  as  a  demonstration  always 
must,  with  a  supposition,  it  can  never  prove  a  fact. 
We  reach  what  we  may  call  a  hypothetical  truth, 
whereas,  in  probable  reasoning,  we  reach  a  fact. 
In  the  one  case  we  have  no  uncertainty  except 
that  which  may  be  connected  with  the  steps  of 
the  process  ;  in  the  other  we  have  the  uncertainty 
connected  with  observation  and  testimony. 

But  not  only  the  starting  point,  and  so  the  re- 
sult, are  different  in  a  demonstration,  but  also  the 
process.  To  a  demonstration  it  is  necessary  'that 
there  should  be  intuitive  evidence  at  every  step. 
This  is  as  essential  as  that  it  should  begin  with  a 
hypothesis. 

It  is  to  be  said  of  demonstrative  reasoning  also 


MATHEMATICAL  DEMONSTRATION.  185 

that  it  admits  of  no  degrees.  What  we  demon- 
strate is  necessarily  true,  true  without  a  doubt. 
Anything  claiming  to  be  a  demonstration  which 
does  not  give  us  a  conclusion  of  which  that  can  be 
said,  is  good  for  nothing  at  all. 

In  all  these  respects  probable  reasoning  is  differ- 
ent. It  starts  from  a  fact,  or  from  facts ;  there  is 
not  intuitive  evidence  at  every  step,  and  so  it  ad- 
mits of  degrees  of  every  shade  from  the  slightest 
probability  up  to  a  certainty  equal  to  that  of  dem- 
onstration. The  term  probable  is  unfortunate  here 
as  implying  some  degree  of  doubtfulness  in  the 
conclusion.  Ordinarily  there  is,  but  we  may  have 
from  what  is  called  probable  evidence,  and  prob- 
able reasoning,  a  certainty  as  absolute  as  from 
demonstration. 

In  probable  reasoning  we  start  from  facts,  and 
we  prove  facts ;  in  demonstrative  reasoning  we 
start  from  a  hypothesis  and  proceed  to  our  conclu- 
sion by  successive  intuitions  ;  and  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  processes  in  the  two  cases  rest  upon  dif- 
ferent principles  of  reasoning.  In  the  syllogism, 
saying  nothing  of  the  other  branches  of  probable 
reasoning,  we  start  from  a  general  proposition  which 
includes  within  itself  the  particular  truth  sought, 
and  when  the  conclusion  is  reached  it  may  be 
fairly  said  to  be  deduced  from  the  premises  be- 
cause it  was  contained  in  them.  But  in  demon- 
strative reasoning,  having  our  definitions  and 
axioms,  not,  as  is  commonly  said,  to   start  from 


186  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

as  if  they  included  anything,  but  as  conditions  of 
reasoning  at  all,  we  start  from  a  hypothesis  and 
proceed,  as  has  been  said,  by  successive  intuitions, 
making  as  we  go  such  suppositions  or  construc- 
tions as  will  give  us  the  intuition.  To  do  this 
may  require  much  ingenuity,  and  it  is  a  part  of 
the  process  in  the  original  work,  but  is  no  part  of 
the  work  of  those  who  come  after,  and  is  not 
properly  a  part  of  the  reasoning.  The  conclusion 
reached  is  not  contained  in  anything  known  be- 
fore, but  is  seen  to  be  true,  and  is  connected  with 
what  was  known  by  means  of  suppositions  or  con- 
structions made  as  we  go  along.  If  I  say  that  A 
is  equal  to  B,  and  B  to  C,  and  so  on  to  X,  it 
will  follow  not  only  that  X  is  equal  to  A,  but  to 
every  member  of  the  series,  and  this  I  suppose 
to  be  the  type  of  much  if  not  of  all  demonstrative 
reasoning.  The  difference  between  this  and  syl- 
logistic reasoning  may  be  illustrated  by  two  pos- 
sible modes  of  constructing  a  bridge.  We  may 
suppose  a  structure  fastened  to  one  bank  contain- 
ing in  it  slides  that  may  be  drawn  out,  if  we 
only  know  how,  till  they  shall  span  the  stream. 
Or  we  may  suppose,  as  is  done,  that  into  an  abut- 
ment made  firm  on  one  side  there  is  fastened  the 
support  for  a  single  step,  and  that  we  then  fasten 
by  clamps  or  bolts  to  the  end  of  that  the  support 
for  a  second  step,  and  so  on  till  we  get  over. 

The  common  account  of  demonstrative  reason- 
ing is  that  it  is  syllogistic,  and  properly  deductive, 


THREE   FIELDS  OF  REASONING.  187 

rather  than  constructive  ;  and  that  it  has  for  its 
major  proposition  either  the  axioms,  or  definitions, 
or  both.  It  is  said  that  C  is  equal  to  A,  in  the 
case  given,  because  things  that  are  equal  to  the 
same  thing  are  equal  to  each  other,  whereas  the 
general  proposition  is  no  more  evident  than  the 
particular  case,  and  is,  indeed,  a  generalization 
from  particular  cases,  all  having  equal  authority 
as  intuitions. 

In  presenting  my  view  of  this  point  I  am  happy 
to  agree  substantially  with  Dr.  McCosh  in  his 
Logic  recently  published. 

We  have  then,  looking  at  the  subject  as  a 
whole,  three  'fields  of  reasoning  under  three  differ- 
ent principles.  The  first  is  that  of  Experience, 
Analogy,  and  Induction,  in  which  the  principles 
are  uniformity  or  similarity.  I  do  not  agree  with 
Dr.  McCosh  in  thinking  that  this  can  be  brought 
under  the  syllogism.  If  it  can  in  form,  nothing 
is  gained  ;  for  no  particle  of  the  certainty  belong- 
ing to  the  general  axiom  can  be  carried  over  to 
any  particular  case. 

The  second  field  is  that  of  general  reasoning  in 
which  the  principle  is  that  of  the  class  relation,  or 
of  whole  and  part  by  which  one  thing  is  included 
within  another,  but  with  implied  reasons  for  their 
being  thus  included.  This  gives  us  the  form  of 
demonstration,  but  never  its  reality. 

The  third  field  is  that  which  has  for  its  sub- 
ject individual  concepts  and  abstract  terms,  and 


188  AN   OUTLINE    STUDY   OF  MAN. 

which  has  for  its  principles  Identity  and  Equal- 
ity. 

In  connection  with  this  subject  of  Reasoning 
there  are  some  inquiries  and  practical  points  that 
need  attention,  and 

First,  If  demonstrative  reasoning,  and,  indeed, 
all  mathematical  reasoning  as  applied  to  realities, 
starts  from  hypothesis,  we  inquire  how  it  comes  to 
pass  that  it  can  be  applied  so  extensively  and  ac- 
curately in  science  and  in  life.  It  is  because  we 
are  able  in  both  to  make  the  hypothesis  correspond 
so  nearly  with  the  fact ;  or  rather,  it  is  in  science 
because  the  physical  universe  is  constructed  on 
mathematical  principles  and  we  have  been  able  in 
certain  cases  to  discover  what  those  principles  are. 
If  we  suppose  the  form  of  the  earth's  orbit  to  be 
an  ellipse,  and  that  be  the  fact,  we  can  calculate 
its  time  and  place.  If  we  suppose  the  force  of 
gravity  to  be  directly  as  the  mass  of  matter,  and 
inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance  from  the 
sun,  we  can  estimate  it  for  any  given  point.  If  we 
suppose  atoms  to  unite  in  definite  proportions  we 
can  tell  the  results  of  a  given  mixture.  So  in  life  ; 
such  precision  of  measurement  and  weight  are 
reached,  that  the  hypothesis  will  approximate  the 
fact  sufficiently  for  practical  purposes.  Still  we 
may  see  how  figures  will  lie.  A  man  brings  you 
a  bill  for  six  cords  of  wood,  or  six  tons  of  coal,  at 
six  dollars  for  each.  The  only  thing  certain  about 
it  is  that  six  times  six  make  thirty-six.      When 


PROVING  AND  INFERRING.  189 

the  hypothesis  is  at  fault,  or  there  is  some  error  in 
our  measures,  or  weights,  or  numberings,  there 
are  no  greater  liars  than  figures. 

We  see  also  in  connection  with  demonstrative 
reasoning  the  fallacy  by  which  mathematicians  are 
misled  when  they  apply  mathematics  to  the  order 
of  nature.  That  which  can  be  demonstrated  can- 
not be  changed  by  will,  and  they  transfer  over  to 
the  phenomena  and  their  order  the  necessity  which 
belongs  to  demonstration  as  a  process  that  is  con- 
cerned only  with  hypotheses  and  abstract  rela- 
tions. The  influence  of  this  fallacy  is  subtle  and 
prevalent. 

I  ask  your  attention  also,  and  finally  as  con- 
nected with  reasoning,  to  a  practical  point  insisted 
on  by  Whately  —  the  difference  between  proving 
and  inferring.  When  a  man  sets  himself,  or  is 
set,  to  prove  anything,  he  has  a  conclusion  given 
him,  and  his  business  is  to  find  out  all  the  con- 
siderations he  can  that  will  sustain  that  conclu- 
sion. A  lawyer  assumes  the  defense  of  an  alleged 
criminal.  What  is  his  business  ?  It  is  to  prove 
that  he  is  innocent.  That  is  what  he  is  paid  for. 
And  what  does  he  do  ?  He  does  not  look  over 
the  whole  case,  or  care  to  know  anything  except 
what  will  substantiate  the  point  that  is  given  him 
to  prove.  Here  again  is  a  lawyer  on  the  other 
side  whose  business  it  is  to  prove  that  the  man  is 
guilty,  and  what  does  he  do  ?  He  finds  out  all 
the  facts  that  bear  on  that,  and  presents  them  as 


190  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

strongly  as  he  can ;  and  so  these  men  are  advo- 
cates. Now  what  does  the  judge  do  ?  He  com- 
pares all  the  facts,  looks  at  them  impartially  on 
one  side,  and  on  the  other,  and  infers  from  them 
the  truth. 

This  is  a  point  I  wish  to  insist  on  because  most 
men  are  constantly  advocates,  and  because  I  be- 
lieve that  the  love  of  the  truth  and  fairness  in 
searching  for  it  are  scarcely  less  essential  to  right 
character  and  the  welfare  of  society  than  the  tell- 
ing of  the  truth.  But  instead  of  this  the  whole 
intellectual  activity  of  many  is  spent  in  seeking  to 
substantiate  what  they  are  brought  up  to  believe, 
or  what  they  are  determined  to  believe  because  it 
is  for  their  interest  to  believe  it.  Men  are  born 
into  parties,  political  and  religious,  or  they  are 
converted  into  them.  They  fall  into  cliques  and 
sets,  and  once  there,  they  become  simply  advo- 
cates, and  truth  has  nothing  further  to  hope  from 
them  in  her  progress.  Or  perhaps  it  is  mere  will. 
They  have  adopted  a  theory.  They  have  said, 
"  I  believe  so,"  and  are  determined  to  make  out 
that  it  is  so  because  they  have  said  it.  The  sin- 
cerity of  most  men  in  their  belief  consists  in  really 
believing  what  they  have  been  taught,  or  what 
they  wish  to  believe  and  seem  to  themselves  to 
have  proved,  rather  than  in  honestly  seeking  to 
infer  the  truth.  But  all  this  is  utterly  wrong.  In 
everything  that  comes  up  bearing  upon  the  in- 
terest of  truth  or  of  society,  in  all  party  questions, 


SYSTEMIZATION.  191 

political  or  religious,  it  is  the  business  of  every 
man  to  put  and  hold  himself  in  the  position  of  one 
who  infers,  that  is  in  a  judicial  position,  and  to 
hold  an  even  balance. 

We  now  come  to  the  last  operation  mentioned 
as  performed  by  the  Intellect,  that  is 

SYSTEMIZATION. 

It  has  been  said  that  unity  in  the  midst  of 
variety  is  the  principle  of  beauty.  Be  this  as  it 
may,  it  is  the  principle  of  system.  In  unity, 
meaning  by  that  a  -unit,  there  can  be  no  system. 
In  variety  without  unity  there  can  be  none,  but 
when  we  bring  variety  into  unity  we  either  form, 
or  enlarge  a  system.  We  bring  the  several  parts 
that  seemed  unrelated  into  relation,  and,  accord- 
ing to  the  etymology  of  the  word,  make  them 
stand  up  together;  and  it  is  among  the  higher 
joys  from  the  Intellect  to  be  able  to  do  this  in  any 
department  of  nature  or  of  study.  It  is,  indeed, 
here,  and  perhaps  here  only,  that  we  find  the  point 
of  contact  between  the  operations  of  the  pure  in- 
tellect and  the  sense  of  beauty.  The  sense  of 
beauty  is  first.  Partly  sensuous,  it  acts  without  our 
thought,  but  finds  gratification  also  in  those  deeper 
relations  of  unity  in  the  midst  of  variety  which 
science  discovers,  and  goes  with  us,  luring  us  on, 
into  the  recesses  and  labyrinths  of  nature,  and  find- 
ing a  higher  and  purer  delight  as  the  sensuous  ele- 
ment is  eliminated.    We  enjoy  what  we  see  of  sys- 


192  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

tern  as  it  appears  superficially,  but  we  seek  some- 
thing deeper  in  the  knowledge  of  its  law.  All  law 
implies  system.  The  discovery  of  a  law  is  virtu- 
ally the  discovery  of  a  system  in  those  things  that 
come  under  the  law,  and  the  history  of  science  is 
little  else  than  a  history  of  the  steps  by  which  di- 
versity has  been  brought  into  unity  in  the  different 
departments  of  nature  and  of  study.  It  is  just 
this,  the  bringing  of  diversity  into  unity,  that  we 
are  now  attempting  to  accomplish  in  relation  to 
man,  and,  if  our  method  of  study  be  the  right  one, 
it  must  result  in  a  system. 

The  right  method  of  study  is  that  of  analysis 
followed  by  synthesis.  In  studying  a  subject,  or 
thing,  we  examine  it  part  by  part.  If  we  find,  as 
we  have  found  in  studying  the  body,  that  there 
are  parts  that  are  themselves  systems,  we  pursue 
the  same  process  till  we  reach  that  which,  so  far 
as  we  can  see,  has  only  the  relation  of  a  part.  We 
then  study  that  as  it  is  in  itself  and  as  it  is  related 
to  the  other  parts,  and  having  done  this  with  each 
part  we  are  prepared  to  put  them  together  into 
a  whole  which  will  thus  become  a  system.  We 
may  then  pass  from  one  related  system  to  an- 
other, each  being  a  whole  in  itself,  and  yet  a  part 
of  a  greater  whole,  till  we  gain  such  a  knowledge 
of  the  universe  as  one  great  system  made  up  of 
related  parts,  as  our  limited  capacities  may  enable 
us  to  reach.  Adopting  this  method  we  place  our- 
selves at   the  feet  of   Nature  as  learners,  and  if, 


SYSTEMIZATION.  193 

with  child-like  docility,  we  recognize  as  parts  what 
she  has  made  to  be  parts,  and  put  them  together 
into  those  wholes  which  she  has  constituted,  we 
have  a  true  science.  We  think  the  thoughts  of 
God.  Our  systems  are  the  systems  of  Nature, 
and  our  minds  are  satisfied  because  there  is  a 
natural  correlation  between  the  mind  and  Nature 
rightly  understood. 


13 


ij  l  B  11  A  u 
CALIFORIVIA. 


* 

LECTURE  IX. 

THE    SENSIBILITY.  —  A  GOOD.  —  BEAUTY.  —  THE 
LUDICROUS.  —  THE  AFFECTIVE  REASON. 

Hitherto  we  have  considered  the  Intellect. 
We  now  pass  to  the 

SENSIBILITY. 

But  in  doing  this  we  do  not  leave  the  Intellect  be- 
hind us.  We  take  it  with  us.  We  combine  it 
with  the  Sensibility  as  its  condition,  and  thus  find 
for  it  a  new  field,  and  get  from  both,  as  thus  com- 
bined, new  products. 

The  Sensibility  includes  all  that  through  which 
we  either  enjoy  or  suffer.  Thus  viewed  it  has 
two  sources  and  forms.  As  physical  beings  we 
have  merely  sensations,  and  the  capacity  for  these 
may  be  called  a  physical  sensibility  ;  but  as  intel- 
ligent beings  we  have  a  wide  capacity  of  feeling 
from  what  we  perceive  and  know.  We  feel  be- 
cause we  know;  and  the  Intellect  thus  becomes 
the  condition  of  all  the  higher  forms  of  feeling. 
The  general  statement  is  that  each  form  of  our 
activity  is  accompanied  by  its  own  feeling ;  and 
that  the  character  and  rank  of  the  feeling  will  be 
as  that  of  the  susceptibility  or  power  from  which 
it  comes. 


SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION.       195 

As  having  Intellect  only  you  will  remember 
that  I  represented  man  by  a  single  vertical  line. 
To  represent  him  as  having  both  Intellect  and 
feeling  we  shall  need  two  such  lines  united,  thus : 


Products  op  the  Intellect 
brought  forward. 


Let  the  line  A  represent  Intellect  as  we  have 
considered  it,  and  as  now  furnished,  having  intui- 
tions, products  of  the  outer  and  inner  sense,  asso- 
ciated ideas,  comparisons,  reasonings,  systems. 
Let  the  line  B  represent  the  Sensibility,  connect- 
ed, as  you  see  with  the  Litellect,  but  as  yet  un- 
furnished. Let  now  this  sensibility  be  awakened 
by  an  object  addressed  to  it  as  well  as  to  the  In- 
tellect, and  are  there  necessary  products  or  results, 
that,  as  necessary,  belong  to  all  men,  and  that 
will  be  thrown  back  of  the  two  lines,  as  the  in- 
tuitions were  thrown  back  of  the  line  represent- 
ing Intellect  ?  I  suppose  there  are,  and  whatever 
those  products  may  be,  you  will  observe  that  they 
must  have  in  them  two  elements,  —  the  intellectual 
element,  and  that  of  feeling  also.  It  will  be  some- 
thing that  can  be  designated  either  as  an  idea  or 
a  feeling.  This  being  premised,  I  may  say  that  it 
would  be  impossible  for  a  person  to  have  a  sensi- 


196  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

bility  rightly  constituted,  and  to  perceive  an  ob- 
ject adapted  to  it,  without  knowing  the  object  as 
good,  and  without  having  an  idea  of  the  enjoy- 
ment produced  by  it  as  a  good.  Thus,  then,  a 
good,  or  the  good,  I  regard  as  the  fundamental 
idea  which  is  given  by  a  sensibility,  given  to  all 
men,  given  necessarily,  and  holding  a  relation  to 
those  processes  which  are  connected  with  Intel- 
lect and  Sensibility  combined,  similar  to  that  held 
by  the  idea  of  Being  in  the  processes  of  Intellect 
alone.  You  can  have  no  thought  of  which  the 
idea  of  Being  is  not  an  element,  and,  the  Sensibility 
being  given,  you  can  have  no  form  of  activity  that 
is  normal  throughout,  of  which  good  is  not  an  ele- 
ment. Of  course  a  sensibility  is  capable  of  work- 
ing both  ways,  perhaps  necessarily.  As  a  fact,  I 
think  that  beings  with  a  sensibility  in  any  form 
are  capable  of  suffering  just  in  proportion  as  they 
are  capable  of  enjoyment.  But  their  suffering  is 
not  necessary ;  it  is  not  that  which  a  sensibility 
was  constituted  to  give,  and  therefore  we  say  that 
the  product  of  a  sensibility  is  a  good.  This  may 
be  either  from  the  action  upon  our  organization  of 
those  surroundings  which  God  has  so  wonderfully 
correlated  to  it ;  or  from  our  independent  activity  ; 
or  from  the  interaction  of  our  minds  with  other 
minds ;  or,  which  is  highest  of  all,  from  such  spir- 
itual revelations  as  God  can  make  of  Himself  di- 
rectly, and  not  through  his  works.  In  each  case 
we  have  the  same  fundamental  idea  extending  it- 


A  GOOD  AND   GOODNESS.  197 

self  through  all  the  operations  of  the  Sensibility, 
but  differing  constantly  both  in  quantity  and  in 
quality  with  the  faculties  exercised,  and  the  objects 
upon  which  they  are  exercised.  Always,  however 
induced,  there  is  an  activity  of  our  own  from  which 
the  enjoyment  is  the  immediate  outcome  as  the 
fragrance  is  from  the  flower. 

To  this  word,  good,  I  ask  attention,  because  of 
the  different  senses  in  which  it  is  used,  and  be- 
cause we  can  never  speak  or  write  understandingly 
on  morals  till  its  meaning  shall  be  fixed.  It  is,  I 
suppose,  conceded  by  all,  that  enjoyment,  and  all 
enjoyment,  is  from  the  Sensibility;  and  that  en- 
joyment is  a  good.  Is  there  anything  that  is  a 
good  that  is  not  from  the  Sensibility?  All  feeling, 
you  will  observe,  has  its  origin  in  the  Sensibility. 
We  think,  and  we  will,  and  act.  Resulting  from 
each  of  these  forms  of  activity  there  is  feeling.  Is 
that  feeling  from  the  Sensibility  ?  So  I  suppose. 
If  not,  it  would  not  be  the  Sensibility.  But  if  it  is 
from  the  Sensibility,  then  I  inquire  whether  there  is 
anything  that  can  be  called  a  good  that  is  not  from 
that.  Suppose  all  beings  as  insensible  as  a  stone, 
could  there  be  anything  that  would  be  either  good, 
or  a  good  ?  There  are  now  many  things  adapted 
to  produce  enjoyment  in  the  Sensibility,  and  these 
are  good.  There  are  also  persons  who  devote 
themselves  to  the  promotion  of  enjoyment  in  its 
highest  forms,  and  to  its  greatest  possible  extent 
by  putting  forth  themselves,   and  leading  others 


198  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

to  put  forth,  the  highest  possible  forms  of  activity ; 
and  these  are  also  good.  They  have  goodness,  but 
if  there  were  no  enjoyment  or  satisfaction  possi- 
ble in  any  sensibility  that  could  become  a  good, 
there  could  be  nothing  good ;  and  there  could  be  no 
goodness.  There  could  be  no  obligation  to  choose 
in  one  way  rather  than  in  another,  and  there  could 
be  nothing  right  or  wrong.  You  will  see,  there- 
fore, that  that  combination  or  fusion  of  Intellect 
and  Sensibility  from  which  we  get  the  rational  idea 
of  a  good  as  something  valuable  in  itself  is  not  only 
essential  as  a  motive  to  rational  action,  but  also  as 
a  condition  for  the  very  formation  of  moral  ideas  ; 
and  it  is  to  that  that  I  think  the  word  good,  used 
as  a  noun,  should  be  confined.  But  instead  of  this, 
you  will  find  the  word  constantly  used  in  discussions 
on  morals  for  goodness.  It  is  not  perhaps  strange, 
since  we  speak  so  constantly  of  a  good  man  to  in- 
dicate a  state  of  the  will,  that  we  should  speak  of 
the  state  itself  as  the  good ;  but  a  state  of  the  Will 
is  one  thing,  and  a  state  of  the  Sensibility  entirely 
another.  In  the  one  we  have  moral  quality ;  in 
the  other  not,  and  hence  the  need  of  terms  that, 
will  discriminate  them  perfectly.  We  will  then 
call  the  normal  state  of  the  Will  goodness  ;  and  the 
normal  state  of  the  Sensibility  from  any  form  of 
activity  a  good  ;  and  this  we  place  on  the  left  hand 
side  of  the  two  lines  as  the  first  of  our  regulative 
ideas  in  this  department,  and  one  that  must  be  a 
condition  for  any  others. 


BEAUTY.  199 

What  other  necessary  and  universal  idea  have 
we  in  the  same  way  ?  Suppose  a  person  with  fur- 
nished intellect  and  endowed  with  sensibility,  to 
see  for  the  first  time  a  rainbow.  I  ask  you  if  it 
would  be  possible  that  he  should  not  have  the 
idea  of 

BEAUTY. 

I  say  the  idea,  but  might  also  say  the  feeling, ; 
for  we  use  one  word  as  freely  as  the  other,  thus 
testifying  to  the  complex  nature  and  double  origin 
of  the  product.  It  is  this  complex  nature  and 
double  origin  that  has  caused  difficulty  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  beauty.  Is  Beauty  a  feeling  ?  So  say 
some.  Is  it  an  idea  ?  So  say  some.  Is  it  both 
united  and  yet  really  one  thing,  the  product  of  a 
mental  chemistry  to  be  known  and  treated  as  one 
thing,  as  water  is?  So  say  others,  and  with  them 
I  agree.  We  shall  find  that  there  is  quite  a  num- 
ber of  these  products  the  nature  and  function  of 
which  we  can  understand  only  as  we  know  their 
origin.  Thus  with  Beauty.  Has  it  an  element  of 
feeling  ?  That  must  be  in  the  mind,  and  can  be 
only  what  it  is  felt  to  be.  There  can  be  no  feeling 
nor  anything  resembling  a  feeling  in  an  external 
object.  So  far,  therefore,  beauty  must  be  sub- 
jective. It  will  be  like  an  odor,  the  intellectual 
fragrance  of  the  beautiful  object.  But,  again,  is 
Beauty  an  idea  ?  Then  it  must  be  from  qualities  in 
the  object  apprehended  by  the  intellect,  and  so  far 
as  Beauty  is  from  those  qualities  in  the  object  which 


200  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

originate  the  idea,  or  rather  is  those  qualities,  it  is 
objective.  And  as  we  give  the  name  sometimes  to 
that  in  the  object  which  produces  the  feeling,  and 
sometimes  to  the  feeling,  and  oftener  make  no  dis- 
tinction between  the  two,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  dis- 
putants may  use  the  same  word  and  be  thinking  of 
different  things,  or,  at  least,  of  different  aspects  of 
the  same  thing,  and  thus  seem  to  differ  when  they 
really  agree. 

This  view  of  the  origin  and  nature  of  Beauty  will 
enable  us  to  solve  the  speculative  difficulties  re- 
specting it,  and  it  will  only  be  left  to  inquire  what 
that  is  in  the  object  which  produces  the  feeling. 
Upon  this  we  shall  not  enter.  The  feeling  will 
vary  with  its  object,  from  the  slightest  impression 
of  mere  sensuous  beauty,  up  to  its  more  complex 
and  highest  forms,  till  indeed  it  passes  into  sublim- 
ity, which  some  regard  as  a  separate  element  and 
idea,  but  which  is  so  far  of  the  same  kind  that  we 
need  not  treat  of  it  separately  here, 

From  what  has  now  been  said,  we  feel  authorized 
to  put  down  Beauty  as  the  second  joint  necessary 
product  of  the  Intellect  and  the  Sensibility. 

What  next !  There  is  another  part  of  our  na- 
ture, somewhat  extensive  and  varied,  for  which  no 
one  word  will  suffice,  but  which  may  perhaps  be 
indicated  as  well  as  in  any  way,  by  the  word  Ludi- 
crous, or 


THE  LUDICROUS.  201 

THE   LUDICROUS. 

This  gives  us  a  field  of  the  lighter  emotions 
awakened  by  a  perception  of  some  form  of  incon- 
gruity, or  of  some  unexpected  and  sportive  com- 
bination, — 

"  Smiles  from  reason  flow, 
To  brutes  denied." 

So  says  Milton,  and  I  think  he  was  right.  Brutes 
are  sportive,  but  I  know  of  no  evidence  that  they 
have  that  combined  apprehension  and  feeling, 
which  go  to  make  up  either  the  ludicrous,  the  ridic- 
ulous, or  the  witty.  Clearly  we  have  here  again 
both  the  idea  and  the  feeling  combined  into  one 
product. 

This  field  of  the  Ludicrous  we  are  not  called 
upon  to  enter.  It  is  legitimate.  It  is  right  in  its 
place,  and  runs  out  into  many  forms  of  humor,  fun, 
and  drollery.  I  will  simply  say  before  leaving  it, 
that  I  do  not  agree  with  those  writers  who  hold  that 
laughter  aways  has  in  it  an  element  of  contempt. 
I  think  it  often  an  expression  of  mere  merriment, 
and  in  the  purest  good  nature. 

We  put  down,  then,  back  of  the  two  lines,  and  as 
our  third  regulative  idea  in  this  department,  the 
Ludicrous.  Is  there  any  other  idea  to  be  placed 
there  ?  I  think  not ;  and  it  only  remains  to  in- 
quire what  we  shall  call  the  faculty  or  power  which 
gives  us  these  ideas.  Sir  William  Hamilton 
speaks  particularly  of  the  deficiency  of  our  nomen- 
clature in  this  department,  and  it  is  to  be  regret- 


202  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

ted.  This  power  —  for  it  is  not  properly  a  faculty 
as  not  subject  to  the  will —  has  no  name,  but  it 
needs  one.  In  its  independence  of  the  Will,  and 
hence  in  its  universality  and  necessity,  it  resembles 
what  we  called  "  The  Reason,"  when  we  were  con- 
sidering the  Intellect  alone.  It  differs  from  it  only 
as  it  acts  with  the  Sensibility,  and  so  has  in  the 
product  an  element  from  that.  What  we  need, 
therefore,  is  the  right  qualifying  word  to  indicate 
that.  But  there  is  no  such  word.  The  only  one 
I  can  think  of  that  will  do  at  all,  is  Affective.  If 
we  adopt  that,  we  shall  call  it  the  Affective  Reason, 
meaning  by  that  a  reason  whose  product  has  the 
power  of  affecting  us  as  a  motive,  which  the  ideas 
of  the  pure  reason  have  not.  This  is  a  real  dis- 
tinction ;  it  is  one  that  needs  to  be  made,  and  the 
word  is  not  a  bad  one.  But  not  accepting  this, 
we  may  either  take  a  name  from  one  of  the  minor 
functions  of  the  power,  and  call  it  the  iEsthetic 
Reason,  or  let  it  go  without  a  name.  I  will  put 
the  two  names  down  under  the  products  we  have 
considered,  and  you  may  choose  for  yourselves. 

In  connection  with  the  fundamental  idea  of  Good 
the  Sensibility  assumes  different  forms,  which  we 
now  proceed  to  consider.  Of  these  the  first  and 
lowest  is  Appetite,  or 

THE    APPETITES. 

These,  together  with  the  other  forms  of  the  Sen- 
sibility that   will   be   considered  in  this  Lecture, 


THE  APPETITES.  203 

were  treated  of  by  trie  in  this  place  eleven  years 
ago ;  and  what  I  then  said  was  .published  in  the 
44  Lectures  on  Moral  Science."  We  may  therefore 
treat  them  the  more  briefly. 

The  Appetites  are  those  cravings  of  the  animal 
nature  that  have  for  their  object  the  well-being 
of  the  body,  and  the  continuance  of  the  race.  As 
the  means  of  sustaining  and  continuing  the  race, 
they  are  the  condition  of  all  other  forms  of  the 
Sensibility,  and  so  are  lower  than  they.  Their 
characteristics  are  that  they  take  their  rise  from 
the  body,  are  periodical,  and  have  a  physical  limit ; 
and  any  craving  that  has  these  characteristics  may 
properly  be  called  an  appetite. 

The  Appetites  commonly  mentioned  are  those  of 
Hunger,  Thirst,  and  Sex.  But  according  to  what 
has  just  been  said,  the  periodical  craving  for  sleep 
and  for  air  may  rank  here.  If  the  intervals  of 
breathing  were  such  as  to  create  a  conscious  de- 
sire for  air  and  an  effort  to  obtain  it,  no  doubt  the 
craving  would  be  ranked  among  the  Appetites. 
And  so,  if  we  would  know  how  many  appetites 
there  are,  we  must  inquire  how  many  things  there 
are  generically  that  are  necessary  for  the  well- 
being  of  the  body,  and  we  may  be  sure  there  will 
be  within  the  body  a  craving  for  those  things. 
We  may  give  them  one  name,  or  different  names, 
but  they  are  really  one  thing,  the  manifestation 
in  different  forms  of  one  principle,  that  is,  a  crav- 
ing, or  going  out  in  all  directions  after  such  things 
as  are  needed  for  the  well-being  of  the  body. 


204  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

As  the  Appetites  have  the  lowest  place  in  our 
sensitive  organization,  it  is  natural  that  any  abuse 
of  them  should  be  concealed  ;  and  hence  while  the 
corruption  and  degradation  through  them  are  so 
fearful  and  extensive,  they  are,  for  the  most  part, 
covered  up.  They  are  so  until  human  beings  be- 
come lost  to  shame,  for  shame  is  the  principle 
placed  in  our  constitution  to  guard  against  what 
is  low  and  mean,  as  conscience  is  to  guard  against 
what  is  wrong. 

In  their  natural  state,  without  artificial  stimu- 
lants, and  with  a  regular  and  adequate  supply  of 
food,  the  Appetites  are  self  regulating,  and  when 
they  are  thus  left  to  themselves,  or  are  in  any 
way  properly  regulated,  man  is  not  degraded  by 
them.  Let  a  man  eat  that  he  may  live  and  do  his 
proper  work,  and  he  is  a  man  ;  but  let  him  live 
that  he  may  eat,  or  give  himself  up  to  any  form 
of  sensual  or  merely  sensitive  gratification,  and  he 
is  degraded  ;  his  face  is  towards  Egypt  and  its 
flesh-pots  to  the  neglect  of  the  pillar  of  cloud 
and  of  fire,  and  of  the  promised  land. 

But  there  are  artificial  appetites  as  well  as  those 
that  are  natural.  These  have  all  the  character- 
istics of  an  appetite  except  its  beneficial  effects. 
They  often  bring  men  into  a  bondage  more  abso- 
lute and  degrading  than  that  from  any  natural 
appetite  ;  but  as  they  do  not  belong  necessarily  to 
the  constitution,  they  need  not  be  treated  of  here. 
I  will  only  observe  that  the  strong  probability  is, 


INSTINCT.  205 

that  God  gave  man  originally  as  many  appetites 
as  it  was  best  he  should  have ;  and  that  I  do  not 
believe  that  any  man  ever  gained  anything  on  the 
whole  by  creating  an  artificial  appetite.  I  believe 
that  purer  and  more  lasting  physical  enjoyment  will 
come  from  the  natural  appetites  alone,  if  properly 
regulated,  and  that  the  system  will  be  better  fitted 
through  them  to  minister  to  those  higher  functions 
and  enjoyments  of  the  intellect  and  the  heart  that 
belong  specifically  to  man. 

Appetite  is  a.  craving ;  but  how  shall  it  know 
where  to  find  its  object  ?  The  young  calf  is 
dropped,  it  craves  food,  but  how  shall  it  know 
where  to  find  it  ?     Here  comes  in 

INSTINCT. 

This  is  needed  where  it  is  impossible  that  Intel- 
lect should  act.  The  Appetite  craves,  Instinct 
directs.  The  Appetite  is  presentative,  the  Instinct 
is  regulative.  Instinct  is  a  kind  of  unintelligent, 
affective  reason,  as  that  has  just  been  defined.  It 
directs  to  ends,  but  presupposes  that  means  and 
conditions  are  supplied  by  an  intelligence  out  of 
itself,  and  if  these  are  wanting  it  knows  nothing 
of  the  mode  of  supplying  them.  It  forecasts  the 
seasons,  and  proceeds  on  the  widest  knowledge  of 
the  laws  of  nature  and  of  the  order  of  events.  It 
knows  the  fact  of  the  law  of  gravitation,  and  the 
doctrine  of  specific  gravities.  The  setting  hen  turns 
over  her  eggs  regularly  by  ruffling  them,  because 


206  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

she  knows  that  the  specific  gravity  of  the  yolk 
is  greater  than  that  of  the  white,  and  that  if  the 
yolk  should  touch  the  shell  at  the  bottom,  it  would 
prevent  the  growth  of  the  chick.  That  is  a  thing 
that  men  did  not  find  out  for  thousands  of  years. 
Hens  knew  it  always.  But  then  the  hen  does  not 
know  a  glass  egg  from  a  real  one ;  she  does  not 
know  a  duck's  egg  from  one  of  her  own,  and  is 
utterly  bewildered  when  the  young  ducks,  guided 
by  an  instinct  which  tells  them  that  they  have 
webbed  feet,  run  at  once  into  the  water.  Instinct 
assumes  a  given  condition  of  things,  which  noth- 
ing but  intelligence,  and  I  may  say  a  Divine  In- 
telligence, could  arrange.  Let  that  condition  exist, 
and  nothing  can  be  more  admirable  and  perfect 
than  its  movements  and  their  results  ;  but  change 
the  condition  and  it  is  wholly  baffled.  The  pro- 
pensity works  on,  but  works  in  the  dark.  A 
beaver,  caught  and  confined  in  a  room,  will  gnaw 
any  wood  it  can  find  and  make  a  dam  of  it  where 
there  is  no  water.  That  is  instinct.  When  it  is 
perfect  it  has  no  power  to  profit  by  experience,  or 
to  modify  conditions.  In  that  case  Instinct  is  at 
its  maximum,  and  Intelligence  at  its  minimum  ; 
but  as  we  rise  in  the  scale  intelligence  increases 
until  we  come  to  man,  and  in  him  intelligence  is 
at  its  maximum,  and  instinct  at  its  minimum. 
This  relation  of  Instinct  to  Intelligence,  was,  I  un- 
derstand, put  upon  the  board  by  President  Chad- 
bourne  in  his  Lectures  here  two  years  since  on  In- 
stinct, in  this  way  :  — 


l  i  n  r 

THE  DESIRES.  207 

[FORM 


Let  the  lower  triangle  represent  Instinct,  and  the 
upper  one  Intelligence,  and  it  will  be  seen  that  as 
we  go  upward  Instinct  diminishes,  and  Intelli- 
gence increases,  until  Instinct  has  come  to  a  point, 
and  Intelligence  has  reached  its  maximum. 

It  is  to  be  said,  however,  that  we  never  reach  a 
point  where  Instinct  is  wholly  absent.  In  going 
up,  according  to  the  system  we  are  working  out, 
we  leave  nothing  behind,  and  so  we  carry  Instinct 
with  us,  or  something  of  the  same  nature,  all  the 
way  up.  The  principle  of  Instinct  is  involved  in 
all  involuntary  tendency  towards  an  end;  and 
when  it  is  unperverted  man  may  rationally  com- 
mit himself  to  its  guidance.  An  intelligent,  or 
rather,  a  rational  being,  having  an  instinct,  knows 
that  instinct  to  be  what  it  is,  and  knowing  that, 
he  may  rationally,  and  most  wisely,  commit  him- 
self to  its  guidance. 

We  now  pass  to 

THE   DESIRES. 

These  have  the  same  relation  to  the  well-being 
of  the  mind  that  the  appetites  have  to  that  of  the 
body.  If  we  would  know  how  many  appetites 
there  are,  we  must  inquire  how  many  things  differ- 
ing generically  there  are  that  are  needed  for  the 
well-being  of  the  body,  and  we  may  be  sure  there 


208  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

will  be  within  the  body  an  instinctive  craving  for 
those  things.  We  may  give  them  one  name  or 
different  names,  but  there  is  really  one  principle, 
that  is,  a  craving  or  going  out  in  all  directions  for 
that  which  is  needed  for  the  well-being  of  the 
body.  So  it  is  with  the  Desires.  They  are  cravings 
for  those  things  which  are  necessary  for  the  up- 
building of  a  perfect  mind.  What  then  are  those 
things  which  it  is  necessary  our  minds  should  have 
that  they  may  become,  and  continue  to  be,  what 
they  are  capable  of  being  ? 

In  the  first  place,  if  we  are  to  be  or  to  do  any- 
thing, it  is  necessary  that  we  should  continue  to 
exist.  We  put  down,  then,  as  the  first  and  lowest 
of  the  Desires,  that  of 

CONTINUED   EXISTENCE. 

Continuing  to  exist,  we  shall  need  to  have,  and 
to  hold  in  our  possession,  that  which  will  enable 
us  to  enjoy  our  existence.     This  gives  us 

THE  DESIRE  OF  PROPERTY. 

Existing,  and  having  that  which  will  enable 
him  to  enjoy  existence,  man  needs  to  know  how 
to  use  himself  and  it.     Hence  he  has 

THE  DESIRE  OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

This  desire  has,  however,  wider  relations  than 
would  be  thus  indicated.  Knowledge  is  the  con- 
dition of  all  rational  action,  and  of  all  the  higher 
emotions. 


DESIRE   OF   POWER  AND  ESTEEM.  209 

Existing,  possessing,  knowing,  man  is  also  ca- 
pable of  doing  many  things,  and  of  becoming 
what  he  is  not.  This  implies  the  power  of  doing 
and  becoming.  It  evidently  belongs  to  the  per- 
fection of  our  nature  that  we  should  have  power, 
and  hence  we  set  down  as  next  in  order 

THE  DESIRE  OF  POWER. 

The  desires  already  mentioned  are  requisite  to 
the  perfection  of  the  individual.  But  man  is 
placed  in  relation  to  his  fellows,  and  he  needs  some 
desire  that  will  make  him  instrumental  in  the 
promotion  of  their  well-being,  and  the  perfection 
of  society.     Hence  he  needs,  and  has, 

THE  DESIRE  OF  ESTEEM. 

These  five  seem  to  me  to  be  the  original  and 
primary  desires.  The  words  indicating  them  are 
put  in  their  general  form,  as  Property,  for  instance. 
What  is  property  ?  It  may  be  farms,  houses,  bank 
stock,  money.  The  term  simply  groups  in  a  class 
all  those  things  with  reference  to  each  of  which  the 
desire  acts  specifically ;  and  I  suppose  that  these 
are  original  desires  and  act  immediately  and  nec- 
essarily on  the  presentation  of  their  objects. 

But  besides  the  desires  just  mentioned,  there 
are  those  who  contend  that  we  have  a  desire  of 
Happiness,  of  Liberty,  and  of  Society. 

What  has  been  termed  the  desire  of  Happiness, 
I  prefer  to  speak  of  as 

14 


210  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 


THE  DESIRE  OF  GOOD. 

This  term  I  prefer,  because  it  includes  in  the 
minds  of  all,  as  the  term  happiness  does  not,  all 
the  normal  products  of  the  Sensibility ;  and  it  is 
of  all  those  products  that  we  are  now  speaking. 
The  normal  product  of  the  Sensibility  in  any  of 
its  forms  is  a  good,  and  is  desirable  in  itself ;  but 
with  many  the  term  Happiness  is  contrasted  with 
pleasure,  and  does  not  include  the  good  that  comes 
through  the  sensitive  organization.  The  term 
also  represents  to  most  minds  a  permanent  state  in 
which  there  is  an  aggregate  of  good,  and  a  pre- 
ponderance of  it  over  suffering,  whereas  the  root 
of  desire,  its  generic  element,  is  found  in  the  in- 
herent desirableness  of  every  normal  product  of 
the  Sensibility.  We  here  reach,  as  in  the  Intel- 
lect, a  simple  and  primitive  element.  Thought, 
the  product  of  the  Intellect,  is  essentially  intelli- 
gent. The  Intellect  is  inherently  and  natively  a 
Knower,  and  knows  itself  as  such.  In  the  same 
way  the  normal  product  of  the  Sensibility  is  essen- 
tially desirable.  Inherently  and  natively  the  Sen- 
sibility is  a  giver  of  good,  which  is  immediately 
and  necessarily  known  as  a  good,  and  so  as  desi- 
rable. 

But  admitting  what  has  now  been  said,  ought 
not  the  desire  of  Good  to  be  placed  among  the 
original  and  primitive  desires  ?  Does  not  every 
one   desire  good  ?      Yes,   but   the   peculiarity   is 


THE   DESIRE   OF   GOOD.  211 

that  no  one  can  will  to  seek  good  directly.  The 
mechanism  of  the  constitution  is  that  we  have 
specific  desires  for  individual  things  with  refer- 
ence to  which  we  can  put  forth  specific  acts  of 
choice  and  volition,  and  that  on  the  attainment 
of  these  things  good  comes  spontaneously.  We 
desire  immediately,  and  choose  and  take  the 
bread ;  its  sweetness  and  nourishment  come  of 
their  own  accord.  As  I  have  said  elsewhere,  the 
good  "  does  not  lie  proximate  to  the  will."  It  is 
the  common  result  of  all  forms  of  activity  when 
objects  directly  chosen  are  attained.  Entering 
thus  as  the  common  element  into  all  the  desires, 
it  cannot  be  classed  as  in  the  same  rank  with  any 
one  of  them.  It  has,  indeed,  the  same  relation  to 
all  specific  forms  of  desire  that  consciousness  has 
to  all  the  other  mental  operations.  It  is  some- 
thing different  from  any  one  of  them  ;  it  is  com- 
mon to  them  all,  and  is  that  without  which  no  one 
of  them  could  be. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  it  would  not  be  phil- 
osophical to  class  the  desire  of  Good,  or,  if  any 
choose, to  call  it  so,  of  Happiness,  with  those  spe- 
cific desires,  by  the  objects  of  which  the  Will  is 
directly  called  into  action. 

In  connection  with  the  view  now  presented,  it 
may  be  well  to  notice  the  provision  made  in  the 
constitution  for  activity  as  the  condition  of  enjoy- 
ment. In  strictness  all  enjoyment  is  from  activ- 
ity, but  it  differs  as  the  activity  is  originated  from 


212  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

without  or  from  within.  Enjoyment  from  activity- 
originating  from  without,  is  sometimes  called  pas- 
sive enjoyment  and  pleasure,  and  it  is  not  as  high 
as  that  from  activity  originated  from  within.  The 
highest  enjoyment  is  an  involuntary  result  of  ac- 
tivity originating  from  within,  coming  from  it  as 
the  fragrance  from  the  flower  ;  and  the  higher  the 
faculties  brought  into  action,  and  the  more  in- 
tense the  activity,  if  it  be  normal,  the  higher 
will  be  the  enjoyment.  In  no  other  way  is  there 
enjoyment  to 

"  The  rapt  seraph  that  adores  and  burns." 

The  highest  results,  either  for  himself  or  others, 
can  be  reached  by  man  only  through  intelligent 
action  originating  from  within. 

And  what  is  true  of  Good  as  a  condition  of  De- 
sire, is  true  of 

THE  DESIRE  OF  LIBERTY, 
as  a  condition  of  action.  By  Liberty  here  is  not 
meant  that  liberty  of  choice  without  which  there 
cannot  be  a  will  in  freedom,  but  the  liberty  to 
carry  out  our  choices  in  action.  A  man  in  prison 
has,  as  a  man,  all  the  liberty  of  choice,  and  all 
the  elements  and  conditions  of  freedom  under  a 
moral  government  that  are  possible,  but  he  has 
not  liberty  of  action.  Of  beings  born  with 
powers  of  whatever  kind,  it  is  to  be  said  that 
they  are  not  so  much  born  with  a  desire  of  free- 
dom, as  that   they  are  born  free,   and  naturally 


THE  DESIRE  OF  SOCIETY.  213 

struggle  against  whatever  would  limit  their  legit- 
imate action.  To  be  born  with  that  which  may 
be  taken  away,  and  will  then  be  desired  as  the 
condition  of  obtaining  other  things,  is  wholly  dif- 
ferent from  being  born  with  a  desire  of  that 
which  is  to  be  attained.  Like  that  of  good,  the 
first  will  be  a  general  and  constant  element,  and 
cannot  be  properly  classed  with  the  specific  de- 
sires. 

It  only  remains  to  speak  of 

THE  DESIRE  OF   SOCIETY. 

All  the  writers  place  this  among  the  original 
desires,  and  perhaps  rightly.  I  have  no  zeal 
about  it.  There  certainly  is  a  gregarious  instinct 
among  animals,  and  perhaps  among  men,  but  so- 
ciety is  so  far  something  that  we  are  born  into, 
and  a  condition  for  the  gratification  of  other  de- 
sires, and  for  the  exercise  of  the  affections  and 
higher  faculties,  that  I  rather  prefer  to  place  it 
with  the  desire  of  good  and  of  liberty,  and  to 
write  it  down  so  as  to  show  that  it  enters  as  an 
element  into  the  operation  of  other  faculties. 

The  place  I  give  to  these  three  desires  —  that 
of  Good,  of  Liberty,  and  of  Society  —  does  not 
disparage  them.  It  makes  them  more  funda- 
mental as  pertaining  more  fully  to  our  nature,  as 
entering  more  deeply  into  its  operations,  and  as 
involved  in  everything  that  is  dearest  to  us. 

Of  the  Desires  in  general  it  is  to  be  said,  that 


214  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

while  they  have  reference  to  the  good  of  the  indi- 
vidual, they  are  not  selfish.  They  may  become 
so,  or  they  may  be  exercised  in  the  interest  of 
benevolence.  How  is  a  man  to  be  effectively 
benevolent  unless  he  has  property,  or  power,  or 
knowledge,  or  esteem  ?  He  has  power  to  do  good 
precisely  as  he  possesses  these,  and  in  gaining 
them  through  the  active  operation  of  the  natural 
desires,  he  may  be  acting  benevolently.  It  is  a 
misapprehension  to  suppose,  when  a  man  is  seek- 
ing to  build  himself  up  in  these  things,  that  he  is 
necessarily  acting  selfishly.  He  may  be  seeking 
to  build  himself  up  in  that  nature  which  God  has 
given  him,  and  which  he  is  under  obligation  to 
perfect,  and,  as  an  instrument  of  good,  to  make  as 
efficient  as  possible.  The  man  who  can  gain  the 
power  to  wield  a  great  assembly  for  good,  to  put 
down  oppression,  to  sit  as  a  judge  and  direct  the 
judicial  sentiment  of  the  community,  is  in  fault 
if  he  does  not  do  it. 

But,  while  the  Desires  are  not  necessarily  selfish, 
they  tend  in  that  direction,  and  we  are  to  be  on 
our  guard  against  the  law  by  which  they  act. 

The  Appetites  have  a  physical  limit,  which 
operates  as  a  kind  of  bodily  conscience,  but  if  a 
man  puts  himself  under  the  control  of  one  of  the 
desires  there  is  nothing  of  the  kind.  On  the  con- 
trary, if  a  man  puts  himself  under  one  of  these 
desires,  as  that  of  property,  it  will  grow  by  be- 
ing indulged,  till  he  becomes  absorbed    and  en- 


THE  NATURAL  AFFECTIONS.  215 

slaved  by  it.  He  may  say  that  he  cares  nothing 
for  property  except  for  its  use,  —  and  perhaps  he 
does  not  at  the  time  ;  that  he  will  go  on  getting 
it  up  to  a  certain  point  and  then  devote  it  to  a 
given  use  ;  but  as  he  goes  on  and  accumulates  he 
holds  on  to  it  with  a  firmer  grasp,  and  when  he 
has  the  ability  to  do  what  he  thought  he  would,  he 
has  lost  the  disposition,  and  perhaps  even  becomes 
miserly.  So  is  it  with  all  the  desires,  and  there- 
fore, as  I  have  said,  we  are  to  be  on  our  guard 
respecting  them. 

The  Appetites  and  the  Desires  have  reference 
to  self  and  its  well-being  ;  but  we  need,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  desire  of  esteem,  a  form  of  the  Sensi- 
bility which  will  bring  us  into  relation  to  others 
as  also  capable  of  well-being,  and  this  we  find  in 

THE    NATURAL   AFFECTIONS. 

These  are  wholly  different  in  their  nature  from 
the  Desires.  As  Affections  they  do  not  appropri- 
ate anything  ;  they  give.  At  the  same  time  they 
contain  in  themselves  an  element  of  desire,  so  that 
the  Desires  are  a  condition  for  the  Affections.  This 
is  so,  because-  if  there  be  an  intelligent  affection 
for  any  being,  or,  indeed,  an  affection  of  any  kind, 
there  must  be  a  desire  for  the  well-being  of  that 
being.  Hence  the  Affections  are  conditioned  on 
the  Desires.  They  take  that  desire  of  good  for 
ourselves  through  which  we  come  to  estimate  good 


216  AN  OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

rightly,  and  make  it  the  basis  of  a  feeling  towards 
others  by  which  their  good  becomes  our  immediate 
object,  so  that  we  are  able  to  love  them  as  our- 
selves. This  is  true  of  the  affections  in  general, 
whether  natural  or  moral,  so  far,  at  least,  as  there 
can  be  said  to  be  love  in  natural  affection.  They 
have  the  good  of  others  for  their  direct  object. 

The  Natural  Affections  differ  from  the  moral, 
in  manifesting  themselves  spontaneously  and  with 
no  reference  to  any  previous  action  of  the  Will ; 
whereas  the  Moral  Affections  depend,  both  for 
their  being  and  character,  upon  the  previous  ac- 
tion of  the  Will.  Indirectly,  and  after  they  have 
revealed  themselves  as  independent  facts  in  our 
constitution,  the  Will  may  have  power  over  the 
Natural  Affections.  They  may  be  indulged  and 
cultivated,  or  they  may  be  repressed  and  dwarfed. 
Hence  want  of  natural  affection  may  become,  as 
it  is  made  in  the  Scriptures  to  be,  an  evidence  of 
moral  depravity.  These  affections  are  common  to 
both  animals  and  man.  Rising  spontaneously, 
they  prompt  both  to  do  what  they  can  for  the 
good  of  those  that  are  made  naturally  dependent 
upon  them. 

The  Natural  Affections  have  generally  been  di- 
vided into  the  benevolent  and  the  malevolent. 
These  terms  I  do  not  accept,  or,  at  least,  I  do  not 
think  them  happy.  They  imply  the  action  of  a 
will  fully  constituted,  whereas  we  have  not  yet 
reached  that.     In  the  proper  sense  of  those  words 


THE  NATURAL  AFFECTIONS.  217 

I  do  not  apprehend  that  an  animal  can  be  either 
benevolent  or  malevolent.  Where  an  animal,  as 
the  parent  bird,  does  good  to  another,  it  is  from 
no  rational  estimate  and  choice  of  the  good  as  a 
motive  lying  before  it,  and  so  as  good  willing,  but 
from  a  beneficent,  spontaneous,  constitutional  im- 
pulse, prompting  from  behind ;  and  so  far  as  man 
is  governed  by  mere  natural  affection  this  is 
equally  true  of  him.  And  while  this  is  true  of 
the  good  done,  it  is  equally  true  of  the  beast  of 
prey  that  he  has  no  malevolence  towards  his  vic- 
tim. He  does  not  hate  him  ;  he  simply  wishes  to 
eat  him.  What,  then,  shall  we  call  these  affec- 
tions ?  Those  which  lead  to  the  doing  of  good  I 
would  call  beneficent.  They  are  so ;  just  that, 
and  nothing  more.  Whether  in  animals  or  in 
man,  there  is  no  benevolence  about  them. 

The  beneficent  affections,  as  thus  defined,  in- 
clude a  wide  range,  and  play  an  important  part  in 
both  animal  and  human  life.  They  correspond 
throughout  to  those  natural  relations,  as  of  parent 
and  offspring,  through  which  there  is  mutual  de- 
pendence, and  on  which  life  in  communities  must 
depend. 

But,  calling  those  affections  beneficent  which 
have  for  their  object  the  production  of  good,  what 
shall  we  call  their  opposite?  They  have  been 
called  "  malevolent,"  but  there  is  in  them  properly 
no  will.  They  are  from  a  tendency,  a  mechanism, 
a  nature.     They  are  a  part  of  an  original  consti- 


218  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF   MAN. 

tution,  and  have  for  their  object,  not  the  produc- 
tion of  misery  as  such,  but  the  well-being  of  the 
individual,  or  of  the  community  of  which  the  indi- 
vidual is  a  part.  It  is  here  that  our  nomenclature 
is  most  deficient.  We  need  some  word  to  indicate 
that  inherent  something  in  everything  that  has 
life  by  which  it  asserts  itself,  and  its  right  to  be, 
in  the  full  exercise  of  its  legitimate  powers,  and 
this,  if  need  be,  to  the  destruction  of  that  which 
opposes  itself  to  it.  Up  to  this  point  we  might, 
perhaps,  call  the  affection  Defensive,  but  it  often 
goes  further.  While  there  can  be,  in  this  region, 
no  conception  of  punishment  in  its  proper  nature, 
there  is  evidently  something  retributive.  The 
foundation  for  this,  however,  lies  in  the  being,  not 
as  malevolent,  but  as  a  guard  against  future  evil. 
I  would  then  call  those  Natural  Affections  which 
are  productive  of  evil  to  others,  either  simply  De- 
fensive, or  Defensive  and  Punitive,  This,  like 
Beneficent,  would  indicate  their  office  in  the  con- 
stitution. There  is  no  natural  affection,  either  in 
animals  or  in  man,  that  has  for  its  object  the 
production  of  evil  for  evil's  sake. 

A  difficulty  with  us  in  treating  of  the  Natural 
Affections  is  from  the  tendency  of  the  Moral  Affec- 
tions to  blend  with  them.  This  blending  is  in- 
evitable, and  hence  the  impossibility  of  our  inter- 
preting with  certainty  those  actions  in  animals 
which  seem  to  correspond  with  our  own.  In 
judging  of    the  characteristics  of    either  men  or 


THE  NATURAL   AFFECTIONS.  219 

animals  we  need  to  know  their  natural  affections, 
as  modified  by  their  constitution,  for  individuals 
of  the  same  species  differ  greatly  in  regard  to 
these ;  but  in  judging  of  character  we  need  to 
know  the  moral  affections. 

In  connection  with  the  different  forms  of  the 
Sensibility  which  we  have  considered,  there  nat- 
urally arise  the  emotions  of  hope  and  fear,  of  joy 
and  sorrow.  Indeed,  desire  and  affection,  with 
the  prospect  that  their  object  will  be  reached, 
become  hope ;  with  the  prospect  of  failure,  they 
become  fear.  Attaining  their  ends,  desire  and 
affection  become  joy ;  failing  of  them,  they  be- 
come sorrow.  Persons  habitually  anticipating 
and  hoping  for  the  objects  of  desire  and  those 
proposed  by  affection,  are  cheerful ;  those  habit- 
ually anticipating  the  reverse,  fall  into  gloom  and 
settled  despondency.  "  Hope  deferred  maketh  the 
heart  sick  ;  but  when  the  desire  cometh  it  is  a  tree 
of  life."  Thus  do  we  find  in  the  Sensibility  the 
source  of  our  activity  ;  and  thus  do  we  see  how 
there  spring  up  from  within  it,  as  Hope  and  Fear, 
the  two  great  and  opposite  gales  of  life. 

We  have  thus  finished  what  I  propose  to  say  on 
this  part  of  our  nature.  If  we  present  it  at  one 
view,  in  a  diagram  constructed  according  to  the 
principle  we  have  adopted,  it  will  stand  thus 
(reading  it  from  the  bottom  upward  as  we  do 
with  all  other  diagrams)  :  — 


220 


AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 


0 


PUNITIVE. 

lFFECTIONS  : 

DEFENSIVE, 

BENEFICENT, 

DESIRES :  • 

ESTEEM. 
POWER, 
KNOWLEDGE, 
PROPERTY, 

ft 

o 
o 

0 

w 

H 

H 

o 
o 

EXISTENCE, 

hi 

CQ 

INSTINCT.    THE  INSTINCTS. 

OF  SEX. 

FOR  SLEEP, 

APPETITES:  « 

FOR  AIR, 
OF  THIRST, 
OF  HUNGER, 

THE  LUDICROUS. 

BEAUTY, 

GOOD, 


AFFECTIVE  OR  -ESTHETIC 
REASON. 


)J 

W 

J 

M 

J 

DQ 
S3 

CO 

PRODUCTS  OF  INTELLECT 
BROUGHT  UP  TO  BE  THE 
CONDITION  OF  THE  ACTIV- 
ITY OF  THE  SENSIBILITY 
AND  THE  INTELLECT. 


INTELLECT  AND  SENSIBILITY. 


XJNIVEUSITY  OF 

MFORNIA.  J 


LECTURE  X. 

INTELLECT,  SENSIBILITY,  AND  WILL.  —THE  PRAC- 
TICAL REASON.  —  PERSONALITY,  CAUSATION, 
FREEDOM,  OBLIGATION,  MERIT  AND  DEMERIT, 
RIGHTS,  RESPONSIBILITY,  PUNISHMENT. 

We  have  not  yet  found  Man.  Unconsciously, 
perhaps  unavoidably,  we  have  carried  ourselves 
back,  and  have  supposed  our  whole  selves  to  be 
present  in  the  different  processes  we  have  consid- 
ered. Doing  this,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  be 
sure  what  the  processes  of  a  mere  animal  are,  or 
what  the  condition  would  be  of  a  being  having 
intellect  only,  or  intellect  combined  with  feeling. 
These  different  departments  can  be  conceived  of, 
and  be  considered  separately,  just  as  we  can  con- 
ceive and  treat  separately  of  the  sides  and  angles 
of  a  triangle,  but  so  great  is  their  unity  that  one 
seldom  if  ever  acts  without  the  other.  The  ele- 
ments are  so  blended  that  it  is  difficult  to  analyze 
them ;  and  besides,  what  mankind  generally  care 
for  is  the  result,  and  not  the  elements  or  combina- 
tion by  which  it  is  produced. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  the  body,  and  the 
two  lower  divisions  of  the  mind,  the  Intellect  and 
the  Sensibility.  These  are  indispensable  condi- 
tions for  the  being  and  action  of 


222 


AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 


THE  RATIONAL  WILL. 

Without  the  Intellect  there  is  no  light,  without 
the  Sensibility  there  is  no  motive.  As  distinguished 
from  mere  impulse,  rational  will  involves  rational 
choice ;  but  without  the  Intellect  there  can  be  no 
rationality,  and  without  the  Sensibility  there  can  be 
nothing  to  choose.  With  these  we  have  all  that 
we  need,  not  as  a  cause,  but  as  a  condition  for  the 
Will. 

As  possessed  of  Intellect  alone,  we  have  repre- 
sented man  by  one  line  ;  as  possessed  of  Intellect 
and  Sensibility  we  have  represented  him  by  two 
lines  united,  and  we  now  represent  him  as  pos- 
sessed of  Intellect,  Sensibility,  and  Will,  by  three 
lines  united,  thus,  — 


?j    g 


>5 

H 
!3 

"3 

h- 1 

j 

M 

hj 

E3 

GO 
g 

tc 

Before  the  Intellect,  which  stands  in  front,  we 
bring  up,  and  suppose  to  be  present,  the  various 
products  of  the  Intellect  and  the  Sensibility  in 
their  combination.  These  the  Intellect  apprehends. 
By  them,  as  thus  apprehended,  the  Sensibility  is 


THE  WILL.  223 

affected,  and  then  the  Will  acts  in  view  of  the  op- 
erations of  both  the  Intellect  and  the  Sensibility. 
Objects  presented  to  the  senses — objects  of  Appe- 
tite, of  Desire,  and  of  the  Affections  —  are  supposed 
to  be  presented  before  the  man  now  fully  consti- 
tuted, and  we  inquire  what  new  phenomena  must, 
and  what  may  result  from  the  possession  of  Will. 

But  first  what  is  Will  ?  By  Will,  or  the  Will, 
we  do  not  mean  anything  that  has  a  separate  and 
independent  existence.  We  mean  by  it  that  con^, 
stituent  of  man's  being  by  which  he  is  capable  of 
free  action,  knowing  himself  to  be  thus  capable ; 
just  as  we  mean  by  the  Intellect,  that  constituent 
of  his  being  by  which  he  is  capable  of  thought, 
knowing  himself  to  be  thus  capable.;  If  we  would 
understand  the  nature  of  Will  we  must  go  back 
to  the  beginning  of  our  course,  and  we  shall  find 
that  there  is  in  it  a  synthesis  of  both  of  the  great 
elements  which  we  have  considered,  and  some- 
thing added.  We  began,  as  you  remember,  with 
gravitation,  that  is  with  force,  —  that  mysterious 
something  which  all  classes  of  thinkers  are  obliged 
to  recognize  and  assume,  but  which  nobody  com- 
prehends ;  we  began  with  that,  acting  necessarily, 
and,  so  far  as  we  can  understand,  by  a  physical 
necessity.  In  the  same  way  we  knew  all  the 
physical  and  vital  forces,  —  Cohesion,  Chemical 
Affinity,  Vegetable  Life,  and  Animal  Life,  as 
necessitated.  We  next  passed  to  the  Intellect 
and  its  different  faculties,  and  what  did  we  find 


224  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

there  ?  We  found,  in  addition  to  force,  the  power 
of  insight  and  comprehension.  And  here  again, 
the  movement  was  subject,  if  not  to  a  physical, 
yet  to  a  logical  necessity.  In  the  Intellect,  taken 
by  itself,  there  is  no  freedom.  But  rational 
choice,  which  is  the  fundamental,  the  voluntary, 
and  moral  part  of  the  Will,  is  impossible  without 
comprehension  ;  and  volition,  which  is  the  execu- 
tive part  of  the  Will,  is  futile  and  nugatory  with- 
out force. 

Thus  do  these  two,  the  power  of  choice  and  the 
power  of  volition,  become  constituents  of  the  will, 
essential  powers  of  a  being  acting  rationally ; 
and  thus  does  the  Will  imply  and  involve  the  two 
great  elements  of  Intellect  and  Force.  Intellect 
it  implies  in  connection  with  choice,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  comprehension  and  rationality .;  and  Force 
in  connection  with  volition,  for  the  purpose  of  ex- 
ecution. We  see  then,  at  this  point,  distinctly, 
the  two  elements  of  which  Will  is  composed,  the 
power  of  choice  and  the  power  of  volition,  each  of 
which  is  essential  to  the  being  and  the  expression 
of  Personality,  in  which,  in  order  to  constitute 
Will,  the  two  must  unite.  Choice  presupposes 
both  Intellect  and  Sensibility ;  Sensibility  and  its 
products  to  constitute  ends,  and  Intellect  to  show 
their  relative  value  and  the  means  of  attaining 
them.  Volition  presupposes  force,  or  rather  is 
nugatory  except  in  a  being  endowed  with  force. 

■These  elements    of   Will,  choice   and   volition, 


CHOICE   AND   VOLITION.  225 

have  not  been  distinguished  as  they  should  have 
been,  and  in  consequence,  the  discussions  respect- 
ing the  Will  have  been  perplexed.  The  cause 
of  the  perplexity  is  that  one  of  the  elements  is 
subject  to  necessity.  What  we  need  to  know  is 
the  point  of  freedom.  That  is  in  choice,  and  in 
that  only.  Choice  being  once  fully  made,  volition 
follows  of  course.  It  may  not  follow  at  once : 
the  choice  may  abide  alone,  but  when  the  voli- 
tion comes  it  is  born  of  choice.  There  will  of 
course,  then,  be  a  radical  difference  between  the 
idea  of  freedom  as  consisting  in  the  power  of 
choice,  and  in  the  power  to  carry  out  our  choices. 
The  one  is  absolute,  and  so  belongs  to  us  that  to 
be  deprived  of  it  we  must  be  destroyed.  The 
other  is  contingent,  and  we  can  be  deprived  of  it 
by  accident  or  disease,  or  by  the  will  of  others. 
The  one  is  the  essential  element  of  freedom  man- 
ifesting itself  in  the  spiritual  realm,  and  is  the 
immediate  object  of  the  divine  government ;  the 
other  simply  instrumental  and  executive,  and  is 
that  of  which  human  governments  chiefly  take 
cognizance.  •""' 

And  in  connection  with  these  two  elements  of 
Will,  the  one  free  and  the  other  necessitated,  we 
may  see  the  harmony  there  is  between  freedom 
and  necessity,  and  the  need  of  necessity  in  order 
to  freedom.  If  the  freedom  is  to  result  in  re- 
sponsibility, or  is  to  avail  anything  with  respect  to 
conduct,  there  must  be  in  connection  with  it  a  sys- 

15 


226  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

tern  of  necessity.  A  man  stands  by  a  stream  of 
water.  He  has  the  power  to  turn  it  in  this  direc- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  irrigation,  or  in  that  for  the 
purpose  of  destruction,  and  this  power  he  has,  with 
the  attendant  responsibility,  simply  because  the 
stream  is  subject  to  invariable  and  necessary  law. 
If  he  could  not  control  it  by  such  a  law,  he  could 
not  know  what  the  consequences  would  be,  and 
would  not  be  responsible  for  them.  Hence  the 
region  of  freedom,  to  which  we  now  come,  is 
wholly  conditioned  on  the  previous  regions  of  ne- 
cessity—  physical,  vital,  and  intellectual  —  through 
which  we  have  passed. 

In  connection  with  this  control  of  force  by  the 
Will,  implying,  as  in  itself,  both  force  and  causa- 
tive energy,  it  is  to  be  said  that  it  is  from  the  Will 
that  we  have  the  origin  of  our  ideas  of  force  and 
causation.  .  It  might  be  supposed  that  we  should 
know  force  and  causation  on  simply  beholding 
physical  changes.  Not  so.  If  we  had  not  had 
these  ideas  from  our  own  causative  energ}^  we 
should  have  seen  nothing  in  physical  changes  but 
mere  succession ;  but,  as  inherent  in  mind,  such 
causative  energy  must  reveal  itself  to  mind  as  a 
matter  of  course.  Hence  in  knowing:  himself  as 
possessed  of  will,  man  must  know  himself  as  a 
cause,  and  whenever  he  sees  causation  exerted  in 
connection  with  evidence  of  intelligence,  he  nat- 
urally attributes  it  to  mind.  This  is  a  cardinal 
point,  because  the  whole  evidence  for  the  presence 


A  GREAT  TRANSITION.  227 

of  mind  in  nature  turns  upon  it.  The  order  of 
nature  depends  upon  its  changes,  and  if  mind  is 
not  the  original  cause  of  the  changes  then  it  is  not 
of  its  order,  and  so  there  is  no  proof  in  nature  for 
the  being  of  a  God.  This  is  what  Positivism  says. 
It  says  that  we  see  nothing,  and  know  nothing, 
and  can  profitably  speculate  about  nothing  except 
mere  orders  of  succession.  But  this  is  virtually 
atheism.  We  do  know  causation  as  belonging  to 
ourselves.  We  recognize  intuitively  the  results  of 
intelligent  causation,  and  from  such  results  can 
rationally  infer  their  cause. 

In  thus  reaching  a  Will  in  freedom,  a  rational 
Will,  we  make  a  great  transition.  Points  of  tran- 
sition we  have  reached  before,  but  none  equal  to 
this.  Our  progress  upward  has  not  been  by  a 
continuous  line  but  by  steps  bringing  in  new  ele- 
ments, and  raising  us  on  to  a  new  platform.  So 
I  have  represented  it  in  the  figure.  Gravitation 
does  not  involve  cohesion,  or  shade  into  it.  Co- 
hesion is  a  new  thing  brought  in.  So  is  chemical 
affinity.  So  is  vegetable  life  ;  it  is  a  thing  wholly 
new.  All  the  way  up  there  are  points  of  transi- 
tion in  which  we  come  to  something  absolutely 
new  ;  but,  as  I  have  said,  there  is  no  point  like 
this.  We  here  reach,  not  spontaneity,  which  is 
wholly  different  from  freedom,  though  sometimes 
confounded  with  it ;  but  that  which  stands  above 
all  spontaneity  and  watches  over  and  controls  it. 
In  adding  the  Will  we  find  the  man  ;  we  constitute 


228  AN  OUTLINE   STUDY  OF   MAN. 

the  Personality.  Not  that  Will  constitutes  the 
person,  or  is  more  essential  to  it  than  Rationality, 
but  that  we  do  not  get  the  person  till  we  have  In- 
tellect, Sensibility,  and  Will  combined.  Then  we 
have  a  Person.  We  then  reach  a  responsible 
cause  that  can  intelligently  choose  between  dif- 
ferent results,  and  can  cause  those  results  to  be 
as  it  chooses.  We  reach  therefore  the  region  of 
character,  of  obligation,  of  right  and  wrong,  of 
sanctities,  of  the  possibility  of  worship,  and  of 
eternal  life. 

But  it  is  one  thing  to  constitute  the  mind  in  its 
Personality,  and  another  to  furnish  it.  We  saw 
that  by  the  addition  of  the  Sensibility  new  mate- 
rial was  furnished  for  the  Intellect,  and  so  it  is 
here.  By  the  addition  of  the  Will  new  material 
is  furnished  both  for  the  Intellect  and  the  Sensi- 
bility. It  is,  indeed,  in  this  way  that  we  have 
the  highest  and  richest  materials  for  both.  These 
materials,  though  we  are  in  the  region  of  freedom, 
are  given  by  necessity.  They  are  the  phenomena 
that  must  be  in  consequence  of  the  addition  of 
Will,  and  we  proceed  to  inquire  what  they  are. 

You  will  remember  that  when  we  represented 
the  Intellect  by  a  single  line  we  had  certain  things 
presented  in  front,  and  then  certain  ideas  which 
originated  from  the  Intellect  by  necessity,  and 
were  thus  the  common  inheritance  of  the  race, 
such  as  time,  space,  etc.,  were  thrown  back  of  the 


PERSONALITY.  229 

line.  In  the  same  way  when  we  had  the  In- 
tellect united  with  the  Sensibility  we  had  certain 
products  thrown  back  which  belong  to  all  alike. 
In  respect  to  whatever  is  in  front  of  the  one  line, 
or  the  two  lines,  men  differ  indefinitely  ;  but  in 
respect  to  what  is  back  of  them  they  are  alike. 
And  so  it  is  here.  When  the  three,  Intellect, 
Sensibility,  and  Will,  act  together  we  shall  have 
certain  products,  call  them  ideas,  or  feelings,  as 
you  please,  that  will  be  necessitated,  and  so,  com- 
mon to  all.  What  are  these  products  ?  This  is 
a  question  of  much  interest. 

The  first  product,  and  one  conditional  for  all 
others  in  this  department,  will,  I  suppose,  be  the 
idea  of 

PERSONALITY. 

We  have  constituted  the  person,  and  now,  as  it 
belongs  to  the  Intellect  to  know  itself  as  Intel- 
lect, and  to  the  Sensibility  to  reveal  itself  as  Sen- 
sibility, so  it  belongs  to  the  very  constitution  of 
a  person  that  he  should  know  his  own  Personality. 
And  just  as  the  notion  of  being  connects  itself, 
and  becomes  interfused  with,  everything  that  fol- 
lows it,  and  as  the  notion  of  a  good  connects  itself 
with  everything  that  follows  after  we  introduce 
a  Sensibility,  so  the  notion  of  Personality  will  go 
forward  and  upward  and  connect  itself  with  every- 
thing that  shall  follow.  Though  taking  up  into 
itself  so  many  elements,  and  thus  complex  in  its 


230  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

origin,  this  idea  of  Personality  presents  itself  as 
one  thing.  It  is  one,  and  it  is  recognized,  and  its 
power  is  felt  by  every  one,  whether  he  has  ever 
heard  of  metaphysics  or  not.  In  the  days  of  slav- 
ery the  question  was  whether  you  might  sell  a  man. 
We  said  a  man  was  not  a  thing,  he  was  a  person, 
and  everybody  knew  there  was  a  fundamental  dif- 
ference between  the  two. 

It  is,  in  my  judgment,  here,  and  next,  that  we 
have  the  idea  of  power,  and  so  of 

CAUSATION. 

Causation  implies  antecedence,  and  the  uniform 
antecedence  of  the  cause  as  related  to  the  effect. 
This  antecedence  is  perceived  by  the  Intellect,  and 
is  supposed  by  Positivists  to  be  all  that  we  know 
of  causation.  We  suppose,  however,  that  antece- 
dence is  merely  incidental,  a  necessary  relation 
certainly,  but  not  involving  the  essence  of  causa- 
tion. We  are  causes.  We  exert  force.  We  put 
forth  energy.  We  know  ourselves  as  doing  this. 
We  thus  gain  the  idea  of  force  and  of  causation, 
and  by  necessity  connect  these  with  all  perception 
of  change,  whether  physical  or  mental.  We  thus 
have  the  original  and  necessary  idea  of  cause,  as 
involving,  not  merely  antecedence,  but  force ;  and 
the  axiom  which  connects  itself  with  it  is,  that 
whatever  begins  to  be  must  have  a  cause. 

What  is  the  next  idea  ?  I  suppose  it  to  be  one 
of  which  I  have  already  spoken,  that  of 


FREEDOM.  231 


FREEDOM. 

There  is  no  personality  where  there  is  no  free- 
dom ;  and  without  the  idea  of  freedom  there  is  no 
possible  conception  of  a  will  with  any  apprehen- 
sion of  what  a  will  is.  As  we  have  seen,  this 
idea  of  freedom  belongs  to  that  element  of  the 
will  which  we  have  called  choice,  or  the  power  of 
choice.  In  that  is  the  freedom,  known  as  such  at 
once  or  not  known  at  all,  given  as  a  simple  in- 
eradicable element  of  our  conscious  life.  Let  the 
opportunity,  or,  it  may  be,  the  necessity,  —  for, 
paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  man  is  under  the  ne- 
cessity of  acting  freely,  —  let  the  opportunity  or 
the  necessity  of  choice  between  two  different 
kinds  of  good  be  presented,  and  the  idea  of  free- 
dom at  once  and  necessarily  emerges.  Let,  for 
instance,  a  man  be  required  to  choose  between 
property  and  integrity,  and  he  knows  by  neces- 
sity, and  with  a  conviction  which  nothing  can 
strengthen,  and  which  nothing  can  shake,  that  he 
is  free  to  choose  either.  The  discussions  about 
the  freedom  of  the  will  have  been  endless,  but 
nothing  has  ever  shaken  the  conviction  of  the  race 
in  regard  to  the  elementary  idea  of  freedom  as  in- 
volved in  choice.  Practically  this  idea  of  freedom 
is  at  the  basis  of  all  obligation,  and  of  all  respon- 
sibility, neither  of  which  can  be  conceived  of  with- 
out it. 

Having,  then,  a  Person,  who  is  a  cause,  and  a 
free  cause,  the  next  idea  will  be  that  of 


232  A      OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 


OBLIGATION. 

Here,  again,  as  in  good  and  in  beauty,  we  have 
a  single  product  resulting  from  the  action  of  more 
than  one  power.  Obligation  is,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, obligation  to  choose,  and,  whether  regarded 
as  an  idea,  or  a  feeling,  or  both,  is  conditioned  on 
the  presentation,  through  both  the  Intellect  and 
the  Sensibility,  of  two  objects  of  choice,  generally 
different  kinds  of  good,  between  which  we  are 
necessitated  to  choose.1 

This  necessity  of  choice  we  are  to  notice.  I 
have  before  spoken  of  the  necessity  of  thought. 
We  may  think  of  one  thing  and  not  of  another, 
but  think  we  must.  And  so  it  is  here.  We  may 
choose  one  thing  and  not  another,  but  choose  we 
must.  A  continual  state  of  choice  is  as  much  a 
condition  of  our  lives,  at  least  in  our  waking" 
hours,  as  continual  thought.  Is  it  said  that  of 
two  objects  presented  we  may  choose  neither? 
True,  but  the  refusal  to  choose  is  itself  an  act  of 
choice.  It  is  the  preference  of  something  else  as 
more  desirable  than  either.  Besides,  in  most 
cases,  the  conditions  of  life  are  such  that  an  alter- 
native is  unavoidable.  We  must  either  eat,  or  go 
hungry.  We  must  study,  or  remain  ignorant. 
We  must  labor,  or  fail  to  enjoy  the  fruit  of  labor. 

This  being  understood,  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
the  necessity  of  obligation  is  as  absolute  as  the 

1  Sec  Appendix. 


OBLIGATION.  233 

necessity  of  choice.  Obligation  is  the  moral  phe- 
nomenon, and  the  spontaneous  presence  of  it  on 
given  conditions  is  the  revelation  of  the  moral 
nature,  as  the  spontaneous  presence  of  thought  on 
given  conditions  is  the  revelation  of  the  intellectual 
nature  ;  for  wherever  there  is  a  necessary  result  on 
given  conditions  there  is  a  nature,  and  that  nature 
can  be  known  and  judged  of  only  by  such  result. 

We  have,  then,  the  necessity  of  choice  of  some 
kind  always  present ;  and  the  necessity  of  obliga- 
tion on  certain  conditions.  What  are  those  con- 
ditions ?  As  has  been  said,  they  are  the  presen- 
tation of  two  or  more  objects  of  choice  that  differ 
in  the  quantity  or  the  quality  of  the  good  sup- 
posed to  be  in  them,  and  that  can  be  either  gained 
for  ourselves,  or  conferred  upon  others.  Let  us 
suppose  then  that  a  choice  is  to  be  made  between 
two  forms  of  good  as  presented  in  two  different 
objects  or  ends,  and  that  one  of  them  is  seen  to  be 
higher  in  kind  and  more  valuable  than  the  other. 
I  ask  whether  it  is  conceivable  that  a  man  with 
faculties  unperverted  should  not  feel  under  obli- 
gation to  choose  the  higher  and  more  valuable.  I 
think  not.  If  a  sense  of  obligation  would  not  arise 
of  necessity  the  man  could  not  have  a  moral  na- 
ture. It  is  the  necessity  and  certainty  of  a  thing 
under  its  conditions  that  make  it  to  be  a  nature. 
The  man  is  under  no  necessity  of  choosing  the 
"  better  part,"  but  would  be  under  a  necessity  of 
feeling  obligation  to  choose  it,  and  of  choosing  be- 


234  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

tween  it  and  that  which  was  less  valuable.  In  all 
rational  action  a  sense  of  obligation  to  choose  the 
higher  good  accompanies  the  apprehension  of  that 
good,  and  there  can  neither  be  choice,  nor  a  sense 
of  obligation  to  choose,  without  an  apprehension, 
direct  or  implied,  of  good  in  the  object  or  act  to 
be  chosen.  That  which  has  no  good  in  it,  and 
is  known  to  have  none,  cannot  be  an  object  of 
choice. 

We  have  then,  both  Good  and  Obligation,  as 
motives  to  choice.  What  is  their  nature  and  rela- 
tive influence  ? 

Good  is  fundamental.  Known  directly  or  im- 
plicitly, it  is,  as  has  just  been  said,  the  condition 
of  obligation,  and  is  the  ultimate  reason  for  choice. 
It  stands  before  the  mind  as  a  reason  and  is  chosen 
for  its  own  sake.  It  is  ultimate.  Something  ulti- 
mate we  must  have,  or  there  would  be  no  end  in 
going  back  for  objects  of  pursuit,  and  this  we  find 
in  Good  known  as  such  in  sonie  form  of  the  Sensi- 
bility,—  known  as  having  value  in  itself.  It  is 
the  apprehension  of  this  as  an  element  underlying, 
interfused,  or  standing  in  front,  and  as  having 
value  in  itself,  that  makes  conduct  rational  as  dis- 
tinguished from  impulsive.  There  is  great  beauty 
in  the  mechanism  of  impulses  as  driving  the  being 
on  to  its  good  with  no  comprehension  of  the  mech- 
anism on  its  part,  and,  with  no  apprehension  of 
the  good  to  be  reached ;  but  it  is  another  order  of 
things  when  all  there  is  of  mechanism  and  impulse 


OBLIGATION   AS   A   MOTIVE.  235 

is  comprehended,  and  when  the  good  stands  in 
front,  or  is  in  any  way  apprehended  as  a  reason 
for  choice,  and  when,  in  order  to  be  attained,  it 
must  be  rationally  chosen.  Then,  and  then  only, 
can  we  have  a  philosophy  of  conduct. 

Such  being  the  part  performed  by  Good  as  a 
motive,  what  is  that  performed  by  Obligation? 
This  is  peculiar.  Being  the  primitive  manifesta- 
tion of  the  moral  nature,  it  stands  by  itself  as 
much  as  thought  does.  As  from  the  Intellect,  ob- 
ligation is  rational ;  as  from  the  Sensibility,  it  is 
emotive.  It  has,  therefore,  in  it  an  element  both 
of  reason  and  of  impulse,  and  so  is  capable  of  be- 
coming, and  does  become,  an  authoritative  impulse. 
But  an  authoritative  impulse  is  law,  and  so  far  as 
we  can  see  is  the  only  possible  form  in  which  there 
can  so  be  a  law  within  the  constitution,  that  a  man 
shall  become  a  law  unto  himself.  As  authorita- 
tive, law  must  be  both  promissory  and  minatory, 
for  anything  claiming  to  be  a  law  without  a  sanc- 
tion express  or  implied,  would  be  no  law.  But  if 
promissory  and  minatory,  then  of  what  ?  It  must 
be  of  some  good  on  the  one  hand,  or  evil  on  the 
other,  that  may  be  realized  in  the  Sensibility. 

Thus  do  we  find  the  deep  harmony  there  is  be- 
tween good  and  obligation  acting  as  motives.  Not 
only  is  good  the  condition  of  obligation,  since  obli- 
gation arises  on  the  apprehension  of  it,  and  re- 
quires it  for  its  sanction,  but  they  are  conspiring 
forces.     In  a  normal  state  the  free  choice  would 


236  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY  OF   MAN. 

always  be  of  that  good  for  its  own  sake  towards 
which  the  impulse  that  is  in  obligation  would 
tend,  and  so  we  may  see  how,  instead  of  a  bond- 
age, all  service  under  the  law  of  righteousness  may 
become  perfect  freedom.  Nor,  in  speaking  of  the 
harmony  of  good  and  obligation  as  motives,  may 
we  omit  to  mention  the  new  and  high  source  of 
good  opened  to  us  in  the  sensibilities  of  the  moral 
nature  which  are  revealed  in  connection  with  the 
sense  of  obligation  and  its  results.  This  good 
reveals  itself  as  a  motive  from  the  first,  and  before 
acting,  as  promised  reward ;  and  immediately  on 
acting  in  accordance  with  the  sense  of  obligation, 
which  becomes  conscience  when  our  own  actions 
are  concerned,  it  becomes  a  song  that  accompanies 
us  through  our  pilgrimage  so  long  as  the  impulse 
there  is  in  obligation  is  heeded. 

When  a  greater  and  higher  good  as  compared 
with  a  lower  is  presented,  perhaps  all  will  agree 
that  we  must  feel  obligation  to  choose  the  higher  ; 
but  are  there  not  acts  and  courses  of  conduct  in 
view  of  which  obligation  arises  when  there  is  no 
distinct  apprehension  of  good,  and  none  at  all  ex- 
cept as  it  comes  in  the  promise  implied  in  the 
sense  of  obligation  itself  ?  I  think  there  are.  If 
there  were  not  there  would  not  be  that  adaptation 
of  man  to  his  position  that  we  find  everywhere 
else.  In  early  life,  and  often  subsequently,  all  are 
so  placed  as  to  be  unable  to  apprehend  intellectu- 
ally the  proper  grounds  of  conduct,  and  therefore 


OBLIGATION  IN  TWO   WAYS.  237 

we  might  expect  that  the  moral  nature,  as  sensi- 
tive, would  have  a  feeling  of  obligation  analogous 
to  instinct  in  animals,  and  directive  for  man  in 
reference  to  his  highest  good.  Such  a  feeling 
there  is,  but  it  is  merely  impulsive,  and  can  never 
be  the  ground  of  a  philosophy.  It  can  never  be 
the  basis  of  a  system  of  comprehension  by  which 
man  knows  himself  to  act  intelligently  with  refer- 
ence to  all  the  impulses  of  his  nature.  Always 
instinct  tends  to  the  highest  good.  It  has  its  basis 
in  the  intelligent  recognition  by  Him  who  gave  it, 
of  the  highest  good  of  the  animal,  while  there  is  no 
conscious  recognition  of  that  good  by  the  animal 
itself.  And  so  it  is  here.  The  impulse  may  be 
rationally  accepted  as  the  ground  of  conduct,  but 
so  far  as  there  is  any  ground  for  the  comprehen- 
sion of  the  conduct  as  rational,  or  for  any  philoso- 
phy, it  must  be  found  in  the  underlying  idea  of 
good.  When  legitimate,  this  impulse  of  obligation 
binds  us  by  its  very  nature ;  but  as  an  impulse,  it 
is  to  be  rationally  tested  like  all  others  ;  especially 
since  men  have  often  believed  themselves  impelled 
by  it  to  perform  the  most  wicked  acts. 

It  is  in  the  two  ways  just  named  that  I  think 
obligation  arises  ;  but  what  of  the  idea  of  right,  does 
not  that  belong  here?  You  will  observe  that  I 
have  spoken  of  the  obligation  to  choose,  and  the 
obligation  to  act.  Between  these,  I  make  a  dis- 
tinction corresponding  to  that  between  choice  and 
volition.     Obligation  to  choose,  arises  immediately 


238  AN    OUTLINE   STUDY    OF  MAN. 

in  view  of  the  higher  good,  and  this  act  of  choice  is 
a  perfectly  simple  act.  No  means  are  needed.  Let 
a  higher  and  a  lower  good  be  presented  between 
which  a  man  must  choose,  and  he  is  to  choose. 
That  is  all.  It  is  a  simple  primitive  act,  which  no 
man  can  explain,  or  make  more  simple,  and  which 
no  man  can  tell  another  how  to  do.  In  that  is 
freedom,  inherent,  essential.  He  does  it,  indeed, 
under  the  sense  of  obligation  to  choose  the  higher 
good,  but  there  is  no  compulsion.  Here  there  is  no 
need  of  the  idea  of  right  as  I  use  that  word,  be- 
cause the  obligation  to  choose  arises  immediately 
from  the  apprehension  of  the  good  itself ;  and  if  we 
have  the  sense  of  obligation,  that  is  all  that  we  need. 
Practically,  the  idea  of  right  avails  nothing  except 
as  it  is  the  basis  of  obligation,  and  here  in  the  in- 
cipiency  of  moral  action,  we  have  a  basis  without 
that.  The  obligation  here,  is  obligation  to  choose. 
But  choice  is  one  thing,  and  the  volition  and  ex- 
ecutive act  by  which  the  choice  is  carried  out,  is 
another.  In  choosing,  there  are  no  means,  and  no 
possible  difference  of  methods.  The  simple  question 
is,  will  you  choose  that  which  you  know  yourself 
to  be  under  obligation  to  choose  ;  yes  or  no  ?  But 
in  volition,  in  acting,  in  seeking  to  carry  out  the 
choice,  and  realize  the  end,  means  must  come  in, 
and  there  is  room  for  a  difference  of  means  and  of 
methods. 

This  brings  us  to  choices  of  a  different  order ; 
the  choice,  not  of  ends,  but  of  means  and  of  meth- 


THE   IDEA   OF   RIGHT.  239 

ods  ;  and  here  comes  in  the  idea  of  right  and  of 
obligation  as  connected  with  that.  Of  two  courses 
of  action  equally  compatible  with  the  rights  of  oth- 
ers, one,  it  may  be,  will  more  effectively  secure 
that  good  sought  than  the  other.  Such  a  course 
will  be  right,  and  there  will  immediately  arise  a 
sense  of  obligation  to  pursue  it.  As  I  understand 
it,  right  always  carries  with  it  a  sense  of  obligation. 
They  go  together.  The  idea  of  right  does  not 
come  in  originally  as  the  foundation  of  the  obliga- 
tion to  choose,  but  obligation  to  act  in  a  given  way 
arises  immediately  from  an  apprehension  of  the 
Tightness  of  the  act,  that  is  to  say,  from  its  ten- 
dency to  accomplish  the  end.  Still  there  would  be 
no  obligation  but  for  the  relation  of  the  rightness 
to  some  good.  If  there  were  no  relation  of  the 
right  act  to  some  good,  there  would  be  nothing 
either  right  or  wrong.  Anything  moral  or  im- 
moral would  be  impossible.  It  will  be  seen,  there- 
fore, that  I  derive  the  whole  moral  value  of  right 
from  obligation,  as  primitive,  whereas  others  de- 
rive the  whole  force  of  obligation  from  the  idea  of 
right.  We  can,  they  say,  be  under  no  obligation 
to  do  anything  except  what  is  right,  and  because 
it  is  right.  To  this,  I  agree  so  far  as  obligation  to 
act  outwardly  is  concerned,  but  I  also  say  that  we 
are  never  under  obligation  to  do  an  act  as  morally 
right,  for  which  there  is  not  a  reason  in  some  good 
besides  its  being  right,  and  on  account  of  which  it 
is  right. 


240 


AN   OUTLINE   STUDY    OF   MAN. 


It  may  seem  trivial,  but  having  illustrated  other 
points  on  the  board,  let  me  attempt  this.  A  boy- 
is  sent  to  school  from  the  point  A.  The  school- 
house  is  at  B.  At  the  point  C,  he  meets  a  boy 
who  asks  him  to  go  with  him  to  the  point  D  and 
steal  some  pears.  Here  we  have  room  for  motives 
that  are  higher  and  lower,  that  may  decide  the 
question  irrespective  of  obligation.  On  the  one 
hand  the  boy  may  love  study.  He  may  wish  to 
please  his  teacher,  or  his  father,  or  may  fear  pun- 
ishment.    On  the  other  hand  is  appetite  and  the 


love  of  truancy.  The  alternative  would  be  be- 
tween taking  the  road  to  B  or  D.  He  would  not 
think  of  going  on  in  a  straight  line  to  some  indefi- 
nite point,  E,  for  the  sake  of  going  in  a  straight 
line  ;  but  if  a  sense  of  obligation  should  come  in  at 
all,  it  would  be  to  prompt  him  to  yield  to  motives 
intrinsically  the  strongest,  and  thus  to  attain 
a  good  congruous  to  the  higher  part  of  his  nature. 
If  there  is  no  good  proposed  either  for  ourselves  or 
for  any  one  else,  the  act  cannot  be  right. 


RIGHT.  241 

This  point  I  stated,  and  in  the  above  terms,  in 
the  lectures  that  I  gave  here  four  years  since,  and 
it  was  especially  this  that  was  controverted  by  Dr. 
McCosh  in  the  correspondence  that  afterwards 
took  place,  and  that  has  been  controverted  by  oth- 
ers. I  have  now  made  it  as  distinct  as  I  can,  and 
leave  you  to  judge. 

But  what  is  the  idea  of  right  which  is  held  by 
those  who  object  to  that  now  presented  ?  You 
will  see  that  I  regard  right  as  the  quality  of  action, 
but  they  generally  present  it  as  an  idea  of  the  pure 
intellect,  and  that  belongs  in  our  scheme,  with 
those  of  time  and  space.  Hence  they  say  it  is 
something  that  is  eternal  and  immutable,  and  to 
which  God  himself  is  subject.  Others  see  that  the 
foundation  of  morals  cannot  be  in  the  pure  intel- 
lect, since  anything  originating  wholly  there  can- 
not be  a  motive,  and  they  say  that  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  right  or  wrong  except  in  connection  with 
the  Sensibility  and  the  Will.  That  of  course  puts 
it  out  of  all  relation  to  those  necessary  ideas  ;  and 
yet,  they  say  that  there  is  no  authority  of  obliga- 
tion, unless  it  be  based  on  right.  It  is  indeed  possi- 
ble, since  choice  is  moral  action,  to  carry  the  word 
right,  up  into  the  region  of  choice  as  distinguished 
from  action,  and  to  say  of  the  choice  of  a  higher 
good  made  under  a  sense  of  obligation,  that  it  is  a 
right  choice,  or  that  it  is  right  to  choose  the  higher 
good ;  but  here  again  it  is  right  with  reference  to 
the  good  chosen,  and  can  have  moral  quality  only 

16 


242  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY    OF  MAN. 

from  the  primary  obligation  based  on  that.  Obli- 
gation thus  springing  as  one  indivisible  product 
from  the  action  of  our  whole  nature,  has  no  need  of 
anything  beyond  itself  to  give  it  authority.  It 
is  the  voice  of  our  moral  nature  speaking  to  us, 
and  is  its  own  authority. 

We  say  then  on  this  whole  subject  —  1st.  That 
good  is  valuable  in  itself.  2d.  That  it  is,  and  there- 
fore, a  proper  motive  of  choice  and  of  action.  3d. 
That  when  a  choice  must  be  made  between  a 
higher  and  a  lower  good,  obligation  is  necessa- 
rily affirmed  to  choose  the  higher.  4th.  That 
between  choosing  in  accordance  with  obligation 
thus  affirmed,  and  ultimate  good,  there  is  a  sure 
connection.  To  doubt  this  would  be  atheism,  or 
worse.  And  5th.  That  there  can  be  no  harm  in 
knowing  these  facts,  and  that  it  will  not  lower  the 
tone  of  action  to  act  in  view  of  them,  as  well  as 
in  accordance  with  them. 

With  the  idea  of  obligation,  formed  as  has  been 
stated,  the  moral  being  is  constituted  ;  he  becomes 
capable  of  a  moral  act ;  that  is  a  free  act.  It 
is  an  act  of  preference  or  choice,  for  where  there 
is  no  preference  or  choice  there  is  no  morality.. 
The  idea  of  obligation  is  conditioned  on  that  of  a 
free  will,  but  is  not  its  product.  It  comes  of  ne- 
cessity before  choice ;  and  choice  made  either  in 
conformity  with  it,  or  in  opposition  to  it,  is  a 
moral  act.  But  such  acts,  of  one  kind  and  the 
other,  cannot  be  without  the  formation  of  the 
ideas  of  — 


RIGHTS.  243 


MERIT  AND  DEMERIT. 

These  are  virtually  contained  in  the  idea  of  ob- 
ligation, but  cannot  be  fully  realized  till  after  the 
act.  I  mention  them  here  because  these  ideas  of 
obligation  and  of  merit  and  of  demerit,  belong  to  a 
moral  being  as  such.  They  would  belong  to  him 
as  existing  and  acting  alone.  Moral  law  is  incon- 
ceivable without  them. 

But  man  has  a  social  nature,  and  he  has  a  class 
of  ideas  from  his  moral  nature  dependent  on  the 
existence  of  others,  and  which  he  must  have  be- 
fore he  can  act  morally  with  reference  to  them. 
Of  these  the  first  is  the  idea  of 

RIGHTS. 

This  is  a  separate,  independent,  and  original  idea, 
and,  like  obligation,  is  founded  on  good.  In  con- 
nection with  our  own  good  we  have  a  right  to 
things  ;  and  in  connection  with  the  good  of  others, 
we  have  rights  over  them. 

When  a  man  has  procured  by  his  labor  an  ob- 
ject of  one  of  the  natural  desires,  and  another  would 
take  it  from  him,  the  idea  of  a  Right  is  immedi- 
ately and  necessarily  given.  Its  relation  to  obliga- 
tion is,  that  obligation  is  its  correlative.  If  a  man 
has  a  right  to  anything,  others  are  under  obliga- 
tion not  to  interfere  with  that  right.  In  this  way 
every  natural  principle  of  action  has  its  correspond- 
ing right,  and  its  reciprocal  obligation. 


244  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY    OF  MAN. 

Again,  from  relations  independent  of  our  will, 
the  good  of  some  beings  can  be  secured  only  by 
the  power,  and  care,  and  guidance  of  others. 
This  gives  the  right  of  authority  on  the  one  part, 
with  the  corresponding  obligation  of  obedience  on 
the  other.  There  is  also  an  obligation  on  the  part 
of  the  superior,  first,  to  exercise  authority  ;  and 
second,  to  exercise  it  within  the  limits  required  by 
the  good  of  those  governed,  regarded  both  as  indi- 
viduals and  as  a  community. 

From  these  ideas  two  others  must  arise.  The 
first  is  that  of 

RESPONSIBILITY. 

We  can  be  responsible  to  no  one  who  has  not  some 
authority  over  us.  The  authority  must  be  a 
righteous  authority,  that  is,  an  authority  founded 
on  a  right ;  and  to  any  one  who  has  such  authority 
we  are  responsible.  Obligation  is  not  the  same  as 
Responsibility.  We  may  be  under  obligation  to 
aid  a  poor  man,  but  are  not  responsible  to  him. 
In  no  proper  sense  can  God  be  said  to  be-  respon- 
sible to  any  one.  "  He  giveth  not  account  of 
any  of  his  matters." 

The  second  idea  is  that  of 

PUNISHMENT. 

This  arises  necessarily  on  the  violation  of  right- 
eous authority.  But  here  a  distinction  is  to  be 
made,  and  is  greatly  needed,  to  which  our  language 


PUNISHMENT.  245 

is  not  fully  accommodated.  It  is  that  between 
the  evil  that  comes  from  the  act  itself  with  no  in- 
tervention of  the  will  of  another,  as  in  remorse, 
or  through  natural  law,  and  that  which  is  in- 
flicted by  another  for  the  purpose  of  sustaining 
righteous  authority.  We  need  a  word  which  shall 
always  imply  a  guilty  disregard  of  authority,  and 
the  infliction  of  evil  by  the  person  in  whom  the 
authority  resides  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining 
that  authority.  This  distinction  is  partially  rec- 
ognized in  the  different  uses  made  of  the  words 
penalty  and  punishment ;  penalty  often  implying 
evil  irrespective  of  guilt,  or  of  the  will  of  another ; 
whereas  punishment  uniformly  implies  guilt,  and 
generally  evil  inflicted  by  another.  When  we 
act  in  view  of  penalty  as  distinguished  from  pun- 
ishment, we  act  under  moral  law,  can  be  governed 
only  by  reason,  and  may  have  a  philosophy.  When 
we  act  in  view  of  punishment  as  distinguished  from 
penalty,  we  act  under  positive  law ;  can  be  gov- 
erned rationally  only  through  faith ;  and  can  have 
no  philosophy.  Obedience  must  be  implicit.  It 
may  be  rational  through  faith,  but  as  obedience, 
it  does  not  admit  of  philosophy.  Philosophy 
may  show  that  the  thing  commanded  is  righteous, 
or  in  accordance  with  rights,  but  this  is  not  sup- 
posed to  be  seen  by  him  to  whom  the  command 
is  addressed,  or  if  it  be,  the  additional  motive  in- 
volved in  the  command  may  be  needed. 

What  next  ?     There  are  those,  and  their  num- 


246  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

ber  is  increasing,  who  say  that  the  idea  of  God  is 
given  in  the  same  way  as  those  we  have  been  con- 
sidering. To  decide  this  we  must  know  what  they 
who  say  this  would  include  in  the  idea  of  God. 
Would  they  include  the  idea  of  an  Infinite  Per 
sonal  Being  possessed  of  moral  attributes  ?  With- 
out this  the  idea  of  God  is  not  worth  contending 
for.  But  if  they  would  include  this,  I  do  not  think 
that  the  idea  is  thus  given.  If  so  no  man  could  be 
an  atheist.  On  this  point,  however,  I  would  not 
be  confident. 

We  have  now  found  the  ideas  which  would  be 
necessitated  by  the  addition  of  a  rational  and  free 
Will  to  the  Intellect  and  the  Sensibility.  What 
shall  we  call  the  power  by  which  these  ideas  are 
given  ?  They  are  given  in  the  same  way  as  the 
necessary  ideas  from  the  Intellect  alone,  which  we 
have  attributed  to  the  Reason  ;  and  as  those  from 
the  Intellect  and  Sensibility,  which  we  have  attrib- 
uted to  the  ^Esthetic,  or  Affective  Reason.  Evi- 
dently the  power  here  is  of  the  same  general  na- 
ture, and  I  suppose  it  to  be  what  Kant  called 

THE  MORAL,  OR  PRACTICAL  REASON. 

If  we  call  it  the  Practical  Reason,  we  indicate  all 
the  functions  of  the  power,  especially  that  charac- 
teristic of  its  products  which  makes  them  both 
rational  and  emotive.  If  we  call  it  The  Moral 
Reason,  we  name  it,  as  in  the  case  of  the  ^Esthetic 


TABULAR  RESULTS. 


247 


Reason,  from  only  a  single  one,  though  the  princi- 
pal one  of  its  functions. 

It  only  remains  to  place  before  you  in  a  single 
view  the  results  we  have  reached  in  this  lecture. 


0     & 

o 

W 

55     S» 

S 

/            PUNISHMENT, 

*<     H 

o 

H 

H     S 

fa 

j          Responsibility, 

w    » 
J   2 

«     M 

O 

t»  1         Rights, 
5    1         Demerit, 

EH 

O 

■«1 

M 
0 

55 
O 

o 

D     /                                                                         ^ 

©  <          Merit,                            J 
5    J        Obligation,                  £ 
§  1         Causation, 

3 

3 

m 

5  s 

fa     * 

o 

0 

o 

CO 

< 

» 
a 

H 

« 
o 
fa 

Freedom, 

to 

O 

\         Personality. 
Products, 

^  s 

9  fa 

H 
2 
0 

BB 

< 

2  * 
5  £ 

Practical  or  moral  Reason. 

5 

INTELLECT,  SENSIBILITY,  AND  Wilt. 


LECTURE  XI. 

BODY  ;  SOUL  ;  SPIRIT.  —  SPONTANEITY  ;  FREE- 
DOM.   THE  NATURAE  ;  SUPERNATURAL  ;  MI- 
RACULOUS. —  CONDUCT  ;  OBLIGATION  ;  A  SU- 
PREME END;  CHARACTER. — THE  HIGHEST 
GOOD  ;  THE  WHOLE  GOOD  ;  THE  LAW  OF  LIMI- 
TATION. 

We  have  now  constituted  the  Person.  In  doing 
this  we  have  found  that  those  necessary  ideas  or 
products  which  are  common  to  the  race,  and  which 
are  regulative,  are  of  three  kinds.  The  first  and 
lowest  are  those  of  the  pure  Intellect.  The  second 
are  those  of  the  Intellect  combined  with  the  Sensi- 
bility ;  and  the  third  are  those  of  the  Intellect  and 
Sensibility  in  combination  with  a  rational  Will. 

And  as  these  three  products  have  a  different 
origin,  so  they  have  different  characteristics  and 
perform  different  offices.  They  are  alike  as  neces- 
sitated, and  common  to  all,  and  regulative  ;  but 
they  contain  different  elements,  and  regulate  differ- 
ent departments.  By  the  addition  of  the  Sensibil- 
ity to  the  Intellect  we  have  a  new  department  for 
the  Intellect.  (The  Intellect  gives  us  light  simply  ; 
what  has  sometimes  been  called  a  "  dry  light." 
With  the   Sensibility  added,  we   have   light  and 


REGULATIVE   IDEAS  :    THREE   CLASSES.  249 

warmth  blended,  and  a  field  for  the  Intellect  that 
covers  the  whole  range  of  possible  combinations  of 
intellect  and  feeling  where  no  conscious  will  or 
purpose  is  involved.  With  the  Will  added  we  have 
not  only  light  and  warmth,  but  the  chemical  rays. 
The  action  of  Will  not  only  opens  new  fields  to  the 
Intellect,  but  gives  new  materials  and  forms  to 
the  Sensibility.  It  is  here,  and  here  only,  that  we 
find  anything  of  a  moral  character. 

From  what  has  now  been  said  it  will  be  seen 
that  we  have  three  departments  of  study  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  three  classes  of  regulative  ideas. 
We  have  the  department  of  pure  thought ;  the 
department  of  animal  wants  and  desires,  and  affec- 
tions, and  of  beauty ;  and  the  department  of  mor- 
als ;  and  we  see  that  these  departments  must  become 
more  complex  and  difficult  as  we  go  up.  We  may 
see  too,  one  great  source  of  the  disagreement  of 
those  who  have  labored  in  the  higher  departments. 
It  has  been  because  they  have  not  sufficiently  ap- 
prehended the  essential  differences  between  the 
regulative  ideas  in  the  different  departments,  for 
these  are  scarcely  more  distinguished  by  their  sub- 
jects than  by  the  regulative  ideas  that  underlie 
them.  With  these  differences  in  view  it  does  not 
seem  possible  that  an  attempt  would  have  been 
made  to  found  the  science  of  morals  on  an  idea 
having  a  similar  origin  with  that  of  space. 

In  thus  reaching  a  person,  we  make,  as  has  been 
said,  a  great   transition.     We    reach   the  highest 


250  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF   MAN. 

possible  point ;  we  reach  an  intelligent,  free,  moral 
cause.  We  reach  a  cause.  Here  is  a  being  capa- 
ble of  interposing  his  own  free  choice  and  his 
power  of  volition,  and  thus  purposely  causing  that 
to  be,  which,  but  for  him,  would  not  have  been. 
Herein,  as  respects  freedom  and  power,  he  is  in 
the  image  of  God.  Now  we  have,  as  we  had  not 
before,  a  being  capable  of  character,  of  being 
loved,  respected,  venerated,  rewarded  ;  capable  also 
of  being  despised,  contemned,  abhorred,  punished. 
You  may  discipline  an  animal,  you  may  train  him, 
but  in  no  proper  sense  can  he  be  said  to  have  guilt, 
and  therefore  he  cannot  be  punished. 

In  reaching  personality  after  the  method  we 
have  followed,  we  find  below  that,  three  forms  of 
necessitated  activity.  The  first  is  that  of  exter- 
nal nature,  with  which  we  have,  at  present,  noth- 
ing to  do.  The  second  is  that  by  which  the  bod- 
ily functions  are  carried  on.  It  comprises  all  the 
movements  within  that  part  of  our  scheme  which 
was  presented  under  the  head  of  Physiology, 
which  are  attributed  to  life,  and  seem  automatic 
or  spontaneous.  The  third  comprises  all  the  men- 
tal movements,  intellectual  and  affective,  up  to 
the  point  of  choice.  There  is  also,  as  we  shall 
see,  a  fourth  region  of  necessity,  comprising  the 
results  subsequent  to  choice  and  consequent  upon 
it.  Of  these  regions  of  necessity,  three  pertain  to 
us  in  such  a  way  as   to  give  us  three  different  na- 


THE   BODY.  251 

tures,  for,  as  I  use  the  term,  wherever  we  have  a 
uniform  necessity  that  can  be  distinguished  from 
all  others,  we  have  a  nature. 

We  have  then  first,  the  physical  nature,  or  the 
body.     It  is  a  living  organized  body,  and,  the  con- 
ditions being  given,  the  processes  within  it  by  which 
it  is  built  up  and  sustained,  as  of  digestion,  circu- 
lation, and  secretion,  go  on  by  a  movement  as  spon- 
taneous, as  necessary,  as  little  connected  with  our 
choice  or  volition,  as  the  processes  within  the  vege- 
table.    These  processes  are,  indeed,  carried  on  by 
that  organic  life  that  is  common  to  the  vegetable  and 
the  animal,  and  the  necessity  which  controls  them 
may  be  called  an  organic  necessity,  as  that  which 
controls  mere  matter  may  be  called  a  physical  ne- 
cessity.    The  body,  then,  will  not  consist  merely  of 
the  matter  of  which  it  may  be  composed  at  any 
given  moment,  and  which  is  constantly  changing, 
but  of  that  in  connection  with  the  organific  power 
that  has  been  in  it  from  the  first,  has  wrought  its 
changes,  has  caused  it  to  be  such  a  body  rather  than 
another,  and  given  it  its  identity,  so  that  we  say 
we  have  the  same  body,  while  not  a  particle  of  the 
same  matter  remains.     How  far  this  individual- 
ized force  may  be  preserved  in  its  identity  when 
it  is  separated  from  the  matter  of  the  body  so  that 
it  may  again  reappear,  perhaps,  according  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  correlation  of  forces,  under  some 
other  form,  it  is  not  for  us  to  say.     Certainly  it  is 
not  the  least  marvelous  feature  of   our  present 


252  AN    OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

state  that  there  are  types  that  are  constantly  pre- 
served, while  yet  having  such  a  wonderful  variety 
under  them.  And  as  the  types  are  preserved,  so 
there  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  that  in  some 
way  unknown  to  us,  each  individual  force,  that 
which  is  really  the  body,  may  be  preserved.  The 
preservation  of  the  type  by  generation  after  its 
kind  seems  natural  because  we  are  accustomed  to 
it,  but  is  really  as  mysterious  as  would  be  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  individual  force.  At  any  rate  we 
have  here  a  separate,  necessitated  form  of  move- 
ment, that  builds  up  and  maintains  organization, 
and  we  call  the  force  thus  building,  together  with 
the  resulting  organization,  the  Body. 

Then  we  have  the  mental  necessity  that  deter- 
mines the  movements  of  the  mind  up  to  the  point 
of  choice.  We  do  not  think,  we  did  not  originally, 
from  will.  If  we  had  not  thought  first  by  a 
necessity  of  our  nature,  and  because  we  were  cre- 
ated thinking  beings,  we  could  never  have  known 
that  we  had  the  power  to  think.  The  power  is 
necessitated,  the  direction  is  from  will.  Of  this 
involuntary  movement  of  the  mind  whose  products 
are  offered  to  us  to  be  accepted  or  rejected,  I  have 
already  spoken.  Left  to  itself  it  is  a  movement 
according  to  a  necessary  law,  thus  implying  a  na- 
ture. The  laws  of  logic  are  as  necessary,  to  say 
the  least,  as  that  of  gravitation.  So,  also,  in  the 
laws  of  the  Sensibility,  when  the  conditions  are 
given ;  and  in  the  various  combinations  of  Intellect 


THE   SPIRIT.  253 

and  feeling,  including  animal  wants  and  passions. 
The  force  which  produces  these  necessitated  move- 
ments, is  other  than  that  which  builds  up  the  physi- 
cal organization.  With  modifications  it  is  com- 
mon to  all  sensitive  and  perceptive  life,  to  the  ani- 
mals as  well  as  to  us,  and,  though  the  word  has 
often  a  different  and  higher  meaning,  may  be  called 
the  Soul. 

There  remains  that  which  I  have  represented  as 
standing  above  the  products  of  this  necessity  and 
choosing  and  refusing,  and  as  exerting  in  various 
ways  an  indirect  control  over  the  products  them- 
selves. This  again  is  a  force  other  than  either  of 
those  below  it.  So  far  as  it  is  free,  that  is,  as  it 
chooses  with  an  alternative  different  in  kind,  and 
as  it  is  intelligently  causative,  it  is  not  a  nature. 
It  is  another  order  of  being.  It  is  Spirit.  The 
functions  of  Spirit  are  two.  They  are  first,  Free- 
dom of  choice,  and  second,  Causation.  By  free- 
dom we  mean  the  power  and  the  opportunity  of 
choice  by  a  rational  being  with  an  alternative  in 
kind.  This  idea  of  freedom  so  inheres  in  such  a 
power  that  the  power  is  inconceivable  without  it. 
By  causation  we  mean  nothing  secondary.  We 
mean  the  origination  both  of  choice  and  of  motion. 
If  man  is  not  a  true  cause  he  cannot  be  responsi- 
ble. In  these  man  has  not  a  nature,  but  is  super- 
natural. But  subsequent  to  choice  there  is  neces- 
sity, and  so  a  nature  ;  and  this  necessity  is  as 
absolute,  at  least  for  us,  as  any  other.     A  man 


254  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY    OF  MAN. 

may  choose  whether  he  will  steal  or  not,  but  if  he 
steal  there  will  be  a  necessary  reaction  on  his  own 
spirit  that  will  render  it  different  in  spite  of  will, 
from  what  it  would  have  been.  Remorse  and 
shame  will  come  by  necessity  after  choice,  when, 
by  a  similar  necessity,  there  might  have  been  a 
virtuous  self-complacency,  and  hope  and  joy. 

The  necessity  of  which  I  have  just  spoken  is 
one  part  of  the  moral  nature,  for  it  will  be  seen 
that,  as  related  to  the  spirit,  the  moral  nature  is 
double.  It  consists  in  the  necessity  which  gives  us 
the  idea  of  obligation  before  choosing ;  and  also  in 
that  which  gives  us  the  results  just  mentioned  that 
follow  choice,  and  action  from  it.  If  we  were  not 
under  the  necessity  of  feeling  obligation,  we  should 
not  have  a  moral  nature;  and  if  there  were  not 
necessary  results  as  we  act  in  accordance  with,  or.  in 
opposition  to  obligation,  that  nature  would  be  nuga- 
tory. We  should  not  be  a  law  unto  ourselves.  It 
is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  while  obligation 
precedes  the  action  of  spirit  as  moral,  yet  that  the 
idea  of  it  is  conditioned  on  the  existence  of  Spirit, 
and  the  possibility  of  its  acting,  as  the  idea  of  re- 
morse is  conditioned  on  its  having  acted  in  a  par- 
ticular way.  We  have  thus  here  also  the  circle 
that  we  find  in  all  life,  for  in  every  living  thing 
all  that  is  essential  to  the  whole  is  implied  in  the 
action  of  every  part. 

We  find  then,  in  working  our  way  up,  a  clear 
distinction  between  the  action  of  Spirit  as  free  and 


SPONTANEITY    AND   FREEDOM.  255 

causative,  and  all  necessity  of  nature.  We  also 
find  three  departments  of  force  clearly  distin- 
guishable from  each  other,  and  suppose  that  the 
Apostle  Paul  was  justified  as  a  philosopher  in 
calling  them  Body,  Soul,  and  Spirit.  Certainly 
man  is  more  complex  in  his  unity  than  any  other 
being  on  the  earth ;  perhaps  more  so  than  any 
other  being  in  the  universe,  unless  it  be  God  him- 
self ;  certainly  there  are  in  him  the  three  distin- 
guishable and  separable  forms  of  activity  mentioned 
—  separable  because  actually  separated  in  the  veg- 
etable and  the  animal,  and  each  fairly  referable  to 
a  distinct  force ;  and  for  each  of  these  we  need  a 
name.  To  the  names  given  there  are  objections  ; 
and  especially  to  the  term  "  soul,"  as  having  often, 
in  our  times,  a  broader  meaning  ;  but  I  suppose  this 
distinction  is  indicated  by  the  Apostle  in  his  use  of 
these  terms,  and  it  is,  perhaps,  as  well  as  we  can  do. 

Having  now  reached  the  point  of  freedom,  and 
having  spoken  of  spontaneous  movement  in  con- 
nection with  that,  I  will  call  your  attention  to  the 
difference  between  them.  As  related  to  our  wills, 
a  spontaneous  movement  is  as  necessary  as  any 
other.  It  differs  from  other  necessitated  move- 
ment in  springing  from  within  that  which  is 
moved,  and  so  simulates  freedom.  As  apparently 
without  effort  it  is  pleasing,  and  as  from  a  con- 
cealed cause  it  is  mysterious,  but  that  it  is  the  op- 
posite of  the  will  and  of  action  from  that  is  clear 


256  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY    OF  MAN. 

because  it  is  the  spontaneous  movements  that  the 
will  is  to  oppose  and  rule  over.  Sudden  anger  is 
spontaneous  ;  so  are  the  Appetites,  the  Impulses, 
and  the  Passions  generally,  and  these  are  to  be 
controlled  by  the  Will.  In  that  is  choice,  and  also 
purpose,  which  is  generic  choice.  These  are 
made,  or  should  be,  in  the  light  of  the  Intellect, 
in  view  of  reasons  standing  before,  as  well  as  from 
impulsions,  and  in  these  alone  is  there  freedom. 
Spontaneity  and  freedom  are  therefore  entirely 
different  things.  This  I  speak  of  with  some 
emphasis  because  the  two  have  often  been  con- 
founded, and  sometimes  by  eminent  writers. 

The  point  of  freedom  which  we  have  now 
reached  is  the  point  of  Dominion.  Of  this  I  have 
before  spoken  as  a  characteristic  of  man.  Domin- 
ion implies  intelligent  freedom,  because  that  which 
is  dominated  over,  or  determined  by  anything 
else,  cannot  have  dominion.  This  prerogative  of 
freedom  is  one  of  the  original  and  simple  forms 
in  which  our  nature  manifests  itself,  and  so  admits 
of  no  explanation.  It  must  be  known  directly  by 
and  in  itself,  or  it  cannot  be  known  at  all.  In 
this  way  all  men  do  know  it.  The  power  of 
choice  and  so  the  idea  of  freedom,  enters  into  their 
conception  of  themselves  in  the  same  way  that  the 
power  of  thinking  does.  We  can  choose  as  we 
please.  Here  our  power  is  direct,  and  nothing 
that  does  not  destroy  our  very  being  can  take  it 


CHOICE  AND   VOLITION.  257 

from  us,  or  prevent  our  using  it.  In  outward  acts 
we  use  means.  We  need  at  least  the  use  of  our 
limbs  and  organs  of  expression.  But  in  choosing, 
the  act  is  simple.  We  use  no  means,  and  no  one 
can  teach  us  how  to  do  it.  There  is  no  how  to  it,  for 
a  how  always  implies  the  use  of  means.  Hence,  as 
independent  of  external  force,  and  of  means,  which 
may,  or  may  not  be  in  our  power ;  as  the  origin  of 
all  outward  manifestation  of  what  is  properly  the 
person,  and  as  rendering  character  possible,  the 
Will  as  choice  is  the  ultimate  seat  of  responsibility, 
and  an  essential  element  of  personality., 

This  direct  power  over  our  own  choices  by 
which  we  become  capable  of  dominion,  ought  to 
be  distinguished  more  carefully  than  it  has  been 
from  that  secondary  power  of  volition  which  is 
put  forth  only  in  the  use  of  means.  Choice  may 
be  without  volition,  and  expresses  character  as 
fully  as  if  volition  followed.  Hence  it  is  that  God 
looks  upon  the  heart. 

But  volition  without  choice  is  impossible,  and 
when  it  is  put  forth  may  be  nugatory.  It  has 
no  moral  character,  and  its  value  depends  on  that 
contingent  power  through  which  we  control  our 
bodies  and  the  agencies  around  us.  It  is  through 
this  that  we  control  indirectly  the  involuntary 
processes  within  us,  both  physical  and  mental,  and 
also  the  processes  of  nature  around  us.  Choosing 
first,  and  then  controlling  these  with  reference  to 
ends,  we  have  dominion. 

17 


258  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY    OF  MAN. 

And  here  I  think  we  are  at  a  point  where  we 
may  see  the  difference  between  what  is  natural 
and  what  is  supernatural.  Nature  is  the  region 
of  necessity.  Left  to  themselves  the  processes 
around  us  go  on  with  absolute  uniformity.  So 
the  rivers  run,  so  the  stars  move.  But  that 
which  is  free,  and  has  dominion  over  nature,  is 
super  natural.  It  is  above  nature.  It  is  in  an- 
other region  and  is  controlled  by  other  principles 
altogether.  There  are  those  who  say  that  every- 
thing out  of  God  is  nature,  but  this  has  been  unfor- 
tunate as  confounding  things  that  differ,  as  favor- 
ing necessity,  and  tending  to  degrade  man.  I 
would  say  that  everything  that  is  not  God,  and 
that  is  not  made  in  the  image  of  God,  is  nature. 
If  that  which  is  in  God  be  not  nature,  if  it  be 
supernatural,  why  should  we  call  that  in  us  by 
which  we  are  in  the  image  of  God,  nature  ?  If 
there  be,  as  is  conceded,  that  in  the  kind  of  pow- 
ers with  which  we  are  endowed  in  virtue  of  which 
we  are  in  the  image  of  God,  and  exercise  domin- 
ion over  nature,  then  we  must  be,  so  far  forth, 
supernatural.  And  here  I  suppose  we  find  the  true 
line  between  nature  and  the  supernatural.  All 
spirit  and  spiritual  activity,  whether  it  be  morally 
good  or  evil,  is  supernatural.  All  free  causation  is 
supernatural. 

There  is  another  point  that  may  be  referred  to 
in  connection  with  the  power  of  Will.     It  is  the 


MIRACLES.  259 

difference  between  the  supernatural  and  the  mi- 
raculous. Much  is  said  at  present  in  regard  to 
miracles,  and  men  seem  to  me  to  fall  into  dif- 
ficulties about  them  of  their  own  making.  Did 
you  ever  see  a  man  riding  in  his  own  dust  ?  In 
California,  where  they  have  no  rain  for  three 
months  and  the  wind  blows  steadily  in  one  direc 
tion,  a  man  may  ride  thus  all  day  with  everything 
obscured  around  and  above  him,  while,  to  one  who 
stands  apart,  the  atmosphere  is  wonderfully  trans- 
parent. We  have  speculative  men  much  in  that 
condition.  On  many  points,  and  this  of  miracles 
is  one,  they  raise  a  fog  about  their  own  heads 
and  suppose  it  extends  through  the  universe. 
They  talk  about  miracles  as  a  violation  of  the 
laws  of  nature.  A  miracle  is  no  violation  of  any 
law  of  nature.  It  presupposes  laws  of  nature,  and 
is  simply  an  act  performed  directly  by  the  will  of 
God  that  transcends  those  laws.  That  the  will 
of  God  should  cause  iron  to  rise  and  swim  in  the 
water,  is  no  more  a  violation  of  the  law  of  gravita- 
tion than  it  is  for  me  to  raise  this  rod  which  goes 
up  directly  or  indirectly  by  the  superior  force  of 
Will  acting  at  some  point  immediately  upon  mat- 
ter. The  law  of  gravitation  continues  to  act,  but 
the  rod  rises  by  a  spiritual  force  that  transcends 
it,  that  force  acting  freely,  intelligently,  and  with 
dominion.  Such  an  event,  so  far  as  it  is  produced 
by  an  agency  that  is  spiritual  and  free,  is  supernat- 
ural, but  not  miraculous.     In  a  miracle  the  will  of 


260  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

God  acts  directly,  and  produces  outward  effects 
with  no  intervening  agency.  This  our  wills  can- 
not do.  Hence  a  miracle  is  the  great  seal  of  God 
to  any  communication  from  Himself,  and,  so  far 
as  we  can  see,  not  the  only  possible  evidence,  far 
from  it,  but  the  only  possible  seal.  There  is  in  it, 
as  there  is  in  our  control  over  nature,  the  agency 
of  an  intelligent  Will  exercising  dominion.  This 
is  the  important  element,  and  the  only  important 
element  in  both  cases.  The  one  is  no  more 
strange  than  the  other  ;  there  is  in  it  no  more  any 
violation  of  a  law  of  nature,  but  the  mode  is  such 
as  to  show  that  it  can  be  done  by  God  only. 
What  difficulty  then  is  there  here  ?  I  see  none, 
unless  we  deny  the  power  of  God  to  act  directly 
on  matter,  and  to  do  that  would  be  a  practical 
denial  of  his  existence. 

We  have  now  seen  how  personality  is  consti- 
tuted, and  what  are  its  prerogatives;  and  we 
have  fully  furnished  the  mind  up  to  the  point  of 
responsible  action,  giving  it  its  three  classes  of 
regulative  ideas,  together  with  all  that  comes  con- 
tingently by  direct  presentation.  Some,  indeed, 
may  think  we  have  gone  beyond  that,  for  in  the 
list  I  gave  you  at  the  close  of  the  last  lecture  the 
ideas  of  merit  and  demerit,  and  of  reward  and 
punishment,  were  put  down,  and  they  may  be 
thought  of  as  solely  the  result  of  moral  action.  In  a 
sense  they  are,  but  they  are  so  implied  in  the  very 


CONDUCT  AND  CHARACTER.         261 

conception  of  a  moral  nature,  are  so  inherent  and 
essential  that  they  may  be  said  to  be  given  with 
the  nature  itself. 

Having  reached  the  person,  as  we  now  have, 
and  thus  a  proper  cause,  we  have  reached  the 
highest  point.  There  is  nothing  higher  in  kind 
than  a  personal  cause.  God  is  such  a  cause. 
Henceforth  there  will  be  no  more  upbuilding  by 
the  addition  of  conditioning  and  conditioned  fac- 
ulties. We  now  enter  another  region.  We  pass 
from  the  tree  to  its  fruit,  from  the  philosophy  of 
man  to  that  of  conduct,  from  the  upbuilding  of 
the  person  to  the  formation  and  upbuilding  of  such 
a  character  as  a  person  thus  constituted  ought  to 
form  and  build  up. 

But  moral  and  responsible  action,  to  which  we 
now  come,  is  action  from  choice,  or  rather,  it  is 
the  choice  itself.  A  being  with  no  power  of  choice 
can  be  neither  moral  nor  responsible,  and  when- 
the  choice  is  made  the  moral  character  of  the  act 
and  of  all  that  pertains  to  it  is  determined. 
Choice  implies  an  object  that  may  be  chosen,  and 
also  an  alternative.  This  alternative  may  be  be- 
tween two  objects  of  the  same  kind,  or  of  different 
kinds,  or  it  may  be  between  choosing  a  single  ob- 
ject or  not  choosing  it ;  but  an  alternative  of  some 
kind  there  must  be. 

Let  us  then  bring  up  before  the  person  the  dif- 
ferent springs  or  grounds  of  action  which  we  have 
found   in   the   constitution,  and  so   the   different 


262 


AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF   MAN. 


possible  objects  of  choice.  To  do  this  let  the 
person,  now  fully  constituted,  but  not  having  yet 
acted,  be  represented  by  a  straight  line  thus,  — 


Moral  Love. 
Benevolence,  or 


For  Country. 
For  Family, 


Natural  Affections,  as 

Esteem. 
Power, 
Knowledge, 
Property, 
Desires,  as  of 

Appetites. 


Benevolent. 
Just, 
True, 
Righteous, 

Patriotic. 
Amiable, 


Ambitious. 
Covetous. 

Sensual. 


GROUNDS  OF  ACTION. 


CHARACTER. 


We  then  bring  up,  as  we  have  heretofore  done, 
the  results  of  our  previous  work,  and  place  them 
before  the  person  in  their  order  and  rank  as  con- 
ditioning and  conditioned.  Without  going  into 
detail  we  have  thus,  in  kind,  every  principle  of 
action  in  our  constitution,  each  legitimate  and 
desirable  in  its  place.  We  then  place  Obligation 
on  the  other  side  of  the  line,  written  so  as  to  show 
its  presence  at  every  point  where  choice  is  to  be 
made  between  different  principles  of  action  that 
may  be  contending  for  the  ascendency. 

With  this  before  us  we  are  able  to  see  what 
takes  place  in  responsible  action.     A  choice  is  to 


OBLIGATION.  263 

be  made  between  a  lower  principle  of  action  and 
a  higher,  and  the  moral  nature,  when  it  is  dealt 
fairly  by,  will  always  affirm  obligation  to  choose 
the  higher.  If  the  question  be  between  the  grati- 
fication of  appetite  and  the  practical  exercise  of 
a  benevolent  affection,  obligation  will  be  affirmed 
to  exercise  the  affection.  This  affirmation  is  not 
an  act  of  the  will.  It  is  not  virtue,  or  any  part 
of  it.  It  is  necessitated  as  being  nature,  and  if 
it  were  not  thus  necessitated  we  should  not  have 
a  moral  nature.  The  sense  of  obligation  thus 
stands  by  itself  in  our  constitution.  We  do  not 
suppose  there  is  anything  like  it  in  that  of  the 
brute.  In  that  the  strongest  principle  prevails 
with  no  intervention  of  any  sense  or  idea  of  obli- 
gation. If  the  nature  of  the  brute  were  repre- 
sented by  a  straight  line,  as  I  have  represented 
the  person,  it  would  be  governed  wholly  by  what 
is  in  front  of  it.  Nothing  would  be  thrown  back. 
With  us  the  proper  motives  to  choice  are  the 
objects  that  address  the  different  principles  of 
action;  or,  if  you  please,  those  principles  them- 
selves prompting  us  to  act  in  view  of  the  objects. 
The  objects  present  themselves  as  good;  if  not 
they  would  not  be  motives.  The  principles  of 
action  promise  us  a  good  if  we  will  permit  them 
to  act,  and,  in  view  of  the  objects  and  of  the 
affirmation  of  obligation  taken  together,  we  are  to 
choose  which  object  we  will  have,  what  principle 
of  action  we  will  adopt,  what  end  we  will  pur- 


264  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

sue.  The  obligation  is  not  an  independent  mo- 
tive, and  becomes  possible  only  as  there  is  such  a 
motive  presented  to  the  Sensibility  as  a  good,  and 
that  is  higher  than  some  other  with  which  it  is  in 
conflict.  There  can  no  more  be  an  obligation  in- 
dependent of  some  good  in  a  sensibility  than  there 
can  be  a  right  thus  independent. 

It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  obligation  acts  from 
behind  as  an  impulse,  and  is  to  a  moral  being 
what  instinct  is  to  an  animal,  except  as  any  im- 
pulsive power,  however  high,  must  be  modified  by 
the  coming  in  of  comprehension  and  of  freedom. 
These  come  in  to  comprehend  it  and  the  condi- 
tions on  which  it  acts,  and  to  prevent  our  being 
misled  by  it  as  we  are  liable  to  be,  and  as  animals 
are,  and  must  be,  liable  to  be  misled  by  their  in- 
stincts. The  differences  between  Obligation  and 
Instinct  are  two,  one  from  its  connection  with 
comprehension,  and  the  other  with  freedom.  By 
comprehension  we  can  understand  its  office  as  we 
can  that  of  an  ordinary  instinct,  can  find  the  con- 
ditions on  which  it  acts,  can  compare  it  with  other 
impulsions  which  come  without  comprehension, 
and  also  with  the  reasons  that  stand  before  us  and 
become  motives  only  through  the  intelligence.  It 
is  through  this  power  of  comprehension  that  a 
philosophy  is  possible.  Obligation  differs  in  its 
action  from  instinct,  through  freedom,  because, 
though  it  claims  to  be,  and  was  intended  to  be  a 
guide,  —  a   voice   behind   us  saying  "  this  is   the 


AUTHORITY    AND    FREEDOM.  265 

way,  walk  ye  in  it,"  —  there  is  yet  that  in  the 
personality  so  above  it  that  it  can  be  rejected. 
The  man  has  the  power  to  set  it  aside,  and  not 
only  that,  but  to  set  aside  the  reasons  that  are  set- 
before  him,  —  all  that  good  with  which  our  whole 
nature  leads  us  to  suppose  that  obligation  will 
ultimately  coincide,  —  and  to  run  into  folly  and 
wickedness.  This  it  is  to  be  a  fool,  which,  as  I 
have  said  before,  no  brute  is  capable  of  being. 
With  this  impulsion,  and  power  of  comprehension, 
and  freedom,  man  can  act  rationally  and  morally 
from  a  sense  of  obligation  alone,  with  no  visible 
reason  in  front,  but  with  the  faith  that  there  is 
one.  He  can  also  act  rationally  and  morally  in 
view  of  the  good  itself  without  being  aware  of  the 
impulsion  or  thinking  of  the  obligation  ;  or  he 
may  act  under  the  conscious  guidance  and  inspira- 
tion of  both. 

At  this  point  it  is  that  we  may  see  how  it  is 
that  obligation  as  authoritative  may  be  reconciled 
with  freedom.  Authority  is  either  mandatory 
or  permissive.  Sometimes  the  parent  says,  "  thou 
shalt,"  and  perhaps  the  command  is  felt  as  oner- 
ous, though  never  if  filial  love  be  what  it  should. 
But  sometimes  the  child  says,  "  May  I  ?  "  and  if 
the  parent  says,  "  Yes,"  he  is  acting  under  author- 
ity no  less  than  if  the  thing  were  positively  com- 
manded. In  this  way,  through  filial  love  when  the 
command  is  positive,  and  through  permission  when 
authority    and    inclination   coincide,   authority   is 


266  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY    OF  MAN. 

harmonized  with  an  obedience  that  is  freedom. 
For  the  most  part  we  act  under  the  guidance  of 
authority  as  permissive,  and,  if  we  are  in  the  right 
path,  shall  do  so  more  and  more. 

Obligation,  as  has  been  said,  is  affirmed  when- 
ever there  is  a  conflict  of  motives  as  higher  and 
lower,  but  we  can  never  estimate  its  full  force,  or 
see  how  character  is  formed  without  referring  to 
a  distinction  I  formerly  made  in  this  place  be- 
tween ends  as  subordinate,  ultimate,  and  supreme. 
A  subordinate  end  is  that  which  we  seek  for  the 
sake  of  something  else.  An  ultimate  end  is  that 
which  we  seek  for  its  own  sake  as  a  good  in  itself. 
A  supreme  end  is  an  ultimate  end  made  by  us 
paramount  to  all  others.  Setting  now  before  a 
person  the  range  of  motives  or  ends  involved  in 
the  column  I  have  placed  before  you,  it  might  be 
supposed  that  he  might  act,  now  with  reference 
to  one  end,  and  now  to  another,  without  making 
any  one  supreme.  And  many  seem  to  do  this. 
They  seem  to  be  controlled,  now  by  this  impulse, 
now  by  that,  and  to  be  under  the  guidance  of  no 
one  principle.  We  call  them  frivolous.  If,  more- 
over, you  ask  the  first  man  you  meet  what  his 
supreme  end  is,  the  chances  are  he  will  not  be 
able  to  tell  you.  But  men  often  have  such  an 
end  without  stating  it  to  themselves  or  revealing 
it  to  others,  till  they  are  tested.  Here  is  a  man 
with  whom  power  is  a  supreme  end.  He  is  full 
of  good  impulses,  ready  to  do  you  a  favor,  cares 


A  SUPREME  END.  267 

nothing  for  money  ;  but  come  between  him  and 
his  power,  and  that  man  is  a  Bonaparte,  and 
will  sacrifice  the  lives  of  five  hundred  thousand 
men  to  enable  him  to  take  the  city  of  Moscow, 
while  professing,  and  perhaps  making  himself  be- 
lieve, that  he  is  acting  for  the  good  of  Ins  country. 
And  so  it  is  that  some  ruling  passion  is  constantly 
revealing  itself  in  society  in  such  results,  that,  if 
they  had  been  foretold,  the  man  himself  would 
have  said,  "  What !  is  thy  servant  a  dog  that  he 
should  do  this  thing  ?  "  It  does  not  follow,  there- 
fore, because  a  man  cannot  state  to  others,  and 
perhaps  does  not  even  to  himself,  what  his  su- 
preme end  is,  that  he  has  none.  Indeed,  it  seems 
to  belong  to  the  very  nature  of  a  moral  being  that 
he  should  have  such  an  end,  for,  as  the  gradation 
of  ends  goes  on  till  you  come  to  the  highest,  Obli- 
gation utters  its  voice  at  every  step,  so  that,  if, 
at  any  point  lower  than  the  highest,  a  stand  is 
made,  the  end  chosen  at  that  point  becomes  the 
supreme  end ;  whereas,  if  the  man  goes  up,  as 
he  should,  till  he  reaches  the  highest  end  and 
chooses  that,  then  that  will  be  the  supreme  end. 
It  enters  therefore  into  the  very  conception  of 
moral  law  that  there  should  be  a  supreme  end, 
and  that  the  law  should  require  that  that  end  be 
chosen. 

We  now  see  how  it  is  that  character  is  formed. 
It  is  formed  by  the  choice  as  supreme  of  some  one 
of  the  ends  presented  in  the  column  of  motives  or 


268  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

principles  of  action,  the  character  being  determined 
by  the  end  chosen.  He  who  chooses  money  as  his 
supreme  end,  is  a  covetous  man  and  "  an  idolater." 
He  who  chooses  power  is  ambitious ;  and  he  who 
chooses  God  and  his  service  is  religious.  This 
divides  characters  into  two  classes.  It  makes  a 
difference  to  the  man  himself  and  to  others  in 
many  ways  whether  he  chooses  appetite,  or  prop- 
erty, or  knowledge,  or  power  as  his  supreme  end, 
but  in  one  respect  those  choosing  either  are  mor- 
ally much  alike.  They  all  equally  ignore  Obliga- 
tion. Whoever  is  governed  by  a  sense  of  obliga- 
tion can  make  no  end  supreme  that  is  not  the 
highest,  and  he  who  fails  to  be  governed  by  a 
sense  of  obligation  must  be  radically  wrong.  If 
the  proper  test  of  morality  be  that  a  man  shall  be 
governed  by  his  rational  and  moral  nature  —  and 
what  else  can  it  be  ?  —  he  is  not  a  moral  man.  Be- 
tween those  who  choose  their  ends  and  seek  them 
with  the  full  purpose  of  doing  it  in  accordance 
with  obligation,  and  those  who  either  count  obli- 
gation out  altogether,  or  only  give  it  its  turn  with 
other  impulses  as  they  may  happen  to  come  up, 
there  is  a  radical  difference.  Every  variety  of 
character  there  may  be  among  those  who  choose 
any  end  beneath  the  highest.  They  may  even 
seem  to  have  no'  character  at  all,  but  they  lack 
equally  the  voluntary  element  of  a  true  manhood, 
which  consists  in  always  choosing  a  higher  end 
when  it  comes  into  competition  with  a  lower,  and 


THE   FLESH   AND   THE   SPIRIT.  209 

in  making  the  highest  end  supreme,  so  that  life 
will  be  at  any  time  sacrificed  rather  than  relin- 
quish it. 

And  this  shows  us  what  it  is  for  a  being  to  fall 
morally.  It  is  to  relinquish  the  choice  of  that 
which  is  highest  for  the  sake  of  an  inferior  good, 
and  to  make  that  supreme.  It  shows  too  what 
is  meant  in  the  Scriptures  by  "  the  flesh,"  and 
"  the  spirit,"  when  they  are  said  to  be  u  contrary 
one  to  the  other."  The  whole  life  of  him  who 
abides  steadfast  in  the  choice  of  that  which  is  high- 
est is  opposed  in  its  spirit  to  that  of  him  who 
adopts  as  supreme  any  inferior  end ;  and  he  who 
has  once  fallen  and  would  regain  his  standing  must 
maintain  a  constant  struggle. 

The  evils  from  a  failure  to  choose  the  highest 
end  are  inherent,  and  are  of  two  kinds.  They 
are,  first,  from  the  want  of  congruity  between  the 
end  chosen  and  our  nature.  There  must  be  that 
which  is  to  our  nature  as  God  made  it,  what  light 
is  to  the  eye,  or  air  to  the  lungs ;  and  unless  we 
find  that,  whatever  it  be,  there  will  be  unrest. 
There  can  be  no  true  success.  There  will  also  be 
evil  from  the  want  of  harmony  within  the  man 
himself.  No  man  can  fail  to  choose  the  highest 
end  known  to  him,  or  that  may  be  known,  with- 
out rebelling  against  his  better  nature  and  subject- 
ing himself  to  self-reproach.  The  particular  pas- 
sion may  be  gratified,  but  the  moral  nature  is 
outraged,  and  the  man  must  either  suifer  from  it 


270  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY  OF  MAN. 

continually,  or  quiet  it  temporarily  in  some  dis- 
ingenuous way.  It  is  this  last  that  most  men  do. 
There  are  more  men  who  practice  dishonesty  upon 
themselves  than  upon  others. 

It  will  follow,  from  the  column  of  ends  presented, 
that  there  is  a  difference  not  only  in  the  quantity 
of  the  good  to  be  derived  from  the  action  of  the 
faculties  in  correspondence  with  their  ends,  but 
also  in  the  quality.  This  is  an  important  point 
in  morals.  Every  principle  of  action  has  con- 
nected with  it  its  own  sensibility  that  differs  in 
quality  from  every  other.  Especially  is  this  true 
of  the  moral  nature  as  we  require  the  faculties  to 
act  in  harmony  with  that,  or  in  opposition  to  it. 
The  deepest  harmony  of  our  being  is  that  of  the 
Will  with  the  Moral  Nature  ;  the  most  fearful  dis- 
cord is  their  opposition.  From  these  we  have  a 
quality  of  enjoyment  and  of  suffering  wholly  dif- 
ferent from  any  other,  and  through  which  we  are 
able  to  enter  into  sympathy  with  the  enjoyments 
and  sufferings  of  the  highest  order  of  beings. 

Understanding  as  we  now  do,  what  the  princi- 
ples of  action  are,  and  how  character  is  formed, 
we  are  prepared  to  see  three  things.  And  the 
first  is,  what  the  highest  good  of  man  will  be.  It 
will  be  the  result  of  the  choice  by  him  of  the  high- 
est end,  and  of  an  adherence  to  that  under  all 
possible  conditions.  He  is  to  choose  it  both  as 
congruous  to  his  nature,  and  as  required  by  obli- 


THE  HIGHEST   GOOD.  —  THE  WHOLE  GOOD.       271 

gation;  and  if  choice  under  such  conditions  will 
not  secure  the  highest  good,  then  our  constitution 
is  untrue  to  itself,  and  the  government  of  the  uni- 
verse is  not  moral.  This  end  differs  from  all 
others  in  one  thing,  and  in  thus  differing  puts  all 
men  on  an  essential  equality.  He  who  chooses 
money  or  fame  must  work  for  them,  but  he  who 
chooses  God  and  his  service,  by  the  very  act  of 
choice  so  enters  into  that  which  he  chooses  and 
takes  possession  of  it  that  nothing  can  deprive  him 
of  it  but  his  own  falling  away  from  the  act  of 
choice. 

The  second  thing  we  are  prepared  to  see  is, 
what  the  whole  good  of  man  will  be.  The  whole 
good  will  be  from  the  conspiring  forces  of  his 
whole  nature  acting  in  harmony.  The  highest 
good  is  independent  of  all  that  is  below  it.  It 
may  belong  to  the  martyr  at  the  stake.  But 
every  principle  of  action  and  every  susceptibility 
of  our  nature  is  legitimate  and  good  in  its  place. 
From  the  action  of  every  one  there  results  a  good, 
and  no  good  is  to  be  rejected  unless  it  comes  to 
be  relatively,  and  in  its  time  and  place,  an  evil. 
"  Every  creature  of  God  is  good,  and  nothing  to 
be  refused,  if  it  be  received  with  thanksgiving." 
The  whole  good  of  man  will  then  consist  in  all 
the  good,  of  whatever  quality,  that  can  be  derived 
from  all  the  susceptibilities  and  powers  acting 
harmoniously. 

The  third  thing  we  are  prepared  to  see  is  the 


272  AN    OUTLINE   STUDY    OF  MAN. 

mode  in  which  this  good  is  to  be  attained.  This 
is  by  acting  in  accordance  with  what  I  have  here- 
tofore explained  in  this  place  as  the  Law  of  Limi- 
tation. This  grows  immediately  out  of  the  Law 
of  the  Conditioning  and  the  Conditioned,  and  is 
simply  an  application  to  human  life,  bringing  unity 
into  that,  of  the  principle  by  which  God  secures 
unity  in  the  action  of  the  several  forces  by  which 
the  processes  of  nature  are  carried  on.  Throughout 
the  range  of  forces  and  faculties  that  have  been  pre- 
sented to  you,  you  have  seen  that  they  have  to  each 
other  the  relation  of  Conditioning  and  Conditioned 
by  which  they  are  higher  and  lower  ;  and  now  it  is 
to  be  noticed  that  the  relative  force  of  the  lower 
is  always  precisely  that  which  is  requisite  for  the 
best  operation  of  that  which  is  higher.  Vegetable 
life,  for  instance,  being  what  it  is,  the  force  of  co- 
hesion and  of  chemical  affinity  are  just  what  they 
should  be  to  enable  the  roots  to  penetrate  the 
earth  and  to  separate  the  needed  elements.  This 
is  the  law  of  the  forces  throughout,  and  gives  us  at 
once  the  law  of  limitation  in  regard  to  conduct. 
As  the  faculties  and  motive  principles  are  higher 
or  lower,  so  are  the  duties,  the  pleasures,  the  sat- 
isfactions connected  with  them.  How  far  then 
may  we  go  under  any  particular  principle,  as  the 
love  of  property  ?  Just  so  far  as  will  best  pro- 
mote the  action  of  the  principles  above  it.  So  of 
the  appetites,  and  all  the  others.  Eat  as  much 
as  you  will,  if   eating  up  to  that  point  will  best 


THE  LAW  OF   LIMITATION.  273 

promote  the  action  of  faculties  above  appetite. 
Follow  the  fashions,  attend  parties,  balls,  theatres 
as  you  choose,  provided  you  do  nothing  to  repress 
or  limit  your  better  nature  and  the  power  of  God's 
Spirit  within  you.  "  We  are  called  unto  liberty." 
We  have  here,  not  a  rule,  but  a  principle.  God 
does  not  govern  man  by  rules.  He  never  meant 
to.  He  would  have  them  govern  their  faculties 
and  principles  of  action,  so  liable  to  become  a 
mob,  and  to  bring  unity  and  harmony 'into  them 
on  the  same  principle  on  which  He  governs  his 
universe  and  brings  unity  and  harmony  into  that. 

We  thus  know  through  the  law  of  the  condition- 
ing and  the  conditioned  what  is  lower  and  what 
is  higher,  and  so  what  is  highest.  We  know 
therefore  through  this  what  the  highest  good  of 
man  is,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  to  be  attained 
simply  by  choosing  it.  Knowing  thus  the  place 
of  each  faculty  and  principle,  we  know  by  the 
Law  of  Limitation  how  to  hold  it  in  its  place  and 
to  make  it  work  there  ;  and  therefore  we  know 
through  that  what  the  whole  good  of  man  is  and 
how  to  attain  it. 

If  the  inquiry  be  made,  as  it  will  be,  how  those 
who  know  nothing  of  the  Law  of  Limitation  can 
regulate  their  conduct  by  it,  it  may  be  replied  that 
this  is  only  what  takes  place  in  other  cases.  To 
all  fundamental  laws  involved  in  our  nature  man- 
kind conform  themselves  in  some  measure,  in- 
stinctively.     They  were  under  the  law  of  gravi- 

18 


274  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

tation,  and  regulated  their  movements  by  it  before 
that  law  was  discovered,  but  had  no  philosophy 
of  those  movements.  In  the  same  way  they  con- 
form to  the  laws  of  health  and  of  taste  by  what 
may  be  called  physical  and  rational  instincts  till, 
at  length,  underlying  principles  are  discovered, 
and  then  philosophy  comes  in,  enabling  them  to 
comprehend  processes,  and  give  reasons,  and  apply 
tests  as  they  could  not  otherwise.  To  some  ex- 
tent there  is,  no  doubt,  an  immediate  and  direct 
apprehension  of  what  is  higher  and  lower  in  mo- 
tive and  in  conduct,  and  of  obligation  as  conse- 
quent upon  that,  but  that  does  not  give  us  a  phi- 
losophy. To  make  progress,  here,  as  elsewhere, 
we  must  reach  comprehension,  and  law,  and  un- 
derlying reasons  where  there  had  seemed  to  be 
mere  fortuity,  or  caprice,  or  impulse,  or  instinct. 


LECTURE  XII. 

ORIGINAL  OBJECTS.  —  ACTION  AND  ITS  CONSE- 
QUENCES. —  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ACTION  FROM  THE 
CONSTITUTION.  —  NO  CHRISTIAN  MORAL  PHI- 
LOSOPHY. —  CHOICE.  —  SUPREME  ENDS.  —  SU- 
PREME   PRINCIPLE   OF    ACTION.  —  CONSCIENCE. 

—  A  NATURE  AND  A  NECESSITY  AFTER  CHOICE. 

—  MORAL    AFFECTIONS.  —  MORAL    EMOTIONS. 

—  RELIGIOUS  EMOTIONS.  —  THE  LAW  OF  CON- 
STRUCTION.—  THE  LAW  OF  CONDUCT. — TEST 
OF  PROGRESS.  —  POSITION  OF  MAN  AS  A  WOR- 
SHIPPER. 

At  the  commencement  of  these  lectures  I  said 
I  had  three  objects  in  view.  One  was  to  present 
man  in  his  unity.  Another,  and  a  principal  ob- 
ject, was  to  try  the  experiment  of  popularizing,  in 
some  measure,  metaphysical  subjects  by  means  of 
the  blackboard.  The  third  was  to  present  some 
views  of  my  own,  perhaps  worthy  of  attention. 

The  first  of  -these  objects,  the  presentation  of 
man  in  his  unity,  I  hope  to  accomplish  before 
closing  this  lecture.  We  have  brought  him  up  to 
the  point  of  choice.  The  choice  itself  and  its  re- 
sults remain  to  be  considered. 


276  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY  OF  MAN. 

In  regard  to  the  second  object,  I  am  encour- 
aged. So  far  as  I  know  it  is  the  first  attempt  to 
instruct  a  popular  audience  on  metaphysical  sub- 
jects through  the  eye,  and  from  the  attention 
given,  and  from  remarks  that  I  hear,  I  cannot 
help  thinking  that  in  the  hands  of  one  practiced 
and  skillful  in  its  use,  the  method  might  be  of  es- 
sential aid.  Following  the  clew  given  by  the  law 
of  the  Conditioning  and  the  Conditioned,  without 
which  these  lectures  could  not  have  been  given  in 
this  form,  what  might  otherwise  seem  complex  be- 
comes simple.  To  one  viewing  the  array  before  you 
for  the  first  time  it  must  seem  complex,  but  how 
simple  it  is.  We  have,  as  you  see,  a  perfect  series 
of  related  forces  and  products,  from  gravitation  up. 
The  forces  and  products  themselves  cannot  be 
presented  to  the  eye,  but  their  relations  can,  and 
by  presenting  them  thus  those  relations  are  more 
clearly  apprehended,  the  attention  is  held,  and  the 
memory  is  aided. 

As  to  any  views  of  my  own,  my  wish  has  been, 
and  will  be,  to  present  them  fairly,  and  to  have 
them  stand  on  their  own  merits. 

It  remains  to  us,  as  I  have  said,  to  speak  of  ac- 
tion and  its  consequences.  We  have  constituted 
the  person,  and  seen  his  prerogatives.  Now  he  is 
to  act.  But  action  morally  is  choice.  In  that 
alone  is  freedom.  We  are  therefore  to  consider 
that.  The  choice  must  lie  between  different  ends 
as  presented  in  the  last  lecture,  but  in  making  it 


A  SUPREME  END  NECESSARY.        277 

we  have  first  to  consider  whether  -we  will  take 
obligation  into  the  account  or  not.  If  we  do  that 
fully  and  fairly  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  choose  as 
our  supreme  end  any  but  the  highest,  or  what  we 
suppose  to  be  so.  Hence  the  necessity  of  a  su- 
preme end  in  a  system  of  morals,  and  the  impossi- 
bility of  reaching  the  full  import  of  obligation, 
and  so  of  moral  law,  till  we  reach  that.  The 
point  where  the  highest  good  is  apprehended  is 
the  Sinai  whence  the  moral  law  proceeds.  Obliga- 
tion accepted  will  continue  to  assert  itself  all  the 
way  up,  and  unless  the  highest  end  be  chosen 
there  can  be  no  peace.  There  must  be  either 
criminal  stupidity  or  intestine  war.  "  There  is 
no  peace,  saith  my  God,  to  the  wicked." 

If  obligation  be  accepted  and  the  highest  end 
be  chosen,  then  we  have  nothing  to  do  but  to  let 
the  other  principles  of  action  take  their  places  and 
act  variously  with  varying  conditions  under  the 
law  of  limitation.  If  obligation  be  not  accepted, 
if  we  ignore  or  neglect  that  peculiar  part  of  our 
nature  which  lies  back  of  the  line  and  prompts 
from  behind,  then  we  are  to  make  our  choice 
along  the  whole  line  below  the  highest.  Doing 
this  we  may  seem,  but  only  seem  to  be  afloat, 
and  to  have  no  fixed  character ;  or  we  may  choose 
definitely  some  lower  principle  and  act  with  en- 
ergy under  it.  Doing  this  last  the  law  of  limita- 
tion for  the  other  principles  of  action  including 
obligation,  which  never  can  properly  come  under 


278  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

that  law,  will  have  a  false  standard.  It  will  have 
the  principle  or  end  chosen  as  supreme  as  its 
standard,  and  all  other  principles  and  ends  will 
be  subordinated  with  reference  to  that. 

If  I  have  stated  rightly  what  the  powers  of 
man  are  and  their  relation  to  each  other,  there 
must  be  some  object  of  choice  or  end  that  it  would 
be  according  to  his  whole  nature  to  choose  as 
supreme.  Not  properly,  or  in  the  highest  sense, 
is  that  natural,  though  often  so  called,  which  is 
demanded  by  some  one  natural  principle  of  action 
that  would  overstep  its  limits ;  but  that  which 
is  demanded  by  the  whole  constitution  when  the 
powers  act  in  harmony.  Rising,  as  these  powers 
and  principles  of  action  do,  one  above  another, 
and  Obligation  constantly  demanding,  when  they 
conflict,  that  the  highest  shall  prevail,  it  must  be 
according  to  the  whole  nature  that  the  highest 
end,  whatever  that  may  be,  shall  be  chosen  as 
supreme.  As  thus  put,  it  is  self  evident  that  what 
is  natural,  and  what  is  obligatory,  that  is,  what 
ought  to  be  done,  must  coincide.  Indeed,  obliga- 
tion, as  necessarily  affirmed,  comes  in  as  a  part 
of  nature,  and  a  part  too  which  a  comprehen- 
sive wisdom  can  least  afford  to  disregard.  There 
must,  therefore,  be  a  coincidence  of  nature,  and 
obligation,  and  wisdom,  in  demanding  the  choice 
of  the  highest  end.  The  choice  itself  is  a  spirit- 
ual and  free  act,  above  and  outside  of  nature,  and 
may,  therefore,  be  unnatural,  and  wrong,  and  fool- 


NO   CHRISTIAN  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  279 

ish.  It  lies  in  a  region  where  wisdom  and  folly, 
holiness  and  sin  are  possible,  and  where  we  find 
laws  and.  results  impossible  in  the  region  of  matter 
and  of  necessity. 

It  is  because  all  normal  conduct  must  thus  grow 
out  of  the  constitution,  that  a  philosophy  of  con- 
duct, or  a  Moral  Philosophy,  is  possible.  This  ;-  ' 
philosophy  will  consist  in  such  a  knowledge  of  - 
the  constitution  of  man  as  God  made  it,  and  of  the 
possible  objects  of  choice,  as  will  enable  him  who 
has  it  to  say  what  the  supreme  end  or  object  of 
choice  should  be,  and  to  adjust  the  whole  range  of 
active  principles  according  to  the  law  and  end  of 
the  being  regarded  as  a  whole.  To  be  philosophi- 
cal, rules  for  the  use  of  the  eye  must  be  derived 
from  a  knowledge  of  its  structure  and  end  ;  and 
so  of  man  as  a  whole.  There  can  be  no  philoso- 
phy of  conduct  for  him  that  is  not  derived  from  a 
knowledge  of  his  constitution  and  end.  Hence  it 
is  only  in  a  modified  sense  that  there  can  be  such 
a  thing  as  a  Christian  Moral  Philosophy.  In 
strictness  there  is  no  such  thing.  So  far  as  man 
is  now  a  ruin  there  can  be  no  knowledge  of  what 
his  restoration  would  be,  nor  any  philosophy  of 
the  mode  of  it,  except  through  a  knowledge  of 
what  the  constitution  originally  was,  and  ought  to 
be.  So  far  as  Christianity  is  a  revelation  it  is  not 
science.  It  is  to  be  simply  interpreted,  and  ac- 
cepted. So  far  as  men  are  governed  authoritatively 
by  the  precepts  of  Christianity  there  is  no  philos- 


280  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY    OF  MAN. 

ophy.  Obedience  is  either  slavish,  or  from  faith. 
So  far  as  Christianity  requires  special  duties  they 
must  be  duties  demanded  by  a  right  adjust- 
ment of  our  powers  in  the  new  relations  in  which 
Christianity  places  us.  If  Christianity  be  not 
fundamentally  in  accord  with  our  original  consti- 
tution, and  will  not  restore  man  to  a  true  man- 
hood, and  the  highest  manhood,  we  cannot  accept 
it.  Hence  a  true  moral  science  will,  and  must  be, 
independent  of  revelation,  and  will  be  a  test  of 
anything  claiming  to  be  that,  for  nothing  that  can 
be  shown  to  be  really  in  opposition,  either  to  the 
reason  or  to  the  moral  nature  of  man,  can  be  from 
God.  Say  if  you  please,  that  on  this  ground  man 
is  incapable  of  constructing  a  moral  science.  Be 
it  so.  The  past  would  almost  seem  to  justify  the 
assertion.  Still,  we  are  not  required  to  call  that 
science  which  is  not  science,  but  is  either  impulse, 
or  instinct,  or  faith.  Certainly  philosophy  is  for 
the  maturity  of  the  race.  Certainly  human  life, 
not  the  life  of  children  only,  but  of  men,  and  of 
the  most  enlightened  men,  ought  to  be  largely 
controlled  by  authority  and  by  faith.  It  befits 
our  condition,  and  there  is  no  more  natural  or  en- 
nobling principle  of  action  than  faith. 

Passing  now  as  was  proposed,  to  Choice  and  its 
results,  the  question  is  what  supreme  end  we  shall 
choose.  To  this  different  answers  are  given  and 
earnestly  contended   for,    though   often   meaning 


SUPREME  PRINCIPLE  OF  ACTION.  281 

the  same  thing.  One  says  perfection  is  the  thing 
to  be  chosen.  In  this  he  includes,  no  doubt,  that 
result  in  the  sensibility  which  comes  from  perfec- 
tion, for  mere  perfection  of  being  or  of  adjustment 
without  activity  or  results  can  avail  nothing.  An- 
other says  that  virtue  is  to  be  chosen.  It  is  to  be 
chosen  for  itself,  and  has  in  it  its  own  reward.  Be- 
ing itself  an  act  of  choice,  and  wholly  in  the  will, 
it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  virtue  can  be  chosen  as  a 
supreme  end,  or  an  end  at  all ;  but  the  thing  pri- 
marily regarded  here  is  right  activity,  the  state 
and  results  being  taken  for  granted.  When  those 
holding  this  speak,  as  they  constantly  do  and 
must,  of  virtue  as  its  own  reward,  they  mean  by 
reward  a  result  in  the  sensibility  wholly  different 
from  the  virtue  itself.  Another  says  that  the 
thing  to  be  really  chosen  and  valued  for  ourselves 
and  others,  is  the  satisfaction  resulting  from  per- 
fection and  from  virtuous  activity,  and  which  can 
be  had  in  no  other  way.  He  says  that  a  rational 
being  comprehending  his  own  capacities  and  the 
capacities  of  others  would  choose  as  his  end  the 
highest  good  of  all  beings  capable  of  good.  Here 
the  result  is  primarily  regarded,  taking  for  granted 
the  state  and  the  activity. 

But  that  these  persons,  mean  the  same  thing, 
will  be  more  evident,  if,  instead  of  inquiring  what 
we  are  to  choose  as  an  end,  we  inquire  what  prin- 
ciple of  action  we  are  to  make  supreme.  Those 
making  the  same  principle  of  action  supreme  will 


282  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF  MAN. 

have  the  same  radical  character,  will  really  choose 
the  same  supreme  end,  and  it  is  a  pity  they  should 
dispute  about  words.  But  in  regard  to  this  there 
is  substantial  agreement,  at  least  among  those 
claiming  to  be  christians.  They  agree  that  the 
principle  that  should  be  made  supreme  is  Love. 
But  what  is  this  ?  Here  men  differ.  I  suppose 
it  is  rational  and  moral  love,  and  by  this  I  mean 
more  than  sentiment,  or  emotion,  or  affinity,  or 
than  choice  from  these.  It  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  natural  affections  that  come  before 
choice,  and  from  complacent  love  that  comes  after 
it.  It  is  not,  as  so  many  suppose,  benevolence  as  a 
sentiment,  but  as  an  act  of  choice  and  of  will. 
Central  to  it  is  a  rational  choice  of  the  good  of 
those  loved  for  its  own  sake,  and  those  loved  must 
include  not  only  those  attractive  to  us  and  in 
whom  we  can  feel  complacency,  but  the  debased, 
and  evil  and  unthankful,  and  those  manifesting 
personal  enmity.  In  short,  it  must  be  a  love  like 
that  of  God  in  giving  his  Son  for  us  ;  like  that  of 
the  Son  in  dying  for  us,  and  in  praying  for  his 
murderers  on  the  cross.  This  love  of  God  for  men 
was  a  holy  love,  but  in  it  he  sought  their  good, 
and  not  the  doing  of  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right. 
Since,  then,  men  are  so  much  better  agreed  about 
the  principle  of  action  that  should  be  supreme 
than  about  the  end,  though  they  really  amount  to 
the  same  thing,  we  will  start  from  that ;  and  if 
we  would  represent  to  the  eye  the  different  results, 


CONSCIENCE. 


283 


as  we  choose  the  highest  as  supreme  or  one  that  is 
lower,  we  must  make  two  columns.  To  do  this 
we  recur  to  the  column  of  possible  principles  of 
action  presented  in  the  last  lecture,  any  one  of 
which  may  be  made  supreme,  and  construct  the 
columns  thus,  making  Moral  Love  supreme  in  the 
one  column,  and  Ambition  in  the  other. 


o 


pq 

GO 


Worship 

and        -^ 

Religious 
Emotions. 


God. 
Power  to 
Glory, 
Honor, 
Blessing, 
Ascription  of 

Praise. 
Thanksgiv- 
ing, 
Adoration, 


V 


f  Peace. 
Moral 

<  Joy, 
Emotions.  I 

VHopk, 


Moral 
Affec- 
tions.       VLove. 
MORAL  LOVE 


f  Moral 
J  Indignation. 
|  Complacent 


^Worship.  Idolatry. 

r 
Vanity, 
Moral 

Pride, 
Emo-     \ 

Joy, 
tions. 

Hope, 


Moral 
Affkc-^ 
tions 


(  Revenge. 
Wrath, 
Hatrkd, 
Envy, 
Emulation, 
AMBITION. 


You  will  see  that  I  have  placed  conscience  along- 
side of  this  whole  movement,  as  pertaining  to  it 
all.  Hitherto  I  have  not  spoken  of  Conscience,  be- 
cause, as  I  understand  it,  it  does  not  appear  except 
in  connection  with  our  own  moral  choices.  Hav- 
ing a  moral  nature  we  might  judge  correctly  of 
the  moral  conduct  of  others,  but  that  would  not  be 


284  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

conscience.  Conscience  is  our  moral  consciousness 
in  connection  with  our  own  choices  —  not  our  out- 
ward acts,  but  our  choices.  It  is  at  work  previous 
to  choice  affirming  obligation  to  choose  in  accor- 
dance with  that  which  is  highest ;  and  after  choice 
it  gives  us,  in  connection  with  the  ideas  of  merit 
and  demerit,  the  feelings  of  self-approbation,  and  of 
guilt  and  remorse.  Like  consciousness  it  is  a  know- 
ing with.  We  know  our  choices,  and  together 
with  the  knowledge  of  them  we  have  through 
Conscience,  a  knowledge  of  their  moral  quality, 
and  so  a  judgment  concerning  them.  It  is  there- 
fore strictly  personal,  and  resembles  the  tribunal 
of  God  in  judging  of  choices  and  motives.  Its 
precise  nature  and  office  are  given  by  the  Apostle 
Paul  when  he  says,  "  For  when  the  Gentiles 
which  have  not  the  law  do  by  nature  the  things 
contained  in  the  law,  these  having  not  the  law, 
are  a  law  unto  themselves.  Which  show  the 
work  of  •  the  law  written  in  their  hearts,  their 
conscience  also  bearing  ivitness,  and  their  thoughts 
the  meanwhile  accusing  or  else  excusing  one  an- 
other" Here  we  see  that  the  law  is  one  thing 
and  the  conscience  another.  But  the  law  is  a  law 
within  us  by  which  we  become  a  law  to  ourselves, 
and  what  can  that  be  but  the  moral  nature,  as  I 
have  said,  affirming  obligation  and  enabling  us  to 
judge  generally  of  moral  subjects,  while,  in  its  re- 
lations to  us  personally  and  when  we  come  to  act, 
this  same  moral   nature  becomes  conscience,  and 


MR.  MARTINEAU  AND  CONSCIENCE.      285 

bears  witness  to  the  moral  quality  of  our  choices, 
and  either  accuses  or  excuses  us  for  what  we  do. 
The  acts  are  done  by  the  man,  the  "  bearing  wit- 
ness," and  the  "  accusing  "  and  "  excusing,"  are 
done  by  the  conscience. 

We  know  our  choices,  and  also  whether  they 
are  or  are  not  in  accordance  with  what  we  believe 
obligation  requires.  It  is  to  this  last,  that  con- 
science "  witnesses,"  and  then  either  excuses  or 
accuses  us.  This  makes  the  office  of  conscience 
wholly  different  from  that  assigned  it  by  Mr. 
Martineau.  He  says  that  u  when  the  whole  se- 
ries of  springs  of  action  has  been  experienced,  the 
feeling  or  *  knowledge  with  ourselves,'  of  their  rel- 
ative rank  constitutes  the  individual  conscience."1 
But  this  seems  to  me  merely  preliminary,  and  not 
the  action  of  conscience  at  all.  Let  a  man  judge 
as  he  may  of  the  springs  of  action,  there  is  no 
"  accusing  "  or  "  excusing  "  connected  with  it. 
He  judges  of  them  as  of  other  things,  and  how  is 
he  to  know  if  he  judges  wrongly  ?  But  every  man 
must  know  whether  he  chooses  and  acts  in  accor- 
dance with  his  sense  of  obligation.  Mr.  Martineau 
places  the  office  of  Conscience  at  the  point  where 
we  judge  of  springs  of  action.  I  place  it  at  the 
point  where  we  judge  of  our  choices  as  conformed 
or  not  conformed  to  the  demands  of  obligation.  In 
his  view  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  will ;  in  my 
view  it  respects   the  action  of  the  will,  and  that 

1  Review  of  WheweWs  Morality,  p.  17. 


286  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

only.  Taking  cognizance  only  of  choices  and  mo- 
tives, the  judgment  of  conscience  has  nothing  to  do 
with  means,  or  opportunity,  or  outward  failure  or 
success ;  and  if  we  deal  honestly  with  it,  it  will 
accord  with,  and  anticipate  the  judgment  of  God. 

And  not  only  do  we  have  conscience  given  in 
connection  with  a  choice  which  determines  the 
drift  of  character,  but  also  Moral  Affections.  The 
difference  between  the  Natural  and  the  Moral 
Affections  is,  that  the  Natural  Affections  spring 
up  before  choice,  and  so  independently  of  it  that 
we  are  not  responsible  for  their  existence,  though 
we  are  for  their  regulation ;  while  the  Moral  Af- 
fections spring  up  only  after  choice,  and  are  so 
dependent  upon  it  that  we  are  responsible  for  their 
existence  and  character.  In  a  sense  they  are  nat- 
ural. They  are  as  uniform  and  necessary  after  a 
supreme  choice  as  the  natural  affections  are  before 
that.  «They  become  spontaneous,  are  a  part  of  the 
character,  and,  as  pertaining  to  the  moral  nature, 
are  deeper  and  more  influential  than  the  affections, 
merely  natural.  This  has  not  been  understood  as 
it  should  be. 

I  have  just  said  that  the  Moral  Affections  are 
necessary  after  choice,  and  from  this  we  see  the 
central  point  held  by  choice  in  our  being.  It  is 
the  point  of  Freedom.  Everywhere  below  that,  as 
I  showed  you,  the  movement,  whatever  it  may  be, 
is  by  necessity,  and  I  showed  you  the  harmony 
there  is  between   freedom   and  necessity  as  thus 


NECESSITY    AFTER   CHOICE.  287 

existing,  and  that  necessity  must  be  a  condition 
for  the  stable,  and  consistent,  and  intelligent  ac- 
tion of  a  free  being.  It  must  stand  below  him, 
and  he  must  rule  over  it,  and  by  the  very  means 
of  it.  But  we  now  pass  over  into  another  region  of 
necessity,  and,  if  you  please,  into  what  may  be 
called  another  region  of  nature.  A  man  may,  or 
may  not,  make  the  love  of  country  supreme.  That 
depends  upon  choice.  But  if  he  does  that,  he 
must  have  a  complacent  love  for  every  man  into 
whose  face  he  looks,  and  who,  he  knows,  has  a 
similar  love.  Tliis  is  by  necessity,  but  it  is  in 
consequence  of  choice.  And  again,  let  this  same 
man  see  a  traitor,  and  he  must  feel  moral  indigna- 
tion. He  must  feel  it,  and  will  know  that  he  has 
a  right  to  feel  it,  and  ought  to  feel  it,  though  it 
has  often  been  a  puzzle  to  see  how  that  which  is 
thus  necessary  and  spontaneous  could  be  justly 
commanded,  or  could  be  a  part  of  moral  clfaracter. 
It  is  a  part  of  moral  character  ;  nothing  more  so  ; 
there  is  nothing  for  which  we  are  more  fully  re- 
sponsible, and  we  see  how  this  comes  to  be. 

"We  may  see  also  that,  as  the  necessity  in  nature 
that  is  before  freedom  is  necessary  in  order  that 
man  may  rule  over  nature ;  so  also  is  the  neces- 
sity after  freedom  of  consequences  within  himself 
necessary  in  order  that  God  may  rule  over  him  by 
any  system  of  natural  consequences,  or  indeed  by 
reward  and  punishment  in  any  form.  If  the  will- 
ful lie  or  fraud  did  not  necessitate  a   stain  ;  if   the 


283  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY    OF   MAN. 

violation  of  obligation  did  not  necessitate  a  sense 
of  guilt ;  there  could  be  nothing  in  himself  that 
would  lead  him  to  avoid  the  violation  of  obliga- 
tion, or  by  which  he  could  know  the  meaning  of 
punishment.  The  sense  of  guilt  and  the  remorse 
are  not  the  punishment,  but  without  them  no  suf- 
fering inflicted  for  the  vindication  of  authority, 
or  for  sustaining  the  majesty  of  law,  can  be  known 
as  punishment.  So  it  is  that  freedom  lies  between 
two  forms  of  necessity,  the  one  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  freedom,  the  other  to  the  moral  gov- 
ernment of  free  beings. 

We  will  now  consider  in  their  order  the  neces- 
sary results,  first  of  choosing  as  a  supreme  end 
that  which  is  highest,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing, 
of  making  supreme  the  highest  principle  of  action. 
This  is  set  down  in  the  scheme  as  Moral  Love. 
We  will  then  consider  the  results  of  making  Am- 
bition supreme. 

Of  Moral  Love  the  first  necessary  result  will 
be  the  Moral  Affections.  Complacent  Love  and 
Moral  Indignation  may  be  said  to  include  all  the 
moral  affections,  the  indignation  being  evolved 
from  the  love  when  the  occasion  calls  for  it,  as  its 
opposite  pole.  In  this  love  it  is  that  we  find  the 
proper,  and  the  only  enduring  basis  of  friendship 
as  distinguished  from  mere  affinity,  and  from  com- 
binations on  the  ground  of  interest.  With  mu- 
tual complacency  on  the  ground  of  moral  charac- 
ter, involving  confidence,  there  is  a  foundation  for 


MORAL  EMOTIONS.  289 

a  permanent  social  state,  and  for  the  highest  con- 
ceivable good  from  such  a  state ;  and  there  can  be 
no  other. 

The  Moral  Emotions,  as  Hope,  Joy,  and  Peace, 
presuppose  the  moral  affections  as  the  fragrance 
presupposes  the  flower.  These,  and  the  religious 
emotions  equally,  are  the  most  complex  products 
of  the  mind,  the  effluence  of  all  its  faculties  in 
their  highest  activity.  Intellect,  sensibility,  choice, 
are  all  involved.  Hope  implies  desire  unsatisfied. 
It  is  mingled  desire  and  expectation  ;  but  joy  is 
fruition  itself  in  the  highest  form  of  the  Sensibility. 
It  is  the  rational  spirit  in  the  consciousness  of  its 
own  perfection  and  of  the  attainment  of  its  ends. 
If  those  ends  have  been  reached  through  struggle, 
the  moment  of  victory  is  preeminently  one  of  joy ; 
but  if  the  struggle  is  over  and  all  the  forces 
within  and  without  with  which  the  spirit  has  to 
deal,  move  with  a  balanced  activity  as  the  quiet 
heavens,  then  the  joy  settles  into  Peace. 

To  the  Moral  Emotions  which  must  thus  enter 
into  and  pervade  the  life  of  one  who  chooses  the 
highest  supreme  end,  the  Scriptures  give  the  high 
place  which  we  see  they  have  as  I  have  presented 
them,  and  which  they  must  have  in  any  true  sys- 
tem of  philosophy.  Their  Hope  is  a  hope  that  is 
"  an  anchor  to  the  soul."  Their  Joy  is  an  "  un- 
speakable "  joy  ;  and  any  sacrifice  needed  for  its 
attainment  they  justify  by  the  example  of  Him, 
"  who,  for  the  joy  that  was  set  before  him,  en- 

19 


290  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

dured  the  cross,  despising  the  shame."  Their 
Peace  also  is  a  peace  that  may  "  be  as  a  river," 
and  that  "  passeth  all  understanding." 

The  Religious  Emotions  come  next,  and  are  the 
crowning  element  in  worship.  These  differ  from 
the  moral  emotions  as  called  forth  in  view  of  God 
and  his  attributes ;  and  as  generally  requiring,  in 
their  highest  form,  volition  as  well  as  choice. 
Hope  and  joy  and  peace  are  from  choice  without 
volition,  but  thanksgiving,  and  praise,  and  bless- 
ing, and  all  forms  of  ascription,  in  which  alone  the 
religious  emotions  find  their  culmination,  require 
not  only  Intellect,  and  Sensibility,  and  Choice, 
but  also  Volition.  It  is  thus  that  in  worship,  the 
lower  animal  nature  being  held  in  reverent  abey- 
ance, everything  that  is  truly  man,  his  whole  in- 
tellectual and  moral  and  spiritual  nature,  are 
brought  to  their  highest  activity.  The  Will,  as 
central,  brings  the  whole  being  before  God  and 
offers  it  to  Him,  the  emotions  going  up  as  incense. 

In  the  moral  affections  and  emotions  thus  origi- 
nated, there  will  be  an  immediate  good  consonant 
with  our  being,  but  the  action  of  conscience  in 
connection  with  them  is  not  to  be  overlooked. 
Conscience  is  not  only  a  witness  to  record,  and  a 
judge  to  acquit,  it  also  approves  and  rewards. 
Connected  with  it,  is  its  own  sensibility  having  in 
it  monition  and  prophecy,  and  an  element  of 
peculiar  satisfaction  that  gives  the  key  note  to 
that  joy  of  the  spirit  that  springs  from  the  har- 


AMBITION  MADE  SUPREME.  291 

mony  of  all  its  powers.  Without  this  there  may- 
be what  shall  be  called  joy,  but  it  is  of  another 
quality.  There  may  be  "  the  joy  of  the  hypo- 
crite "  which  "  is  but  for  a  moment,"  but  there 
can  be  no  foundation  for  adequate  and  permanent 
joy  except  as  the  voice  of  conscience  gives  assur- 
ance of  the  harmony  of  the  whole  soul  with  itself 
and  with  God.  No  outward  prosperity  can  avail 
anything,  while  this  Mordecai  sits  at  the  King's 
gate  and  refuses  to  recognize  it  as  legitimate. 

So  is  it  that  all  the  powers  are  harmonized  in  the 
choice  of  the  highest  supreme  end ;  so  is  it  that  wis- 
dom and  duty  conspire  in  leading  us  to  that  choice. 

We  next  turn  to  the  other  column,  and  to  the 
necessary  results  of  choosing  any  end  lower  than 
the  highest. 

We  will  suppose  power  to  be  made  the  supreme 
end,  and  so  the  love  of  power,  or  Ambition,  to  be 
chosen  as  the  supreme  principle  of  action.  Let 
this  be  done,  and  the  moral  affections  placed  in 
the  diagram  above  ambition  will  spring  up  of 
necessity.  Let  another  come  into  competition 
with  one  thus  choosing  power,  and  there  will  be 
emulation.  Let  his  rival  surpass  him,  and  there 
will  be  envy ;  and  there  is  no  hatred,  or  wrath, 
or  revenge  that  will  not  stir  in  a  man  and  become 
settled  passion,  issuing  in  every  form  of  cruelty 
and  crime  as  the  pursuit  of  power  becomes  intense, 
and  as  others  become  obstacles  in  the  way.  Con- 
science and  humanity  and  other  natural  and  beau- 


292  AN  OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

tiful  principles  of  action  may  have  wide  scope, 
but  if  the  love  of  power  be  really  supreme,  when 
the  occasion  demands  it,  they  will  give  way,  and 
violence,  or  treachery,  or  whatever  means  may  be 
needed  to  secure  the  end  will  be  employed. 

Of  the  Moral  Emotions,  Hope  and  Joy  will  be 
the  same  in  name  as  when  the  right  supreme  end 
is  chosen.  The  pursuit  of  any  end  implies  hope, 
and  the  attainment  of  it  joy,  or  at  least  some  kind 
of  satisfaction  ;  but  in  quantity,  and  quality,  and 
permanence,  and  in  their  affinities,  there  may  be 
a  difference  heaven  wide.  And  such  difference 
there  is.  Legitimate  joy  abides,  and  either  be- 
comes the  peace  of  which  I  have  spoken,  or  alter- 
nates with  it.  What  man  needs  is  a  joy  that 
may  settle  into  peace,  a  peace  that  may  at  any 
time  rise  into  joy,  as  the  floods  may,  now  "  clap 
their  hands,"  and  now  reflect  the  quiet  image  of 
heaven.  But  the  joy  of  a  selfish  ambition,  exclud- 
ing, as  it  must,  a  sense  of  dependence  on  God  and 
the  love  of  others,  will  connect  itself  with  pride 
and  vanity  and  self -idolatry,  and  these  are  incom- 
patible with  peace. 

If  we  pass  up  to  the  religious  nature,  it  is  clearly 
impossible  that  one  who  makes  power  his  supreme 
end  should  have  in  his  worship  of  God  the  element 
that  is  central  to  all  true  worship,  that  is  the  sub- 
mission of  the  will.  There  may  be  for  such  an 
one  much  that  is  emotive  and  aesthetic  in  some- 
thing that  is  called  religion  and  worship.     In  the 


IDOLATRY.  293 

absence  of  the  spiritual  elements  of  submission 
and  self-consecration  there  will  be  special  tempta- 
tion to  appeal  to  the  senses,  and  to  the  taste 
through  art ;  but  that  a  man  making  power  his 
supreme  end  should  worship  God  in  spirit  and  in 
truth  would  be  a  contradiction,  because,  to  make 
anything  aside  from  God  supreme  either  in  the 
affections  or  the  will,  is  essential  idolatry.  It  is 
for  this  reason  that  idolatry  is  placed  where  it  is, 
in  the  diagram.  It  must  be  there  if  there  be 
religion  at  all ;  and  history  has  shown  that  it  is 
impossible  for  men  to  divest  themselves  wholly  of 
their  religious  nature. 

The  direct  results  just  mentioned,  of  choosing 
as  supreme  any  object  or  principle  of  action  below 
the  highest,  are  as  inevitable  as  those  under  any 
law  of  nature.  I  call  these  results  direct,  because 
they  involve  the  action  of  those  faculties  that  look 
directly  at  their  objects  without  reference  to  the 
action  of  the  Moral  Nature  that  now  becomes 
Conscience,  and  that  acts  only  with  reference  to 
the  character  of  the  previous  action  of  the  mind 
itself.  It  is  the  peculiarity  of  the  moral  nature, 
as  shown  by  its  position  in  the  diagram,  that  it 
presupposes  direct  voluntary  action  either  con- 
templated or  performed  in  view  of  objects  sup- 
posed to  have  in  them  a  good  ;  the  idea  of  a  good 
and  the  action  of  the  faculties  respecting  it  being 
thus  the  underlying  condition  of  the  action  of 
the  moral   nature.      This   gives  us  the  position 


294  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

of  the  moral  nature  and  the  key  to  the "  problems 
respecting  it.  Its  action,  sometimes  called  reflex, 
and  as  related  to  previous  action  really  so,  is  yet 
direct  upon  its  own  object,  which  is  the  character 
of  voluntary  action.  If  the  choice  be  in  accord- 
ance with  the  highest  good,  the  conscience  will 
approve  ;  if  not,  it  will  condemn ;  and  this  action 
is  as  necessary  after  choice  as  any  of  the  results  al- 
ready mentioned.  This  it  is  that  makes  the  posi- 
tion of  the  wrong-doer  so  fearful.  It  is  that  the 
moral  nature  is  a  nature,  a  part  of  himself  acting 
by  necessity,  so  that  there  is  no  escape.  The  bat- 
teries of  conscience,  it  will  be  seen,  are  planted  all 
along  the  line,  and  at  any  point  where  there  is 
wrong-doing,  as  there  is  at  every  point  when  a 
wrong  supreme  end  has  been  chosen,  they  are 
ready  to  open  fire.  If  these  batteries  may  be 
silenced  for  a  time,  they  are  yet  consciously  there  ; 
the  act  of  silencing  them  but  charges  them  more 
highly,  and  the  only  possible  ground  of  a  peace  that 
may  at  any  time  rise  into  joy  is  the  perfect  accord 
t>f  the  moral  nature,  acting  as  Conscience,  with  the 
Will.  Let  the  Conscience  act  so  in  the  light  that  its 
decisions  shall  coincide  with  the  law  of  God,  thus 
becoming  legitimately  Law,  and  let  the  Will  act  as 
Love,  and  then  the  Law  of  Love  will  reign,  and 
there  will  be  conscious,  permanent,  and  universal 
peace.  But  let  the  Will,  on  the  other  hand,  fail  to 
heed  the  monitions  of  Conscience,  and  no  result 
under  any  law  of  nature  can  be  more  certain  than 
the  disorder  and  misery  that  must  ensue. 


THE  LAW  OF  CONSTRUCTION.  295 

We  have  now  completed  our  work  in  its  details, 
and  the  results  have  been  presented  to  the  eye  in 
parts.  In  doing  this  we  have  needed  to  know  the 
law  of  construction  for  the  universe,  and  the  law 
of  conduct  for  man.  The  law  of  construction  is 
the  law  of  the  conditioning  and  the  conditioned. 
This,  I  have  said,  implies  throughout  the  relation 
of  lower  and  higher,  and  that  relation  has  been 
indicated  by  their  position  on  the  board.  This 
relation  of  conditioning  is  simply  that  of  neces- 
sary presupposition  without  causation ;  and  if  any 
question,  as  some  may,  and  plausibly  too  in  cer- 
tain cases,  whether  that  which  conditions  is  always 
lower,  they  may  express  the  relation  of  the  two  by 
placing  the  condition  back  of  the  conditioned,  as  I 
did  in  my  lectures  four  years  since,  and  as  is  done 
in  Appendix  A,  in  "  The  Law  of  Love."  But  in 
either  case  it  is  the  law  of  the  conditioning  and 
the  conditioned  that  is  the  law  of  construction. 
So  is  it  with  the  works  of  man  ;  so,  as  far  as  we 
can  understand  them,  with  the  works  of  God. 
This  law  holds  throughout,  but  when  it  brings  us 
up  to  the  point  of  choice  we  need  a  Law  of  Con- 
duct. Construction  is  for  the  sake  of  conduct. 
Conduct  is  higher,  and  in  order  to  be  philosophi- 
cal it  must  not  only  grow  out  of  the  construction 
by  instinct,  or  impulse,  or  faith,  but  must  be  seen 
to  grow  out  of  it,  and  be  adopted  on  that  ground. 
As  adopted  by  faith  it  may  be  rational,  but  to  be 
philosophical  it  must  be  seen  to  grow  out  of  the 


296  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY   OF  MAN. 

construction.  It  is  the  business  of  a  rational  and 
free  being,  not  to  create  anything  as  God  did,  but 
to  construct  a  course  of  conduct.  And  this  he  is 
to  do  from  the  same  principle,  and  on  the  same 
model  as  God  has  constructed  the  universe.  The 
principle  is  Love.  This  we  learn  from  the  Word 
of  God.  The  model  is  a  variety  of  forces,  broader 
and  less  broad,  which  may  be  represented  by  a 
pyramid,  the  forces  being  regulated  in  their  rela- 
tion to  each  other  by  the  Law  of  Limitation. 
This  we  learn  from  the  works  of  God.  And  these 
two  give  us  the  Law  of  Conduct.  Conduct  is  to 
spring  from  Rational  Love,  the  man,  meantime, 
being  brought  under  obligation  through  the  con- 
science to  regulate  the  various  impulsive  principles 
of  action  according  to  the  Law  of  Limitation. 
Combining  thus  the  word  and  the  works  of  God, 
we  gain  a  true  philosophy  both  of  Nature  and  of 
human  life. 

As  has  been  said,  the  results  of  our  work  have 
been  presented  to  the  eye  in  parts,  let  us  now  look 
at  them  as  a  whole.  That  we  may  do  this  we 
bring  together  in  one  diagram,  the  several  parts 
already  presented.1  Viewing  them  thus  we  have 
only  to  begin  at  gravitation  and  follow  the  series 
up  to  see  how  perfectly  the  laws  of  construction 
and  of  limitation,  as  they  have  been  explained, 
apply  in  every  case  ;  and  how  simple  the  series  is. 
These  laws  apply  up  to  the  point  where  the  Law 

1  See  diagram  at  the  end. 


THE   TEST   OF   PROGRESS.  297 

of  Conduct  is  needed.  Then  the  Law  of  Con- 
struction stops,  but  that  of  Limitation  continues 
throughout.  The  Law  of  Conduct  is  not  less  sim- 
ple in  its  principle  than  the  others,  nor,  except 
from  a  want  of  simplicity  and  thorough  honesty 
in  ourselves  or  others,  should  we  find  it  difficult  of 
application.  God  would  have  men  govern  their 
lives  on  the  same  principle  on  which  He  governs 
the  universe.  Let  them  do  that,  and  their  lives 
will  be  brought  into  harmony  with  Him,  into  har- 
mony with  themselves,  and  ultimately  into  har- 
mony with  all  their  surroundings.  Thus  men 
will  confer  upon  others  whatever  of  good  they  are 
capable  of  conferring,  and  will  enjoy  whatever  of 
good  they  are  capable  of  enjoying  through  the  sus- 
ceptibilities and  powers  of  their  being,  acting  ac- 
cording to  its  law. 

Looking  at  the  series  as  a  whole  we  find  a  test 
of  the  progress  of  the  race.  Civilization  is  not 
progress.  It  belongs  in  the  lower  part  of  the  dia- 
gram, in  the  region  of  the  appetites  and  desires 
and  of  Beauty.  By  ministering  to  luxury  and  art 
and  to  the  senses  merely,  civilization  may  retard 
progress.  It  has  often  done  so.  There  is  no 
more  formidable  obstacle  to  progress  than  a  cor- 
rupt and  effete  civilization.  As  compared  with 
that  a  state  of  barbarism  is  hopeful.  But  the 
things  which  belong  to  the  Spirit  are  in  another 
and  a  higher  region,  and  it  is  here  that  we  find 
the  test  of  progress.     That  test  is  not  in  the  ex- 


298  AN   OUTLINE   STUDY   OF   MAN. 

tent  of  knowledge,  or  in  the  progress  of  civiliza- 
tion, but  in  the  extent  to  which  the  masses  are 
under  the  control  of  that  which  is  highest  in  the 
diagram,  and  the  extent  to  which  they  adopt  a 
law  of  conduct  in  harmony  with  the  conscience. 
Civilization  should,  and  always  will  ultimately 
accompany  the  paramount  activity  of  the  higher 
powers ;  but  there  may  be  individuals,  as  the  an- 
cient patriarchs,  and  communities,  high  in  spiritual 
growth,  who  are  yet  but  partially  civilized,  while 
there  may  be  an  advanced,  and  refined,  and  con- 
temptuous civilization  that  is  contemptible  and 
well-nigh  hopeless.  It  is  Christianity  alone,  awak- 
ening into  life  and  regulating  the  higher  powers, 
that  can  furnish  the  conditions  of  permanent  prog- 
ress ;  and  nowhere  does  a  spiritual  Christianity 
find  an  opposition  so  intrenched  and  so  bitter  as  in 
the  bosom  of  such  civilizations  and  from  the  idola- 
tries consonant  with  them. 

In  closing,  I  ask  your  attention  to  the  complex 
nature  of  that  which  stands  highest  on  the  scheme 
as  worship  ;  and  to  the  position  of  man  as  a  wor- 
shipper. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  affections  and  acts  in- 
volved in  worship  are  conditioned  on  all  that  is 
below  them.  From  this  it  will  follow  that  wor- 
ship is  the  highest  act  which  man  can  perform, 
and  that  his  nature  does  not  reach  its  full  expres- 
sion without  that.  Take,  for  instance,  the  intelli- 
gent ascription  of  praise  to  God,  and  it  will  be 


WORSHIP.  299 

found  to  presuppose  and  involve  the  presence  and 
activity  of  every  element  of  our  proper  humanity. 
It  presupposes  the  Intellect,  and  the  recognition 
by  that  of  the  being  of  God,  and  of  his  perfections 
so  manifested  as  to  be  worthy  of  praise.  It  pre- 
supposes the  Sensibility,  and  that  it  is  awake  to 
every  manifestation  of  the  divine  perfections. 
The  expression  of  praise  is,  indeed,  a  manifesta- 
tion of  the  Sensibility  itself  in  an  exalted  state.  It 
presupposes  also  the  Will,  and  that  too  in  joyful 
submission.  Without  the  submission  of  the  Will, 
there  may  be  external  acts  of  homage  through  in- 
terest or  fear,  but  there  can  be  no  true  worship. 
With  the  Intellect,  the  Sensibility,  and  the  Will, 
thus  active  in  view  of  the  highest  possible  object, 
there  could  not  fail  to  be  complacent  love,  and, 
based  on  that,  in  connection  with  the  filial  rela- 
tion, joy,  and  peace.  These  being  given,  the  will 
of  a  rational  being  could  hardly  fail  to  be  put 
forth  in  the  form  of  choice  to  praise  God,  and  in 
the  form  of  volition  to  give  to  that  praise  its  high- 
est outward  expression.  The  ascription  of  praise 
would  thus  go  up  from  the  whole  of  his  being  as 
the  odor  goes  up  from  the  plant  All  that  is  be- 
low in  the  plant,  every  leaf  and  rootlet,  contributes 
to  the  fragrance  of  its  blossom.  And  so  it  is  with 
praise,  and  with  all  right  forms  of  worship.  They 
are  the  complete  and  full  expression  of  our  proper 
humanity  carried  up  to  its  highest  point.  Failing 
to  reach  this  point,  humanity  fails  of  its  proper 


300  AN   OUTLINE  STUDY    OF  MAN. 

amplitude  and  upward  growth  ;  there  is  reaction 
downward,  and  the  whole  being  becomes  dwarfed 
and  perverted. 

But  in  worshipping  God  man  does  not  act  for 
himself  alone.  He  is  the  priest  of  nature.  Stand- 
ing at  its  head,  and  he  alone  recognizing  the  Crea- 
tor, it  is  only  through  him  that  the  praise  that 
goes  up  from  all  parts  of  the  works  of  God  can 
find  intelligent  expression.  From  the  beginning 
of  time  those  works  have  been  an  expression  of 
the  perfections  of  God.  As  we  now  look  at  the 
march  of  the  creation  that  expression  was  rela- 
tively feeble  at  first,  but  has  become  more  full 
and  pronounced  at  every  new  epoch.  With  the 
progress  in  time  there  has  also  been  progress  up- 
ward in  the  manifestation  of  those  forces  and 
products  which  we  have  in  the  series  before  us, 
but  until  man  came  the  expression  of  praise  did 
not  become  conscious  and  articulate.  It  was  for 
him  to  gather  it  up  and  give  it  voice,  and  it  is  one 
of  his  high  and  peculiar  prerogatives  to  do  this. 
He  needs  but  to  have  an  ear  rightly  attuned,  as 
was  that  of  him  who  heard  the  heavens  declaring-* 

o 

the  glory  of  God,  or  that  of  the  Apostle  John,  in 
Patmos,  and  to  put  it  to  the  universe  as  God  has 
made  it,  to  hear  a  low  voice  coming  up  from  gravi- 
tation giving  praise  to  God.  And  then  he  would 
hear  that  voice  rising  as  he  should  go  up  through 
Cohesion,  and  Chemical  Affinity,  and  Vegetable 
Life,  and  Animal  Lifer  and  Rational  Life,  and  the 


WORSHIP.  301 

provision  made  for  every  living  thing,  until  he 
would  come  into  full  sympathy  with  the  Apostle, 
and,  with  him,  be  ready  to  say  in  regard  to  the 
whole  universe  of  God,  "  And  every  creature  which 
is  in  heaven,  and  on  the  earth,  and  under  the 
earth  ;  and  such  as  are  in  the  sea,  and  all  that  are 
in  them,  heard  I  saying,  blessing,  and  honor,  and 
glory,  and  power,  be  unto  Him  that  sitteth  upon 
the  throne,  and  unto  the  Lamb,  for  ever  and  ever." 


APPENDIX. 


When  the  Lectures  were  delivered  reference  was 
.made  to  Mr.  Martineau  at  this  point,  and,  according  to 
the  stenographic  report,  substantially  as  follows  :  — 

In  speaking  of  obligation  and  of  right,  it  is  due  to 
Mr.  Martineau,  and  to  myself  as  having  come  independ- 
ently to  the  same  view  with  him,  though  I  did  not 
state  it  as  well,  that  I  should  say  a  word  respecting  the 
position  taken  by  him  as  related  to  my  own.  It  was 
said  by  me  here  in  1860,  long  before  I  had  heard  of  Mr. 
Martineau,  that  "  we  shall  readily  see  what  that  form  of 
activity  is  to  which  responsibility  ultimately  attaches. 
It  is  not  volition  regarded  simply  as  an  executive  act ; 
it  is  preference.  It  is  that  immanent  act  of  preference 
in  which  we  dispose  of  ourselves  and  on  which  charac- 
ter depends." x  I  said  again,  "  We  are  not  to  eat  from 
conscience,  else  why  the  appetite  ?  The  affections  are 
not  from  conscience,  else  they  would  not  be  original 
parts  of  our  nature.  It  is  not  the  office  of  conscience  to 
supersede  any  of  the  natural  principles  of  action,  nor 
can  it  ever  lead  to  action  except  as  there  are  grounds 
for  that  action  furnished  by  principles  other  than  itself."  2 
As  I  understand  it,  these  two  extracts  —  and  many  others 
might  be  given  —  involve  the  whole  doctrine  of  Mr.  Mar- 

l  Lectures  on  Moral  Science,  page  168. 
*Jd.  page  221. 


APPENDIX.  303 

tineau,  except  the  doctrine  of  motives  as  higher  and 
lower,  and  that  is  fully  treated  of  in  the  "  Lectures  on 
Moral  Science."  *  The  last  extract  makes  Conscience  a 
knowing  with,  in  everything  pertaining  to  Morals,  as 
Consciousness  is  in  everything  pertaining  to  the  whole 
mind.  The  same  view  I  stated  explicitly  four  years 
since,  when  I  had  not  seen  Mr.  Martineau's  review  of 
Whewell.  It  is,  indeed,  fully  implied  in  the  passage 
quoted  from  "  The  Law  of  Love,"  in  the  eleventh  lec- 
ture to  which  Dr.  McCosh  and  others  have  objected. 

The  view  of  Mr.  Martineau  is  as  follows.  He  says, 
"  Every  moral  judgment  is  relative  and  involves  a  com- 
parison of  two  terms."  ....  "This  fact,  that  every 
ethical  decision  is,  in  truth,  a  preference,  an  election  of 
one  act  as  higher  than  another,  appears  to  us  of  funda- 
mental importance  in  the  analysis  of  our  moral  senti- 
ments." .  .  .  .  "  Every  action  is  right,  which,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  a  lower  principle,  follows  a  higher  ;  every  action 
is  wrong,  which,  in  the  presence  of  a  higher  principle, 
follows  a  lower."  Further  on  he  says,  "  The  preferen- 
tial character  attaching  to  all  moral  judgments  is  im- 
plied, and  yet  as  it  seems  to  us  very  inaccurately  repre- 
sented by  Butler In  describing  the  constitution 

of  our  nature  he  presents  to  us,  first  of  all,  as  springs  of 
action,  a  system  of  '  particular  passions  '  and  desires, 
such  as  the  bodily  appetencies,  pity,  anger,  social  affec- 
tion, each  pursuing  an  end  appropriate  to  itself;  and 
then,  as  a  supplementary  and  crowning  spring  of  action, 
conscience,  having  also  its  own  separate  end,  namely, 
right  voluntary  dispositions  and  actions.  The  collection 
of  ends  embraced  by  the  former  constitutes  natural  good, 
of  which  each  ingredient  in  its  turn  is  equally  eligible ; 


304  APPENDIX. 

so  that  thus  far  our  nature  is  a  republic  of  equal  princi- 
ples. The  single  additional  end  of  conscience  consti- 
tutes moral  good,  which  has  a  natural  right  of  suprem- 
acy over  the  other Now,  for  our  own  part,  after 

the  most  diligent  search,  we  cannot  find  within  us  this 
autocratic  faculty,  having  its  own  private  and  paramount 
end."  l 

Conscience,  then,  according  to  Mr.  Martineau,  never 
acts  with  reference  to  a  single  end,  but  always  to  decide 
the  choice  between  two,  each  of  which  furnishes  in  itself 
a  reason  for  action,  and  the  higher  of  which,  in  virtue  of 
its  being  higher,  furnishes  the  ground  of  approval  and 
of  impulse.  This  is  precisely  what  I  said  in  the  passage 
already  quoted.  "  No  man  can  be  under  obligation  to 
do  an  act  morally  right,  for  which  there  is  not  a  reason 
besides  its  being  right,  and  on  the  ground  of  which  it  is 
right."  Conscience  has  no  separate  object,  as  the  right, 
with  reference  to  which  it  acts.  Its  office  is  to  affirm 
obligation  to  choose  a  higher  end  when  it  comes  into 
competition  with  a  lower  one,  which  higher  end  is  not 
presented  by  the  Conscience,  but  by  some  form  of  the 
Sensibility.  It  must  be  found  in  some  form  of  the  good 
of  beings  capable  of  good ;  and  if  there  were  no  beings 
capable  of  good  through  a  Sensibility,  there  could  be  none 
capable  of  goodness  through  the  Will.  What  I  say,  there- 
fore, is  not  merely  that  the  Will  is  dependent  on  the  Sen- 
sibility for  its  motives  in  moral  action,  but  that  the  Moral 
Nature  itself  is  conditioned  upon  it,  and  inconceivable 
without  it. 

With  a  high  admiration  for  Mr.  Martineau,  I  do  not 
agree  with  him  on  some  points.  I  do  not  believe,  as 
1  Review  of  Whewett. 


APPENDIX.  305 

he  seems  to,  that  wisdom  and  holiness  are  attributes  of 
the  Divine  Being  as  hardness  is  the  attribute  of  a  stone. 
As  will  be  seen  further  on,  I  do  not  agree  with  him  in 
relation  to  the  precise  office  of  conscience,  and  I  believe, 
and  shall  endeavor  to  show,  that  we  are  not  left  to  the 
guidance  of  instinct  alone  in  deciding  which  of  our  prin- 
ciples of  action  are  higher  and  which  are  lower. 

20 


EXPLANATION  OF  THE  DIAGRAM. 


The  whole  system  and  process  of  the  lectures 
is  given  in  the  Diagram.  The  process  begins  with 
Analysis,  or  Separation.  Man  is  first  separated 
from  all  other  objects  and  beings ;  and,  by  a  law 
which  is  found  to  make  the  structure  of  the  uni- 
verse below  him  pyramidal,  he  is  placed  at  their 
head.  He  is  so  as  gathering  into  himself  every- 
thing which  they  possess,  with  something  added. 

The  place  of  man  being  thus  found,  we  separate 
the  body  from  the  mind.  As  a  condition  for  the 
mind  we  examine  the  body  first,  separating  it  into 
its  different  parts  by  Anatomy ;  and  into  its  dif- 
ferent systems  as  functional,  by  Physiology ;  the 
order  of  the  systems  being  determined  by  the 
same  law  that  determines  the  order  of  the  forces 
of  nature.  Of  these  forces  we  find  the  products 
when  they  act  according  to  their  law. 

Having  examined  the  parts  and  functions  of  the 
body,  we  pass  to  the  Mind.  That  we  divide  into 
the  Intellect,  the  Sensibility,  and  the  Will,  and 
proceed  to  examine  them  in  their  order. 

We  first  take  the  Intellect  as  conditional  for  the 


EXPLANATION   OF  THE  DIAGRAM.  5307 

others,  and  represent  that  a3  acting  alone,  by  a 
single  vertical  line.  Before  this  we  suppose  ob- 
jects to  be  presented  in  front,  and  necessary  ideas 
to  be  originated  within  it,  which  are  represented 
as  thrown  back  of  the  line.  We  thus  furnish  the 
Intellect,  so  far  as  that  can  be  done  acting  by  it- 
self, through  the  Presentative  and  the  Intuitive 
Powers.  We  then  consider  the  Representative 
Powers,  and  then  the  Elaborative,  dividing  them 
into  their  parts  and  finding  their  legitimate  prod- 
ucts. 

From  the  Intellect  we  pass  to  the  Sensibility  as 
conditioned  upon  it.  As  thus  conditioned  the  two 
must  act  together,  and  we  therefore  represent 
them  by  two  lines  united.  We  then  examine  the 
forms,  the  processes,  and  the  products  of  the  two 
united,  as  we  had  before  those  of  the  Intellect 
singly. 

We  next  take  the  Will.  And  because  the  Will 
is  conditioned  upon  the  other  two,  we  represent 
them  by  three  lines  united,  and  inquire  as  before 
for  the  contingent  and  the  necessary  processes  and 
products  from  their  combination.  This  brings  us 
up  to  the  region  of  Personality.  It  constitutes 
the  man. 

The  man  being  constituted,  we  pass  to  an  en- 
tirely different  region.  The  tree  is  grown ;  it  is 
now  to  bear  fruit.  The  end  of  the  man  is  free 
rational  choice  and  action  under  the  government 
of  God,  with  the  results  of  such  choice  and  action. 


308  EXPLANATION   OF  THE  DIAGRAM. 

But  as  Choice  must  involve  an  alternative,  the 
column  will  now  divide  itself  into  two  branches  ; 
and,  as  we  had,  up  to  the  point  ol  choice,  nature 
and  necessity,  and  so  science,  so  now  we  have 
these  after  Choice,  with  results  differing  according 
to  that. 

In  connection  with  these  operations  we  have 
Consciousness ;  and  this  is  so  written  as  to  indi- 
cate its  connection  with  them  all.  In  connection 
with  moral  operations  we  have  also  Conscience, 
and  this  is  written  in  the  same  way. 


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